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1. Introduction to the Study of Metareference 
1.1 Beginnings and Early Terminology1  
Metareferences, especially in the narrative arts, have been around for centuries. Literary pre-
forms can be traced as far back as Homer’s Odyssey (cf. Scheffel 159-161) or, within 
Anglophone literature, as far back as Geoffrey Chaucer’s elaborate framing of The 
Canterbury Tales (1476) or William Shakespeare’s plays-within-plays (cf. Currie, 
“Introduction” 5). Furthermore, metanarrative comments by narrators on (their own) narration 
have been a constitutive element of the rhetoric of the novel from its very conception (cf. 
Blackwell 231; Nünning, “Metanarration als Lakune” 126). Still, the phenomenon only 
became a significant scholarly topic with the rise of Postmodernism (cf. Wolf, “Preface” vi). 
The period saw a peak in the use of metareference, which eventually led to the introduction of 
the concept of ‘metafiction’. The term was coined by William H. Gass and established by 
Robert Scholes in 1970 (cf. e.g. Currie, Metafiction 21; Herman et al. 301, Lodge “Mimesis” 
107, Scholes 21-38) yet its exact meaning would be contested and expanded upon for the next 
thirty years.2  
Linda Hutcheon described the most common Postmodernist type of metareference as “a 
kind of fiction which began to run rampant in the 1960s” (1). She further elaborated that 
“‘[m]etafiction’, as it has […] been named, is fiction about fiction – that is, fiction that 
includes within itself a commentary on its own narrative and/or linguistic identity” (Hutcheon 
1). Because of this quality, ‘self-reflexive fiction’ was another term used by scholars of the 
time to refer to this type of texts, including both the idea of literature reflecting or mirroring 
itself, and that of literature reflecting upon itself (cf. Scheffel 162).  
Not only did two separate terms denoting metareferential works emerge but over time 
different scholars saw a different scope of aspects encompassed by these terms. In the early 
1980s, for example, Patricia Waugh, in addition to Hutcheon’s criterion of commentary on the 
self, listed all the following features as typical of metafiction: “a celebration of the power of 
the creative imagination together with an uncertainty about the validity of its representations; 
an extreme self-consciousness about language, literary form and the act of writing fictions; a 
pervasive insecurity about the relationship of fiction to reality” (2). In other words, for 
                                                 
1 The following examples are only a small sampling of early scholarly approaches since a full summary would 
go beyond the scope of this dissertation. For a more detailed analysis of the terminological diversity cf. e.g. 
Wolf, “Metareference across Media” 4-5, 15. 
2 For examples of the concept being discussed in scholarly works before Scholes gave it its name cf. Neumann 
and Nünning 205-206. 
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Waugh, discussions of imagination, language, literature, writing, reality and subjectivity were 
all central to a metafictional text – just as they were to the Postmodernist discourse in general. 
In fact, according to definitions such as Waugh’s, ‘metafiction’ was the quintessential 
realisation of Postmodernist thought. The reasoning behind this theory is easy to comprehend 
if one takes a closer look at the period’s central beliefs. 
It was one of the defining features of Postmodernism that the movement considered 
(mimetic) representation to be in crisis (cf. e.g. Wolf, Ästhetische Illusion 683-684). Scholars 
have suggested a large variety of origins for this opinion, from it being the result of post-
(Cold-)war beliefs in the exhaustedness and futility of traditional narratives (cf. e.g. Adorno 
61-72; Hutcheon 19; Kümmel 223-224) to it being a consequence of the birth of new media 
technologies and Media Studies (cf. Irmer 19). Whatever the reason, an increased disbelief in 
objective truths as well as a disbelief in an objective and coherent reality are observable in 
most Postmodernist works, as is the increased acknowledgement of what Hilary Lawson 
building upon Linda Hutcheon has termed the “irreducibly textual character” (24) of 
Postmodern ideology.  
Lawson, like many other Postmodernists, propagated the idea that any and all beliefs, just 
as any and all perceptions, are mediated and constructed through the thoughts, words and 
discourses of the people holding them, similarly to how any and all narratives are mediated 
and constructed through language and the process of narration (cf. e.g. McHale, 
Postmodernist Fiction 164). Metafiction – a genre self-reflexively exposing the constructions 
and conventions behind narratives – was consequently seen by many writers and scholars as 
the perfect tool with which to discuss and analyse these same constructions and conventions 
at work in culture and society in general (cf. e.g. Herman et al. 301). Mark Currie has written 
of “Postmodernist fictional texts” that they “like to thematise their own artificiality, often by 
constructing an internal boundary between fiction and reality, which allows for reflection on 
the relation between fiction and reality, as well as the irony that both the fiction and the reality 
are, in the end, fictional” (“Postmodern Narrative Theory” 2). While Currie never mentions 
the word ‘metafiction’, if one compares his definition to that of Hutcheon’s or Waugh’s, 
clearly the ideas are essentially the same. 
The terminology surrounding the concept of ‘metafiction’ did not become any clearer 
over the following years. In the late 1980s and in the 1990s the field of study expanded 
further with the topic of history and its representation becoming more and more central. In 
fact, in 1995, “for the purposes of contextualising metafiction”, Mark Currie named “the 
writing of history” as one of “the two most relevant domains of theoretical writing [on the 
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subject]” (“Introduction” 11), the other being language. The central thesis of Currie and other 
prominent scholars such as Thomas Irmer was that history could also only be perceived 
through (re)construction rather than be accessed directly and “truthfully” (cf. e.g. Irmer 47). 
Consequently, the writing down of history was viewed by these scholars to be closer to the 
construction of fiction than to the mere depiction of actual truth (cf. e.g. McHale, 
Postmodernist Fiction 96). With this view of history being so similar to (and most likely the 
result of) the Postmodernist view of reality in general described before, it is unsurprising that 
‘metafiction’ was once again deemed the best tool for the portrayal of these new ideas (cf. e.g. 
Elias, “Postmodern Metafiction” and “Historiographic Metafiction”). Therefore, the genre 
definition was extended to include not only fiction discussing the writing of texts and the 
writing of realities but the writing of history as well. 
Over the next decade, the scope of the term ‘metafiction’ was stretched even further as 
scholars published more and more essays on – to name only a few – “ethnographic 
metafiction” (Ingram), “bibliographic metafiction” (King and Lee), “cosmological 
metafiction” (Herren), “performative metafiction” (Austin), “scientific metafiction” 
(Engelhardt), “technological metafiction” (Andersson), “cosmographic metafiction” 
(Pöhlmann) and adjacent subjects such as “metafictive geography” (Ridanpää) or “metafiction 
and general ecology” (Burton). With every article, the existing terminology became 
increasingly vague and unwieldy. And once it became clear that in the 2000s the number of 
metareferential elements in texts only kept growing and even reached a new peak3 which 
caused Werner Wolf to declare a “metafictional turn” in contemporary media (“Metareference 
across Media” 73; cf. “Preface” v-vii), more and more scholars began to advocate for a more 
narrow, precise and differentiated terminology.  
Ansgar Nünning, for example, called for a subdivision of the field into ‘metanarration’, 
which discusses narrative practices, ‘(historical) metafiction’, which discusses the fictionality 
of truths and narratives and ‘metalinguistics’, which discuss language (cf. “Metanarration als 
Lakune” 132-133; “Mimesis des Erzählens” 32, 34; “On Metanarrative” 11-16, 19; Neumann 
and Nünning 204-205)4. Werner Wolf, meanwhile, advocated for a clearer and more 
universally applicable terminology, arguing that the current one unnecessarily restricted the 
                                                 
3 Any attempt at an explanation for this new peak would unfortunately vastly exceed the scope of this 
dissertation. For ideas on the topic cf. e.g. Butler 313-314; Wolf, “Ästhetische Illusion” 699-700, 704-706, 724-
725; Wolf, “Metareferential Turn” 25-34. 
4 A distinction similar to Nünning’s ‘metanarration’ vs. ‘metalinguistics’ can technically already be found in 
Linda Hutcheon’s work. She does, however, consider it a differentiation between what she calls a “diegetic” and 
a “linguistic” mode of metareference, rather than two entirely separately categories (cf. 7, 22-23, 28-29). 
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applicability of the concept(s) by using such exclusively literary terms as ‘fiction’. As a 
solution Wolf suggested adopting ‘metareference’ as an umbrella term usable across all media 
(cf. e.g. “Metareference across Media” 8). Consequently, he defined ‘metareferentiality’ as an 
at its core ‘transmedial’5 phenomenon denoting “references to, or comments on, aspects of a 
medial artefact, a medium or the media in general that issue from a logically higher ‘meta-
level’ within a given artefact and elicit corresponding self-referential reflections in the 
recipient” (“Preface” v). Finally, a further important differentiation was proposed by Werner 
Wolf as well as by Wolfgang Funk and Martin Butler, all proponents of a terminological 
distinction between ‘metareference’ as a concept, fully metareferential works of ‘total 
metafiction’, and individual ‘metareferential elements’ which can be so few and interspersed 
within a text as to not make the entire work automatically metareferential but rather make it 
‘partial metafiction’ (cf. Wolf, Ästhetische Illusion 240-250; Butler 299-316; Funk 128-129). 
Building upon all these demands for conceptual specification, over the last decade a lot of 
scholarly work has gone into developing a more precise terminology. Much of the work has 
been done by Werner Wolf over the course of several seminal studies but a variety of other 
scholars have also made important contributions. An attempt at compiling these studies into 
one core definition will constitute the content of my next chapter. 
 
 
                                                 
5 For a brief introduction to the term and its relationship to intermediality cf. e.g. Wolf, “Metareference across 
Media.” 13-14. 
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1.2 Current Terminology 
At the core of ‘metareference’ as it is understood today lies a movement from the usual “first 
cognitive or communicative level” (Wolf, “Metareference across Media” 3) or “object level” 
(Wolf, “Metareference across Media” 22) to a “higher ‘meta-level’” (Wolf, “Metareference 
across Media” 3). Werner Wolf, in accordance with Klaus W. Hempfer, refers to this 
movement as ‘metaization’. Through the process of ‘metaization’, the contents of the initial 
level, the “thoughts and utterances, and above all the means and media used for such 
utterances, self-reflexively become objects of reflection and communication in their own 
right” (Wolf, “Metareference across Media” 3), and are then discussed on the higher level. 
The result is ‘metareference’ which elicits “corresponding self-referential reflections” (Wolf, 
“Preface” v) from the recipient. 
Once it has thus been established what ‘metareference’ is, questions of sub-categories, 
differentiations and of the phenomenon’s place in relation to other terminological fields arise. 
In his essay “Metareference across Media”, Werner Wolf structures his answers to these 
questions into a highly systematic and hierarchical typology of reference, basing his 
differentiations on (1) what exactly is being referred to and (2) where that object of reference 
is located in relation to the sign system used to refer to it. Wolf depicts his findings in the 
form of several tree-diagrams (cf. “Metareference across Media” 17-22 for metareference as a 
subcategory of reference, 33-35 for the macro-level distinctions, 38-47 for the micro-level 
distinctions) which can be merged into the following schematic:  
 
Fig. 1: Wolf’s Typology of (Meta)Reference 
       
6 
 
In his own works, Wolf’s terms are usually visualized as separate branches of a tree or as 
binary oppositions. Yet in his writings Wolf specifically points out that they are in fact better 
understood as the two ends of a spectrum with hundreds of actual realisations of referentiality 
situated in between (cf. e.g. “Metareference across Media” 24). I have therefore tried to 
include this idea into my diagram by transforming Wolf’s branches into axes, to better 
visualize the gradual nature of the transitions between the respective terms. 
 
1.2.1 Metareference vs. Other Types of References 
At the top of Wolf’s diagram stands the broadest term, namely that of ‘reference’, of which 
‘metareference’ is merely a sub-form. ‘Reference’, according to Wolf, is any relation between 
a sign (be it a verbal, iconic, or indexical one) and a referent. This basic concept can then be 
subdivided into ‘heteroreference’, which denotes the traditional idea of signs pointing to a 
conceived reality outside the semiotic system6, and into ‘self-reference’, which encompasses 
signs referring to themselves and/or to their system. ‘System’ here can refer both to the 
particular work in which the reference appears and to the much broader field of type of 
medium to which the work in question belongs. Therefore, in a next step, Wolf further 
distinguishes between ‘intra-compositional’ and ‘extra-compositional’ self-references7.  
Each of these two categories of reference can be further subdivided into three types: Wolf 
describes a ‘general’ self-reference as a simple formal connection between signs (e.g. one 
created through the mere repetition present in alliterations, rhymes, quoting mirroring, etc.) 
which does not demand a discursive reflection on the system as such. Slightly more complex 
than ‘general’ self-reference, a ‘self-reflexive’ self-reference is one in which the signs refer to 
the world depicted in the work while still suggesting a non-mediated reality (an example 
would be that of a narrator addressing the readership and discussing the qualities of a 
character as if he or she was a “real” person in the narrator’s “real” world). Finally, a ‘meta-
referential’ self-reference or a “self-reference or self-reflection with a metadimension” deals 
with the signifying system itself. According to Wolf, this metadimension “establishes a 
secondary reference to texts and media (and related issues) as such by, as it were, viewing 
                                                 
6 Many Poststructuralists would of course object to this idea of a reality outside of language and discourse. 
However, to discuss this potential problem of Wolf’s ‘heteroreference’-definition in a study concerned with 
merely a sub-form of what Wolf subsumes under the opposing term of ‘self-reference’ would go far beyond the 
scope of this dissertation. 
7 This terminology seems to replace similar categories found in Wolf’s earlier work, e.g. the distinction between 
‘Eigen-’, ‘Allgemein-’ and ‘Fremd-Metafiktion’ in Ästhetische Illusion 250-254 or the distinction between 
‘Einzel-’ and ‘System-Referenz’ in “Formen literarischer Selbstreferenz” 72. 
       
7 
 
them ‘from the outside’ of a meta-level from whose perspective they are consequently seen as 
different from unmediated reality and the content of represented worlds” (“Metareference 
across Media” 37-38).  
Wolf’s distinction between ‘general’, ‘self-reflexive’ and ‘meta-referential’ self-reference 
has not remained uncontested. Already Linda Hutcheon, for example, argued for the inclusion 
of puns and anagrams into the category of what she calls ‘covert linguistic metafiction’ (cf. 
34) if “the linguistic structures employed [are] immanent and functional within the text” (118) 
– or, in other words, if they are neither so subtle as to be invisible, nor so obvious that the 
reader is not required to work with the language but merely asked to appreciate the author’s 
verbal cleverness (cf. Hutcheon 118). Similarly, more recently Winfried Nöth, building upon 
the work of Walter A. Koch, has also objected that any poetic language can be seen as 
concrete metalanguage full of at the very least potential metasigns, it being after all “a 
language that draws attention to the structure of language itself” (“Metareference” 105) and 
thus in its essence “enhances language awareness” (“Metareference” 106).8 Both these views 
thus at first glance contradict Wolf’s definition of ‘general’ versus ‘meta-referential’ self-
reference yet I would argue that they exactly do so only at first glance. 
I agree with Hutcheon and Nöth that in the examples they have provided – all examples 
in which the recipients’ awareness of the metareferential nature of poetic language is very 
likely to be high due to the textual context – it would definitely be appropriate to consider 
repetitions etc. not mere general but metareferential self-references. However, I also believe 
that Wolf himself would agree with this assessment. The crux of the matter lies in Wolf’s 
definition of ‘general’ self-reference as not demanding reflection. Nöth and Hutcheon’s 
examples are all cases in which the use of poetic language is salient enough to do demand 
reflection. After all, as both scholars have pointed out, the language they refer to is not as 
subtle as to be overlooked and that is exactly why it has the potential to actively raise 
awareness. Consequently, Nöth’s and Hutcheon’s examples do not actually fall into Wolf’s 
category of ‘general’ self-reference in the first place despite formally and linguistically fitting 
the label. Still, it is important to acknowledge that Nöth and Hutcheon’s (seeming) objections 
expose a flaw in Wolf’s typology: namely the uncertainty which results from having a 
terminological criterion based on something as unreliable as the presumed effect on the 
audience (raising awareness, triggering reflection, etc.) or as difficult to prove as the intended 
demands made by a text (or even worse of an author).  
                                                 
8 I will cover the topics of awareness and potentiality in more detail in the following chapter. 
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In an attempt to overcome this potential weakness of his system, across his works Wolf 
presents a series of criteria which could help to narrow down the intent of a work. He argues 
that a metareference can be assumed to be intentional whenever the “deciphering [of a 
reference as a metareference] is not merely a bonus in a work’s reception” but is “essential to 
its understanding” (“Metareference across Media” 48) and thus is of functional relevance (cf. 
“Formen literarischer Selbstreferenz” 73-75). This quality in turn, according to Wolf, can be 
determined by analysing contextual factors within the work as well as factors surrounding it.  
Within the work, such criteria can be the metareference’s location within the text, the 
overall frequency of metareferences within the text, and how fluently these metareferences 
interconnect with the rest of the text. Specifically, Wolf distinguishes between metareferences 
in central (e.g. located in the middle of a text or chapter) and metareferences in marginal 
positions (e.g. located at the beginning or end), between isolated (“punktuell”) and extensive 
metareferences (depending on the number of metareferential instances within one work), and 
last but not least, between connected and unconnected metareferences (depending on whether 
or not there are clear and drastic breaks or jumps between the metareferential and non-
metareferential parts) (cf. Ästhetische Illusion 240-250).9  
Contextual criteria surrounding the work can equally be threefold. Firstly, Wolf suggests 
an analysis of the cultural and historical context of the work in question, especially as to how 
common debates on meta-phenomena were during the period of its creation. A second 
criterion is that of whether the medium – or even the genre (cf. Limoges, “Gradable Effects” 
399-340) itself – facilitate or restrict the transmission of metareferences (e.g. Wolf suggests 
that musical metareference is much harder to achieve than a narrative one). Finally, Wolf 
proposes that the (target-) recipients’ level of medium-awareness, of ‘meta-awareness’ – “the 
at least passive or latent knowledge that a given phenomenon is not ‘reality’ as such but 
something thought, felt or represented by someone else, in short that this is a phenomenon or 
a ‘reality’ processed through a medium” (Wolf, “Metareference across Media” 27) – and their 
willingness to engage with and participate in both also need to be considered. 
Returning to the distinction between demanding and not demanding reflection, between 
‘meta-referential’ and ‘general’ self-reference which these factors can help illuminate, a 
further observation needs to be made. In his earlier work on aesthetic illusion and illusion 
                                                 
9 Similar distinctions have also been made by Ansgar Nünning, who, building upon Susan Sniader Lanser, 
differentiates between ‘integrated’ and ‘isolated’ metanarration, ‘non-digressive’ and ‘digressive’ metanarration 
and ‘motivated/functional’ and ‘unmotivated/ornamental’ metanarration (cf. “Metanarration als Lakune” 135-
150; “Mimesis des Erzählens” 36-37; “On Metanarrative” 35-38). I, however, find Wolf’s choice of wording 
more straightforward and intuitive, which is why I have adopted it for my work.  
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breaking, Wolf used to differentiate between ‘overt’ and ‘covert’ metareferences, the latter of 
which he specifically defined as referring to “double-coded” utterances which also make 
sense as fully intra-diegetic references and thus can be more difficult to recognise as meta-
references (a possible example being a character describing a scene as a “pleasing tableau”) 
(cf. Ästhetische Illusion 240-250). These categories have mostly been incorporated into the 
‘explicit’ versus ‘implicit’ distinction of Wolf’s current typology and will as such be 
discussed later in this chapter. What I want to draw attention to at this point, however, is the 
concept of double-coding. If we adopt this idea, poetic language does not actually have to be a 
type of either ‘general’ or ‘meta-referential’ self-reference but can, in fact, be both at the 
same time. After all, as mentioned before, the two categories are conceived by Wolf as the 
extreme ends of a spectrum rather than as clear opposites. Poetic language can thus best be 
thought of as being located somewhere on the spectrum between ‘general’ and ‘meta-
referential’ self-reference, its exact position varying depending on the contextual criteria. 
 
1.2.2 Types of Metareference: Macro-Level Distinctions 
With this I would like to return to my analysis of Wolf’s overall typology. Once he has 
reached the level of ‘metareference’, Wolf subdivides the field further, first on a macro- and 
then on a micro-level. On the macro-level, Ansgar Nünning has suggested a metaization-
object-based classification (cf. “Metanarration als Lakune” 135-150; “Mimesis des 
Erzählens” 36-37; “On Metanarrative” 35-38), Janine Hauthal has argued that even a 
function-based differentiation could be possible (cf. Hauthal et al. 5), and Werner Wolf 
recommends a distinction based on the medium in which the metaization occurs. Wolf 
explains his decision by demonstrating that concepts such as ‘metanarration’ or 
‘metalinguistics’ (two of Nünning’s examples of object-based classification) apply only to 
certain media, while a category such as ‘metafilm’ or ‘metapainting’ can be coined for any 
medium. He therefore suggests to use the medium-based terminology for a main division, and 
the object-based or function-based distinctions as means for further differentiation. I, 
however, see validity in the respective proposals of all three scholars and think that the choice 
of hierarchical order (if there needs to be a hierarchy at all) should be dependent on the 
framework and goals of the analysis that is being conducted.  
If different realisations of metareference within one medium are to be examined, it would 
be only sensible to use the distinction of medium first to delineate one’s field of study. If, 
however, only narration-related metareferences across genres and media are to be analysed, 
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then an initial division into subjects as suggested by Nünning becomes more practical. 
Finally, for a study such as mine, in which metareferences to different subjects as well as 
to/within different media are to be examined, I find the hierarchical subdivision generally 
unwieldy. Instead, I prefer to think of subject and medium as simply two separate categories 
to be looked at on the same level and in whatever order – a concept which Wolf himself 
applies to his four micro-level categories.  
 
1.2.3 Types of Metareference: Micro-Level Distinctions 
On the micro-level, Wolf again addresses different previous approaches to subdivision: for 
example, he mentions Marion Gymnich’s function-based breakdown of metapoetry (cf. e.g. 
Gymnich and Müller-Zettelmann 65-91) or Gloria Withalm’s distinction between filmic meta-
forms dealing with production versus consumption versus distribution (cf. e.g. 129-130) – an 
approach similar to Kay Kirchmann’s content-based differentiation between metareferences 
discussing film as art with its own aesthetic (containing questions of reality versus fiction as 
well as discussions of the language and toolset of film), versus metareferences discussing film 
and perception (from viewing experiences to voyeurism in general), versus metareferences 
depicting film as part of an industry, versus metareferences focusing on film and its relations 
to and effects on society and politics, versus metareferences to film as part of a more often 
than not nostalgically presented filmic tradition, versus metareferences discussing film in 
relation to TV and/or New Media (cf. 68-73). Unsurprisingly, Wolf once again dismisses 
these categories for being potentially too open – a certainly convincing argument when one 
looks at the length of even just Kirchmann’s list10 – and/or too medium-specific. Instead, for 
his own terminology, Wolf chooses effect- and recipient-orientated criteria, eventually ending 
up with the four major distinctions illustrated at the bottom line of fig.1.  
Firstly, Wolf distinguishes between ‘intracompositional/direct metareference’ and 
‘extracompositional/indirect metareference’. Technically, since ‘intracompositional’ and 
‘extracompositional’ refer to the same concepts already discussed on the higher level of self-
reference, this introduces a redundancy into Wolf’s system. For studies such as mine, 
however, which deal exclusively with metareference and for which it therefore makes sense to 
                                                 
10 This is not to say that the core metareferential topics identified by Withalm and Kirchmann, or the functions 
identified by Gymnich are of no analytical use. In fact, this study will repeatedly draw on them. Thinking of all 
these elements as separate categories, however, in this I agree with Wolf, would open the micro-level to an 
infinity of further possibilities, making it unmanageable.  
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put aside all higher-level distinctions, the possibility of discussing intracompositional and 
extracompositional aspects on the micro-level is actually very useful. 
The next major distinction Wolf makes is that between ‘explicit’ and ‘implicit’ 
metareference. Within the first category, “a metacomment is clearly made by the 
conventional, denotational meaning of a sign” (“Metareference across Media” 39), e.g. by 
explicit verbal references to ‘reader’, ‘pen’ or ‘good book’ in a metanovel or by the use of 
(quasi-)denotational iconic and/or indexical signs in non-verbal media. Within the second 
category, on the other hand, more “covert” devices are used to express a metacomment, such 
as the “salient foregrounding of the medium” through “salient deviations from conventions” 
(“Metareference across Media” 40). Therefore, within the second category, the contextual 
frame and knowledge of the medium and/or genre etc. is of particular importance since it is a 
prerequisite to the recognition of conventions in the first place.  
Another possible way of approaching these two categories would be to think of them as 
metareference through ‘telling’ versus through ‘showing’ (cf. Gymnich 127; Wolf, 
Ästhetische Illusion 234 and “Formen literarischer Selbstreferenz” 54, 56). However, one 
should then be careful so as not to equate these two terms with Irina O. Rajewsky’s highly 
useful further distinction between ‘story-based’ (also called ‘content-based’ to avoid the 
otherwise present narrative media restriction) and ‘discourse-based’ (or ‘form-based’) types 
of metareference (cf. e.g. “Beyond ‘Metanarration’” 137)11. For as Rajewsky points out, 
following Wolf’s terminology, the bending of narratological conventions would be considered 
implicit metareference while actual metanarrative comments would be considered explicit. 
Both references, however, take place on the level of ‘(re)presenting’, rather than the level of 
the ‘(re)presented’ and as such fall both into Rajewsky’s form-based category (cf. “Beyond 
‘Metanarration’” 158).  
Finally, before moving on to the next micro-category, there is one last aspect of Wolf’s 
distinction to which I want to draw attention. Irina O. Rajewsky has pointed out that she finds 
Wolf’s particular choice of terminology, that of ‘explicit’ vs. ‘implicit’, rather problematic 
since it suggests not only a difference in devices used to transport the metareference but also a 
difference in the notability of the metareference (cf. “Beyond ‘Metanarration’” 154 footnote 
40). With this, I certainly have to agree. Especially when Wolf uses descriptors such as 
“weak” to further elaborate upon his idea of ‘implicit’ metareference and its effects on the 
                                                 
11 This distinction can in turn be seen as a variation on Ansgar Nünning’s equally narrative-level-based 
differentiation between ‘diegetic’, ‘extradiegetic’, ‘paratextual’ and ‘hypodiegetic’ metanarration (cf. 
“Metanarration als Lakune” 135-150; “Mimesis des Erzählens” 36-37; “On Metanarrative” 35-38). 
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recipients (cf. Ästhetische Illusion 44), Wolf’s choice of terminology definitely does suggest 
that ‘implicit’ metareference is inherently less impactful. This, however, does not need to be 
the case. As Winfried Nöth has pointed out, implicit metasigns “can lead to as much or even 
more reflection on the nature of signs as an explicit metasign can” (“Metareference” 89). 
After all, a potentially double-coded, implicit metareference can certainly cause recipients to 
reflect even more on how exactly the reference is meant than the mere straightforward explicit 
mentioning of the respective idea would. Finding more precise terminology would therefore 
definitely be an important future goal for this field of study.  
Wolf’s third type of micro-level categories deals with the content of the metareflection, 
namely with whether a work merely foregrounds the mediality of a text, in which case Wolf 
refers to it as ‘fictio-metareference’ (a quality inherent to all metatexts), or whether the work 
additionally and possibly mainly discusses its truth-value or fictionality, thus making it a 
‘truth or fiction-’ rather than ‘mediality-centred’ metareference, or what Wolf calls a ‘fictum-
metareference’. The Withelm and Kirchmann categories previously rejected by Wolf could 
thus be seen as medium-based subtypes of ‘fictio-metareference’ since they all elaborate on 
the mediality of a work and/or medium by detailing how a work within that medium is 
created. Equivalent and/or comparable criteria to Withelm and Kirchmann’s film-related ones 
could then be worked out for every medium individually. By contrast, the typical 
Postmodernist questions about the relationship between discourse and reality mentioned in the 
previous chapter would be examples of ‘fictum-metareferences’. 
Finally, the last pair of categories Wolf establishes on the micro-level is that of ‘critical’ 
vs. ‘non-critical metareference’. As an example, he points out that narrators commenting e.g. 
on their own powers were a dominant feature of nineteenth-century realist novels but that they 
were in no way intended to bring about a critical debate on mediality12. Thus metareferences 
can also be non-critical, and not just of the predominantly critical variety represented by the 
Postmodernist approaches discussed before. Furthermore, the functional distinctions 
suggested before by scholars such as Marion Gymnich or Janine Hauthal can be seen as sub-
categories of or further categories within this particular subdivision of Wolf’s since they also 
relate to potential goals and intents of the creators of the works in question. In the following 
chapter I would like to have a more detailed look at some of these main possible functions of 
metareference and at the possible sub-categories that can be derived from them. 
                                                 
12 Instead, those types of narrator comments were often used to actually create/imitate “authenticity” (cf. e.g. 
Wolf, “Formen literarischer Selbstreferenz” 72 and “Metareference across Media” 35-43). 
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1.3 Functions and Effects of Metareference 
Postulating the functions of a specific work is always a difficult matter. In the case of 
metareference the issue is further amplified by the fact that, as suggested before, any 
discussion of function and effect is closely linked to not easily answerable questions of 
author/text intent and recipient response. 
As pointed out by Werner Wolf, for metareference to be functional it needs to activate a 
very specific cognitive frame in the recipient’s mind before the meta-potential of a sign or text 
can be properly realised and/or actualised (cf. “Metareference across Media” 31). To make 
matters even more complicated, the activation of the cognitive frame does not only depend on 
the author’s skill and work but also on the capabilities of the recipients. And Wolf is not the 
only scholar to point this out. Hans Ulrich Seeber correctly draws attention to the fact that for 
a recipient to be able to recognise many types of metareference, he or she requires a certain 
pre-knowledge of e.g. medium and/or genre conventions (cf. 438). Similarly, Andreas Böhn, 
whilst describing the criteria necessary for the successful recognition of a quotation, has 
argued that “[k]knowledge of the quoted text (primary context) and the perception of its 
alteration in the quoting text (secondary context) are necessary conditions for the reader in 
order to perceive a quotation as quotation” (592). Irina O. Rajewsky has also repeatedly 
stressed the importance of reader competence (cf. e.g. “Beyond ‘Metanarration’” 147), 
Patricia Waugh has explained that “[t]o be successfully decoded [...] experimental fiction of 
any variety requires an audience which is itself self-conscious about its linguistic practices” 
(64) and Linda Hutcheon has even argued that in (Postmodern) metafiction, there is a “near 
equation of the acts of reading and writing”, for as “the novelist actualizes the world of his 
imagination through words, so the reader – from those same words – manufactures in reverse 
a literary universe that is as much his creation as it is the novelist’s” (27).  
In short, the demands posed by metareferential works upon their readers and audiences 
are arguably even higher than those posed by merely heteroreferential ones. As a result, as 
scholars such as Jean-Marc Limoges, Winfried Nöth and Hans Ulrich Seeber have pointed 
out, no matter what the author’s intentions might have been, recipients of these types of works 
can easily still be differently aware, either missing metareferences completely or reading 
metareferences into signs which were not intended to be read as such (cf. Limoges “Gradable 
Effects” 397-398; Nöth “Metareference” 96-100; Seeber 438). Therefore, all statements made 
henceforth about possible functions of metareferential works are always to be understood as 
hypotheses on the topic formed by a member of the audience during the reception process. 
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Building upon the particular audience member’s – or researcher’s – interests and perspectives, 
the hypotheses are then enriched with plausible arguments which refer back to the work as 
well as to its external context (cf. Gymnich and Nünning 6-10, Sommer 330-337). 
 
1.3.1 Aiding as well as Breaking the Narrative Illusion 
Based on the many different fields of study affected by metareferences, it is not surprising 
that the number of hypotheses postulated about their functions is vast as well as diverse. 
According to scholars, metareferences have been used for a variety of purposes over the last 
few centuries. Initially, metareferences were mainly utilised to tie up story lines, to create 
coherence, to communicate moral values and, already introducing Wolf’s fictum-category, to 
suggest “authenticity” (either by simulating orality or by having fictional narrators, editors 
and publishers present themselves and their work as a ‘true story’). In the second half of the 
twentieth century, however, at the height of Postmodernism, the fictum-aspect kept gaining 
prominence and shifted the functional focus almost entirely to increasingly illusion-breaking 
metafiction which aimed to create rather than reduce the distance between stories and their 
audiences (cf. e.g. Hauthal et al. 4-10; Nünning, “Metanarration als Lakune 135-150, 
“Mimesis des Erzählens” 36-37, “On Metanarrative” 35-38; Wolf, Ästhetische Illusion 117-
130, 217-219, 643-644). 
The scope, impact and achievement of the illusion-breaking effect has been continuously 
debated over the last few decades. Ansgar Nünning, for example, has pointed out that the 
strength of the effect differs drastically depending on the overall function of the 
metareferences present in a text: when used to create a sense of authenticity, metareferences 
obviously not only do not break but actually contribute to a work’s illusion (cf. also 
Fludernik, “Scene Shift” 383); meanwhile, comical and/or parodistic metareferences are 
situated somewhere in the middle of the spectrum, their position in-between illusion-
strengthening and illusion-breaking forming the whole basis for their depiction of the absurd; 
finally, metareferences used for poetological discussions are frequently the most destructive 
towards diegetic illusion (cf. Nünning “Metanarration als Lakune” 133-150, 152-153 and “On 
Metanarrative” 40). 
In addition to the overall functions, Jean-Marc Limoges has suggested that the mere 
context of a work’s reception already has an impact on its illusion-breaking potential: for 
example, a person watching a film “for fun” at home would arguably be less predisposed to 
recognize potential metareferences and let them break his or her illusion than a scholar 
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watching a film in the context of a conference on metareference (cf. “Gradable Effects” 398). 
Furthermore, Limoges has pointed out that the level of harshness of a possible illusion-break 
is also influenced by how far a potentially illusion-breaking element is motivated within the 
work and world presented – Limoges’ argument being that in a film such as EDtv (1999), for 
example, Matthew McConaughey’s character addressing the camera is less illusion-breaking 
than the same action would have been in a more traditional film in the world of which no 
camera is supposed to be present (cf. “Gradable Effects” 402). For if a device is perceived by 
the audience as “diegetically, symbolically or even dramatically motivated, it will be 
‘naturalized’ and will somewhat lose its anti-illusionist effect” (Limoges, “Gradable Effects” 
402). Finally, Limoges has suggested that the modalities of potentially illusion-breaking 
metareferences should be examined as well since the illusion-breaking effect of a 
metareference can depend on how frequently such elements appear in a text as well as on 
where exactly in the text the metareference is located. In other words, Limoges suggests an 
analysis of the same concepts of ‘central’ versus ‘marginal’, ‘isolated’ versus ‘extensive’ and 
‘connected’ versus ‘unconnected metareferences’ introduced by Wolf. Yet as to the precise 
effect of these modalities on a metareference’s illusion-breaking capabilities, Limoges and 
Wolf come to different conclusions. 
As to the effect of the frequency of potentially illusion-breaking elements, Limoges has 
argued that rare metareferences are more unexpected and thus can more easily startle 
recipients out of the narrative illusion (cf. “Gradable Effects” 401). In contrast, Wolf has 
voiced the view that the more metareferential instances there are within one work, the more 
difficult they become to ignore, hence their illusion-breaking potential is in fact higher 
(Ästhetische Illusion 242). Similarly, as to the positioning of the metareferences, Limoges has 
suggested that the later a potentially illusion-breaking element appears in a work for the first 
time, the more unexpected it is and, thus again, the stronger the break is (cf. “Gradable 
Effects” 401). In contrast, Wolf has argued that metareferences in marginal positions such as 
right at the end or beginning of a text (or even just of a chapter), are in fact less illusion-
breaking since the reader would either be not fully immersed yet (in the case of a text/chapter 
beginning) or would be already on the way out of immersion (in the case of a text/chapter 
ending) (cf. Ästhetische Illusion 242). 
Looking at these two very different positions it soon becomes clear that while Limoges 
generally sees the cause of illusion-breaking in the sharp and sudden onset of certain illusion-
breaking elements, Wolf bases his approach on the idea of when immersion (or for that matter 
illusion) is at its weakest to begin with, as well as on the question of at what point no amount 
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of immersion will be enough to drown out the illusion-breaking elements. In other words, 
Wolf’s and Limoges’ suggestions are not as much a contradiction as they are two approaches 
with entirely different perspectives and starting points. Therefore, in accordance with the 
belief postulated at the beginning of this chapter that all function-theories can only be 
hypotheses, rather than trying to decide whether Limoges or Wolf is in the right, I find it more 
productive to simply always analyse potentially illusion-breaking metareferences with both 
functional hypotheses in mind, and to see if and/or how the hypotheses hold-up in regards to 
particular works. 
In addition to his thoughts on the relationship between frequency and positioning of 
metareferences and illusion-breaking, Werner Wolf has also discussed the illusion-breaking 
potential of several of his other metareferential categories. For example, he has argued in 
relation to his ‘connected’ versus ‘unconnected’ distinction that the less clear the break is 
between the mimetic and illusionist rest of a text and the metareferential element (e.g. the 
metareference appears without warning, from one sentence to the next, in the middle of a 
paragraph) the stronger its illusion-breaking effect will be (cf. Ästhetische Illusion 241-242). 
Wolf has furthermore analysed the illusion-breaking potential of ‘overt’ versus ‘covert’ 
metareferences, coming to the conclusion that the latter – since it is double-coded and thus 
would also make sense as a fully intra-diegetic reference – is far less illusion-breaking (cf. 
Ästhetische Illusion 245-247). Finally, Wolf has also discussed the effect on illusion had by 
‘intracompositional’ and ‘extracompositional’ metareferences, the first type in this case being 
the more illusion-breaking one. This is not to say, however, that extracompositional 
metareferences have no illusion-breaking potential at all – after all, comments made about 
another text or about one’s medium can already trigger enough meta-awareness in the 
recipient for him or her to leave his or her immersion behind and to instead begin to consider 
the metareferential parallels drawn by the text in a more analytical fashion (cf. Wolf, 
Ästhetische Illusion 250-254). 
Coincidentally, this observation also serves as a great reminder that, as mentioned before, 
the intensity of the metareferential effect is of course also always dependent on the audience’s 
willingness and/or capability to participate in the illusion-breaking, which can differ strongly 
from recipient to recipient. In fact, it has been argued by scholars such as Sonja Klimek that 
the increase of metareference over the last few (Post-Postmodernist) decades, in ‘high’ as well 
as in ‘pop’-art has taught recipients to “combine media-awareness with the appreciation of 
aesthetic illusion” (“Fantasy” 90) to the point where they have started to develop what Werner 
Wolf has referred to as a heightened ‘meta tolerance’ (cf. “Metareference across Media” 74). 
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As a result, according to these scholars, contemporary recipients are actually increasingly less 
startled by metareferential elements and are therefore increasingly less likely to be thrown out 
of their immersion by them.  
This idea that today’s omnipresence of metareferential elements has changed the effect of 
metareference on something such as illusion naturally poses the question of what effect it has 
had on other functions of metareference. Furthermore, if illusion-breaking has lost its impact, 
what are the most common functions of metareference actually still observable today?  
 
1.3.2 Intellectual Stimulus as well as Pop-Cultural Game 
According to Werner Wolf, one set of functions centres around the idea of metareference as 
something particularly intellect-engaging. According to Wolf, from the perspective of the 
recipient, the presence of metareference in a work provides him or her with an additional 
intellectual stimulus (cf. “Metareference across Media” 67-68); from the perspective of the 
author, metareferences can be used to make one’s work more intellectually challenging (cf. 
“Metareference across Media” 65-66) as well as to present the author him- or herself as 
“particularly self-conscious and hence intellectual” (“Metareference across Media” 66).  
This concept of Wolf’s is clearly rooted in the fact that especially during the 
phenomenon’s previous peak during Postmodernism, metareferences were still almost 
exclusively a feature of ‘high’-art, or often, especially initially, of experimental art. Yet today, 
metareferences can be found in even the most mainstream popular works. In fact, the presence 
of metareferential elements therein is so dominant that Michael Dunne has suggested that 
‘metapop’ should be considered its own subgenre (cf. 11; cf. also Wolf, “Metareference 
across Media” 11 and “Metareferential Turn” 9, 15). As a result, the question emerges of how 
older theories about the intellectual nature of metareference are to be reconciled with this new 
development. 
Different scholars have voiced different opinions on the topic. Some, such as Marion 
Gymnich, Eva Müller-Zettelmann, Marie-Laure Ryan or Werner Wolf, have pointed out that 
due to their paradoxical, boundary-breaking, absurdity-creating, playful and distancing nature, 
metareferences have always been particularly well fitted to be employed for comic or ironic 
effect (cf. Gymnich and Müller-Zettelmann 88-89; Ryan, “Metaleptic Machines” 445; Wolf, 
“Metalepsis as Transgeneric” 445 and “Metareference across Media” 71-72). Agreeing with 
his colleagues, Wolf in particular has suggested that metareference can be used to increase the 
entertainment value of a work (cf. “Metareference across Media” 65-68). Taking this into 
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consideration, one solution to the seeming ‘high’- versus ‘pop’-art discrepancy could thus be 
to suggest that while ‘high’-art focuses on the intellectual aspects of the phenomenon, ‘pop’-
art is most likely trying to utilize the entertainment value of metareferential elements. In fact, 
Marion Gymnich, Karin Kukkonen and Jeff Thoss have all voiced this suggestion in the past 
(cf. Gymnich 130; Kukkonen, “Textworlds” 499; Thoss, When Story Worlds Collide 6, 42-
43). It is, however, also possible to see ‘pop’-art’s use of metareference not as opposing its 
use in ‘high’-art but as an emulation of that use.  
From that perspective, scholars such as Kay Kirchmann and Werner Wolf have argued 
that ‘pop’-art could be seen as employing metareference to elevate itself, to point out that it 
can also be an aesthetically ambitioned, intellectual, “proper” art worthy of the same respect 
as ‘high’-art (cf. Kirchmann 67; Wolf, “Metareferential Turn” 35). Naturally, it is always 
dangerous to propose such a ‘prelocator model’-based hypothesis and to suggest that ‘pop’-art 
is merely following in its more ambitious predecessor’s footsteps, picking up trivialized 
versions of the latter’s repertoire13. After all, ‘high’- and ‘pop’-art both have their value and 
influences from one to the other go both ways. Still, in the context of the use of 
metareference, it is undisputable that the phenomenon was embraced by ‘high’-art first. 
Therefore, the question if – and if, then how – ‘pop’-metareferences differ and/or are inspired 
by their ‘high’-art predecessors, remains valid. Hopefully, the examples of ‘pop’-art analysed 
in this case study will bring us closer to finding answers. 
Yet first, in conclusion, one final aspect of this set of functions needs to be discussed. As 
mentioned multiple times before, metareferences can only realise their full potential if their 
audience is aware enough to notice them. This fact is particularly easy to acknowledge in the 
context of intellect-engaging metareferences (be they present in ‘high’-art, ‘high’-art-
imitating ‘pop’-art or simply in ‘pop’-art) for their demanding nature is their whole raison 
d’être. It is, however, important to note that the same concept applies to the comical type of 
metareferences as well: similar to an inside joke, these metareferential elements require their 
audience to be highly aware of many, often extracompositional items that are being referred 
to. Therefore, one can argue that a final recipient-centric function of metareferences in this 
context is that to not only potentially elevate individual ‘pop’-cultural works but to elevate the 
recipients of those works by providing them with an opportunity to demonstrate their media-
savviness and to prove themselves to be ‘superior’ by belonging to a small elite of people who 
                                                 
13 For more on the topic cf. e.g. Jannidis. 
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“get” the references and recognise the structures (cf. Wolf, “Metareference across Media” 67-
68 and “Metareferential Turn” 31). 
 
1.3.3 Descriptive as well as Prescriptive Medium Commentary 
The final commonly discussed set of metareferential functions is the one most central to all 
types of metareferences: it is the one which relates to the medium commentary provided by 
the metareferences as well as to that commentary’s purpose. One of the most salient effects of 
metareference in this regard is of course the fact that it draws attention to a work’s, a genre’s, 
a medium’s or possibly even to art’s conventions as a whole, be they compositional, 
production- or even reception-related (cf. Butler 305-309). The exact function of such a use of 
metareference, however, can vary. 
Firstly, by paying homage to and/or by presenting a parody of certain conventions – as 
Martin Butler has pointed out, metareferences are often located somewhere in between (cf. 
302) – a creator can not only experiment with the limits and possibilities of his or her medium 
of choice (cf. Wolf, “Metareference across Media” 66-67), but he or she can also present his 
or her own work as part of this medium, as part of an artistic history and tradition (cf. Butler 
302; Wolf, “Metareference across Media” 66-67), and thus can help “write” his or her own 
work as well as its most significant predecessors into cultural memory (cf. Gymnich and 
Müller-Zettelmann 87). Furthermore, the creator can then either celebrate the achievements of 
art, of an artform, or even of imagination, creativity (cf. e.g. Gymnich and Müller-Zettelmann 
86; Irmer 22-23; Wolf, “Metalepsis as Transgeneric” 102) and language (cf. Gymnich and 
Müller-Zettelmann 87-88; Hutcheon 29) or he or she can choose to expose their respective 
weaknesses and deficiencies (cf. e.g. Gymnich and Müller-Zettelmann 87; Irmer 22-23; Wolf, 
“Metareference across Media” 65-66). 
In addition to thus discussing what an artform is or is not capable of doing, has or has not 
been able to do, metareferences can also be used to postulate what works of a certain type can 
or should do in the future. As Ansgar Nünning has argued, for centuries now authors such as 
Henry Fielding have used metareferential elements to formulate and express their 
poetological ideologies (cf. “Metanarration als Lakune” 153; see also Gymnich and Müller-
Zettelmann 87). It can therefore be argued, as scholars such as Mark Currie, David Lodge and 
Robert Scholes have done in the past, that metareference in this context is located on the 
border between fiction and criticism, between creative and critical discourse (cf. Currie, 
“Introduction” 2; Lodge, “Novel Now” 146; Scholes 29). And this once again in-between 
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position is highly important. As Werner Wolf has made sure to point out, unlike critical or 
scholarly texts which simply participate in a theoretical metadiscourse, actual metatexts 
“enable recipients to experience metareferences [e.g. by letting them experience “conventions 
ex negative in an amusing way” in a parody], so that metaization in the media becomes 
‘applied metareference’” (“Metareference across Media” 33, my emphasis). This ‘applied 
metareference’ in turn has, as Debra Malina has put it, “not only a rhetorical [...] but even a 
transformative effect on audiences” (9, italics in original). In other words, poetological 
explorations through metareference can not only help works themselves evolve beyond a 
potentially stale conventionalized state (cf. e.g. Hauthal et al. 11; Reinecke 14; Wolf, 
“Metareference across Media” 69-70) but they also have a strong effect on the texts’ 
recipients. They can “activate” (Wolf, “Metalepsis as Transgeneric” 103) them and even help 
them evolve by providing interpretational clues and work- and/or medium-specific 
information which helps increase the recipients’ media-and cultural literacy (cf. Schwanecke 
160; Wolf, “Metareference across Media” 66-67). 
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1.4 (Potentially) Metareferential Devices, e.g. the Metalepsis 
Before further elaborating upon my exact focus for this thesis there is one last theoretical 
aspect that needs attention, namely the question of metareferential devices. As seen already 
during the typological discussion there are many elements within a work which have the 
potential to become metareferential devices. The variety of such elements only grows in the 
context of a study of multiple media. For, as Marion Gymnich has pointed out, in addition to 
transmedial structures such as the ‘mise-en-abyme’, there are also medium-specific devices 
which need to be taken into consideration (cf. 130-131) as well as devices which are of 
different significance within different media. Salient breaks of conventions, for example, can 
be observed in every medium. Yet they are particularly important for non-narrative media 
such as music, architecture or dance which do not have the additional explicit devices of 
narrative media at their disposal (cf. the part on music in Wolf, Metareference across Media 
190-316; Keazor “L’architecture” 319-353; Pfandl-Buchegger and Rottensteiner 490; Wolf, 
“Metareference across Media” 63). Furthermore, different devices can be used to a different 
degree to address different objects of metaization. To stay with the previous example, a 
structure such as the mise-en-abyme could be used to discuss a variety of mediality-related 
topics, while self-reflective narrator comments are most likely to draw attention to features of 
narration (cf. Nünning, “Metanarration als Lakune” 132).  
Due to this wide variety of possible devices, expanded even further by the previously 
mentioned ability of not per se metareferential signs to still realise a metareferential potential, 
any attempt to list and cover all of them in one chapter would be futile. To still be able to 
briefly demonstrate the questions involved, however, I have included the following short 
introduction to the arguably most striking as well as most representative of all metareferential 
devices14, the ‘metalepsis’. 15 
As Karin Kukkonen has pointed out, ‘metalepsis’ literally means ‘a jump across’, and 
within metareferential terminology is used to refer to jumps, or transgressions, made across 
the borders between fictional worlds and/or the borders between narrative levels (cf. 
“Metalepsis in Pop” 1-2). The origins of the phenomenon can be traced back to the thirteenth 
century during which many texts contained what were at the time presumably “ordinary and 
                                                 
14 Ansgar Nünning even uses the presence or lack of metaleptic elements as subdivision-category within his 
metanarrative typology (cf. “Metanarration als Lakune” 135-150; “Mimesis des Erzählens” 36-37; “On 
Metanarrative” 35-38) 
15 For two much more extensive and in-depth studies on this device in its present form, its functions and effects, 
as well as on the related theoretical framework cf. Hanebeck as well as Thoss, Storyworlds.  
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innocent” (Genette 235) rather than illusion-breaking and metanarrative (cf. Genette 234-235) 
entrelacement-formulas: remarks by narrators through which they would explain how they 
would drop the current story line (for example because a character would not leave an inn or 
had gone to sleep) and move their attention to another (for example to fill the time while the 
first character’s story was not progressing) (cf. Fludernik “Metanarrative” 1-39; Genette 234-
235; Häsner “Preface” to Metalepsen 4 and Metalepsen 32-34, 52). These formulas, while not 
yet containing actual transgressions between levels, already portrayed an image of the narrator 
as moving from character to character, from location to location within a story world in which 
either (1) he or she, the extradiegetic narrator, did not actually belong or (2) within which he 
or she, the intradiegetic narrator, would actually not have had the ability to jump back and 
forth, resulting in a narrative paradox. 
Building upon these beginnings, metalepses today in their fully realised form are defined 
as follows, for example by Werner Wolf:  
[T]he prototypical case of metalepsis can be defined as […] a usually non-accidental and 
paradoxical transgression of the border between levels or (sub)worlds16 that are ontologically 
(in particular concerning the opposition reality vs. fiction) or logically differentiated 
(logically in a wide, not only formal sense, including e.g., temporal or spatial differences). 
The paradoxical ‘impossibility’ of metaleptic transgressions seems to lay bare the fictionality 
of the work in which they occur and thus implies a meta-statement on its medial nature as an 
artefact (“Metareference across Media” 50; cf. “Metalepsis as Transgeneric” 91). 
While Wolf’s words certainly include all major points necessary for a definition, there is one 
complaint I would like to raise about his choice of language: Like most basic definitions of 
the term, Wolf simply speaks of a “transgression” of borders – yet this term does not fully 
capture the complex nature of the phenomenon. In contrast, Debra Malina in her seminal 
work on the topic defines metalepses as something “toy[ing] with the borders between the 
theoretically mutually exclusive zones of (extra-textual) reality, the fictional frame 
(extradiegetic level), the main story (diegesis), and the story-within-the-story (hypodiegesis)” 
(1, my emphasis). I find this description much more on-point, for metalepses rarely just 
“transgress” a border once and move on. Instead, they usually linger at the border and make 
its crossing (often repeatedly back and forth) their actual subject, playfully17 deconstructing 
any and all borders in the process.  
                                                 
16 This idea of metalepses as dealing with multiple worlds and the borders between them has brought the device 
to the attention of scholars of (Im)Possible World Theory and Unnatural Narratology. For a variety of 
stimulating studies which would unfortunately exceed the scope of this chapter cf. Bell (and Alber); Biwu; 
Martín Jiménez; Ryan, “Machines” and “Impossible Worlds”; and the exchange between Alber, Iversen, Nielsen 
and Richardson and Fludernik. 
17 Similarly to Malina’s idea of “toying”, Gérard Genette in his seminal works on metareference also refers to 
metalepses as “games” (236). 
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Starting from this general definition, several subcategories of metalepses can be 
identified. Firstly, a whole variety of scholars have argued for a differentiation between 
‘ontological metalepsis’, which depicts an actual “physical” crossing of narrative levels and 
boundaries within a work, and ‘rhetorical metalepsis’, which resembles the original 
entrelacement-formulas and in which characters or narrators glance at and comment on each 
other across levels but in which there is no actual crossing of boundaries. Instead, in these 
‘rhetorical metalepses’ there is merely a temporary window between the levels which soon 
closes again (cf. e.g. Kukkonen, “Metalepsis in Pop” 2-3; Ryan, “Metaleptic Machines” 441; 
Wolf, “Metareference across Media” 53-54). To these two categories, Werner Wolf has added 
the concept of an ‘epistemological metalepsis’, which he describes as merely dealing with 
“impossible” knowledge (e.g. characters being aware of their own fictionality) (cf. 
“Metalepsis across Media” 52-53). According to Wolf, ‘ontological’ metalepses are the most 
metareferential ones due to their highly paradoxical nature, which usually is particularly 
inducive to the activation of the recipients’ reflection processes (cf. “Metareference across 
Media” 54-55). In contrast, ‘epistemological’ and ‘rhetorical’ metalepses have increasingly 
less metareferential potential since they are not fully realised transgressions and/or 
impossibilities (cf. “Metareference across Media” 54-55). All three sub-categories, however, 
do have some metareferential potential.18 
An entirely different pair of classificational distinctions deals with the directionality of 
the transgression: in the case of ‘ascending metalepses’ a character moves from a lower, 
supposedly fictional level to the higher level of the seemingly real world of the narrator; 
conversely, within a ‘descending metalepsis’, the movement takes place in the opposite 
direction, e.g. a narrator intrudes into his narrated world (cf. e.g. Klimek, “Metalepsis” 170; 
Kukkonen, “Metalepsis in Pop” 3); finally, ‘lateral metalepses’ remain on the same level and 
as such often traverse narrative boundaries which are much more difficult to grasp (cf. Thoss, 
Storyworlds 11). Naturally, one and the same work can include examples of all three of these 
types of metalepses, for which case Sonja Klimek has suggested the term ‘tangled heterarchy’ 
(cf. “Metalepsis” 33-37). 
A final possible classification would be to distinguish what Kukkonen refers to as 
‘heterometalepses’ or ‘intertextual metalepses’ and what Limoges calls ‘interdiegetic 
                                                 
18 In his in-depth study which focuses on matters of hermeneutics, Hanebeck introduces additional terminology 
which both (re)groups and further subdivides these categories in an attempt to account for complexities 
overlooked by Genette’s “deceptively simple” (Hanebeck 26) structuralist notion of diegetic levels. Whilst 
Hanebeck’s framework offers a lot of valuable food for thought, for the purposes of this very short introduction, 
I consider the basic terms sufficient to provide a preliminary overview. 
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metalepses’ from cases of ‘intradiegetic metalepses’, thus differentiating whether the crossed 
boundary is one located between two entirely separate fictional worlds and/or works (as in the 
case of cross-overs) or whether it is a boundary within one work, the latter being the much 
more common variety (cf. Kukkonen, “Metalepsis” 8; Limoges, “Metalepsis” 200-202; 
Thoss, Storyworlds 4-5). Similarly, but one could say on a smaller scale, Limoges has further 
advocated a distinction between ‘internal metalepses’ within the hierarchically same level of a 
story (in other words between a primary and secondary story) and ‘external metalepses’ in 
which the transgression is located between the extradiegetic and the diegetic level (cf. 
“Metalepsis” 200-202; Thoss, Storyworlds 4-5).  
In addition to these typological considerations, there is one final issue relevant to an 
intermedial study such as mine, namely the question of whether all types of metalepses can 
appear in all media. The answer is contested. Some scholars, such as Klimek, have suggested 
that “proper” metalepsis can only be achieved in drama where an actor is simultaneously 
present as himself and as his role (cf. “Metalepsis” 172; also Hauthal 585-586). Even film, in 
keeping with this theory, while similar, is not quite the same since the audience is not actually 
on-site during the recording process (cf. Hauthal 585-586). As for the non-performative arts, 
there, according to Klimek, “metalepses can only appear within artefacts” and in the process 
merely create “the impression of a transgression between a fictitious and a real world [while] 
hiding the fact that also the level of what seems to be ‘real’ is merely a part of the artefact, not 
of the reality outside the artefact” (“Metalepsis” 172, my emphasis).  
While I am willing to agree with the reasoning behind the first of Klimek’s two 
statements, namely her postulation about the special status of drama, I consider Klimek’s 
second thesis an untenably limited view of the effect even a mere “impression of a 
transgression” can have on an audience. I would argue that far from “hiding” the fact that the 
diegetic ‘real’ world is still a fictional one, metalepses, through their portrayal of the 
dissolution of borders between fiction and ‘reality’, prompt the work’s recipients to reflect on 
the idea of possible dissolutions of all borders between fiction and reality, including the one 
between the artefact and the real world and/or the one between the real world and fiction in 
general. Sure, the actual physical duality which drama can provide is not there within a non-
performative art form, yet that does not automatically diminish the mental, intellectual and 
interpretational effectiveness of the metareferential device. Analysing how specific individual 
works and/or media can achieve this desired metaleptic effect is therefore, in my opinion, a 
much more interesting and fruitful endeavour than just postulating a lack of effect based on a 
pedantically abstract, theoretical distinction. 
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2. So Why (this) Study (of) Metareference? 
The answer to this question might seem simple in the face of the seemingly endless amount of 
metareferences present in today’s media. Yet in contrast to the affinity of writers and artists 
towards metafiction, the initial critical and scholarly reception of the phenomenon was rather 
derogative, thus making my question anything but rhetorical. 
 Already before the Postmodern peak but also well into and after it, self-reference was 
often described in negative terms: From Søren Kierkegaard’s critique of ‘romantic irony’ as 
destructive, threatening to the integrity of the subject and dissolving meaningful causality, to 
Friedrich Nietzsche’s more positive approach towards these in his view equally destructive 
qualities, to Roland Barthes’ ‘Death of the Author’, to Jean Baudrillard’s elaborations on 
simulacra and simulations – the metareferential dissolution of what was traditionally 
considered to be an independent, unshakeable, normative reality was often received with 
hostility (cf. Quendler 104-119). 
Even within the field of metareferential studies the subject was often associated with 
negative connotations: In the 1980s, Linda Hutcheon, for instance, considered Narcissistic 
Narrative a fitting title for her seminal work on the topic. And although she explains in her 
introduction that the text was “conceived as a defence” (1, my emphasis) and that 
“‘Narcissistic’ – the figurative adjective chosen here to designate this textual self-awareness – 
is not intended as derogatory but rather as descriptive and suggestive” (1), the traditionally 
negative connotation of the word is still of significance. For even if Sigmund Freud, as 
Hutcheon argues, is often misunderstood in the context of narcissism – having in fact 
described it as a “universal original condition” rather than “just pathological behavior” 
(Hutcheon 1) – and even if Hutcheon explains that “[o]ther potentially pejorative terms, such 
as introspective, introverted, and self-conscious, are likewise meant to be critically neutral” 
(1), the fact that those defensive elaborations are needed already demonstrates the moral 
pitfalls metareferential works and their scholars used to face and sometimes still do. 
As a result, Hutcheon was not the only scholar feeling the need to explain herself. Further 
examples of such a defensive approach to the topic can be found both in Brian McHale’s 
work Postmodernist Fiction, the final part of which is titled “How I Learned to Stop 
Worrying and Love Postmodernism” (217-221), and in Patricia Waugh’s seminal work on the 
subject, the introductory part of which is tellingly named “What is metafiction and why are 
they saying such awful things about it?”. As Waugh then moves on to demonstrate, critics 
well into Postmodernity could often be seen discussing metafiction in the context of a ‘crisis 
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of the novel’ or even ‘death of the novel’. In Waugh’s own words: “Instead of recognizing the 
positive aspects of fictional self-consciousness, they have tended to see such literary 
behaviour as a form of the self-indulgence and decadence characteristic of the exhaustion of 
any artistic form or genre” (9).  
Till the present day, metareferential texts have unfortunately not been able to fully rid 
themselves of these accusations and studies proclaiming their “virtuous” nature (Karbalaei) 
are still the exception. In an essay published in 2001, for example, Werner Wolf still felt the 
obligation to defend self-reference in general and Postmodern metareference in particular 
against accusations of it being sterile, disconnected from reality and aesthetically irrelevant. 
Wolf argued that today neither the works nor their study should need justification (cf. 
“Formen literarischer Selbstreferenz” 80) – and yet, the fact that he still felt the need to 
include these sentences into his essay shows quite strikingly that the negative viewpoint on 
the field had (and possibly has) not yet been overcome. In fact, even critics and scholars 
deeming the subject worthy of exploration still seem to often get caught up – to different 
degrees – in strikingly negative language when describing it.  
Sometimes, it is just a case of one or two singular conspicuous phrases: Michael Scheffel, 
for example, when speaking of the metareferential device of a narrator drawing attention to 
the process of narration, describes it as happening “auf Kosten des erzählten Vorgangs” (167), 
so “at the expense” of what is being narrated – not exactly a neutral expression. Much more 
striking, however, is the number of violence- and confusion-related adjectives used on a 
regular basis to describe metareferential features and effects. Brian McHale serves as a 
particularly great example. In Postmodernist Fiction he repeatedly uses words such as 
“destabilizing” (101), “disquieting” (125), “dizzying” (198), “jarring” (90), “strange[]” and 
“disorienting” (119), and continuously describes metareferential texts as “transgressions” 
(114) and as “deliberately misleading” (115), “disquieting puzzles” (114) which “violate 
linear sequentiality” (103, my emphasis), “dupe the reader” (114, my emphasis), “court 
confusion” (115), and “cause disruption” (125). Similarly, Linda Hutcheon describes the new 
Postmodernist reading experience as follows: “Disturbed, defied, forced out of his 
complacency, [the reader] must self-consciously establish new codes in order to come to 
terms with new literary phenomena” (39, my emphasis). “Reading was no longer easy, no 
longer a comfortable controlled experience; the [“unsettled” (139, my emphasis)] reader was 
now forced to control, to organize, to interpret” (25-26, my emphasis).  
This violent imagery gets even more dramatic when it comes to scholarly descriptions of 
the effects of metalepses. Suddenly, even the most basic definitions draw parallels to violent 
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acts, starting with the core idea of “frame-breaking” (McHale, Postmodernist Fiction 197, my 
emphasis). Add to that statements such as this from William Nelles describing vertical 
embedding as being “violated by the use of the trope of metalepsis” (92, my emphasis), add 
the Routledge Encyclopaedia of Narrative Theory defining ‘metalepsis’ as “the contamination 
of levels in a hierarchical structure as it occurs in narrative” (303, my emphasis), as 
“uprooting” (303) boundaries, and again as “violati[ng]” (304) levels, add Werner Wolf 
calling the device a “violation” (“Metalepsis as Transgeneric” 90-91) with a “startling” effect 
(“Metalepsis as Transgeneric” 91), add Marie-Laure Ryan comparing a particularly extreme 
sub-form of metalepsis “to an invasive growth that destroys the structure of […] tissues” 
(“Metaleptic Machines” 442, my emphasis), add Debra Malina describing the effects of 
metalepses as ranging “from startling diversion through destabilization and disorientation to 
outright violation” (3, my emphasis) and even self-consciously explaining “If I emphasize a 
violent streak underlying this persistent breaching of constitutive boundaries, it is because I 
detect, even in the metaleptic joke or game, a certain aggression toward the subject, whether 
internal or external to the text.” (3, my emphasis) – the pattern is clear. 
Finally, it is not only academic circles in which unfavourable commentary on 
metareference can still be found. The Guardian, for example, only a few years ago published 
an article which commented spitefully on the fact that “[t]elevision is becoming meta 
television, existing primarily to be self-referential and a bit pleased with itself” (Crace online, 
my emphasis). Similarly, in a different article bearing the title “Enough with the Found 
Footage Movies” another writer for The Guardian referred to the genre’s defining 
characteristic as a “conceit” and a “gimmick”, before concluding the article by voicing his 
utter incomprehension for why we would suddenly “feel the need to have the very mechanics 
of cinema explained to us” (Lyne online). In my opinion, the answer to this question is closely 
linked to the title question of this chapter. Why do we suddenly feel the need to discuss media 
mechanics? For the same reasons for which I believe that the artistic discussion of media 
through metareference is worth studying. 
First of all, self-reference is much more than a narratological “gimmick”. As Winfried 
Nöth, Nina Bishara and Britta Neitzel have demonstrated within their semiotic approach to 
the topic, no communication is ever purely referential and without self-reference. In their 
words, “no speaker can hide his or her self in his or her message entirely” (Nöth et al. 32, my 
translation), be it through something as seemingly negligible as his or her personal presence, 
through the distinguishable style of a specific magazine or, as mentioned in another article by 
Nöth, even just through the presence of a logo (cf. Nöth, “Self-Reference” 13). As Nöth 
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explains in a third article discussing his concept of ‘performative metareference’, the very 
basic central idea of performative linguists that “each and every speech act contains an 
implicit sign of its purpose as a speech act and thus a sign about itself” (“Metareference” 112) 
means that if we “always communicate that we communicate” (“Metareference” 114), 
‘performative metareference’ is “omnipresent in each and every communicative situation” 
(“Metareference” 114).  
Yet metareference is not even “only” a natural feature of our language. In fact, in the 
1970s, scholars such as Gregory Bateson went so far as to argue that the capability of 
discerning and producing metareference has been a crucial feature of our cognitive evolution. 
More specifically, Bateson’s work focused on  
the drama precipitated when organisms, having eaten of the Tree of Knowledge, discover 
that their signals are signals. Not only the characteristically human invention of language can 
then follow, but also all the complexities of empathy, identification, projection, and so on. 
And with these comes the possibility of communicating at the multiplicity of levels of 
abstraction. (Bateson 179)  
These ideas of Bateson’s have prevailed over the last few decades and can still be found in the 
theories of scholars such as Dan Sperber who have continued to speak of the fundamental 
metarepresentational capacity of humans (cf. Sperber 4), arguing that “metarepresentational 
phenomena as based on a metarepresentational capacity [are] no less fundamental than [our] 
faculty for language” (Sperber 6-7). 
The question as to how we humans actually utilise this “metarepresentational capacity” is 
the next aspect which makes the study of metareference important as well as rewarding. 
Werner Wolf, with reference to Marcel Cornis-Pope, has argued that meta-reflections often 
contribute to both how we conceive reality and to how we analyse our conception of reality. 
Building upon the previously discussed Postmodernist ideas of reality and history as 
constructs, Wolf eventually comes to the conclusion that an analysis of metareference can be 
of utmost epistemological value (cf. “Formen literarischer Selbstreferenz” 8). After all, as 
Ansgar Nünning has added, metareferential elements are not only an integral component of 
novels and narrative fictions of all kinds, but of narration in general (cf. “Metanarration als 
Lakune” 125-164): from everyday conversations, to anecdotes, to urban legends, to a variety 
of life-guiding cultural myths – every one of these narratives contains self-referential 
elements. Studying them, therefore, contributes towards an analysis of how we perceive the 
world.  
It seems therefore, in the words of Patricia Waugh, that despite the doomsday prophecies 
voiced by critics of Postmodernism proclaiming the ‘death of the novel’, in metareference, 
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“far from ‘dying’, the novel has reached a mature recognition of its existence as writing, 
which can only ensure its continued viability in and relevance to a contemporary world which 
is similarly beginning to gain awareness of precisely how its values and practices are 
constructed and legitimized” (19, italics in original). Furthermore,  
[i]f, as individuals [of Postmodernity], we now occupy ‘roles’ rather than ‘selves’, then the 
study of characters in novels may provide a useful model for understanding the construction 
of subjectivity in the world outside novels. If our knowledge of this world is now seen to be 
mediated through language, then literary fiction (worlds constructed entirely of language) 
becomes a useful model for learning about the construction of ‘reality’ itself. (Waugh 3) 
Seeing how our society has only become more “media-saturated” (Van Dreunen 8) in the 
thirty years since Waugh’s study was published, learning about this constructedness has only 
become more important.  
Of course, our current media-saturation is not the first cultural and/or technological 
change to make an according narrative analysis valuable. As Max Nänny with reference to 
Walter Allen and John Foster has argued, the “impact of something external to narrative on its 
internal structure” (51, italics in original) is something that can be observed all over literary 
history, the impactful external influences ranging from changes in technology (e.g. the 
introduction of the railway or the invention of the printing press) to changes in social habits 
(e.g. the increased social value and popularity of familial letter writing during certain times in 
history) (cf. Nänny 51-62). Consequently, it is barely surprising that changes in something as 
closely related to narratives as the media which convey them would have a particularly strong 
impact on all narratives and their cultural role (cf. Ryan, Avatars 24, 30). Examining the 
specific changes to the media landscape over the last few decades more closely, the most 
significant ones are arguably the advent of computers and the rise of the internet, both of 
which have changed everything from the amount and scope of narratives accessible to us at 
any given time (cf. e.g. Murray, Janet H. 85), to our communication, to our social 
relationships (cf. e.g. Krotz 32). Increasingly, our society is one in which communal 
affiliation as well as personal identities are negotiated, acquired and shared through media (cf. 
Ganz-Blättler 292; Klaus and Lünenborg 193).  
This increasingly close connection between our fictional narratives, our cultural 
narratives and our social life has naturally had a strong impact on the relationship between our 
media and our world. In the process, as Winfried Nöth, Nina Bishara and Britta Neitzel have 
pointed out, certain perceptions on that topic have clearly become outdated to a point where it 
is, for example, near impossible to think of media and narratives as semiotically separate from 
the world. Instead, today, they are a part of the world themselves, connected to it through 
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multiple circularities and self-references (cf. Nöth et al. 49). As Linda Hutcheon had already 
correctly observed, “[i]n this light metafiction is less a departure from the mimetic novelistic 
tradition than a reworking of it” (5). Finally, one can also argue that the sheer amount of 
contemporary media makes it nigh impossible for texts to not refer to their predecessors 
and/or to not interact with their contemporaries (cf. Colapietro 31; Nöth, “Self-Reference” 6; 
Santaella 208-209). Instead, they form webs of intermedial as well as self-citation, the 
workings and minutiae of which can be analysed through the study of metareference. 
I began this chapter by drawing attention to the fact that metareferential works have often 
been accused of being self-absorbed to the point of narcissism. As I have just shown, 
however, raising media-literacy in an age as media-saturated as ours is anything but that. 
Werner Wolf has described the origin of the allegations as being located in the assumption 
that metareferential works, being too busy with unhealthy self-obsession, are ignoring what is 
traditionally considered the social and cultural function of any worthy medium or work. In 
Wolf’s words, from the perspective of such traditionalist critics, “[t]he principal function of 
the media, in particular the representational media, is, after all, not to mirror themselves, but 
to contribute to ‘Culture’ at large, raising questions, ‘holding the mirror up to nature’ and so 
forth” (“Metareference across Media” 69). Yet what an assumption such as this ignores is the 
fact that in an age such as ours, in a culture as hypermediated as ours, the media themselves 
have become such a major component of our culture, society, and reality that holding the 
mirror up to media is holding the mirror up to nature. 
 Already Linda Hutcheon had argued that “the unsettled reader” of metafiction, having 
been forced to scrutinize conventions, ‘truths’ and his or her own perception in the context of 
art, might very well begin to “question the very possibility of understanding”, and that in 
doing so, he or she “might be freed from enslavement not only to the empirical but also to his 
own set patterns of thought and imagination” (139). Such an effect would consequently have 
an impact on all of the reader’s life, way beyond his or her attitude towards the microcosm of 
art: in the words of Debra Malina, it would “reach through the final frontier, the boundary 
between fictional text and extratextual reader, to affect our construction as subjects, at least in 
some small way” (9, italics in original; cf. also Klimek, “Metalepsis” 178); in the words of 
Marion Gymnich and Eva Müller-Zettelmann it would trigger reflection on the nature of all 
socio-cultural meaning (cf. 88; also Gymnich 152); and in the words of Werner Wolf 
“[m]etareferentiality in medial representations thus becomes an acknowledgement of, and a 
sensitization towards, the impact of the media on ourselves and culture at large” 
(“Metareference across Media” 70). These are the ideas in which this dissertation is grounded.  
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The relationship between current uses of metareference, today’s media landscape and the 
respective socio-cultural circumstances and contexts is what this case study is set to explore. 
Over the next five chapters, I will analyse eleven contemporary, comparatively popular works 
of fiction taken from five different (more or less) narrative media and containing a large 
variety of metareferential elements. It will be my goal to find out what kind of metareferences 
are used in them and to what effect, how the individual metareferences work with each other 
to depict the state of their respective medium, and what the depicted state implies about our 
culture and society in general. Furthermore, in a final chapter, I will compare the 
metareferences used across all eleven works in regards to their functional differences and 
similarities, searching for potential functional foci which make contemporary metareferences 
different from, for example, their Postmodernist predecessors. 
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3. Metareference in Contemporary Literature 
Werner Wolf has described the move from early to Postmodernist metafiction as one 
abandoning the affirmative uses of the phenomenon (such as the celebration of artists’ 
imaginations or the proclamation of immortality through art) for highly critical messages sent 
out with the almost didactic purpose of educating readers about ideas such as the 
(de)construction of ‘truth’ and ‘reality’ (cf. Ästhetische Illusion 695). In turn, over the last 
decade or two, these radical messages have been frequently toned down again as 
metareferences have become increasingly commonplace even in mainstream literature. This 
has resulted in what Wolf refers to as a “muted postmodernism” (Wolf, “Atonement” 292). 
Wolf characterizes this development as a synthesis of tradition and innovation: while 
works belonging to this category contain metareferentiality, it is not employed in an attempt 
to fully shatter the literary illusion anymore (cf. Wolf, “Atonement” 292-293). In this, these 
“muted” texts are highly reminiscent of the way in which children’s literature has been 
incorporating metareferences from as early as Lewis Caroll’s Alice’s Adventures in 
Wonderland (1865) to more recent texts such as Lauren Child’s Beware of the Storybook 
Wolves (2000) and Who’s Afraid of the Big Bad Book? (2002).19 Naturally, the functions of 
metareference in contemporary adult fiction are still frequently more complex and multi-
facetted than they are in these texts. Yet their effect is also far from the “uprooting” and 
“disorienting” one ascribed to Postmodernist works. For whilst contemporary fiction contains 
metareferences, the new muted texts also provide readers with a coherent, “readable” story 
and a variety of themes which encourage emotional engagement. 
The possibly easiest but also most condescending and superficial way of explaining this 
shift would be to see it as a “dumbing down” or dilation of radical ‘high-brow’ ideas to make 
them more accessible to a wider audience. I would, however, argue that while the 
popularization of metareferential texts has certainly played a role, there is also a much deeper 
and more interesting cultural and ideological development represented in this shift. Its 
exploration lies at the centre of this section of my dissertation. 
As mentioned before, the core beliefs of Postmodernism were focused around the idea of 
a “crisis” resulting from the realisation that mimetic representation is impossible, that there is 
no such thing as an objective truth, that reality is a construct and that all perception and 
experience are mediated. Yet over the last few decades, as all these realisations have had time 
to sink in and to be processed, the initial shock and therefore the “crisis” itself seem to have 
                                                 
19 For recent ideas on the specific use of metareference in children’s literature cf. e.g. Austin or Sanders. 
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begun to be overcome. Today, instead of conveying these Postmodernist concepts through the 
violent depiction of fractured realities, more and more literary texts approach the set of issues 
from a more positive – one could even say once again affirmative – perspective. Instead of 
simply decrying the constructed and mediated nature of our lives, contemporary works set out 
to depict and analyse how exactly this constructed and mediated nature comes to be. For once 
we know that, so these new texts suggest, we can start to find ways in which we can use these 
initially “disquieting” circumstances to our advantage. 
It has by now been well established that constructed narratives play, and have always 
played, an essential role in our lives. Firstly, ever since the beginning of human existence, 
telling stories has been a central part of social interaction. On a very basic level, stories have 
always been the best, if not the only way, to share with others what Martin Sexl refers to as 
“historical or extreme experiences” which cannot be directly demonstrated (cf. 88). As 
Stephen John Read and Lynn Carol Miller have pointed out, stories have “enabled individuals 
within a group to learn from the mistakes of others – even those who [have] died generations 
earlier – rather than via individual trial and error” (142). In fact, Roger Schank and Robert P. 
Abelson have even argued that “[v]irtually all human knowledge is based on stories 
constructed around past experiences” (1, my emphasis). Thus storytelling has always been 
central to human survival.  
Furthermore, as Read and Miller have also argued with references to R. I. M. Dunbar, 
John Tooby and Leda Cosmides, even narratives as seemingly trivial as gossip have played an 
important role in our societal development. Since the dawn of humanity, they have “enabled 
the group to identify particular individuals and their deeds and misdeeds” and through that 
have “enhanced group cohesiveness” (Read and Miller 142). Additionally, gossip has been, 
and arguably still is being, used as a means of establishing and communicating “group norms 
and values regarding cooperation and principles of social exchange” (Read and Miller 142). 
In other words, it has contributed and is still contributing to the foundations of our culture.  
Finally, narratives are not only omnipresent in our social interactions but are central to 
our own, individual cognitive processes as well. Over the last few decades, a whole barrage of 
articles has been deployed to demonstrate that we often think in characters and plots, in 
expectations and consequences, or in other words that we perceive and organise our thoughts 
in the form of stories (cf. e.g. Bernstein quoted in McHale, Constructing Postmodernism 7; 
Bruner, Making Stories; Carrithers; Polkinghorne, “Narrative”; Read and Miller; Schank; 
Schank and Abelson; Vorderer). As Frank Smith has put it: 
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Most of the beliefs we have about the world and our place in it come in the form of stories. 
Most of the beliefs we have about other people, and the way we regard and treat them, are in 
the form of stories. Stories are the mortar that holds thought together, the grist of all our 
explanations, rationales and values. (144)  
Or in short, in the words of Marie-Laure Ryan, “we activate the same cognitive processes to 
give coherence and intelligibility to imagined and real events” (“Avatars” 50).  
In several studies, Roger Schank and Robert P. Abelson have explained this phenomenon 
by arguing that people “try to comprehend what is going on around them” by “refer[ing] to 
what they already know [be it from experience, or from “official stories” circulated by 
politicians, scientists, cultural institutions etc. (cf. Schank 32, 37)] in order to make sense of 
new input” (2). After all, “[u]nderstanding the world means explaining its happenings in a 
way that seems consonant with what you already believe” (5; cf. also Schank 59-60). As 
Schank has further elaborated, “[w]e take the standard stories of our culture and interpret what 
happens to us in terms of such stories” (149). Indeed, the complexity of each newly 
encountered situation would make comprehension nigh impossible if we did not employ 
previously established stories as guidelines to which to compare and/or contrast any new 
situations and experiences.  
On a next cognitive level, as once again a large variety of scholars have argued (cf. e.g. 
Bruner, “Narrative Construction”; Neumann, Erinnerung; Schank; Schank and Abelson), 
stories and narratives are not only highly important for our understanding of (new) 
experiences but also for their storage in the form of memory. We humans as a species simply 
find the memorization of stories much easier than that of abstractions or disassociated and/or 
disparate facts and events (cf. Schank 10). Remembering, from this perspective, is then 
comparable to the internal construction of a story. An actual outward telling of the story then 
facilitates the remembering while the keeping of the story to oneself and avoiding its retelling 
makes it easier to forget (cf. Neumann, Erinnerung 50; Schank 115-116; Schank and Abelson 
3, 36).  
This storyfication of memories means that during the process of memorization we shape 
our experiences to fit our culture’s standard storytelling devices (cf. Schank 137; Schank and 
Abelson 34). As Birgit Neumann has pointed out, when trying to remember, we often 
reconstruct past events based on patterns and schemes derived through socialization from our 
cultural surroundings – the culture we were raised in influences what we consider memorable 
in the first place as well as how we organize our memories (cf. 49). Or in the words of Astrid 
Erll, “individual memory is unthinkable without cadres sociaux. It is the social context we 
live in that provides ‘frames’ – such as language or concepts of time and space – which 
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channel our perception and memory” (49). Therefore, what we eventually consider our 
memory of events is highly influenced by and reflective of our view of our world as well as of 
ourselves, even if we might not be consciously aware of this fact. Building upon this idea, it is 
further not surprising that (1) all stories we tell transport our individual as well as our cultural 
memories20 and thus serve as vehicles for our social, cultural and personal identities; and that 
(2) all studies of memory-related fields including that of history are consequently required to 
take these cultural as well as narrative colourings and constructions into account.  
The stories we tell, aloud or to ourselves, furthermore do not only carry our identities, but 
they actively contribute to their creation. Debra Malina has argued that “‘we’ are in some 
sense the product of cultural ‘stories’” (8), of what Jerome Bruner has referred to as 
“unspoken, implicit cultural models of what selfhood should be, might be – and, of course, 
shouldn’t be” (Making Stories 65; “Narrative Construction”) and of what Donald E. 
Polkinghorne calls “one’s cultural stock of stories and myths” (“Narrative” 144), “exemplar 
plots that can be used to configure the events in [people’s] own lives” (“Narrative” 147) and 
“honored plots [held up] for emulation” by society (“Narrative” 147). Roger Schank has even 
gone as far as to suggest that “[w]e are the stories we like to tell” (137, my emphasis), his 
idea being that  
[w]e tell stories to describe ourselves not only so others can understand who we are but also 
so we can understand ourselves. Telling our stories allows us to compile our personal 
mythology, and the collection of stories we have compiled is to some extent who we are, 
what we have to say about the world. (44; cf. also Neumann, Erinnerung 2-3 with 
elaborations in later chapters) 
In other words, which events we choose to include in our compilation is what defines our 
concept of self, our identity.  
Therefore, while memory with what Christopher Henke has called “its subjective 
distortions, omissions, and unnoticed falsifications” (80) can be considered unreliable in its 
representation of past events, it is still highly reliable and revealing as a window into our 
concepts of identity (cf. Henke 80). It is, additionally, important to note that these story-based 
identities are not set in stone. Instead, as Birgit Neumann and Donald E. Polkinghorne have 
emphasised, identity construction has a prominent temporal, diachronic dimension (cf. 
Neumann, Erinnerung 19-20; Polkinghorne, “Narrative”): over the course of our lifespans we 
repeatedly re-narrate and, in the process, re-evaluate our life stories. In fact, this dimension is 
what makes narratives and narrative arts such as literature particularly well-equipped to depict 
                                                 
20 For a more detailed introduction to this concept cf. e.g. Nünning, Fictions of Memory.  
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our processes of identity formation – for what else are stories at their core than a compilation 
of sequenced events and experiences.  
Building upon all these theoretical concepts, literature – and all narrative art forms – thus 
both hold up a mirror to and collect processes of inherently human storytelling, and as a result 
become in the words of Eric Mankowski and Julian Rappaport an “indexer of collective 
memory and national identity stories” (212-213). Furthermore, by in turn contributing new 
narratives themselves, new narrative works always become part of our cultural memory 
themselves and introduce new storytelling devices, new ‘myths’ on which we can model our 
experiences (cf. Gymnich and Nünning 20, van der Bossche). 
Looking at all these different ways in which narratives permeate our thoughts and 
behaviours, it is not surprising that a large variety of social and cultural sciences over the last 
few decades have turned to analysing related phenomena, resulting in what the Routledge 
Encyclopaedia of Narrative Theory has termed a “narrative turn in the humanities” (378) and 
the creation of comparatively new fields of study such as ‘cognitive narratology’, ‘cultural 
narratology’ and ‘narrative psychology’. It is equally not surprising that many literary texts 
have also taken it upon themselves to explore the implications of this predominance of 
narratives in our lives, and that their authors have chosen the use of metareference as a 
particularly fruitful method of doing so. Two such texts, Ian McEwan’s Atonement (2001) and 
Markus Zusak’s The Book Thief (2007), shall serve as examples for the upcoming literary 
section of my case study.  
Many other works could have been chosen for this purpose. To name only a few, Alan 
Bennet’s The Uncommon Reader (2007) as well as a vast number of Postcolonial texts would 
have served as great examples for a discussion of reading and writing as a means to engage 
with the world and to take (back) control of one’s identity. Mark Haddon’s The Curious 
Incident of the Dog in the Night-Time (2003) would have provided a great opportunity to 
demonstrate connections between narrative (genre) traditions and our way of making sense of 
the world. Jonathan Safran Foer’s Everything is Illuminated (2002) and Extremely Loud and 
Incredibly Close (2005) would have constituted great subjects for a study on the construction 
of narratives as a process of sense-making and remembering. Finally, a comparison between 
Paul Auster’s debut novel City of Glass (1985) and his much more recent Man in the Dark 
(2008) would have provided a great example for the general metareferential perspective shift 
from depicting reality and meaning as in crisis to depicting narratives as a way to move 
beyond such a crisis. In the end, however, I did choose McEwan’s and Zusak’s novels for the 
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fact that they both contain every single one of these themes and that they discuss them 
through a variety of different types of metareference.21 
 
 
 
                                                 
21 This list of possible works strikingly lacks any reference to (web)comics and/or graphic novels. This is due to 
the ultimate restrictions I had to place on this study to keep my corpus manageable. I in no way mean to suggest 
that metareferences cannot be found in this type of narrative works – quite the opposite. For a variety of studies 
which provide a much more informed and in-depth introduction as well as historical overview than I ever could 
provide cf. Atkinson; Dunne; Inge; Kukkonen’s “Textworlds”; Limoges’ “Metalepsis in Cartoons”; Palumbo; 
Polak; Szép; and Thoss. 
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3.1 Metareference in Atonement 
It wasn’t only wickedness and scheming that made people unhappy, it was confusion 
and misunderstanding; above all, it was the failure to grasp the simple truth that 
other people are as real as you. And only in a story could you enter these different 
minds and show how they had an equal value.  
(Atonement 40) 
Ian McEwan’s Atonement is one of the most densely metareferential novels of our time. 
Throughout the text, the use of metareferences is in fact so extensive that it makes questions 
of position and/or connectedness nigh impossible to answer. Furthermore, the novel is filled 
with both intra-compositional references to itself and extra-compositional ones to the medium 
of literature and story-telling in general22. Finally, through all these metareferences, McEwan 
engages critically both with poetological discussions on the purpose and effect of narratives, 
and with a variety of related socio-cultural topics. 
 
3.1.1 Literary Traditions, Preferences and Internalised Tropes 
Firstly, in full accordance with the Postmodern practice of “intertextual novels […] highly 
aware of […] their place in a tradition” (Currie, Postmodern Narrative Theory 3), McEwan’s 
text constantly refers to its literary predecessors. It does so both by a variety of form-based 
homages and by plenty of literary discussions held between characters within the story itself. 
 On the highest extra-diegetic level, right on the very first page, Atonement opens on a 
quotation from Jane Austen’s Northanger Abbey (1817). The latter itself being a highly 
intertextual and metareferential work, Atonement thus immediately aligns itself with these 
traditions. Furthermore, the quoted passage refers specifically to the scene in which Henry 
Tilney reprimands Catherine Moreland for her suspicions towards his father. Therefore, the 
quote also instantly foreshadows the strong role misreading and misinterpretation will have in 
the upcoming events. 
                                                 
22 In fact, McEwan’s novel references a lot of other art forms as well: from repeated comments about the 
architecture of the Tallis house and gardens (cf. e.g. 72-73), to Paul Marshall’s thoughts about Lola as a “Pre-
Raphaelite princess” (60), to Robbie envisioning himself calming down an angry Cecilia through cinematic 
tropes (cf. 80), to thoughts on Cecilia’s evening gowns and the meaning of fashion design (cf. 97-99), etc. 
Unfortunately, it would have been impossible to discuss every single reference within the scope of this chapter. 
Consequently, I focused on the references which deal with the medium of literature and with narratives in the 
wider sense. 
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While this quote is a very explicitly labelled and formatted extra-compositional example, 
McEwan’s novel is also full of many implicit and double-coded extra-compositional 
references to other literary works. Remaining with Austen for a moment, smaller homages to 
her work, especially to Pride and Prejudice (1813), are dispersed throughout the entirety of 
Atonement: the migraine-prone, ineffectual mother worrying about her educated daughter’s 
marriage prospects; Cecilia’s invitation from an aunt and uncle to accompany them on a trip 
to New York (cf. 103); the amount of misunderstandings based on hurt pride, class 
differences and emotional confusion, which characterise Robbie and Cecilia’s early 
interactions; Cecilia’s eventual exclamation of “how could I have been so ignorant about 
myself” (134) which paraphrases Elizabeth Bennet’s epiphany on the matter; even the fact 
that we as readers are encouraged to get a wrong impression of characters by being introduced 
to them through someone else’s misguided point-of-view first (Cecilia through Briony’s (cf. 
7), Robbie through Cecilia’s (cf. 19, 22, 27)) can be seen as an homage to Austen’s 
introduction of Darcy – the list of examples is seemingly endless. And Jane Austen’s texts are 
not the only ones McEwan and Briony keep referring to. 
Throughout the entire novel literary preferences are constantly used to characterize 
people. For example, Atonement introduces thirteen-year-old Briony through a description of 
her play and the girl’s experience of herself as a playwright. Already the narrative voice’s 
immediate use of classically romantic language and tropes such as “tempest of composition” 
or “cousins from the distant North” (3) aligns Briony’s experience with that of her favourite 
literary heroines at the time. Furthermore, the summary of the contents of the freshly-written 
play is equally filled to the brim with homages to famous literary works the fledgling 
playwright has clearly been borrowing both language and ideas from (cf. 3). Throughout the 
passage, late-eighteenth- and early-nineteenth-century sentimental, Gothic and moralist motifs 
are everywhere. They not only situate Briony’s writing within a literary tradition and 
comment implicitly on the interconnectedness of all writing, but they also tell us a lot about 
Briony herself, her literary preferences and about the views and knowledge with which she as 
a result approaches the world. 
Whenever Briony feels strong emotions her mind is shown to immediately jump to 
literary tropes. For example, when her cousin Lola takes over the lead role in Briony’s play, 
the latter girl’s thoughts are described to be the following:  
How could her mother reject the daughter who had loved her all these years? […] Briony 
knew her only reasonable choice then would be to run away, to live under hedges, eat berries 
and speak to no one, and be found by bearded woodsman one winter’s dawn, curled up at the 
base of a giant oak, beautiful and dead, and barefoot. (15) 
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Similarly, just before the pivotal fountain scene, Briony’s thoughts on the panorama before 
her are “that [it] could easily have accommodated, in the distance at least, a medieval castle” 
(38). The gardens, Robbie’s posture – in Briony, they immediately trigger associations with 
literary motifs she has encountered in the past (cf. 38). In other words, Briony’s imagination 
is thus shown to instinctively transform or maybe even better to translate her base emotions 
into literary tropes, even when she is not actively writing but just processing a situation for 
herself. In perfect accordance with the theories discussed in the introduction to this 
dissertation chapter, Briony is thus portrayed right from the beginning as using narratives to 
make sense of her experiences. The fact that the fountain scene in question unfolds in a way 
which transgresses all narrative norms she is familiar with is exactly what triggers a form of 
awakening in Briony, what lets her observe that “for her now it could no longer be fairy-tale 
castles and princesses, but the strangeness of the here and now” (39) and thus sets the course 
of the novel’s entire story. 
Briony is furthermore not the only character which Atonement introduces through his or 
her reading habits. There are several references to the books present in the mother’s room (cf. 
64, 70); Cecilia is introduced as someone reading Samuel Richardson’s Clarissa (1748) while 
procrastinating after college (cf. 21-22); and as for Robbie, the documents on his desk are in 
fact described over three whole pages (cf. 81-84) when he himself “survey[s] his desk as one 
might a life” (81). Literary texts, theoretical texts, university books and notes, maps, 
photographs, anatomical drawings – all these items contribute to characterising Robbie, his 
personality, his goals and his ideals. And because this passage is located within a highly 
metareferential novel, all these items are double-coded with meaning that goes well beyond 
their practical use. As the sentence introducing Robbie’s desk-survey explicitly stresses, all 
these “texts” are portrayed as representations of his life. 
Unsurprisingly then, Briony is also not the only character who is shown to think and feel 
in narrative tropes. To give only a few examples, Cecilia’s enjoyment of “the familiar [being] 
transformed into a delicious strangeness” (20) is clearly influenced by the idea of the 
‘uncanny’, and her thought that “[d]rowning herself would be his [Robbie’s] punishment” 
(30) is as Shakespearean as a thought can be. Speaking of drowning, when Cecilia at one 
point learns that her younger sister has stormed off and not yet returned, she employs the 
following mind-game to ward off anything really bad happening to Briony:  
This time she paused to peer out of the window at the dusk and wonder where her sister was. 
Drowned in the lake, ravished by gypsies, struck by a passing motor car, she thought ritually, 
a sound principle being that nothing was ever as one imagined it, and this was an efficient 
means of excluding the worst. (101) 
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In other words, Cecilia is portrayed to purposefully evoke the most horrific tropes to try and 
affect reality.  
Similarly, when Robbie fantasises about how he could overcome Cecilia’s anger he 
imagines her “pound[ing] against his lapels before yielding with a little sob to the safe 
enclosure of his arms and letting herself be kissed; she didn’t forgive him, she simply gave 
up. He watched this several times before he returned to what was real” (80). Once again, 
tropes are thus invoked to guide a character’s imagination. Finally, when Robbie is 
contemplating his feelings for Cecilia, the narrative voice through its focalisation describes 
that he himself is even conscious of the literary tropes at work: 
How had it crept up on him, this advanced stage of fetishising the love object? Surely Freud 
had something to say about that in Three Essays on Sexuality. And so did Keats, Shakespeare 
and Petrarch, and all the rest, and it was in the Romaunt of the Rose. He had spent three years 
dryly studying the symptoms, which had seemed no more than literary conventions, and 
now, in solitude, like some ruffed and plumed courtier come to the edge of the forest to 
contemplate a discarded token, he was worshipping traces – not a handkerchief, but 
fingerprints! – while he languished in his lady’s scorn. (84) 
This passage, by showing Robbie’ self- and narrative-awareness, explicitly brings the close 
relationship between experiences and literary conventions to the foreground. It also suggests – 
unlike in the case of Briony’s observations during the fountain scene – that previously “dry” 
and theoretical conventions, under the right circumstances, can help make sense of a person’s 
inner life. 
What this last Robbie passage furthermore demonstrates is that in addition to being 
indirectly characterized through their reading habits, characters in Atonement are also 
portrayed to directly and actively deliberate upon these particular habits. Cecilia’s and 
Robbie’s literary degrees as well as the respective works they have encountered throughout 
their studies are repeatedly shown to be on their (and even on their relatives’) minds (cf. e.g. 
19, 64-5, 91-3, 152). Furthermore, reading preferences are not only thought about by 
characters but they get explicitly and verbally discussed by them as well. For example, 
already early on in the novel, Robbie and Cecilia are shown to debate the merits of 
Richardson in comparison to Fielding (cf. 25-6) – and while the conversation works as a 
purely literary discussion, it is clearly also double-coded and carries a lot of subtext, as 
Cecilia herself is shown to think: “She felt she had said something stupid. […] He might be 
thinking she was talking to him in code, suggestively conveying her taste for the full-blooded 
and sensual. That was a mistake, of course, and she was discomfited and had no idea how to 
put him right” (25). Just like Briony’s introductory paragraphs, this passage demonstrates 
beautifully the effect literary narratives can have on our thoughts and perception. Not only do 
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they affect our individual views of the world but by being culturally shared knowledge they 
tie people together and provide a common code, a means of communication, a language – 
even if the language in question, as shown in this passage, can be prone to misreadings and 
misunderstandings. 
 
3.1.2 The Power and Limits of Language 
This motif of language is the next central metareferential topic of Atonement. The novel as a 
whole places a high importance on the meaning and significance of words. Already on the 
very first pages, the narrative voice describes Briony’s attempts to learn new words with the 
help of dictionaries and thesauri, even if only to then point out that as a result the girl often 
uses constructions which are “inept, but hauntingly so” (6). The passage thus immediately 
demonstrates how nigh impossible it is to grasp the correct meaning of words without 
knowing the context – a highly metareferential statement, especially when presented in a 
novel which focuses on the misconstruction of experiences due to flawed narrative 
frameworks. The passage, however, also shows that the “misuse” of words, or at least their re-
appropriation into new contexts, can also have a strong creative and productive component to 
it, which is what makes Briony’s use of language “haunting”, rather than just ridiculously 
wrong. 
Such deliberations upon the effects of (often misused) language form a recurring pattern 
across the entirety of McEwan’s novel. From words such as ‘divorce’ (cf. e.g. 57), ‘cunt’ (cf. 
e.g. 85-86), ‘maniac’ (cf. e.g. 119), ‘Liars!’ (cf. e.g. 86) to the constant reference to the title 
word of ‘atonement’ itself, the book is filled with expressions the impact of which within the 
culture in which they are spoken (cf. Schank 149) is shown to be world-shattering and life-
changing. After all, it is “mere” words which seal Robbie’s fate: whilst repeatedly asking Lola 
about the name of her rapist, Briony is shown to think that she “wanted [Lola] to say his 
name. To seal the crime, frame it with the victim’s curse, close his fate with the magic of 
naming” (165, my emphasis) – and this seemingly magical power Briony explicitly assigns to 
words is shown to be real. For her naming of Robbie, as well as her mother’s reading of The 
Word at the end of Robbie’s letter to Cecilia (cf. 179) are what decides the young man’s fate. 
And it is Briony’s words “read out loud on her behalf in the Assize Court” (325) which 
“convict” (325) him. 
Going beyond individual words, Atonement also depicts characters wielding entire 
phrases. Trying to reproach Paul Marshall for a glib comment about her parents, Lola asks 
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him to “not talk about them in front of the children” – a phrase which, as the narrative voice 
itself points out, “she must have once overheard, and [now] had uttered in blind faith, like an 
apprentice mouthing the incantation of a magus” (59). This spell-like property of phrases is 
picked up again and again throughout McEwan’s novel, especially in the context of the ‘come 
back to me’ motif. As the narrative voice explains, this phrase used to be originally employed 
by Cecilia to calm child Briony down when the latter was plagued by bad dreams (cf. 43). At 
the end of the novel, however, eighteen-year-old Briony notices that Cecilia has begun to use 
the phrase with Robbie (cf. 349), causing the younger sister to reflect upon “[h]ow easily this 
unthinking family love was forgotten” (349). And yet, if one considers the fact that all these 
interactions between Cecilia and Robbie are eventually revealed to be a figment of old-age 
Briony’s imagination – the transposition of the phrase is not a sign of Cecilia changing the 
focus of her affection but of mature Briony acknowledging the importance of Cecilia’s 
affection for Robbie by gifting the couple the phrase previously reserved for her. 
While Atonement spends a lot of time demonstrating the power of words, it also contains 
a plethora of examples in which words seemingly fail to achieve their function. In addition to 
the overarching themes of misunderstandings and of unsuccessfully trying to use words to 
make sense of the world (to both of which I will come back later), there are many unique and 
individual examples in McEwan’s novel which suggest a certain impotence of language. One 
particularly prominent scene depicts the moments preceding Robbie and Cecilia’s sexual 
intercourse. When he asks her why she is crying, the narrative voice makes the following 
observation: “How could she begin to tell him when so much emotion, so many emotions, 
simply engulfed her? […] They stared at each other in confusion, unable to speak, sensing 
that something delicately established might slip from them […] For the moment, there seemed 
no way out with words.” (134-135) Robbie, eventually, bridges the gap through physical 
contact – words, despite all their power and cultural encoding, seem unable to do so. 
This passage is soon followed by another in which Robbie and Cecilia admit their love 
for each other. In the novel, their exchange is presented as follows: 
She whispered his name with the deliberation of a child trying out the distinct sounds. When 
he replied with her name, it sounded like a new word – the syllables remained the same, the 
meaning was different. Finally he spoke the three simple words that no amount of bad art or 
bad faith can ever quite cheapen. She repeated them, with exactly the same slight emphasis 
on the second word, as though she were the one to say them first. He had no religious belief, 
but it was impossible not to think of an invisible presence or witness in the room, and that 
these words spoken aloud were like signatures on an unseen contract. (136) 
Several things are interesting about this passage. First of all, there is the fact that the narrator 
never actually names the three words in question. And yet they are so inscribed in our cultural 
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repertoire that the reader understands immediately what is meant even without the words ever 
being explicitly voiced. The second interesting thing is the fact that already in this passage, 
only one page further than the previous one discussed, the power of words is immediately re-
instated. Furthermore, their potential for childlike playfulness and for the exploration of new 
ideas and feelings is evoked. Consequently, according to McEwan’s novel, words seem to 
only be impotent – or possibly even only unnecessary – in very specific contexts. 
 
3.1.3 The Roles and Functions of Different Narratives and Styles 
Another trope through which Atonement portrays the power as well as the limitations of 
words, phrases and language is the novel’s depiction of Briony’s writing. Over the course of 
the text, this writing fulfils a variety of functions, one of the most prominent ones being once 
more the attempt to create narratives which help make sense of experiences. A close look at 
the different writing styles Briony chooses to imitate during different stages of her life soon 
makes it clear that Atonement is structured around the depiction of a double-coded process of 
maturing: Briony’s personal growth is mirrored in her ever-developing writing style, which in 
turn through its stylistic homages duplicates the gestation process of the medium of literature 
as a whole. 
 
3.1.3.1 Romantic Beginnings 
When Briony writes her first story at the age of eleven, she is shown to imitate folk tales full 
of innocent, bursting imagination but “lacking, she realised later, the vital knowingness about 
the way of the world which compels a reader’s respect” (6). The deficiency of certain types of 
narratives in regards to understanding the real world is thus thematised right from the 
beginning. It is, however, important to note that the deficiency in this case seems to mostly 
result from Briony’s age-based own lack of “knowingness” rather than from an inherent flaw 
in the folk tale genre as such. 
The next and first work of Briony’s Atonement depicts in detail is the play she writes for 
her brother at the age of thirteen. It represents a sentimental, melodramatic stage of 
development applicable both to Briony, to her writing and to literature as a whole in its early 
days. During this stage, narratives are portrayed as being emotion-driven and filled with 
mysteries. The realities of life and human interactions are always just out of Briony’s grasp 
and understanding – just as they arguably were out of that of literature in general and fiction 
in particular in the early days of these media. Significantly, however, Briony’s first play is 
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also characterised by a highly moralist goal which can be explained as the girl’s desire, in an 
attempt to regain understanding, to force a fixed code of meaning onto a world which eludes 
her.  
Briony’s exact motivation behind her play is relayed as her writing it “for her brother, to 
celebrate his return, provoke his admiration and guide him away from his careless succession 
of girlfriends, towards the right form of wife, the one who would persuade him to return to the 
countryside, the one who would sweetly request Briony’s services as a bridesmaid” (4). In 
other words, in her construction of the play’s narrative, Briony is driven by a rather simplistic 
and naïve view of morality, as well as by her desire for the real world around her to be more 
static, as represented by the girl’s wish for her brother to return home and settle down.  
In the paragraphs which follow this initial explanation, Briony is even more and more 
explicitly described as a character “possessed by a desire to have the world just so” (4), as 
someone with a “controlling demon” (5). Both of these traits she is furthermore shown to 
channel into her approach to authorship, which at the beginning of the novel is all about 
control: 
[A]n unruly world could be made just so. A crisis in a heroine’s life could be made to 
coincide with hailstones, gales and thunder, whereas nuptials were generally blessed with 
good light and soft breezes. A love of order also shaped the principles of justice, with death 
and marriage the main engines of housekeeping, the former being set aside exclusively for 
the morally dubious, the latter reward withheld until the final page. (7) 
Clearly, in her writing, Briony is shown to indulge in the simplistic, highly formulaic nature 
of early literary forms and genres, and to grasp at the order they seemingly bring as a way to 
make up for the changes taking place in her own life (her older sibling’s increasingly common 
absence, her own growing up, etc.).  
McEwan in this context particularly draws attention to the fact that the thirteen-year-old 
girl is on the brink of sexual awakening and of her consequent entry into adulthood: for 
example, describing the significance of weddings in her early stories, the narrative voice 
explains that 
[a] good wedding was an unacknowledged representation of the as yet unthinkable – sexual 
bliss. In the aisles of country churches and grand city cathedrals, witnessed by a whole 
society of approving family and friends, her heroines and heroes reached their innocent 
climaxes and needed to go no further (9, my emphasis).  
Briony’s in-between existence is in fact so closely defined that even her merely two years 
older cousin Lola completely eludes Briony’s understanding, and she does so long before the 
dramatic events which constitute the turning point in Briony’s life. From the moment of her 
appearance, Lola is said to have “full two years’ refinement weigh against [Briony]” (13), 
who “could not keep up with the older girl” (14). And it is not only the seeming maturity of 
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her cousin with which Briony is portrayed to be unable to “keep up”. Her three newly arrived 
young relatives from the North bring a whole avalanche of turmoil with them.  
Firstly, there is the whole idea of their parents’ divorce which the cousins are trying to 
escape through their visit. Briony’s reaction to the concept is described as follows: 
She vaguely knew that divorce was an affliction, but she did not regard it as a proper subject, 
and gave it no thought. It was a mundane unravelling that could not be reversed, and 
therefore offered no opportunities to the storyteller: it belonged in the realm of disorder. 
Marriage was the thing, or rather, a wedding was, with its formal neatness of virtue 
rewarded. […] If divorce had presented itself as the dastardly antithesis of [this], it could 
easily have been cast onto the other pan of the scales, along with betrayal, illness, thieving, 
assault and mendacity. Instead it showed an unglamorous face of dull complexity and 
incessant wrangling […] it was simply not a subject, and when […] Briony […] ran […] out 
into the blinding light of midday, it was not insensitivity so much as a highly focused artistic 
ambition that caused her to shout to the dazed young visitors huddled together by the trap 
with their luggage, ‘I’ve got your parts, all written out. First performance tomorrow. 
Rehearsals start in five minutes’! (9-10, my emphasis) 
In other words, for the order-loving Briony, divorce is the manifestation of an ungraspably 
chaotic concept, in real life as well as in writing. The ability to make sense and the ability to 
narrate are depicted here as one and the same. The writing traditions with which Briony is 
familiar at this point do not present her with any tools to process the concept, so she ignores 
the subject in her works as well as in real life.  
Briony’s desire for order and control is furthermore presented as one of the main reasons 
for her shift from the prose of folk tales to the dramatic style of plays. In the narrative voice’s 
words, “it was a relief [for the girl] not to be writing out the she saids, or describing the 
weather or the onset of spring or her heroine’s face […] A universe reduced to what was said 
in it was tidiness indeed, almost to the point of nullity” (8, my emphasis). Briony’s approach 
to the play’s creation is finally also described as being of an “innocent intensity” (8) – a 
surely fitting description since Briony’s views on drama are highly influenced by said 
innocence. After all, the idea of drama as something “tidy” and controlled is merely an 
illusion. And Briony is confronted with that fact as soon as her actors come into play.  
Already her cousins’ red hair and freckles oppose Briony’s concept as well as literary 
sensibilities of what a heroine, hero and villain should look like (cf. 10). And once the 
children’s utter lack of acting potential is revealed, Briony is quickly forced to realise “the 
chasm that lay between an idea and its execution” (17). This realisation and her consequently 
ever-increasing lack of control keep troubling Briony throughout rehearsals, triggering further 
explicit poetological reflections as the girl re-evaluates her views on prose: 
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A story was direct and simple, allowing nothing to come between herself and her reader – no 
intermediaries with their private ambitions or incompetence, no pressures of time, no limits 
on resources. In a story you only had to wish, you only had to write it down and you could 
have the world […] a story was a form of telepathy. By means of inking symbols on a page, 
she was able to send thoughts and feelings from her mind to her reader’s. It was a magical 
process, so commonplace that no one stopped to wonder at it. Reading a sentence and 
understanding it were the same thing […] There was no gap during which the symbols were 
unravelled. You saw the word castle, and it was there […]. (37, my emphasis) 
This view of prose as one-to-one, immediate telepathy is of course highly innocent and naïve 
once more – for what an author sees when he or she writes ‘castle’ is very different from what 
reader A sees when he or she reads the word, which in turn differs from what reader B sees 
when he or she does the same. Still, by the time her theatre production disintegrates 
completely, Briony is convinced that her problem lies not just with the unsuitable cousins but 
with the whole genre of drama per se (cf. 45). As a result, once Briony abandons the project 
and leaves the house to let off steam by beating nettles with a stick, it is described that, 
eventually, “play writing itself became a nettle, became several in fact; the shallowness, the 
wasted time, the messiness of other minds, the hopelessness of pretending – in the garden of 
the arts, it was a weed and had to die” (74). 
Additionally, Briony’s authorial wish to exert control does not end with the content of her 
works but it is shown to influence her writing process as well. In fact, it is explained that only 
when a work is entirely finished and wrapped up fully to her liking, is she able to share its 
existence with the world: 
[O]nce she had begun a story, no one could be told. Pretending in words was too tentative, 
too vulnerable, too embarrassing to let anyone know. Even writing out the she saids, the and 
thens, made her wince, and she felt foolish, appearing to know about the emotions of an 
imaginary being. Self-exposure was inevitable the moment she described a character’s 
weakness; the reader was bound to speculate that she was describing herself. What other 
authority could she have? Only when a story was finished, all fates resolved, and the whole 
matter sealed off at both ends so it resembled, at least in this one respect, every other 
finished story in the world, could she feel immune, and ready to […] take the finished work 
to show to her mother, or her father, when he was home. (6, my emphasis) 
This particularly explicit metareferential passage says a lot about Briony’s immature approach 
to writing and even about early approaches to writing in general. It is still clumsy, so 
characterised by insecurities and fears about presumptuousness or revealing too much about 
oneself that the writer is forced to resort to established norms and rules to feel safe and in 
control.  
Before I move on to the next stage of Briony’s literary development one last aspect of her 
youthful creativity needs to be mentioned. Interestingly enough, whilst Briony uses writing at 
this stage of her life to try to arrange the world to her liking, her use of her imagination for the 
purposes of that writing is also shown as something which provides her with secrets (cf. 6) 
       
48 
 
and indulges passions in her (cf. 5) which otherwise would have run dry as a result of the 
girl’s highly orderly nature. At one point, Briony herself is depicted to wonder, “[w]asn’t 
writing a kind of soaring, an achievable form of flight, of fancy, of the imaginations?” (157). 
In other words, Atonement portrays writing as a bursting creative outlet as well as as a control 
mechanism. 
The first signs of Briony (and the medium of literature) entering a next developmental 
stage can be observed during the girl’s witnessing of the fountain scene. As Briony has her 
epiphany about the naivety of fairy-tale castles, she immediately attempts to change her 
approach to writing. Once again, perception, sense-making and narration are depicted as 
nearly congruous. Deliberating upon how she could capture the scene, cognitively as well as 
literarily, Briony decides that she would have to write the scene several times from different 
perspectives: 
[H]er excitement was in the prospect of freedom, of being delivered from the cumbrous 
struggle between good and bad, heroes and villains. None of these three was bad, nor were 
they particularly good. She need not judge. There did not have to be a moral. She need only 
show separate minds, as alive as her own, struggling with the idea that other minds were 
equally alive. It wasn’t only wickedness and scheming that made people unhappy, it was 
confusion and misunderstanding; above all, it was the failure to grasp the simple truth that 
other people are as real as you. And only in a story could you enter these different minds and 
show how they had an equal value. That was the only moral a story need have. (40) 
Thus, at this particular moment, Briony’s developmental stage jumps away from a moralist to 
a much more modern(ist) phase of writing. For the first time, she considers the style which 
elderly Briony, once she has mastered it, will eventually refer to as “impartial psychological 
realism” (41). This realisation marks an important step in the girl’s personal development for, 
as some scholars such as Stephen John Read and Lynn Carol Miller have argued, “the ability 
to take the perspective of the other, to recognize that other people are conscious, intentional 
actors like oneself is a fundamental part of being human. Without that awareness, one is 
unable to function as a social creature” (140). In fact, McEwan himself in an interview with 
The Guardian has expressed in relation to 9/11 the belief that “[i]f the hijackers had been able 
to imagine themselves into the thoughts and feelings of the passengers, they would have been 
unable to proceed. […] Imagining what it is like to be someone other than yourself is at the 
core of our humanity” (quoted in Finney 80; cf. also Weidle 60). 
Unfortunately for Robbie and Cecilia, in Atonement, thirteen-year-old Briony is not yet 
mature enough to be able to act in accordance with her epiphany. The newly discovered 
complexity of the world only makes her want to understand and through that to control it even 
more. For example, as the narrative voice explains, the whole reason why Briony soon after 
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the fountain scene opens Robbie’s letter addressed to Cecilia is the fact that “the writer she 
had only that day become needed to know, to understand everything that came her way” (180, 
my emphasis). Clearly, for the young girl at this point in time, understanding is still linked to 
the idea of uncovering a simple, meaningful and narratable truth. Consequently, as the fateful 
day progresses and Briony finds herself under more and more pressure, she immediately 
resumes attempting to understand other people’s minds and stories based on her own 
experiences and value systems, immediately forgetting “that other people are as real as you”. 
As soon as Briony reads Robbie’s confounding letter, her coping mechanism of 
processing information through writing and through formulating narratives is triggered. As 
the narrator puts it, “[s]he needed to be alone to consider Robbie afresh, and to frame the 
opening paragraph of a story shot through with real life” (113, my emphasis). “At that 
moment”, the narrative voice continues, 
the urge to be writing was stronger than any notion she had of what she might write. What 
she wanted was to be lost to the unfolding of an irresistible idea […] But how to do justice to 
the changes that had made her into a real writer at last, and to her chaotic swarm of 
impressions, and to the disgust and fascination she felt? Order must be imposed. (115)  
In other words, (temporary) epiphany or not, young Briony at this point in the novel has still 
not actively abandoned her notion of writing as a means to create order. Based on this scene, 
Atonement suggests that the grasping for narratives is a reflex, an instinct – both for Briony 
and for all of humanity.  
It needs to be noted, however, that Briony in this scene is also at least portrayed as 
mature enough to doubt her own responsive behaviour and to question whether it is “too 
childish to say there had to be a story” (115). She instantly reminds herself that she is now 
supposed to be “above such nursery-tale ideas as good and evil” (115). Still, as these early 
passages of Atonement show, having a realisation and being able to adapt your entire 
cognitive framework to it are two separate things, and young Briony is clearly still incapable 
of operating within her new belief system. At this moment in the story she is entirely unable 
to “forgive Robbie his disgusting mind” (115) – possibly because for someone whose mind is 
so obsessed with control, the idea of an unruly mind is particularly threatening.  
Uncertain about what to do, Briony therefore just sits, pen poised, torn between the wish 
to write a diary entry for herself and a desire to create something bigger. Whilst doing so, she 
wonders how she could possibly ever put all the feelings involved onto paper. For while 
Briony is said to be comfortable with dialogues and descriptions, feelings in their complexity 
still elude her (cf. 116). Eventually, she is forced to temporarily give up, conceding that 
“[w]riting a story was a hopeless, puny enterprise when such powerful and chaotic forces 
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were turning about her, and when all day long successive events had absorbed or transformed 
what had gone before” (121). This focus on the mysterious and incomprehensible nature of 
the events of the day expresses most succinctly what it is about her experiences that is causing 
Briony so much trouble: while the series of events have happened consecutively, from the 
girl’s perspective they are so confusing that they seemingly lack causality, and thus lack the 
traditional structural base of sense-making narratives. 
By the end of part one of the novel, with more and more chaos erupting around her, 
Briony eventually overcomes her feelings of hopelessness by grasping for the last narrative 
straw which can help her young mind make sense of events: the idea of Robbie as a villain. 
Despite her assertions that she is now acknowledging the complexities of adulthood, Briony 
thus reinstates her authorial control by reverting to the moralistic patterns of her childhood, 
demonstrating just how difficult it is to outgrow cultural narratives that have shaped our 
development. While she is roaming the grounds looking for her runaway cousins, Briony’s 
fancy runs wild. She not only imagines evil Robbie lurking and waiting to attack her (cf. 157), 
she not only fantasizes about the state in which she will find the boys (cf. 156), but she also 
immediately wonders how she would afterwards describe the scene in her writings. Through 
Atonement’s focalised narration, she exclaims that “[t]here was nothing she could not 
describe” (156), not even Robbie’s maniac behaviour, once she has had the time to find the 
right way of “conjuring [Robbie] safely onto paper” (157). In other words, as much as she is 
worried about her sister and cousins, Briony seems to almost delight in the revelation that 
Robbie is an evil man, for it presents her with a perfect villain for her story (cf. 158), a villain 
she can frame as the cause of all the chaos.  
Briony’s casting of Robbie in the role of the villain once more shows that the 
developmental and narrative transition from traditional black-and-white morality to 
modern(ist) psychological complexity is a slow and multi-staged process. Rather than 
immediately arriving at a state free from the simplistic concepts of both good and evil, Briony 
is depicted as only having grown as much as to recognise that good and evil in real life are 
more complicated than in fairy tales. For Briony, Robbie is consequently a prime example of 
such a complex evil pretending to be good:  
The pretence, and how she ached to expose it! Real life, her life now beginning, had sent her 
a villain in the form of an old family friend […] That seemed about right – truth was strange 
and deceptive, it had to be struggled for […] This was exactly what no one would have 
expected, and of course – villains were not announced with hisses or soliloquies, they did not 
come cloaked in black, with ugly expressions […]. (158) 
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Thus while acknowledging certain complexities of life, the young girl still holds on to the 
belief that behind those complexities exists a clear-cut truth, which one merely needs to find. 
No traces are left at this moment in time of her initial epiphany that she should write the 
fountain scene from three different perspectives since they would all be equally valid. 
Eventually, Briony summarises her experiences of the day as follows: 
Her childhood had ended […] The fairy stories were behind her, and in the space of a few 
hours she had witnessed mysteries, seen an unspeakable word, interrupted brutal behaviour, 
and by incurring the hatred of an adult [Robbie] whom everyone had trusted, she had 
become a participant in the drama of life beyond the nursery. All she had to do now was 
discover the stories, not just the subjects, but a way of unfolding them, that would do justice 
to her new knowledge. (160, my emphasis) 
One final time in Atonement’s part one, the focus is thus put on the idea of growing up 
through the acquisition of new knowledge of the world. Yet at this stage of the novel, that 
knowledge is also still depicted as something which does exists, as something which might 
need to be “discovered” and “unfolded” but which is undoubtedly there. 
 
3.1.3.2 War and Impressionism 
Part two of the novel marks the first serious break in style within Atonement and with it the 
almost essayist explicitness of the metareferences nearly disappears. As the story moves on to 
depict the events of Robbie’s last few days as a soldier in World War II (his only way of 
achieving an early release from prison having been to join the infantry), the narrative style 
moves away from long passages of poetological deliberations. Instead, it focuses on depicting 
events and scenery in a much more impressionistic manner, with feelings and memories 
interspersed on the basis of more or less random associations. Furthermore, even on the few 
occasions on which actual inner thought-monologues are still portrayed, their flow is much 
more impressionistic (cf. e.g. 202) and not comparable with the essayist nature of the ones 
portrayed in part one.  
Another striking difference observable in part two of the novel is the fact that 
 the clear structure of the narrative itself is dropped as the idea of chapters is left behind and 
as transitions between sections become more fluid. Overall, part two adopts a much more 
Modernist style. It even includes a two-page text block of almost stream-of-consciousness-
like quality when Robbie succumbs to a wound-induced, mind-distorting fever (cf. 261-262) 
foreshadowed a good dozen of pages earlier when Robbie is said to notice that something is 
going wrong with his mind in the following manner: “Periodically, something slipped. Some 
everyday principle of continuity, the humdrum element that told him where he was in his own 
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story, faded from his use, abandoning him to a waking dream in which there were thoughts, 
but no sense of who was having them” (246).  
The stylistic change of Atonement’s second part, while at first glance a strong break from 
the first, is in fact – once Briony’s (metafictional) authorship of the whole text is revealed – 
the logical continuation of the personal-development-through-narrative-development motif. 
Over the years, Briony’s fountain-scene realisations are shown to (have) slowly be(en) 
incorporated into her writing. The style of Atonement’s first part, having been proven as 
unsuitable for the narration of chaotic events, is abandoned by elderly Briony for a style with 
hopefully better potential to capture the horrific and disjointed experience of war. 
Part two of Atonement opens with the following line: “There were horrors enough, but it 
was the unexpected detail that threw [Robbie] and afterwards would not let him go” (191). 
And it is exactly these horrific details of Robbie’s retreat towards Dunkirk, such as his 
random discovery of a child’s leg hanging from a tree (cf. 192), which mature Briony tries to 
capture and convey through the stylistic change. Rather than focusing on narrative as a means 
of chaining up events in order to uncover their causality, the fictional author this time tries to 
make “sense” of experiences by presenting them as “authentically” and close to Robbie’s 
perspective as humanly possible. For even though this part of the novel abandons young 
Briony’s views on the power of certain types of narratives, it does not abandon the idea that 
narratives, literacy and words in general are powerful. 
No matter how big the stylistic and thematic break from the previous part of the novel, 
the central role of language and documents does not disappear in part two of Atonement. 
Throughout their retreat towards Dunkirk, Robbie (in this part only referred to as Turner to 
clearly demarcate his role as a soldier as well as his transition into adulthood) is shown to be 
the only member of his three-men troupe who keeps clinging on to and constantly consulting 
a map (cf. e.g. 191, 214-215). In the context of a different novel, this could easily be 
interpreted fully heteroreferentially as merely being due to the fact that he is the only soldier 
knowledgeable enough to read a map. In the metareferentially dense framework of 
Atonement, however, Robbie’s holding on to a written document becomes something more. 
Similarly to young Briony’s use of texts for orientation and (regaining of) control, Robbie 
here refers to the map in an attempt to find a sense of direction – in the figural as much as in 
the literal, geographical sense of the word. Furthermore, just like Briony’s writing used to at 
least partially isolate her from her surroundings (cf. 68, 75), Robbie is shown to think that “in 
their [the other two soldiers’] company the map was his only privacy” (192). Additionally, the 
reading of the map is not exclusively portrayed as a comforting experience for Robbie, but it 
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depicts troubling qualities of the terrain as well (cf. 214). It furthermore does not actually 
fully represent reality since it in no way contains the horrors of war which Robbie encounters 
in the marked places. Once again, the narrative voice thus makes sure to demonstrate that 
while texts can provide us with guidelines and support, they do not relay an accurate truth. 
The intensity of the support that they can provide, however, is not in any way diminished 
by this fact. Other than the physical map, Robbie is also repeatedly portrayed as using 
Cecilia’s letters and words as a means to keep himself going. Furthermore, he draws on his 
previously decried academic knowledge of lyrical metre to provide him with a point of 
reference: Trying to distract himself from all the death and refugees he encounters during the 
retreat and to instead focus on the basic goal of his journey, Robbie is shown to come up with 
a rhythm for his march: “He walked / across / the land / until / he came / to the sea. A 
hexameter. Five iambs and an anapaest was the beat he tramped to now” (219). More than just 
through their contents, texts are thus shown to be able to provide support even through their 
formal aspects by adding structure and familiarity to even the most horrific of experiences. 
In addition to commenting on the power of pre-existing tropes and narratives, the second 
part of Atonement also once more engages with the supportive potential of stories we create 
within our minds. While in part one of the novel flights of fancy are depicted as something 
univocally empowering (cf. e.g. 157), Robbie’s imagination during the war is shown to be a 
double-edged sword which causes him pain by constantly bringing up flashbacks and images 
of horrific scenes he is trying to forget (cf. e.g. 194, 199, 202, 204). And yet, even whilst 
contributing to his nightmares, Robbie’s imagination is also portrayed as one of his main 
sources of hope: it helps him envision his future life with Cecilia to keep himself sane and 
helps him visualise water when he is suffering from dehydration (cf. 238). Finally, as 
Robbie’s mind begins to deteriorate and both reality and words begin to carry less and less 
weight, it is his imagination which brings him peace, making his hopes and fantasies seem 
near-tangible: “The more he described, the more certain he was that the room [he was 
dreaming of] was close by. His words were bringing it into being.” (259)  
As well as deriving support from his literacy and imagination, Robbie is further depicted 
as drawing life from his knowledge of the French language, which enables him to serve as 
interpreter and to converse with the French locals. Thus even amidst the unspeakable horrors 
of war, language is shown to be still a powerful tool which makes interaction and survival 
amidst strangers possible and helps create a sense of a communal spirit (cf. 198-201). This 
last idea is portrayed at its strongest and most explicit when Robbie and his squad are shown 
to spend the night at a French farmhouse. Once the two middle-aged sons of the French 
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family learn that Robbie speaks their language, they start telling him of the destruction they 
have witnessed, clearly in need to vent their experience over drinks (cf. 198-199). The idea of 
processing trauma through storytelling is thus established in this passage23. However, once the 
Frenchmen have finished their stories, Robbie is also said to “th[ink] about telling them of his 
own single, haunting detail [the leg]. But he didn’t want to add to the horror, and nor did he 
want to give life to the image while it remained at distance, held there by wine and 
companionship” (199). Communication and social interaction are thus depicted as a complex 
matter. Yes, in one way or another they provide relief for all men present – but depending on 
the men they do so in different ways: The French brothers they provide with an opportunity to 
share their experiences, Robbie they provide with a distraction from his own experiences as 
well as with the instinctive safe haven of camaraderie. Either way, the impact of the discovery 
of a common language is depicted as undeniably powerful. In fact, as Atonement’s description 
of Robbie’s journey progresses, the ever increasing failure of language and communication is 
specifically used to symbolise the increasing deterioration of both the retreat in general and of 
Robbie himself. 
In addition to all these rather abstract references to language, imagination and narratives 
as such, the second part of Atonement furthermore once again employs specific intertextual 
references to convey its (metareferential) message. In accordance with the section’s overall 
motif of what type of narratives suit the depiction of war, the referenced works in part two are 
however very different from those mentioned in the first part of the novel. Part one’s 
conversations between Robbie and Cecilia about novels such as Clarissa are replaced in part 
two by exchanges the two of them have about poems they share through letters.  
While Robbie’s interest in poetry is already mentioned in earlier passages of the novel, in 
part two of Atonement the intertextual references to poems go into much more detail than just 
namedropping classic authors: when Robbie is lying awake at night, grasping his pocket 
which holds Cecilia’s letters, it is one particular line of the last poem she has sent him (“In 
Memory of W. B. Yeats” (1940) by W. H. Auden) that is shown to rise to the surface of his 
mind: “In the nightmare of the dark, All the dogs of Europe bark” (203); another line from the 
same poem appears in his head when he is imagining how after the war he will find Cecilia 
and his father: “In the deserts of the heart/Let the healing fountain start” (242); finally, when 
Robbie remembers Cecilia running after him after his arrest, it is once again a poem quotation 
(from the eighteenth poem of A. E. Housman’s A Shropshire Lad (1896)) that he is reminded 
                                                 
23 For more on Atonement’s portrayal of trauma as linked to narrative cf. also Crosthwaite as well as Letissier. 
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of: “Oh, when I was in love with you, Then I was clean and brave” (262). Throughout these 
passages, Robbie’s connection to poetry demonstrates that even if traditional narratives have 
their flaws, not all literary phrases are empty and meaningless. For even if they are unable to 
present factual, practical solutions to problems, they can still serve as an outlet for emotions, 
as a way to feel connected and understood, and as a general subliminal beacon of light in 
times of turmoil and darkness.  
Another function of poetry and literature in general depicted in Atonement’s second part 
is once more that of literary tropes and motifs being able to serve as a common language 
between two people. During Robbie’s incarceration, he and Cecilia are portrayed as 
repeatedly referencing literary works to communicate their strong emotions to each other in 
letters without having the censoring instances of the prison system catch them:  
So they wrote about literature, and used characters as codes. At Cambridge, they had passed 
each other by in the street. All those books, those happy or tragic couples they had never met 
to discuss! Tristan and Isolde, the Duke Orsino and Olivia (and Malvolio too [Robbie had 
performed that role once at a university staging of the play]), Troilus and Criseyde, Mr. 
Knightley and Emma, Venus and Adonis. Turner and Tallis. Once, in despair, he referred to 
Prometheus, chained to a rock, his liver devoured daily by a vulture. Sometimes she was 
patient Griselde. Mention of ‘a quiet corner in a library’ was a code for sexual ecstasy. (204) 
As this passage alone shows, a full in-depth analysis of every intertextual reference in 
Atonement would go far beyond the capabilities of this single chapter24. As a summary of the 
overall function of those references, however, it can be said that the novel’s core idea of 
literature as a common, multi-coded cultural framework is once more reiterated. Furthermore, 
by adding “Turner and Tallis” to the list of famous couples, both Atonement’s fictional writer 
Briony and its real author McEwan acknowledge Robbie and Cecilia’s relationship as being 
in-line with the classics, and in the process position their story within a century-spanning 
literary tradition. 
As multiple of my last few examples show, another central topic of Atonement’s second 
part is the discussion of letters and of the complex nature of communication through this 
textual medium. Restricted by circumstances – first by Robbie’s incarceration, then by his 
being sent off to war – Robbie and Cecilia’s entire relationship is in fact depicted as evolving 
almost exclusively through their letters to each other. And the quality and success of these 
exchanges is shown to vary, especially when combined with actual in-person conversations. 
Atonement’s study of epistolary communication begins with the following portrayal of 
Robbie and Cecilia’s writing to each other during Robbie’s time in prison: 
                                                 
24 For more detailed analyses of McEwan’s use of intertextual references cf. e.g. Adams, Ann Marie; Alden; 
Bastin; Behrman; D’Angelo; Finney; Grmelová; Head; Ingersoll; Marcus; Pedot; Robinson; Wells. 
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He described the prison routine in every aspect, but he never told her of its stupidity. That 
was plain enough. He never told her that he feared he might go under. That too was clear. 
She never wrote that she loved him, though she would have if she thought it would get 
through. But he knew it. (205) 
In other words, the focus of this passage is to show that communication involves much more 
than the words written on a page, and that it is possible for thoughts to remain unspoken 
without them remaining unknown. Once the initial connection between the characters has 
been established, both Robbie and Cecilia are portrayed as capable of reading between each 
other’s lines and of understanding each other’s deepest meanings. In the highly 
metareferential context of the rest of Atonement, this passage thus implicitly draws attention 
to the processes of reading and interpretation in general, and to the complex ways in which all 
signs communicate meaning. 
The second striking aspect of Robbie and Cecilia’s letter exchange is the fact that the 
narratives the couple create in their writings eventually begin to impact and even hinder their 
face-to-face relationship. When Robbie and Cecilia meet for the first time in person once he is 
released from prison and just before he departs for the war, their interaction – in stark contrast 
to their letter-based communication – unfolds far from smoothly. Suddenly, all the 
awkwardness from the first part of the novel is back and the two have to realise “how far they 
ha[ve] run ahead of themselves in their letters. This moment had been imagined and desired 
for too long, and could not measure up.” (205). Thus Atonement once again points out the 
discrepancy between reality and the narrative-based images we construct in our minds. The 
discrepancy is in fact portrayed as being so strong that it results in an utter loss for words 
which once more needs to be overcome through physical contact (cf. 206).  
As a result of this experience, Robbie and Cecilia from this point onward are depicted as 
holding back on “wild intimacies” (207) in their letters, “[i]mpatient with living on the page, 
mindful of the difficulties, they were wary of getting ahead […] they tried not to dream it 
away in their letters” (207). In other words, this passage reaffirms the just established idea 
that the relationship between reality and narratives is a precarious one for the force of one can 
diminish the other. And while the just mentioned quotes mostly suggest that flights of fancy 
can make reality seem bleak in comparison, subsequent passages in Atonement prove that a 
harsh reality can equally result in words becoming “bleached” and “colourless through 
overuse” (226).  
Most saliently, when Robbie’s war trauma begins to deteriorate his mind, this 
deterioration manifests as an increasing doubt in the meaning of the words which up to this 
point have helped keep him sane and alive. When Robbie is at his worst, even the memory of 
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Cecilia’s whisper of “I’ll wait for you. Come back.” causes him to remark: “The words were 
not meaningless, but they didn’t touch him now. […] Waiting. Simply one person doing 
nothing, over time […] She was waiting, yes, but then what? He tried to make her voice say 
the words, but it was his own he heard […] He could not even form her face” (261). Only 
when he calms down again and manages to temporarily subdue his trauma-based despair, 
does Robbie acknowledge that “of course he saw how fine it really was that she was waiting. 
[…] I’ll wait for you was elemental. It was the reason he had survived” (264). 
 
3.1.3.3 Growth beyond Modernism 
Soon after this scene, the novel’s narrative leaves Robbie’s war experience behind and moves 
on to the portrayal of Briony’s war experience as a trainee nurse in London. This third part of 
Atonement introduces a new major stylistic change, once more mirroring Briony’s personal 
development with a development in her writing style. Specifically, Atonement’s third part is 
characterised by a shift towards an increasingly realistic and physical approach to 
descriptions. Part three is as a result by far the goriest and bloodiest section of the novel. 
While part one is characterised by Briony’s innocence and the seeming purity of the calm-
before-the-storm English landscape, and while part two focuses on Robbie’s psychological 
turmoil in France much more than on any actual violence (the brutal scenes portraying the leg 
in the tree or Robbie’s festering wound are all painful to read because of his emotional 
response, not because of any actual gory details), part three of Atonement makes use of very 
detailed physical descriptions to convey the suffering of the soldiers – and by extension of 
Briony – in the London hospital (cf. e.g. 296-297, 301-302). These anatomically detailed 
depictions of mutilated bodies as well as of Briony’s close bodily contact with them introduce 
an entirely new lexical field to the narrative and form a strong contrast to Briony’s mental 
state in part one, where the mere mention of the word ‘cunt’ caused her to fall apart. 
Another significant stylistic feature of part three of Atonement is the fact that due to the 
story’s renewed focus on Briony’s life and her growth as a writer, this section soon 
reintroduces the highly explicitly metareferential poetological statements so characteristic of 
the novel’s first part. For even as Briony is shown to have left her family and previous life 
behind, she is also depicted as still permeated by a need for writing. As the narrative voice 
explains, the ‘real’ Briony can still only be found within her notebook: “Here, behind the 
name badge and uniform, was her true self, secretly hoarded, quietly accumulating. She had 
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never lost that childhood pleasure in seeing pages covered in her own handwriting. It almost 
didn’t matter what she wrote” (280).  
What she does write, meanwhile, are “artistic manifestos, trivial complaints, character 
sketches and simple accounts of her day which increasingly shade[] off into fantasy” (280) as 
Briony’s changing of the names of people involved for the sake of protecting their identity 
seems to permit her conscience to unshackle her imagination from any constraints posed by 
veracity: 
[H]aving changed the names it became easier to transform the circumstances and invent. She 
liked to write out what she imagined to be their rambling thoughts. She was under no 
obligation to truth, she had promised no one a chronicle. This was the only place she could 
be free. […] At the time, the journal preserved her dignity: she might look and behave like 
and live the life of a trainee nurse, but she was really an important writer in disguise. And at 
a time when she was cut off from everything she knew […] writing was the thread of 
continuity. (280) 
This passage, in a highly condensed manner, exemplifies all the changes to and continuities 
within Briony’s approach to writing at this point in her life. While she is still interested in 
imagining other people’s inner lives, she no longer presumes to be uncovering universal truths 
about them in the process. She is furthermore writing mostly for herself to keep having a 
‘self’, and not anymore to morally educate others or to garner their attention. Finally, while 
Briony still needs to imagine herself as an “important writer in disguise”, she has also learned 
to subordinate this need in her everyday life to the practical needs of the people around her, of 
the hospital and soldiers. In short, young Briony’s approach to authorship as a way of 
becoming a god-like focal point of her surroundings is gone, and the idea of using narratives 
to control reality is reduced to its bare minimum of providing continuity for her self. 
The next lengthy passages in part three of Atonement which are highly and explicitly 
metareferential refer to Briony’s first attempts at having some of her work published. These 
passages continue the motif of Briony’s overlapping literary and personal development whilst 
also introducing the idea of the literary business as an industry for the first time. The text 
Briony tries to submit to the magazine Horizon is a novella portraying the events of the 
fountain scene from the three different perspectives of the people present, exactly as her 
younger self had imagined it. As the narrative voice explicitly points out, this novella is 
furthermore heavily influenced by Modernist literature, and specifically by the works of 
Virginia Woolf. These influences are what, according to the text, has helped Briony to finally 
let go of her search for certainties and to instead focus on “thought, perception, sensations” 
(281) and “the conscious mind as a river through time” (281). In other words, through the first 
text she endeavours to publish, Briony is shown to attempt to fully embrace her epiphany that 
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“[t]he age of clear answers was over. So was the age of characters and plots” (281) and to 
infuse it into her writing. And yet, even with this attempt at a new style, Briony’s 
development into a mature author and human being is nowhere near complete. 
During the early days of this new stage of her personal and literary growth, Briony is still 
portrayed as being particularly proud of her novella’s “design, the pure geometry and the 
defining uncertainty [of] which reflected, she thought, a modern sensibility” (281, my 
emphasis). That is to say, the young woman is still depicted as clinging to overly formulaic 
literary traditions, even if she has replaced the eighteenth-century tropes with twentieth-
century ones. Unsurprisingly, Horizon rejects Briony’s story with encouraging words about 
her talent but with criticism towards her owing “a little too much to the techniques of Mrs 
Woolf” (312), having “thrown the baby of fictional technique out with the folk-tale water” 
(313) and having written a novella which lacks “the backbone of a story” (314). The editors’ 
general advice is, in fact, best summed up in his following suggestion:  
[R]ather than dwell for quite so long on the perceptions of each of the three figures, would it 
not be possible to set them before us with greater economy, still keeping some of the vivid 
writing about light and stone and water which you do so well – but then move on to create 
some tension, some light and shade within the narrative itself. Your most sophisticated 
readers might be well up on the latest Bergsonian theories of consciousness, but I’m sure 
they retain a childlike desire to be told a story, to be held in suspense, to know what happens. 
(314-315) 
In other words, Horizon’s editor defends the concepts of ‘structure’ and ‘narrative’ and 
presents them as a basic human need, “a childlike desire” inherent to all readers, even the 
most medium- and psychology-savvy ones.  
If one compares all the advice of the rejection letter (cf. 311-315) to the way in which the 
fountain scene is presented in part one of Atonement and thus supposedly is finally written by 
aged Briony, it becomes clear that, eventually, the mature writer will choose to follow many 
of the editor’s suggestions. This transforms the rejection letter from a mere extra-
compositional metareferential comment on the topic of literary styles (or rejection letters) to a 
particularly self-referential intra-compositional reference to the stylistic choices made within 
Atonement itself. Before Briony matures enough to be able to perform the edit, however, her 
initial response to the feedback she receives is to criticise herself for writing the novella in the 
first place.  
While generally receptive to the editors’ stylistic critique, Briony’s thoughts soon zero in 
on the personal and motivational flaws she perceives in her work. Specifically, she begins to 
chastise herself for having attempted to “obscure [her crime] by concocting a slight, barely 
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clever fiction” (320) and for trying to “satisfy her vanity by sending [the novella] off to a 
magazine” (320). Or as the narrative exposes her cogitations:  
Did she really think she could hide behind some borrowed notions of modern writing, and 
drown her guilt in a stream – three streams! – of consciousness? The evasions of her little 
novel were exactly those of her life. Everything she did not wish to confront was also 
missing from her novella – and was necessary to it. […] It was not the backbone of a story 
that she lacked. It was backbone. (320) 
In short, this passage suggests that the reasons for trainee-nurse Briony’s use of narrative 
tropes are actually quite different from the reasons which motivated her thirteen-year-old 
self’s use of literary formulas. The formulaic writing here is shown not only to not be helping 
her to make sense of her experiences but to be – quite the opposite – actively obfuscating 
events so that Briony can avoid having to engage with the deeper meaning of her own actions. 
Possibly as a result of this increased self-awareness of her abuse of literary tropes, or 
possibly simply due to her change of life-style once she fully enters the nurse training 
programme, Briony’s indulgence in literary works is barely ever mentioned again for the rest 
of Atonement’s third part. Consequently, the number of intertextual references in this section 
declines drastically. Instead, Briony is depicted as beginning to draw more and more 
inspiration for her notebook writings from her everyday experiences and observations rather 
than from literary predecessors. Still, it is said that sometimes, just before falling asleep, 
“Briony contemplated a ghostly parallel life in which she was at Girton, reading Milton” 
(275). Passages such as this suggest that literature and Briony’s previous academic ambitions 
thus never entirely lose their value for her as points of reference. They are, however, clearly 
designated to a space outside of the realm of her reality. 
In addition to introducing overall stylistic changes, part three of Atonement continues 
many of the novel’s previously established motifs and shows how they fit into Briony’s new 
stage of development. For example, the idea of word mantras as something a person can hold 
on to once again makes its appearance. Similarly to Robbie repeating Cecilia’s phrases to 
himself during the war, the porters at Briony’s hospital are said to constantly repeat the line 
“Cheer up love, it might never happen” (269) like a desperate prayer, hoping to ward off the 
war. And while Briony initially detests this behaviour, once the men stop saying the phrase 
because the war has happened, she misses the expression and its consoling nature, which she 
eventually acknowledges (cf. 269). Soon, overwhelmed by the terrible condition of one of the 
soldiers at the hospital, Briony herself is shown to start repeating the empty phrase of “We’ll 
soon have you fixed” (301, 302) to her patients as a way to keep herself from breaking down.  
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Part three of Atonement furthermore continues to emphasise how powerful words can be 
even when used amidst the violence and pain of war. For example, when Briony removes a 
shrapnel piece from a soldier’s leg, he asks her to rinse the metal shard so he can take it home, 
after which he begins to sob. The narrative voice explains this behaviour with the words that 
“[i]t may have been the word home, as well as the pain” (300) that brought on the tears. 
Furthermore, the idea of temporary reprieve from terror through communicative venting is 
picked up in part three as well when “[m]en coming round from amputations seemed 
compelled to make terrible jokes” such as “What am I going to kick the missus with now?” 
(304). Finally, the potentially violent nature of words is once more depicted as well. 
Leading up to the shrapnel-removing procedure, the soldier in question is portrayed as 
repeatedly swearing (cf. 299) due to being in pain. And whilst he initially keeps catching 
himself and apologizing for his bad language (cf. 299), eventually, when Briony pulls the first 
piece of shrapnel out of his body, he cannot help himself but scream out a loud “Fuck!” (299). 
The reaction on the ward is described as follows: “The escaped word ricocheted around the 
ward and seemed to repeat itself several times. There was silence, or at least a lowering of 
sound beyond the screens” (300, my emphasis). That one word, ‘fuck’, stemming from the 
same lexical field as the initial world-shattering ‘cunt’, is thus shown to still have the ability 
to shock. Through the imagery of the “ricochet” and the consequent silence the word is even 
compared to a bullet itself. Eventually, the scene ends in a head nurse coming over and 
reprimanding the soldier for his language, demanding he stop acting like a coward and treat 
his nurse with more respect – a reprimand which he, despite his agony, acknowledges by 
remaining silent for the rest of the procedure (cf. 300). Thus, even in times of war and crisis, 
words and their use are portrayed as still being a vehicle for cultural values and norms (e.g. in 
regards to what is appropriate behaviour in front of a woman). And abandoning these values, 
under any circumstances, is presented as worse than any pain. 
Another interesting word-related motif which reappears in part three of Atonement is that 
of the significance of names. In Briony’s hospital, nurses are outright forbidden by “hallowed 
rule” (271) to give their first name to patients to the point where they get punished and/or 
reassigned for doing so (cf. 271-272, 275). This circumstance picks up on the stylistic 
decision made in part two to refer to Robbie only ever as Turner and develops it into an 
explicitly discussed metareferential topic within part three of the narrative. Briony, for 
example, is at one point within this section of the novel shown to actively reflect on the 
exclusive use of last names as “above all a stripping away of identity” (275) similar to the 
wearing of the obligatory nurse’s uniform, which, “like all uniforms, eroded identity” (276) 
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even further. Both these observations clearly apply to Robbie the soldier as much as to Briony 
the trainee nurse. 
It is, however, important to note that, unlike Robbie, Briony gets involved in this process 
of identity-removal willingly. In fact, she almost seems to appreciate the physical hardships of 
the training as well as the demand for “unthinking obedience” (275) which helps her “close 
down [her] mental horizons” (275). As the narrative voice explains, 
she had no will, no freedom to leave. She was abandoning herself to a life of strictures, rules, 
obedience, housework and a constant fear of disapproval. She was one of a batch of 
probationers […] and she had no identity beyond her badge. There were no tutorials here, no 
one losing sleep over the precise course of her intellectual development. She […] was 
delivered from introspection. […] Mostly, she was a maid, a skivvy and, in her hours off, a 
crammer of simple facts. She was happy to have little time to think of anything else. (276-
277, my emphasis) 
This passage is, of course, in stark contrast to the portrayal of thirteen-year-old Briony’s 
character in Atonement’s part one. Whereas child Briony used to be almost purely a free-
roaming mind, this new, slightly older version of her willingly reduces herself to menial work 
precisely to escape the consequences of the actions incited by her having this type of mind. In 
that, Briony’s approach to dealing with her war experiences strongly resembles Robbie’s 
feverish exclamations in Dunkirk during which he proclaims the superiority of a basic 
marching order over poetry: “Order would prevail. No one at Cambridge taught the benefits 
of good marching order. They revered the free, unruly spirits. The poets. But what did the 
poets know about survival? About surviving as a body of men?” (264). Knowing that these 
exclamations themselves are merely figments of elderly Briony’s writerly imagination, part 
three’s portrayal of Briony’s processing mechanisms thus once again becomes a double-
coded, highly metareferential, intra-compositional commentary on part two’s narrative 
choices as well. 
Yet the reasons for Briony’s adoption of a menial lifestyle go beyond her need for 
distraction from both her past and current experiences. Already one of Cecilia’s letters to 
Robbie in part two seems to suggest that her younger sister is taking on the nursing role as a 
form of “penance” (212), and passages such as the following from part three of Atonement 
only confirm Cecilia’s hypothesis: 
All [Briony] wanted to do was work, then bathe and sleep until it was time to work again. 
But it was useless, she knew. Whatever skivvying or humble nursing she did, and however 
well or hard she did it, whatever illumination in tutorial she had relinquished, or lifetime 
moment on a college lawn, she would never undo the damage. She was unforgivable. (285, 
my emphasis) 
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This passage demonstrates very clearly that Briony entered into the nursing profession to 
actively ‘relinquish’ any potential for future happiness in an attempt to reach atonement 
through sacrifice. 
Yet strikingly enough, even in her desire for penance, Briony never seems to consider 
sacrificing her writing – a fact which suggests that writing and the construction of narratives 
are actually more intrinsic to her nature, more needed for her survival than her name and/or 
outward identity. Similarly, part three of Atonement also depicts Briony as incapable of fully 
relinquishing her thinking in literary tropes. The novel thus once again demonstrates just how 
deeply this behaviour is ingrained in her – and arguably in us all. For example, whilst 
performing her nurse duties, Briony cannot help herself but imagine what it would be like to 
find Robbie amidst the soldiers in her hospital, grime-covered to the point of 
unrecognizability:  
[S]he would dress his wounds without knowing who he was, and with cotton-wool tenderly 
rub his face until his familiar features emerged, and […] he would turn to her with gratitude, 
realise who she was, and take her hand, and in silently squeezing it, forgive her. Then he 
would let her settle him down into sleep. (298)  
In the romantic imagery of this fantasy, in the stylisation of herself into a saviour, the Briony 
of part one is still very much alive and present in this scene. And soon, Atonement shows us 
that this is a good thing. 
In a scene which follows soon after Briony’s thoughts of Robbie, the trainee nurse is sent 
to talk to a dying soldier (cf. 305-310). Having received a fatal head-wound the young man is 
fantasising as well as hallucinating, and is convinced that Briony is a girl from his past. 
Briony initially tries to break his delusions but as soon as she realises the severity of the 
soldier’s condition, she begins to indulge and expand upon the happy-end narrative with 
which his damaged brain is presenting him to ease his passing (cf. 308-310). In the end, as the 
soldier takes his final breath, she even breaks the hallowed rule of nursehood and tells him her 
first name: “‘It’s Briony,’ she said, so only he would hear. […] ‘It’s not Tallis. You should 
call me Briony’” (310). And in this moment, she really is Briony, the writer, and not merely 
Tallis, the nurse. For it is her imagination and her storytelling abilities, not her medical skills, 
which comfort the dying young man. 
While this experience contributes greatly to Briony’s development and can be read as an 
affirmation of the power of narratives to – if used correctly and not like in part one – bring 
comfort and salvation, the biggest growth in Briony during part three can be observed in the 
final scenes of this section of the novel when she uninvitedly visits Cecilia and Robbie for the 
first time. During the entire scene, words and communication seem once again to be close to 
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failing as sentences such as “There was too much that couldn’t be said or asked” (332), “there 
was something mask-like and carved about [Cecilia’s] face, and very still. And hard to read.” 
(332, my emphasis) or “There was so much more that could have been said” (347) indicate. 
However, part-three Briony’s reaction towards these difficulties and information gaps is very 
different from that of her thirteen-year-old self and this is what makes all the difference. By 
being able to acknowledge the gaps without forcefully trying to fill them, part-three’s 
increasingly mature Briony for the first time actually demonstrates an acceptance of 
unknowingness and life’s complexities. Additionally, by processing the situation mostly 
through fact-focused observation, Briony’s internal narrative at this moment perfectly mirrors 
the overall stylistic concept of Atonement’s third part. 
The more mature Briony, as a result of her nurse training, is furthermore shown to have a 
much better psychological insight into people’s behaviour. Consequently, she is not even 
terrified by Robbie’s near-violent outbursts. Recognising them for what they are, traumatic 
memories (cf. 343) which just “had to come out” (341), she remains calm – in stark contrast 
to her younger self which labelled Robbie a “maniac” for far less maniacal behaviour. This 
passage, in addition to showing Briony’s personal growth also comments on the source of her 
growth as a writer by providing a metareferential counter-image to an idea expressed in 
relation to Robbie earlier in the novel. While the young man, according to the narrative voice, 
used to believe that his literary knowledge could provide him with the human insight 
necessary to make him a better doctor one day (cf. 93), part three of Atonement suggests that 
the process, instead, works the other way around: it is Briony’s experience in caring for 
people which provides her with the human insight necessary to make her a better writer.  
Finally, Briony in this interaction furthermore demonstrates that she has learned when to 
hold her tongue and to not impose her self and her (narrative) views on an interaction. When 
Robbie, reproachfully, asks her whether she has any idea what it is like to be in prison, 
Briony’s reaction is described as follows: “She imagined small high windows in a cliff face of 
brick, and thought perhaps she did, the way people imagined the different torments of hell. 
She shook her head faintly.” (341) In other words, even though the familiar tropes 
instinctively rise to the surface of Briony’s mind, she chooses to push the image back down, 
to remain silent and to let Robbie’s words have their weight. 
The one thing Briony eventually does force herself to voice in this conversation is her 
explicit apology. Despite it sounding “so foolish and inadequate” (348) and despite Robbie 
and Cecilia remaining silent, Briony finally says the words which up till now have only been 
implied in all her other attempts at penance: “She spoke slowly. ‘I’m very very sorry. I’ve 
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caused you such terrible distress.’ […] and she repeated herself. ‘I’m very sorry.’” (348). 
With this few lines, Atonement makes it very clear that while certain things can be left 
unspoken and while certain things do not need to be said to be understood, others do require 
the explicit act, even if just to acknowledge one’s (self-)awareness and responsibility by 
officially and publicly putting one’s acknowledgement into words. 
While neither Robbie nor Cecilia accept Briony’s apology, Atonement’s third part ends 
on the idea that the younger sister might still achieve atonement, eventually, through a more 
detailed, written “apology”. A first clue in this direction is Robbie’s own demand for Briony 
to write him a long, detailed letter explaining exactly why she did what she did (cf. 345). 
Once the young woman leaves her sister’s apartment, however, she takes the thought one step 
further: “She knew what was required of her. Not simply a letter, but a new draft, an 
atonement, and she was ready to begin.” (349). Those last words of the third part of the novel 
are followed by the initials “BT” as well as by a place and date, “London 1999”. Thus 
Atonement reveals that what we as readers have been reading this entire time is in fact meant 
to be exactly this atonement written by Briony, begun in 1940 and finished nearly sixty years 
later. 
 
3.1.3.4 (Post-)Postmodernist Finishing Touches 
Brian Finney has pointed out that some reviewers have criticized Atonement for this most 
illusion breaking of its metareferential choices, calling it modish and inappropriate (cf. 69-
70)25. Yet the ending’s revelation is much more than a mere gimmick. Firstly, the dated 
ending as well as the following epilogue, rather than forming a break with the preceding 
narrative, simply bring that narrative into the stylistic realm of contemporary (Post-
)Postmodern literature and as such carry the story of Briony’s personal and literary 
development to its natural metareferential conclusion. Furthermore, the novel’s final “twist” 
draws attention to the fact that we readers are just as prone to mistaking narratives for realities 
or to assuming a narrative voice’s omniscience and objectivity based on tradition rather than 
actual facts as the novel’s characters are. In other words, rather than breaking with the text’s 
established themes, the ending once more simply takes them one natural step further. 
Finally, in the novel’s epilogue, Atonement introduces one final major stylistic change: 
the last part of the novel is the only one presented as a first-person narrative by the at that 
time seventy-seven-year-old Briony herself. In the epilogue, the fictional writer once again 
                                                 
25 For examples of studies decrying Atonement’s ending cf. e.g. Albers and Caeners; Phelan; Spiridon; Wood. 
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reminisces simultaneously about (the end of) her life and about the novel she has just finished 
writing, thus one final time conflating the two processes. Her focus during her ruminations 
lies specifically on the relationship between facts, truth and fiction, thus significantly 
increasing the fictum-metareference quota of the text. 
Throughout the epilogue, Briony spends many paragraphs referring to the research she 
has had to conduct to be able to portray the details of the war experiences in her novel 
correctly (cf. 353, 359-360). At the same time, she stresses that she has made many changes 
to the facts of her story (cf. 356). In fact, she points out that if she had cared about depicting 
facts, she “should have written a different kind of book” (360). Still, Briony also emphasises 
that her novel would not have worked as a pure work of fiction, either. For Atonement’s 
purpose, according to its fictional author, is to describe the crime she, Lola and Paul Marshall 
have committed, “to disguise nothing” of “the names, the places [and] the exact 
circumstances” (369) and to “put it all there as a matter of historical record” (369) even if this 
meant that her work would never be published in her, Lola and Paul Marshall’s lifetime due 
to libel law (cf. 359, 361, 370).  
This idea of making a narrative “a matter of historical record” adds a new perspective to 
Atonement’s debate on the socio-cultural role and value of stories. Up to this point, the 
novel’s metareferential discussions overwhelmingly focus on the impact cultural and literary 
narratives have on individuals, their thoughts and their perception of the world. This new 
statement by seventy-seven-year-old Briony, however, goes one step further and postulates 
that narratives have an impact on official record-keeping as well. This one sentence, barely 
more than an aside, is the first time the novel frames history and our associated cultural 
memories themselves as narratives26. 
While taking responsibility for her crime by testifying to its occurrence in the first place 
certainly constitutes a central part of Briony’s atonement, the novel’s epilogue suggests that 
there is also a second component to her literary penance. As Briony herself explains, she sees 
her ultimate work as “a final act of kindness” (372), “a stand against oblivion and despair” 
(372) which attempts to gift Robbie and Cecilia happiness (cf. 372) by having them “survive 
to love” (371) for as long as a single copy or even a single typescript of Atonement’s final 
draft exists in the world (cf. 371). For in the end, as Briony points out, once all participants 
are dead, the couple will “only exist as [her] inventions” (371).  
                                                 
26 For more on this specific idea in relation to Atonement cf. e.g. Henke; Nünning “Editorial” 4, 6 and “Fictional 
Metabiographies” 208; Schmitz-Emans 225. 
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This idea of people living on through their narratives is one that is repeated multiple 
times throughout the epilogue: it is central to the depiction of the letters and correspondences 
stored in the war museum which serve Briony as research and which are shown to keep the 
memories of their writers and through those their writers themselves alive (cf. 359-360); the 
motif is picked up again during Briony’s birthday party when her thirteen-year-old self is 
shown to live on in the performance of her play (cf. 367); and the motif is finally ever-present 
in Briony’s motivation for the writing of her ultimate novel. Still, the fictional writer’s choice 
of words when describing Cecilia and Robbie as living on “as [her] inventions” shows that 
this particular example of survival through narrative is more complex than the other two. 
In the first two examples, the words and stories through which people live on are their 
own. In the case of Robbie and Cecilia, however, the words which are to carry them onward 
are Briony’s. One could therefore question whether despite all her growth, Atonement’s 
fictional author is not still trying to achieve atonement by doing what she always has, namely 
imposing her own views on others’ experiences.27 Yet what makes Briony’s ultimate work 
ultimately different is the fact that (1) she is for the first time fully self-aware of what she is 
doing, and (2) that this time she does not presume to be presenting an ultimate truth but 
instead purposefully breaks open her narrative and transforms its ending into an open one. 
Specifically, in the epilogue, Briony reveals that what we have read within Atonement is just 
one possible ending to Robbie’s and Cecilia’s story. It is the ending she as an author has 
chosen. What really happened to the couple is, according to her and independent of readers’ 
potential demands for the truth, irrelevant (cf. 370-371).28 From Briony’s perspective, the 
important thing about her work’s ending is that, by outlasting the couple either way, it will 
make sure that “the lovers survive and flourish” (371) indefinitely.  
This passage of Atonement shows that mature Briony’s views on the function of 
narratives have changed dramatically from those of her thirteen-year-old self. Whilst clearly 
still connected to and inspired by reality, her ultimate text does not attempt to uncover the 
truths within this reality or to make neat sense of it. Instead, her novel is written to transcend 
reality, and even to transcend the divide between truth and fiction. All that matters for 
                                                 
27 In fact, scholars such as Emily Holman, James Phelan (cf. 331-332), James Wood (cf. 18-19) or Kim 
Worthington (cf. 146) have argued just that. 
28 Interestingly, many scholars seem to misread this passage as a proclamation of Robbie’s and Cecilia’s factual 
deaths (cf. e.g. Albers and Caeners 713; Cormack 81-82; D’Hoker 41; Spiridon 54; Wood 3, 16-17) – a reading 
which Briony’s (and McEwan’s) chosen language simply does not support. The couple’s “true” fate is 
purposefully left unreported and, as Martin Jacobi has pointed out in an essay devoted to this subject, by 
misreading this passage the scholars in question are in fact arguably the ones taking Robbie’s and Cecilia’s lives. 
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seventy-seven-year-old Briony is that the novel’s message of love, survival and the power of 
stories is carried on to and by future generations, keeping the transcendent ideas of her 
experiences alive rather than any related facts. 
 
3.1.4 The Role of the Author 
The last big metareferential topic Atonement’s epilogue elaborates upon is the question of the 
significance of authorial control. Young Briony, in her attempts to use narratives to make 
sense of the world, is often portrayed as trying to elevate herself to a god-like position 
through her role as a writer. And at first glance, mature Briony could be accused of the same 
thing since she keeps emphasising how the ending of the novel is her choice, in other words 
how she is the one in control of the narrative. This position is especially problematic 
considering that the novel is supposedly written as a form of atonement29. But can atonement 
be achieved through self-elevation into a position of power?  
In a typically explicit self-aware manner, mature Briony voices this very same question 
herself. Her answer, consequently, is as follows: 
The problem these fifty-nine years [between first and final draft] has been this: how can a 
novelist achieve atonement when, with her absolute power of deciding outcomes, she is also 
God? There is no one, no entity or higher form that she can appeal to, or be reconciled with, 
or that can forgive her. There is nothing outside her. In her imagination she has set the limits 
and the terms. No atonement for God, or novelists, even if they are atheists. It was always an 
impossible task, and that was precisely the point. The attempt was all. (371) 
In other words, according to Briony, being self-aware and doing your best within the 
limitations of your medium is all that can be achieved. It is the closest she believes she can 
come to atonement. She is, however, arguably wrong. For there is an instance above the 
writer, there is an instance outside the writer, and that is the writer’s readership (cf. D’Angelo 
101-103). 
While an author might have god-like powers during the creation of a narrative, 
eventually, if published, the text will land in the hands of a reader. And as Atonement by this 
point has shown repeatedly (most explicitly in the passage describing the Tallis’ fountain in 
comparison to its original artist’s intentions (cf. 28)), an author has no control over what 
happens to his or her creation next, and as such is entirely at the mercy of the recipients. In 
the case of Briony, therefore, we readers are the ones able to pronounce judgement, and we 
are encouraged to do so based both on the story we have just read and on the metareferential 
                                                 
29 For a more in-depth study of McEwan’s use of the ‘confession’ and ‘atonement’ tropes in relation to their 
traditional use in literature cf. D’Hoker. 
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commentary provided in the epilogue. For Briony’s belief expressed therein that she cannot 
ever achieve atonement is arguably her most redeeming quality. 
Furthermore, as Atonement’s epilogue demonstrates repeatedly, mature Briony, fully 
(self-)aware of her unavoidable authorial control, specifically does everything in her power to 
relinquish as much of it as she can, proving just how much she has grown over the last six 
decades as both a person and a writer30: she does not provide herself with forgiveness within 
the novel (cf. 372); she leaves the ending open; she chooses to stay faithful to the exact truth 
of Robbie’s wrongful incarceration even if that means the novel will not be published in her 
lifetime and she will not be able to hear her readers’ response and potentially receive 
absolution. By making these and many other narrative choices, mature Briony comes as close 
as possible to making her novel about Robbie and Cecilia and not about herself. This 
approach constitutes an exact opposite to her initial crime and thus arguably makes her 
worthy of forgiveness. 
 
3.1.5 Memory, Self-Stylisation and the Construction of Our Autobiographies 
Still, by being (fictionally) highly autobiographical, Atonement can of course never fully 
avoid to be a novel about Briony as well. After all, as Raphael Samuel and Paul Thompson 
have pointed out, “[a]ny life story, written or oral, more or less dramatically, is in one sense a 
personal mythology, a self-justification” (quoted in Henke 82). And in the case of Briony the 
narrative is most definitely both. Throughout Atonement, the type of self-stylisation31 varies – 
though arguably, in the end, its final effect is not very different from its initial one.  
Part one of Atonement makes it very clear that in addition to using narratives to make 
sense of her experiences – both by sorting them into her memory and by using them to form 
her own identity (cf. Henke 94) – young Briony then shares those narratives with her relatives 
with the specific purpose of making herself the centre of attention32. For example, Briony’s 
first play is described as providing her with a stage from which she can “unapologetically 
demand[] her family’s total attention as she cast[s] her narrative spell” (6-7). In other words, 
despite the supposed moralist intentions behind her dramatic work, writing for Briony at this 
early stage is portrayed as a selfish enterprise through which she mostly wants to express 
                                                 
30 For an interesting study on the differences in effect especially this section has in Joe Wright’s film adaptation 
of the novel due to the added layer of directorial control cf. Bolton. 
31 Claudia Schemberg even speaks of “self-making” (8) and “self-creation” (9). 
32 These methods of creating a personal mythology can of course be utilized not only by individuals such as 
Briony but by entire communities or even countries in search of a national identity. For an analysis of how 
Atonement touches upon this in the context of the English Heritage movement cf. Henderson. 
       
70 
 
herself. In fact, the young girl is depicted as fully aware of this, for when one of her cousins 
eventually criticises the grandstanding quality of plays, Briony has to agree that “he had a 
point. This was precisely why she loved plays, or hers at least; everyone would adore her” 
(11). 
Beyond sharing stories and plays to aggrandise herself in front of others, thirteen-year-
old Briony is furthermore repeatedly shown to construct additional narratives in her mind 
which equally embellish her personality and place in the world. For example, when she is 
letting out her frustration by beating up nettles, she soon begins to envision her actions as a 
form of sport, with newspaper reports complimenting her on her skills (cf. 76). And as the 
strength of these images begins to fade, Briony proclaims that she will stay out in the gardens 
“until events, real events, not her own fantasies, r[i]se to her challenge, and dispel[…] her 
insignificance” (77). Thus the young girl even wills reality as a whole to conform to her 
image of herself. 
This motif of self-stylisation can be observed on many further occasions throughout 
Atonement. From her childhood obsession with being thought of as “an author” (4) “lost to the 
intricacies of her art” (75, cf. 68, 158-159) to her hospital fantasies of being the one to nurse a 
wounded Robbie back to health, Briony continually imagines herself as the heroine of a story. 
And she is not the only character guilty of such behaviour. When Robbie is planning his 
future in part one of the novel, the narrative voice explains that “[t]here was a story he was 
plotting with himself as the hero, and already its opening had caused a little shock amongst 
his friends” (cf. 91, my emphasis). Similarly, when Briony’s and Cecilia’s mother is 
reminiscing about her own aging, she is struck by “[h]ow quickly [her] story was over” (151, 
my emphasis). Less explicitly but not less saliently, many of the literary tropes Cecilia 
employs also cast her in the role of a literary heroine (cf. e.g. 30). Finally, coming back to 
Robbie, when he is writing to Cecilia from prison the narrative voice explains that “[w]hen he 
wrote back, he pretended to be his old self, he lied his way into sanity” (204, my emphasis). In 
other words, Atonement here even suggests that by writing himself as sane within his own 
narrative, Robbie succeeds in transforming his real-world self to fit that image. 
Once the ending of part three reveals Briony as the fictional writer of Atonement, these 
seeming similarities between characters acquire additional significance. Within this new 
context, the respective passages can suddenly also be interpreted as mature Briony’s 
superimposition of her own thoughts onto everybody else’s in a more or less conscious 
attempt to justify her younger self’s behaviour by suggesting that everybody functions this 
way. In fact, even the thoughts assigned to thirteen-year-old Briony can suddenly be seen as 
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mature Briony’s thoughts placed into the younger girl’s mind, especially considering the fact 
that many of the thoughts attributed to the girl are far too abstract and philosophical for 
someone her age (cf. e.g. 37) as even the narrative voice itself has to admit on at least one 
occasion: 
Briony resisted because she wanted to chase in solitude the faint thrill of possibility she had 
felt before, the elusive excitement at a prospect she was coming close to defining, at least 
emotionally. The definition would refine itself over the years. She was to concede that she 
may have attributed more deliberation than was feasible to her thirteen-year-old self. At the 
time there may have been no precise form of words; in fact, she may have experienced 
nothing more than impatience to begin writing again. (40, my emphasis) 
Thus part three’s final twist exposes the fact that from the beginning of the novel, the Briony 
the readers are confronted with is not so much the “real” young girl as she is the stylised, 
fictional image of that girl (cf. also Waugh 123) created by Atonement’s fictional writer, her 
sixty years older self. Furthermore, by having previously shown how strongly Briony’s 
literary creations are influenced by literary and cultural tropes, Atonement also suggests that 
Briony’s self-stylisation is equally indebted to these narrative formula (cf. also e.g. Eakin 4; 
Löschnigg 172-174; Polkinghorne, Narrative Knowing 150). 
As for the reasons behind Briony’s self-stylisation, Atonement presents multiple possible 
options. On the one hand, the young writer’s desire for attention and the maturing writer’s 
desire for penance alone would be strong enough psychological motivators for this type of 
behaviour. A further possible explanation, however, can be found in part one of the novel 
when the narrative voice suggests that older Briony’s “self-mythologizing” (41) is the result 
of her constantly having been asked the same question until she “felt obliged to produce a 
story line, a plot of her development that contained the moment when she became 
recognisably herself” (41). In other words, this passage suggests that some degree of self-
stylisation is in fact unavoidable when we as a society constantly ask each other for our life-
stories, always searching for causalities and connections within our respective experiences. 
Furthermore, this passage consequently also points out that once we construct a functional 
narrative to explain our experience(s), we keep retelling and retelling the very same story (cf. 
41) until “[t]he truth […] become[s] as ghostly as invention” (41) and we eventually store the 
entire experience in our memory in the form of the story we have constructed. In fact, as 
Roger Schank and Robert P. Abelson have argued, at this point our stories and our memories 
become one and the same: “They end up packaged together, so that the belief indexes the 
story, and the story supports the belief” (13; cf. also Schank 44). 
This concept – increasingly common in contemporary literature (cf. Neumann, “Der 
metamnemonische Roman” 303) – of memory as compiled of deposited narratives can be 
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found through the entirety of Atonement33, closely linked to the fact that many characters, 
especially Briony, are repeatedly shown to conflate trope-based knowledge with factual, 
actual knowledge, and to store both in their memory on equal terms. The previously 
referenced passage describing Briony as just knowing that she had to run away now that her 
mother had rejected her (cf. 15) is thus more than sarcastic flourish and exaggeration by the 
narrative voice. Instead, it carries a deeper meaning. 
This meaning first begins to reveal itself during the description of how Briony in part one 
perceives the library scene she happens upon. Based on her culturally and narratively 
influenced interpretation of Robbie’s letter as him being a raving “maniac”, Briony is 
portrayed as absolutely certain that she has walked in on an attack. The narrative voice 
conveys this by presenting her mere interpretation of the situation as factual observation: 
“with his right [hand] he held [Cecilia’s] forearm which was raised in protest, or self-defence” 
(123). For the readers of Atonement, the rest of the passage makes it abundantly clear what is 
really going on and that Cecilia’s arm is really only raised in what Briony believes to be 
“protest, or self-defence” – yet this is not how the narrative voice describes Briony’s 
experience: the young girl is fully unaware that she is interpreting the scene based on tropes in 
her mind; instead, she honestly believes that she is simply observing the tableau in front of 
her. 
This discrepancy between believing to know that something is true and actually knowing 
comes to a first big climax in the final chapters of part one when Briony expresses her 
certainty that the man she saw raping Lola was Robbie. The actual description of the rape 
scene makes it very clear that she cannot possibly have recognised the man in the dark (cf. 
164), and the fact that Briony initially keeps asking Lola who it was further proves her 
uncertainty (cf. 165). Still, unintentionally bending reality to fit her own narrative-based 
event-processing framework, Briony soon begins to see all events of the day merge into a 
“story […] that was writing itself around her” (166), a story in which “[e]verything 
connected” (166), “everything fitted” (167) until she finally speaks the first accusatory “It was 
Robbie, wasn’t it” (166). From there on, Briony keeps repeating his name like a mantra even 
though Lola never confirms it – until finally, when her cousin asks whether she actually saw 
him, Briony responds: “Of course I did. Plain as day. It was him. […] I saw him.” (167)  
Admittedly, Briony’s utter conviction does not last for long (cf. 168) and already a week 
later, self-awareness begins to arise: 
                                                 
33 For a more detailed exploration than this chapter permits cf. e.g. Hidalgo. 
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[W]hat she knew was not literally, or not only, based on the visible. It was not simply her 
eyes that told her truth. […] Her eyes confirmed the sum of all she knew and had recently 
experienced. The truth was in the symmetry, which was to say, it was founded in common 
sense. The truth instructed her eyes. So when she said, over and again, I saw him, she meant 
it, and was perfectly honest, as well as passionate. What she meant was rather more complex 
than what everyone else so eagerly understood, and her moments of unease came when she 
felt that she could not express these nuances. (169) 
Yet Briony never voices these thoughts and doubts publicly. As time progresses, it is said that 
“she would have preferred to qualify, or complicate, her use of the word ‘saw’. Less like 
seeing, more like knowing.” (170) but the interrogators, the judicial system and all the people 
around her make it clear that they would not accept such a nuanced phrasing:  
‘You saw him then.’ 
‘I know it was him.’ 
‘Let’s forget what you know. You’re saying you saw him.’ 
‘Yes, I saw him.’ 
‘Just as you see me.’ 
‘Yes. 
‘You saw him with your own eyes.’ 
‘Yes. I saw him. I saw him.’ (181) 
In other words, “[e]ither she saw, or she did not see. There lay nothing in between” (170), and 
Briony as portrayed does not want to disappoint (cf. 170). Consequently, she tries to repel her 
doubts by “plunging in deeper. By clinging tightly to what she believed she knew, narrowing 
her thoughts, reiterating her testimony” (170) until her story becomes so ingrained in her 
memory that she never actually believes that she is lying. 
When more than five years later Cecilia refers to her sister’s testimony with those words, 
Briony is honestly taken aback, observing: “[Cecilia’s] perspective was unfamiliar. Weak, 
stupid, confused, cowardly, evasive – she had hated herself for everything she had been, but 
she had never thought of herself as a liar. […] She hadn’t intended to mislead, she hadn’t 
acted out of malice” (336). What Briony had done, instead, was merely to mistake 
interpretation for fact and to unconsciously spin her particular interpretation into a story 
which she then, unable to express its complexities, presented as fact. 
As Briony’s life progresses and she matures both as a writer and as a person, her 
awareness of this issue is shown to grow, demonstrated in her increased interest in open-to-
interpretation, open-ended narratives. Briony’s stories over the course of the novel become 
less and less a means to express her personal certainties, just like they become less and less a 
means for self-elevation. Instead, mature Briony focuses increasingly on motifs of self-
sacrifice, subordination and prioritization of others. And yet, strikingly, it could be argued 
that in her most penitent final moments, seventy-seven-year-old epilogue Briony once more 
depicts herself as a saviour, this time of Robbie’s and Cecilia’s love. By proclaiming that her 
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novel is the only way in which the couple will be able to live on forever, Briony could be said 
to stylise herself, the writer, as the source of Cecilia and Robbie’s immortality. This reading, 
however, would entirely neglect the rest of Atonement’s core message about the power 
inherent to all narratives as such, independent of their author. What gives life to Cecilia and 
Robbie is the sharing of their story, Briony as the story-teller serves merely as facilitator or 
catalyst. 
 
3.1.6 Flourish and Detail through Implicit Metareferences  
Before wrapping up this chapter I would like to draw attention to one final aspect of 
Atonement’s use of metareferences. In addition to all these examples of very explicit and in-
depth poetological and poetology-adjacent commentary, the novel furthermore contains a lot 
of language and implicitly metareferential imagery which only blossoms into salience within 
the context of its highly metareferential surroundings. The following description of Cecilia 
arranging flowers in part one constitutes only one perfect example:  
She spent some minutes making adjustments in order to achieve a natural chaotic look […] 
It made no sense, she knew, arranging flowers before the water was in – but there it was; she 
couldn’t resist moving them around, and not everything people did could be in a correct, 
logical order, especially when they were alone. (23, my emphasis) 
At first glance, these sentences have nothing to do with literature but are merely mocking 
Cecilia’s behaviour in a very Austenian manner. And yet considering the novel’s central 
themes it soon becomes apparent that Cecilia’s sentiments in this situation apply to the subject 
of literature and narratives as well. On the one hand, her process of flower arrangement 
demonstrates just how much construction is involved even in the presentation of a seemingly 
wild and “natural” scene. On the other hand, her acknowledgement of the lack of “logical 
order” in human behaviour exposes the paradox inherent to the construction of narratives 
based on logic and causality. The fact that Cecilia is furthermore portrayed as fighting against 
the “wilful neatness” and “orderly pattern[s]” (45) of the flowers because they do not suit her 
romantic sensibility of what a picturesque wild-flower bouquet should look like, only 
emphasises the discrepancy between reality and our narrative tropes even further. 
In addition to these types of double-coded scenes, Atonement bursts with language and 
imagery drawing from literature- and text-related lexcal fields: from Cecilia trying to 
“interpret” (27) Robbie’s behaviour, to Briony trying to “read his expression” (184), to the 
girls’ mother observing that “[t]he indistinct murmur of voices heard through a carpeted floor 
surpassed in clarity a typed-up transcript” (66, my emphasis), to the library-setting of the 
sex-scene, to the constant aforementioned references to documents and letters and even to the 
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reading of wine labels (cf. 126), to the portrayal of Londoners removing destination boards 
from buses and taking down or blackening out street signs to confuse potential German 
invaders (cf. 318) – metareferential language is everywhere. And while often these remarks 
are barely more than asides, only there for the most attentive of readers to notice, at other 
times they appear in scenes which are so striking that the references are impossible to miss. 
One particularly impactful example of this can be seen in the scene portraying Robbie’s 
arrival at Dunkirk in part two. Just outside the city, he witnesses soldiers disposing of items 
they cannot take with them when they retreat. The passage describes many things that the men 
are ordered to destroy so that they cannot be used by the enemy: uniforms, blankets, weapons, 
horses – but also documents and document-related items. From “[a] beefy lance-corporal with 
a sledgehammer […] smashing typewriters and mimeograph machines” (242) to “a chaplain 
and his clerk […] dousing cases of prayer books and bibles with petrol” (243), the range of 
related objects is wide and varied. Whereas the first example serves as an homage to the 
power of the printing press and its derivatives, the second example once more establishes the 
spiritual power of words. Either way, both the practical tools involved in the spreading of 
words and the actual content of the words being spread are depicted as significant and 
dangerous enough to be worth destroying. 
What all these implicit uses of metareference contribute to Atonement is to emphasise the 
omnipresence of words, documents, texts and narratives in our every-day lives. For in the end, 
the novel is not about Briony’s personal obsession with narratives and writing, it is about the 
role narratives and writing play in our society. Within Briony’s personal development, this 
message is conveyed through her shift from stories as a means to distinguish herself to stories 
which contribute to communal knowledge and history instead. Though interestingly enough, 
this latter approach to storytelling is already portrayed much earlier in the novel, namely 
through Briony’s brother. 
When he is first introduced, the oldest Tallis sibling Leon is portrayed as a young man 
who loves to share anecdotes – and who does so in a manner strikingly different from the 
highly intellectualised and pre-constructed approach to storytelling embodied by Briony. The 
narrative voice describes Leon’s stories as follows: “The effect of [his] anecdotes was to 
make his listener warm to humankind and its failings” (107). Furthermore, Leon’s anecdotes 
are always about people rather than about abstract ideas, for “[l]iterature and politics, science 
and religion did not bore him [but] they simply had no place in his world” (108). Finally, 
Leon’s entire storytelling process is depicted as a much more social enterprise than Briony’s. 
All his narratives are born out of social situations – they are tales of events which Leon has 
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experienced with or heard from others – and all their narration itself is social: he tells them 
orally, to an audience, and his aim is to entertain that very audience rather than to demonstrate 
his personal, authorial skill (cf. 107-108). The communal significance of his narratives is what 
gives them their meaning. 
This observation invokes a final noteworthy implicitly metareferential element found 
within part one of Atonement. When Cecilia is shown to be arranging her flowers, the vase 
she is using – a cherished family heirloom passed down from an uncle who had died in the 
Great War – is described as follows: “The vase was respected not for Höroldt’s mastery of 
polychrome enamels or the blue and gold interlacing strapwork and foliage, but for Uncle 
Clem, and the lives he had saved, the river he had crossed at midnight, and his death just a 
week before the Armistice.” (24) That is to say, the most honoured art piece in the Tallis 
household – a household otherwise filled with grand fountain replicas and first edition books 
– is presented as deriving its value not from the craftmanship involved in its construction but 
from the additional personal meaning it carries for the members of the family. It is precious 
because it has history, context, a social and communal component, not because of some 
intrinsic artistic value. 
 
3.1.7 Conclusion: Atonement’s Use of Metareference 
This last fact becomes particularly important when one considers how often metareferential 
works are criticised for being narcissistic embodiments of l’art-pour-l’art beliefs. Throughout 
its narrative, however, Atonement makes it very clear that it does not care about art for art’s 
sake but for the sake of its relationship with society. Whilst Horizon’s editor in the novel 
might still suggest that he “[does] not believe that artists have an obligation to strike up 
attitudes to the war” and that “[i]ndeed, they are wise and right to ignore it” since “artists are 
politically impotent” (314-315), Atonement shows very clearly that as a result of the immense 
influence which narratives have on our perception, our memory, our knowledge and our 
history, works of art and their creators are anything but impotent. Consequently, artists such 
as Briony are also shown to most definitely have certain obligations (cf. also Weidle 68) – if 
nothing else then at least to fight reality’s destructive tendencies by giving people and ideas 
eternal life within our cultural memory. 
What is particularly striking about Atonement’s take on this pivotal message is the fact 
that the intertwined nature of reality, narratives, memories, etc. – unlike in the novel’s 
Postmodernist predecessors – is actually not presented as something negative. It is merely 
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shown to be something which needs to be approached with maturity. As Katharina Rennhak 
has pointed out, the novel’s focus is therefore not on the “crisis” of reality and representation, 
as scholars such as Alistair Cormack seem to believe (cf. 76-82), but on the question of how 
we can move past this crisis (cf. 216-219). Just as Briony as part of her development needs to 
first realise the impact of narratives on her beliefs, and then needs to find a way to translate 
that realisation into her work, so all literature, all human beings and all authors, according to 
Atonement, need to do the same thing. In the process, authors specifically are encouraged to 
grow and to discover new styles and means which allow them to keep writing impactful, 
ethically valuable texts within their new Post-Postmodernist framework (cf. Rennhak 218-
219)34. For just because all reality is constructed, that does not mean that all constructs are 
created equal (cf. also Wolf, “Atonement” 301): young Briony’s narratives, for example, are 
unmistakably more flawed and thus less meaningful than those composed by mature Briony. 
In other words, according to Atonement, even as certain narratives fail us, others can still rise 
in their place and achieve a variety of purposes – one such purpose, in the spirit of Briony, 
being that to metareferentially uncover their past transgressions and in the process possibly to 
achieve atonement. 
 
                                                 
34 For more detailed philosophical elaborations on the possible nature of such ethical texts as suggested by 
McEwan cf. Bradley and Tate; Concha; Harold; Ionescu; as well as O’Hara. For an opposing view doubting 
literature’s reliability as a “tool for improving the ethical behaviour of humanity” (21) cf. Mathews. 
       
78 
 
3.2 Metareference in The Book Thief 
The words. Why did they have to exist? Without them, there wouldn’t be any of this. Without 
words, the Führer was nothing. There would be no limping prisoners, no need for consolation 
or wordly tricks to make us feel better. 
What good were the words? 
 (The Book Thief 525) 
Markus Zusak’s The Book Thief shares many similarities with Ian McEwan’s Atonement: the 
young-girl protagonist; the highly self-conscious and emotionally involved narrator; the 
abundance of metareferences; the commentary on the correlations between narratives, 
identity, trauma and interpersonal relationships; the portrayed omnipresence of language and 
books. Yet with all these parallels, the two books are also very different: Liesel and Briony 
have little in common beyond their age and gender, and the metareferential foci of the two 
novels are different as well. As a result, a comparison between the two works as well as an 
individual analysis of Zusak’s are warranted within the framework of this study. 
 
3.2.1 Tropes, Traditions and Self-Aware Narration 
To start things off, compared to Atonement, The Book Thief is far less explicit with its 
references to extra-compositional, real-life literary predecessors and traditions. The majority 
of the stolen “books” invoked in Zusak’s title are, in fact, entirely fictional. Contrary to 
McEwan and Briony, Zusak only positions his novel within a larger literary context through 
the use of small, usually implicit metareferential elements. For example, on the form level, the 
typography and layout of the title pages as well as the partial summaries included thereon are 
clearly inspired by literary classics. Similarly, Liesel’s reading and writing lessons – 
performed with the help of letters painted onto the walls of her basement – (cf. 77) invoke 
even older writing traditions of hieroglyphs and pictograms on cave walls.  
The most explicit Zusak’s Death narrator ever gets on the topic of narrative tradition is 
the acknowledgement of the fact that some of the story’s characters are based on familiar 
tropes. When he35 describes the mayor’s wife, for example, Death does so with the following 
words: “You have seen her before, I’m certain. In your stories, your poems, the screens you 
                                                 
35 I was unable to find a single explicit mention of Death’s gender throughout the entirety of The Book Thief. 
However, based on a remark within the text which suggests that Death would have been called a “Saukerl” (cf. 
536) – an insult previously introduced as referring specifically to men – and based on the film-adaptation’s 
casting choice, male pronouns seem to be appropriate. The grammatical gender of the German word for death 
might be the reason for this.  
       
79 
 
like to watch” (153). Similarly, the sadistic Hitler Youth leader’s name, Franz Deutscher, is 
explicitly described as “the ultimate name for the ultimate teenage Nazi” (278). What is 
striking about Death’s use of tropes throughout these descriptions – especially when 
compared to the use of tropes in Atonement – is the fact that the exact origins of the employed 
tropes seem to be irrelevant since the narrator never refers to them. Instead, the focus of 
Death’s elaborations lies exclusively on the fact that his characters, like all archetypes, stand 
for more than themselves and are representatives of larger issues. Furthermore, while Death 
himself initially never suggests that the events he is narrating are fictional, the attention he 
draws to the highly archetypical nature of some of the elements of his story raises first 
questions about the truthful versus constructed nature of The Book Thief’s narrative.  
In addition to these metareferential remarks about his characters, Zusak’s narrator, in a 
very traditionally metafictional manner, also constantly comments on his own process of 
narration. Already the multitude of asides interrupting the narrative to provide additional 
information or explain individual words and elements of the story can be read as implicit 
examples of this. After all, by interrupting the text flow – and arguably the readers’ 
immersion – they encourage an engagement with the respective passages and lexical items 
from a different perspective. Even more explicitly, however, Death also repeatedly discusses 
his story’s chronological structure, in particular his constant jumping back and forth across 
Liesel’s timeline.  
For example, when Death gives a foreshadowing summary of the ten books that will 
impact Liesel’s story, he finishes by saying that he is getting ahead of himself (cf. 37). 
Likewise, when he temporarily abandons a plotline related to the girl’s foster father, Death 
comments: “We’ll give him seven months. Then we come for him. And, oh, how we come.” 
(134). Similarly, when he temporarily abandons Liesel’s plotline to describe Max 
Vandenburg’s journey he explains that “We move forward now, to a cold night struggle. 
We’ll let the book thief catch up later” (164). Finally, when Death shortly after brings Liesel’s 
and Max’s plotlines together, he observes that “The juggling comes to an end now, but the 
struggling does not. I have Liesel Meminger in one hand, Max Vandenburg in the other. Soon 
I will clap them together. Just give me a few pages” (175). In other words, throughout the 
novel, Death repeatedly employs traditional entralecement elements to metareferentially 
explain his narrative’s structure and to facilitate its understanding. Yet according to Death 
himself, this is not the only reason for his use of metanarrative commentary. At the beginning 
of the novel’s final part Death takes one last temporary jump forward and immediately 
announces that “Again, I offer you a glimpse of the end. Perhaps it’s to soften the blow for 
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later, or to better prepare myself for the telling” (501)36. Thus Death suggests that the 
metanarrative comments in The Book Thief are also used to steer the readers’ (as well as the 
narrator’s own) emotions.  
A final, even lengthier example providing insight into the reasons for Death’s repeated 
narrative time jumps can be found after he foreshadows (or “spoils”) Liesel’s best friend’s 
future death not even half-way into the book, two years ahead of it actually happening: 
Of course, I’m being rude. I’m spoiling the ending, not only of the entire book, but of this 
particular piece of it. I have given you […] events in advance, because I don’t have much 
interest in building mystery. Mystery bores me. It chores me. I know what happens and so do 
you. It’s the machinations that wheel us there that aggravate, perplex, interest and astound 
me. 
There are many things to think of. 
There is much story. (253) 
In other words, Death explains that a final function of his narrative’s structure is to direct the 
reader’s attention away from the mere facts of certain events to the circumstances and 
motivations leading up to them – an idea very much in-synch with mature Briony’s 
narratological goals portrayed in Atonement. Equally in accordance with Briony, Death also 
explicitly points out that he wants to make people experience his experiences through his 
story. For when at the beginning of part six of the novel he gives a summary of the events he 
witnessed in 1942, he immediately explains: “I could go on, but I’ve decided for now that 
three examples will suffice. Three examples, if nothing else, will give you the ashen taste in 
your mouth that defined my existence during that year” (318). Clearly, it is the shared “ashen 
taste” that is important to him, not the factual details of the horrors he witnessed during the 
war. 
 
3.2.2 Human Languages versus a Human “Language” 
This topic of sharing experiences through stories remains central throughout the entirety of 
The Book Thief, and as the novel progresses it is more and more intertwined with questions 
about the function of language. For language, according to Zusak’s narrative, can be both the 
means through which experiences are communicated and the reason why attempts at 
communication fail.  
To portray this idea, The Book Thief employs a variety of frequently metareferential 
methods and motifs. On a purely formal, linguistic level, the author and his narrator 
                                                 
36 For an interesting study on how this last line might in fact summarise Zusak’s whole point of including Death 
as a character (as well as all associated components of Magic Realism) into his novel cf. Adams, Jenni. 
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themselves use multiple languages to tell their story. While most of The Book Thief is written 
in English, the novel is full of individual German words and phrases, often with translations 
but sometimes without (cf. e.g. 28). Frequently, these “foreign” lexical items create a setting 
and an atmosphere of strangeness, implicitly demonstrating just how easy it is to fall prey to 
‘othering’ based on language. In fact, even for readers who do understand German, the choice 
of words and phrases which are incorporated into The Book Thief still often triggers a feeling 
of ‘otherness’ since many of the lexical items are highly region-specific (the story is set in 
Bavaria) and since even common German phrases are transcribed in a way which carries 
dialectal traits (cf. e.g. “Was wuistz?” (101)). Finally, this idea of linguistic ‘otherness’ is 
ultimately emphasised by the fact that Death himself makes a point of presenting himself as 
an outsider to the German language. For example, when discussing the place name of 
Molching, the narrator explains that it is “said best by the likes of you and me as Molking” 
(33). Asides such as this, while certainly helpful to Anglophone readers, clearly position 
Death as linguistically – and potentially culturally and psychologically – closer to those 
readers than to the German characters in his story.  
As mentioned before, however, The Book Thief does not only portray specific languages 
as dividing lines between people but also stresses that there are forms of “language” which 
can overcome such divides. Interpersonal communication specifically is shown to be able to 
function as a rope connecting people across any chasm, as the image of Liesel “thr[owing] 
some words across” (433) to her best friend after an argument suggests. This duality of 
language is most clearly exemplified in the following sequence of scenes depicted in chapter 
nine of the novel.  
Early on in that chapter, Death describes the events at Stalingrad as things that “happened 
when there was snow and guns and the various confusions of human language” (474). 
Symbolically, the inability to communicate is depicted as lying at the core of war and chaos. 
This idea is further elaborated upon when the narrator then describes a particular battle by 
saying that “[t]hose who remained were firing into the blank pages in front of them. Three 
languages interwove. The Russian, the bullets, the German.” (475). Conflicting languages are 
thus once more, and this time quite literally, equated with the violence of bullets and 
weapons. Yet importantly, rather than focusing on the conflict between the two nations till the 
end, the Stalingrad scene eventually culminates in Death’s portrayal of a very basic, intuitive 
and human exchange between two enemy soldiers – one dying, one almost doing so – at 
which point Death remarks that in this moment of their connection “[t]he voices suddenly all 
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sounded the same” (475). Language divides, whilst existing, are thus purposefully portrayed 
as not unsurmountable.  
This motif of overcoming language boundaries is picked up again roughly twenty pages 
later when Rudy and Liesel are shown to witness the crash of an Allied Forces airplane. When 
the two children run up to the wreckage, they find the pilot near-death and uttering what could 
be his final words in a language which the children do not understand (cf. 494). This once 
again marks the man as more than just linguistically ‘other’ and alien, and yet Rudy still 
immediately and actively forms a bond with the pilot. Without understanding what the man is 
saying, the boy chooses to place a teddy bear with him in the cockpit in an instinctively 
human attempt to provide the man with comfort. Moved by this wordless gesture, the soldier 
replies “Thank you” (495) – and while Rudy, naturally, once more does not understand the 
words (cf. 495), no reader would deny that they have just witnessed a meaningful exchange 
between the two characters. In this passage, as in the Stalingrad scene, language is once more 
portrayed as a barrier which simple, instinctive human behaviour can easily overcome 
through empathy and non-language-based communication. 
 
3.2.3 Language and Communication Skills in Relation to Personal Identity 
In addition to thus portraying the role of language and interpersonal communication within 
human (co-)existence, The Book Thief also repeatedly shows how closely verbal and 
communicative skills are related to individual personal identities, relationships, mental and 
emotional states. Zusak and his narrator, in fact, frequently use the characters’ respective 
skills to characterise them at different points throughout the narrative, thus further elaborating 
upon the significance of the skills in question. All the while, the fact that both “language” and 
“communication” in this context are to be understood as complex constructs and processes 
which go beyond the mere use of words is repeated again and again.  
To give a few examples, the very different personalities of Liesel’s foster parents are first 
introduced to the readers through the way the two adults communicate with and around the 
girl. Liesel’s foster mother’s incessant cussing is directly contrasted with her foster father’s 
quiet nature – and whilst the woman’s violent verbal outbursts are shown to repel the newly-
arrived Liesel, the man’s near word-less attempts to connect with the girl through playfulness 
and music are shown to form the basis for a deep bond between the two (cf. 40). Similarly, 
the character of the mayor’s wife is introduced as too traumatised to speak – and yet her and 
Liesel are capable of having meaningful exchanges in the woman’s library without the need 
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for words, merely through nods, gestures and facial expressions (cf. e.g. 140-141). In short, 
throughout all these examples, as well as through the Stalingrad and airplane crash examples 
described before, Zusak and his narrator again and again stress the idea that acts can be as 
much a form of communication as actual words, and in fact can express what words cannot – 
an idea most strikingly condensed into the following aside: “DEFINITION NOT FOUND IN THE 
DICTIONARY. ‘Not-leaving’: An act of trust and love, often deciphered by children.” (43, my 
emphasis). 
In addition, the novel’s main side characters are not the only ones introduced and 
portrayed through their communicative skills. Instead, protagonist Liesel’s entire 
development is equally depicted through this theme in a way highly reminiscent of 
Atonement’s link between Briony’s personal and authorial development. Throughout The 
Book Thief, the novel’s protagonist develops from a petrified, mute girl (cf. 39-40) to a girl 
who on lonely nights greets the stars (cf. 51) but still does not speak at school (cf. 94), to a 
bedside reader who takes over that comforting role from her foster father when Max falls ill 
(cf. 327) or is too afraid to sleep (cf. 343), to a public reader comforting her entire 
neighbourhood in air-raid shelters (cf. 388-390) and during funerals (cf. 510) and braving her 
foster father’s letters from the front (cf. 485), to a words-juggling writer (cf. e.g. 528-532). In 
fact, foreshadowing Liesel’s entire development, Death describes the girl already at the end of 
part one as follows: “She was the book thief without words. Trust me, though, the words were 
on their way, and when they arrived, Liesel would hold them in her hands like the clouds, and 
she would wring them out, like the rain” (86). Similarly to McEwan’s portrayal of Briony 
through her writing style, Zusak thus portrays Liesel’s personal development through her 
increased mastery of and skill with words. 
And it is not only Liesel’s positive development and growth that are thus described 
through her communicative skills. Instead, her personal setbacks are equally shown to impact 
and set back her communication skills. Most strikingly, when towards the end of the 
narrative, bombs quite literally destroy the girl’s entire world, the trauma – just like the initial 
trauma of losing her mother – is once again portrayed as a temporary loss of meaningful 
speech. When Liesel is pulled out of the rubble, she is rambling. Whilst her sentences are 
grammatically correct, they are seemingly utterly disconnected from reality. Or as Death puts 
it, only “[t]he girl’s mouth wander[s] on” (537).  
Only as the girl begins to push through the immediate trauma does she slowly begin to 
regain control over her words so that when she eventually begins to find one body of a loved 
one after the other, she is increasingly able to express the sentiments she wishes she would 
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have expressed while the respective loved ones (Rudy cf. 539, Mama cf. 541, Papa cf. 542) 
were still alive. In her need to find the right words to say goodbye, Liesel slowly finds the 
strength to pull herself together rather than to let the trauma overwhelm her. Unlike Liesel’s 
neighbour and the mayor’s wife who throughout the novel are portrayed as having retreated 
into silence, Liesel is described by Death to have “the opposite reaction to her devastation” 
(549). With her world in ashes, she “spoke and spoke – to herself – well into the night” (549). 
Speaking, expressing, letting everything out is thus depicted as the girl’s way of successfully 
processing her traumatic experience by putting it into words. 
It is especially worth noticing hereby that Liesel is portrayed as voicing rather than 
writing down her thoughts. For whereas Atonement is very much a novel about the written 
word, in The Book Thief the spoken word is of highest importance. In fact, Zusak’s focus on 
the oral transmission of information goes so far that his depiction of voices extends far 
beyond the typical description of personal characteristics. Instead, throughout The Book Thief, 
voices repeatedly take on a physical shape, sometimes even reaching full personification.  
When Max first arrives at Liesel’s door, for example, Death remarks that “the young 
man’s voice was scraped out and handed across the dark like it was all that remained of him” 
(181). Similarly, when Liesel’s foster father during a World War I battle gets volunteered by a 
friend to write letters for a commanding officer rather than to go into combat, his friend’s 
speaking out is described as “a voice stepped out and ambled towards the sergeant. It sat at his 
feet, waiting for a good kicking” (185). Continuing the motif, Death later on describes Max’s 
voice as explicitly having a “physicality […] like friction – like a stone being gently rubbed 
across a large rock. It was deep in places and scratched apart in others, sometimes breaking 
off altogether” (225). Finally, when Max brings Liesel his book-gift and the half-asleep girl is 
unable to grasp his presence, Death comments that “[s]he couldn’t tell exactly where the 
words came from. What mattered was that they reached her. They arrived and kneeled next to 
the bed.” (246). Voices, and words for that matter, are thus shown to have a life, a presence of 
their own for Zusak and his Death. And through images such as these those life and presence 
are brought to the foreground of the readers’ attention. 
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3.2.4 The Power of Words, Names, Labels and Poetic Language… 
Considering the significant life-force The Book Thief assigns to voices and words, it is not 
surprising that in addition to using such imagery as a form of double-coded metareferential 
commentary on the topic, Zusak and his Death also discuss the power of words explicitly 
throughout the novel. In fact, this motif is one of The Book Thief’s central themes.  
Firstly, already from the start of the novel, Death as the narrator constantly draws 
attention to labels such as “Communist” (cf. e.g. 38) or “Jew” and “Jewish” (cf. 66). In the 
process, he repeatedly points out the incongruity between how inherently meaningless these 
words are – the child protagonist is after all unable to instinctively comprehend them – and 
how much unstoppable power and influence they still carry. The first label is soon 
acknowledged to have cost Liesel her biological father, and the second, eventually, costs her 
even more. The fact that an early mention of either label immediately serves as an ominous 
foreshadowing if not for Liesel then most definitely for the more mature and historically 
aware readers of the text only stresses the cultural weight infused in these words even further.  
The novel’s discussion of the power of labels derives additional significance through 
Zusak’s chosen historical backdrop of the Hitler-era propaganda machine which the author 
and his narrator reference repeatedly. Already early on in The Book Thief, for example, Death 
points out that the first thing that the Hitler Youth did with new arrivals such as Liesel was to 
“make sure [their] Heil Hitler was working properly” (47). Thus the imprint of correct 
terminology is shown to be more important to the Hitler Youth apparatus than the imprint of 
actual ideology or the enforcement of practical ideals such as bodily orderliness.  
Continuing this thought, bonfires organized by the Nazis to destroy “anti-German” 
writings (cf. e.g. 107-108) feature prominently in the novel and show that the political elite of 
the time acknowledged the power of words not only as part of their own propaganda but also 
when the words were directed against it. The announcer of the festivities surrounding the first 
bonfire Liesel experiences, for instance, is said to exclaim “Today is a beautiful day […] Not 
only is it our great leader’s birthday, but we also stop our enemies once again. We stop them 
reaching into our minds…” (116). That is to say, the book-burners of the period are explicitly 
portrayed as doing what they do not because they consider “anti-German” words worthless, 
but because they acknowledge their power to affect people’s minds. This idea is immediately 
reiterated by Liesel’s foster father who, after Liesel saves one of the books from the fire, is 
said to study the title “probably wondering exactly what kind of threat this book posed to the 
hearts and minds of the German people” (132).  
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This omnipresent attitude towards words unsurprisingly soon permeates Liesel’s mind 
and awareness as well. Consequently, once she gains access to the mayor’s library, it is 
equally unsurprising that one of her first thoughts, according to Death, is the following: 
Once, words had rendered Liesel useless, but now, when she sat on the floor […] she felt an 
innate sense of power. It happened every time she deciphered a new word or pieced together 
a sentence. 
 She was a girl. 
 In Nazi Germany. 
 How fitting that she was discovering the power of words. (154, my emphasis) 
For this power, she by then is fully aware, is central to the Nazi apparatus. Yet if the Nazis are 
able to use words to affect the world, then by learning to decipher and use such words, Liesel 
herself realises she is gaining the power to do the same. 
This is especially true since, as The Book Thief also demonstrates, it is not only politically 
backed labels that have power. Instead, individually assigned labels are shown to be similarly 
impactful. For example, the term “coward” thrown at Liesel’s foster father by his Nazi-
sympathizer son is shown to have an equally strong and destructive effect (cf. 111-112). 
Furthermore, the word is equally depicted as being charged with meaning beyond its literal 
one. Young Liesel therefore once again does not understand the full meaning of the insult, yet 
her foster mother (and the reader) does. So much so, in fact, that she for once remains silent – 
an occurrence so rare that the girl’s silence itself becomes highly charged with meaning. 
In a next step, The Book Thief also points out that labels can furthermore be detrimental 
and highly impactful even when they are assigned to a person by him- or herself. For 
example, Death makes a point of noting that Max thinks of himself as a deserter for leaving 
his own family behind and moving in with Liesel and her foster parents: “That’s right – his 
desertion, not only his escape. That’s how he viewed it” (202, my emphasis). This private and 
personal label, unknown to anybody else, is consequently shown as causing Max pain even 
though – or possibly even exactly because – it is “merely” self-imposed. 
Importantly, however, it is not only negative labels that The Book Thief portrays as 
having an impact. Zusak and his Death demonstrate the significance of labels with 
traditionally positive connotations as well. A good example is the scene in which the foster 
mother’s demand that Liesel should call her “Mama” comes across as heartless while Liesel 
herself admits that calling her foster father “Papa” would be no problem at all (cf. 42). In 
other words, this passage demonstrates the strong emotional connotations both of these labels 
carry, and that they are more than just words designating a person who is currently raising 
you. Continuing this thought, shortly after, Death describes how the mere whisper of the word 
“Mama” to herself is enough for Liesel to “see her mother’s face a hundred times in a single 
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afternoon” (45) and to cause her to feel miserable. The evocative power inherent in the 
seemingly positive label “Mama” is shown to be at least as strong and complex as that of a 
word such as “Communist”, “coward” or “deserter”. 
Whilst thus repeatedly portraying the power of labels, Zusak and Death, however, also 
continuously demonstrate just how unreliable, constructed, and thus seemingly random labels 
can be. During his train-journey to Liesel’s foster family, for example, Max is said to muse 
about the fact that shaving off his beard has changed his identity as follows: “[H]e had walked 
out of that building a new man. In fact, he walked out German. Hang on a second, he was 
German. Or more to the point, he had been” (166). The label of ‘German’, in other words, 
while so important for the young man’s survival, is shown by The Book Thief to be highly 
fleeting and almost nonsensically arbitrary since it can be influenced by something as banal as 
the presence or absence of a beard. 
Finally, Zusak’s Death also makes a point of re-appropriating labels to suit his own 
narrative purposes. In the process, he repeatedly questions if people are labelled based on who 
they are or whether labels make people into who they are. Depicting the abysmal conditions in 
which Max is living in hiding, for example, Death describes what little means the young man 
has to wash himself only to follow up this description with a dead-pan use of the anti-Semitic 
“The Jew was filthy” (217) trope. Similarly, just in case his portrayal of the young man’s 
basement living quarters is not enough to evoke the image of rats living in small, dark spaces, 
Death makes sure to comment explicitly that “the Jewish rat” Max had to keep going “back to 
his hole” (223). In other words, in both cases, the narrator draws upon anti-Semitic labels – 
yet only to turn them on their heads and suggest that their applicability to Max is the result of 
Nazi persecution rather than a reason for the Nazis to persecute him in the first place. 
Similar to this portrayal of labels, The Book Thief additionally depicts names as words 
with equally impactful, condensed and complex meanings. A particularly striking example of 
this motif can be found in the scenes which describe how Liesel’s foster father fulfils his army 
duty by cleaning up certain streets after bombings. One of the sights he is repeatedly 
confronted with during this period is the following: 
Once in a while there was a person roaming doggedly through the fog, mostly single-
worded. They always shouted a name. 
Sometimes it was Wolfgang. 
‘Have you seen my Wolfgang?’ 
[…] 
‘Stephanie!’ 
‘Hansie!’ 
‘Gustel! Gustel Stoboi!’ (441) 
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Once, the name is even “‘Rudy!’” (443). Just as with the labels discussed before, individual 
words are once more shown to be loaded with nigh-infinite, life-encompassing and life-
changing significance. Entire people with all their complexities as well as entire interpersonal 
relationships are encased in one or two shouted words – not to mention that an entire nation is 
depicted through these words as a result of Zusak’s choice of highly regional and/or Germanic 
names. The fact that Liesel’s foster father eventually hears a familiar name, even though the 
boy it is referring to is a stranger to him, further stresses this idea of names as carriers of 
cultural identities. Moreover, it demonstrates how easily a mere common word can create a 
bond between two strangers, in this case between Liesel’s foster father and the woman 
looking for her Rudy. Finally, a last central example of this motif can be found in the 
passages which describe the captured Max being marched through town with other Jewish 
prisoners. According to Death, all Liesel can do at the sight of her friend is to call out his 
name (cf. 514), and as soon as Max hears her he does the same: “his mouth shivered as he 
said the word, the name, the girl. Liesel.” (514). Even more than in the previous examples, the 
choice of words in this description equates the name with the person it represents. The mere 
utterance of the name is, consequently, enough to invoke that person, to summon Liesel to 
Max’s (figurative) side as a source of strength and comfort. 
Continuing their elaborations upon the topic of the power of words – in a manner highly 
reminiscent of the treatment of the same subject in Atonement – Zusak and his Death next 
draw attention to the effects and use of curse-words. When Liesel arrives at her foster parents’ 
home it is said that “[i]n the beginning, it was the profanity that made the greatest impact. It 
was so vehement, and prolific” (39). Just like Briony, Liesel is thus portrayed as repulsed and 
shocked by what she considers to be unusually harsh language. And as the novel progresses, 
the profanities portrayed by Zusak and Death develop an even more near-tangible, material, 
almost physically violent quality: When Death describes Liesel’s foster mother’s unusual way 
of showing her love, he says “[i]t involved bashing [the girl] with wooden spoons and words” 
(41); when Pfiffikus is shouting after the children who have been taunting him, he calls Liesel 
a “little slut”, her perception of that insult being described as “The words clobbered her in the 
back” (59); when Liesel gets reprimanded by her foster mother for getting her clothes dirty, 
Death explains that “[t]he word Saumensch featured heavily in the administration of 
punishment. She [the foster mother] made mincemeat out of her [Liesel].37” (61); an argument 
                                                 
37 This last line thus drawing further attention to the literal, corporeal meaning of the expletive “Saumensch” 
which in English roughly translates as ‘pork human’. 
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between the foster mother and father is described as her using “uppercut words” (74) and him 
“counter-punch[ing]” (75), with Death thus using lexis normally reserved for physical fights 
to depict this verbal one; similarly, when Liesel gets into a schoolyard fight, cursing just like 
her foster mother, it is said that “[h]er voice, too, was able to scratch” the target of her rage 
(83). In short, in all these examples, the narrative’s imagery is centred around the idea that 
curse-words exert a physical force, bashing, clobbering, mincing, cutting, punching and 
scratching their victims. 
According to The Book Thief, this physical, violent quality of words is furthermore not 
only inherent to curses. When at one point in the novel Liesel’s foster father is shown to have 
an epiphany, his exclamation is described by Death as “his voice was like a fist, freshly 
banged on the table” (132). That is to say, any emotional force carried through words is 
portrayed as comparable to a physical force. In addition, when the produce-stealing children 
described later in the text are running away from a farmer, their leader shouts one word which 
Death describes as follows: “It was his next word, however, that frightened. He called it out 
as if he’d already been attacked with it. His mouth ripped open. The word flew out, and the 
word was axe.” (172). Not only does Death in this passage thus explicitly draw another 
parallel between a word and a physical attack, but the expression “mouth ripped open” when 
combined with the consequent image of a flying axe, further solidifies the violent imagery 
unfolding in front of the readers’ eyes. And the brutal associations do not end there. 
 When Max at one point imagines himself fist-fighting with Hitler, the fantasy eventually 
culminates in the latter removing his gloves and “finish[ing] him” (264) by giving a hate 
speech, thus once again enforcing the idea of the deathly power of propaganda. The most 
violent verbal interaction in the entire novel, however, is arguably perpetrated by Liesel 
herself when the girl attacks the mayor’s wife after the latter’s husband decides he cannot 
afford to have Liesel and her foster mother do their washing anymore. Furious, Liesel assaults 
the woman in what could as well be a physical manner, throwing the woman’s trauma in her 
face and criticising her for the way she is living her life: “[Liesel’s] voice, though shaken, 
hooked at the woman’s throat. […] She sprayed her words directly into the woman’s eyes. 
[…] Now she became spiteful. More spiteful and evil than she thought herself capable. The 
injury of words. Yes, the brutality of words.” (272). And the result of this word-lashing is 
described as equally physical: on the one hand, the mayor’s wife is described as “battered and 
beaten up […] Liesel could see it on her face. Blood leaked from her nose and licked at her 
lips. Her eyes had blackened. Cuts had opened up and a series of wounds were rising to the 
surface of her skin. All from the words. From Liesel’s words.” (273); on the other, Death 
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suggests that the entire “glass casing of Molching had now been shattered” (273), thus 
portraying Liesel’s words as impactful enough to wound structures as well as people. 
Moreover, even when The Book Thief discusses words of a less violent nature, they are 
still frequently shown to have a physical, tangible effect. For example, Death describes words 
as having the quite literal ability to get under a person’s skin, as the following passage 
describing Liesel’s foster father’s interaction with a newspaper containing the news that Hitler 
has taken Poland demonstrates: 
On his way home, he picked up a discarded newspaper, and rather than stopping to shove it 
between paint tins in his cart, he folded it up and slipped it beneath his shirt. By the time he 
made it home and removed it, his sweat had drawn the ink onto his skin. The paper landed 
on the table but the news was also stapled to his chest. A tattoo. Holding his shirt open, he 
looked down in the unsure kitchen light. (79) 
In other words, Zusak and his narrator once more portray words not only as capable of 
affecting people’s minds (as in the case of propaganda) but as being powerful enough to even 
cause physical ripples in people’s lives. And while sometimes these portrayed ripples are 
merely metaphorical (as in the case of the bruised mayor’s wife), there are also repeated 
examples, such as this last one, of Death describing actual bodily reactions to the use of 
words. Furthermore, The Book Thief’s entire Max narrative also demonstrates that the 
utterance of certain words can be factually dangerous, for if Liesel were to tell anybody about 
the young man living in her basement, this would have literally fatal consequences for him 
and possibly even for Liesel’s foster parents (cf. 210-211).  
In addition to thus portraying the extensive power inherent to words, Zusak and his 
narrator also depict the ways in which the effect of such words can be transformed through re-
appropriation. The author’s own implicit stylistic feature employed in his portrayal of labels is 
thus introduced as an active metareferential subject within the narrative itself. For example, 
observing how Liesel has begun to identify herself with her foster mother’s favourite 
swearword ‘Saumensch’ in a neutral, non-pejorative way just because she has heard it used in 
connection with herself so often, her foster father is portrayed as taking the re-evaluation of 
the term even further by adopting it as his loving nick-name for the girl. This re-appropriation 
culminates in the ultimate expression of the highly positive and emotional bond between him 
and Liesel in their bedtime ritual exchange of “‘Goodnight, Saumensch.’ ‘Goodnight, Papa.’” 
(73). This familial bond is soon extended to include the girl’s best friend Rudy as can be seen 
from his use of “Dear Saumensch” (100) to address a letter to Liesel. Finally, as the story 
progresses, even the girl’s foster mother is shown to use the expression lovingly, for example 
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when praising Liesel for doing something right by saying “Good girl, Saumensch.” (220). 
With that, for the protagonists, the word’s meaning is changed for good. 
A second significant example of re-appropriation depicted in The Book Thief is Max’s 
initially merely practical and eventually highly symbolic use of his copy of Mein Kampf. 
Firstly, together with his shaved beard and a fake identity card, the book is depicted as an 
integral part of Max’s passing for German during his train journey: “Look proud, he advised 
himself. You cannot look afraid. Read the book. Smile at it. It’s a great book – the greatest 
book you’ve ever read.” (164) Secondly, even while the contents of the book utterly repulse 
Max, the title is shown to resonate with the young man: “Mein Kampf. My struggle.” (166), or 
possibly even ‘my fight’ – these words apply to Max’s experience as much as the text 
containing them is one of the triggers for it. Finally, when Max uses the whitewashed, newly 
blank pages of the book for his own writing, the re-appropriation of the text is complete. As 
Max’s copy of the text is what makes the creation of his own literary work possible in the first 
place, Mein Kampf ironically serves as the young Jewish man’s “saviour” for the third time. 
Mein Kampf is furthermore not the only narrative The Book Thief shows as capable of 
saving lives. In fact, this motif keeps reappearing again and again throughout the novel. 
Already early on, for example, Death remarks that “words and writing actually saved [Liesel’s 
foster father’s] life once. Or at least, words and a man who taught him the accordion” (69). 
This statement is mirrored in the experience of said accordion teacher’s son, Max, who 
himself later on is described as owing his life to “some reading and writing, and a book called 
The Shoulder Shrug” (221). Finally, her love for writing(s) is also quite literally what saves 
Liesel’s life during the bombing which kills her family since the girl escapes her parents’ and 
best friend’s fate by going into the basement to revise her book while everyone else is asleep 
in their beds (cf. 502-503). And even when she is eventually freed from the rubble, Liesel is 
still described as “holding desperately on to the words who had saved her life” (503).  
What is particularly striking about the wording of this last sentiment is Death’s use of the 
pronoun “who” as a means to evoke the idea of words as corporeal, living beings – an idea 
which clearly mirrors The Book Thief’s previously described motif of imbuing voices with 
personalities. As proven by further passages such as the following: “The scrawled words of 
practice stood magnificently on the wall by the stairs, jagged and childlike and sweet. They 
looked on as both the hidden Jew and the girl slept, hand to shoulder” (247), words for Death 
and Zusak, be they written or uttered by voices, have undeniable anthropomorphic 
characteristics.  
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All these hitherto described elements, while never as elaborate as Atonement’s 
poetological discussions, still draw constant attention to the power of words on the narrative 
level of Zusak’s novel, both through story elements and through Death’s repeated use of 
metaphors from highly metareferential lexical fields. Yet The Book Thief is also full of even 
more subliminal form-based metareferential commentary as Zusak’s own choices of language 
and style equally contribute to the motif. For example, Death’s frequently poetic, colourful 
and creative use of words is in itself a testament to language’s endless potential. Already the 
following excerpt from the second page of the actual narrative serves as a perfect case in 
point: 
The question is, what colour will everything be at the moment when I come for you? What 
will the sky be saying? 
Personally, I like a chocolate-coloured sky. Dark, dark chocolate. People say it suits me. I 
do, however, try to enjoy every colour I see – the whole spectrum. A billion or so flavours, 
none of them quite the same, and a sky to slowly suck on. (14) 
The unusual choice of a brown colour for the sky, the link between colour and flavour, that 
last image of “a sky to slowly suck on” – right from the start, Zusak and his Death make a 
show of combining words into unusual and new patterns. Furthermore, they continue to do so 
throughout the whole novel: an Aryan woman is described as having “even [a] breath that 
smelled like Heil Hitler” (55); Pfiffikus is described as “He was a delicate frame. He was 
white hair. He was a black raincoat, brown pants, decomposing shoes, and a mouth – and 
what a mouth it was.” (58); the mayor’s wife’s smile is described as “the appearance now of a 
bruise” (142); a war scene is described as “There is air like plastic, a horizon like setting glue. 
There are skies manufactured by people, punctured and leaking, and there are soft, coal-
coloured clouds, beating, like black hearts.” (319).  
This short list, whilst nowhere near complete, already demonstrates the unusual nature of 
a lot of Death’s use of imagery. On the one hand, Death’s language is thus used by Zusak to 
characterise his narrator by portraying him as an unusual being with an unusual way of 
perceiving the world (cf. 13). On the other hand, however, all these phrases also serve as 
implicit, double-coded metareferential commentary on the power of words to innovate and to 
elicit emotions. Death’s descriptions are, in fact, a prime example of how poetic language can 
most certainly become metareferentially salient as a result of its narrative context. In a 
different work, appearing with a lower frequency, surrounded by fewer additional 
metareferential elements, all these descriptions could easily be read as a mere stylistic quirk of 
the author/narrator. Yet within the thematic focus of The Book Thief, within a novel which 
explicitly discusses the beauty and potential of words, the surprising nature and beauty of the 
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narrator’s own language plays directly into the wider metareferential network established in 
the readers’ minds and re-affirms its motifs. In the process, Death’s words, however, also 
always form fully-functional descriptions. Their stylistic divergence is never as radical as to 
start breaking grammar, coherence or all sense of illusion in a traditionally Postmodernist 
fashion (cf. Wolf, Ästhetische Illusion 380-381). Instead, Death’s linguistic flourishes 
constitute a perfect example of double-coded metareference. 
 In addition to using the narrator’s language to implicitly demonstrate the poetic power of 
words, Zusak furthermore often employs it to spin a similar cognitive web of text- and 
communication-related imagery as the one spun in Atonement. From describing an individual 
battle as a “conversation of bullets” (183) to describing his reaping of souls after the bombing 
of Cologne as  
By the time I was finished, the sky was yellow, like burning newspaper. If I looked closely, I 
could see the words, reporting headlines, commentating on the progress of the war and so 
forth. How I’d have loved to pull it all down, to screw up the newspaper sky and toss it 
away. My arms ached and I couldn’t afford to burn my fingers. There was still so much work 
to be done. (345, my emphasis), 
Death’s continuous drawing from the lexical fields of words, documents and conversations 
fashions a thread which ties the whole world of The Book Thief together. 
A final form-based contributor to the novel’s linguistic web are Zusak’s typographical 
and structural choices which constantly foreground the medial features of the novel. In 
addition to the design of the multitude of title-pages mentioned before, The Book Thief also 
uses font and layout to highlight Death’s numerous asides. While their main narrative 
function is to let the narrator share additional facts, theories, thoughts and comments, their 
bold type and their set-apart, central placement on the page further add to the interruption of 
the flow of the story and to an increased metareferential awareness in the readers. Finally, the 
asides are further supplemented by smaller and more scattered typographical anomalies such 
as irregular indents or line breaks (cf. e.g. 81, 123) which are used to highlight individual 
words or phrases and to add meaning through rhythm and stress. In the process, the 
complexities and potential of poetic language are once again brought to the foreground of the 
reader’s attention. 
 
3.2.5 … and the Difficulty and Importance of Finding the Right Ones 
As strong as Zusak’s focus on the power of language and communication is, The Book Thief 
also contains, especially in the final chapters, many scenes in which finding the right words is 
shown to be difficult. Sometimes, the difficulties are only temporary, such as when Liesel 
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sees Max being driven through the street and Death describes how “[h]er voice trailed off and 
fell away, inside. She had to re-find it – reaching far down, to learn to speak again and call out 
his name.” (513). More often, however, the difficulties persist. When Liesel is caught stealing 
her final book from the mayor’s wife, for example, and the two have their first proper 
conversation, while many things are shared, the process is described as far from easy-going. 
Eventually, Liesel is left not knowing what to say: “There was an itch to leave then, but also a 
peculiar obligation to stay. She moved to speak, but the available words were too many and 
too fast. There were several attempts to snatch at them” (467), but those attempts remain 
unsuccessful. The “too many and too fast” words remain unspoken.  
Similarly, when Liesel’s neighbour soon after, heartbroken by the death of her son, 
freezes and does not want to go into the bomb shelter, the girl is once again portrayed as 
being at a loss for words. Liesel knows that she has “a multitude of words and sentences […] 
at her fingertips” (490): “Frau Holtzapfel, we have to go.”, “Frau Holtzapfel, we’ll die if we 
stay here.”, “You still have one son left.”, “Everyone’s waiting for you.”, “The bombs will 
blow your head off.’” (490-491) – yet all these sentences, whilst true, are also nigh-truisms, 
utterly devoid of meaning for the traumatised neighbour. Finally, Liesel goes for the last 
option that comes into her head: “If you don’t come, I’ll stop coming to read to you, and that 
means you’ve lost your only friend” (491) – but even this specific, personal and purposefully 
violent choice ends up having no effect on the woman. The power and moving force of words 
is thus portrayed to have limits after all.  
Communication is also depicted as difficult for Frau Holtzapfel’s equally traumatised 
surviving son. When he first returns home from the front, the young man is depicted as having 
difficulties to speak with anyone. His mere attempt to share his experiences at his brother’s 
deathbed is consequently portrayed as miraculous (cf. 473) – yet even this miracle ends in a 
failed communication as the man repeatedly misjudges what he should and should not say (cf. 
473-474) until he, eventually, simply tries to “bury [his wrong words] beneath some other 
words” (474). From there on, throughout the rest of the novel, the young man’s survivor’s 
guilt – a guilt he remains unable to express – keeps eating at him until he finally commits 
suicide. And Liesel, who wants to help him, never finds the right words to prevent it. As 
Death comments: 
How do you console a man who has seen such things? Could you tell him the Führer was 
proud of him, that the Führer loved him for what he did in Stalingrad? How could you even 
dare? You can only let him do the talking. The dilemma, of course, is that such people save 
their most important words for after, when the surrounding humans are unlucky enough to 
find them. A [suicide] note, a sentence, even a question, or a letter, like on Himmel Street in 
July 1943. (507-508) 
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Thus according to The Book Thief, after some traumatic experiences, neither the traumatised 
nor the people trying to help them are capable of bridging the divide through words. The fact 
that Liesel in contrast chooses to speak and speak all night after the bombing that kills her 
family is thus only further proof of the special relationship she has with words. 
Yet even in less dramatic and traumatic situations, the novel shows that words are too 
often left unsaid. For example, when her foster mother presents Liesel with the book Max has 
left behind for her, Liesel embraces her but is not capable of putting her feelings into words: 
“[t]here was also a great longing to tell Rosa Hubermann that she loved her. It’s a shame she 
didn’t say it.” (449). Similarly, when Liesel increasingly becomes aware of her love for Rudy 
she cannot find the words to tell him this: “Restricted as she was from speaking, she wanted 
him to kiss her” (522) – but Rudy, never knowing her feelings, never does. When Liesel one 
month later finds the boy’s dead body after the bombing, her previously awkwardly held back 
feelings finally flow out of her in the form of words. She similarly for the first time calls her 
foster mother “Mama” upon finding the latter’s dead body in the rubble, too. In both cases, 
the words come too late (cf. 539, 541). 
In addition to all these examples of failed verbal communication, The Book Thief also 
demonstrates that the difficulty of finding the right words is not only confined to speaking on 
the spot. Letters, which – just as in Atonement – play a central part in Zusak’s novel, are often 
shown to suffer from the exact same problems. For example, the first letter Liesel’s foster 
father writes home from the front is described by Death as follows: “A COMPLETE LETTER 
HOME. To my dear Rosa and Liesel, everything is fine here. I hope you are both well. With 
Love, Papa.” (439) At first glance, the word “complete” in the heading of this aside is thus 
highly ironic. After all, considering the terrible experiences that have been left out of this 
written communication, there is nothing (factually) “complete” about this letter at all. Yet 
arguably, letters from the front – just like Death’s (and Briony’s) writing – are not about 
factual completion. They are signs of life, a way for soldiers to express that they are thinking 
of their families, a way for them to keep interpersonal bonds alive and at the forefront of their 
battered minds. Looking at this type of letter from this perspective, Liesel’s foster father’s 
communication actually does cover all of these aspects completely. And by labelling the aside 
as “A Complete Letter Home”, Zusak and his Death actively and metareferentially draw the 
reader’s attention to this fact by asking for a resolution of the seeming discrepancy. 
Whilst this interpretation of the letter’s purpose would already exonerate the shortness of 
Hans Hubermann’s communication, The Book Thief further defends the man by portraying the 
limited length of the text not as an example of a character refusing to communicate but as the 
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result of overcoming a difficulty to communicate in the first place. For the foster father’s 
writing process leading up to the letter in question is described as follows: 
A few hours later [after a particularly emotionally draining bombing-aftermath], when 
he’d washed and eaten and thrown up, he attempted to write a detailed letter home. His 
hands were uncontrollable, forcing him to make it short. If he could bring himself, the 
remainder would be told verbally, when and if he made it home. [and he does cf. 498] 
To my dear Rosa and Liesel, he began. 
It took many minutes to write those six words down. (443) 
Just like Liesel and unlike all the side characters previously discussed, Hans Hubermann is 
thus portrayed to push through his trauma by putting words on paper even if it is difficult. The 
physical effort involved in something as seemingly simple as letter-writing is once again 
particularly brought to the readers’ attention in the process, as is the sheer force required to 
keep communicating after a traumatic experience. 
This idea that it is crucial to keep trying to find and voice the right words no matter how 
gruelling the process is one of the central themes of The Book Thief. The novel, even whilst 
depicting the difficulties of communication, always stresses how they are outweighed by the 
rewards for overcoming them. One of the most salient passages in that respect is once more 
the portrayal of captured Max’s march through town. As explained before, the situation is 
described as so dire and traumatic for both Liesel and Max that it would be only natural for 
either of them to assume that words in that moment would be futile since they cannot stop 
what is happening. Yet once Liesel “re-finds” her voice, once the two call out each other’s 
names (cf. 513-514), and once Liesel begins to quote passages from Max’s book (cf. 515-
516), the two friends are shown to successfully re-establish a meaningful connection and to be 
able to provide each other with comfort. Specifically, Death describes Liesel’s perspective as 
follows:  
Somewhere inside her were the souls of words. They climbed out and stood beside her […] 
The words were given across from the girl to the Jew. They climbed onto him. […] Hot tears 
fought for room in her eyes and she would not let them out. Better to stand resolute and 
proud. Let the words do all of it. (515-516) 
Speaking and sharing words is thus depicted as a form of defiance. In stark contrast to the 
loving yet mellow portrayal of instinctive, non-verbal acts of communication and humanity 
described before, this passage stresses that, within the right context, the actual articulation of 
thoughts and words is essential. 
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3.2.6 The Roles and Functions of Books 
Unsurprisingly therefore, books as a means for such (self-)expression constitute a central 
topic within The Book Thief. Firstly, however, Zusak’s novel also portrays a variety of other 
roles texts can play in people’s lives. For example, similarly to Atonement, The Book Thief 
also draws attention to the idea that people’s thoughts and linguistic choices can be influenced 
by the books they have read. After all, Liesel is shown on multiple occasions to remember, 
use and comment on quotes from books whilst making her own experiences (cf. e.g. 479, 
523). And yet, this particular functional aspect of literature is not one of the main foci of 
Zusak’s attention. 
Much more central, by contrast, is the idea of books as items and/or symbols which can 
provide mental support.38 Already early on in the novel, in a passage foreshadowing later 
events, Death introduces this idea of books and writing(s) as anchors or lifelines through the 
following description of Liesel’s thoughts upon emerging from her bombed home clutching 
her “most precious item” (24), her self-written book: 
Apart from everything else, the book thief wanted desperately to go back to the basement, to 
write, or to read through her story one last time. […] She was dying for it – the safety, the home 
of it – but she could not move. Also, the basement no longer existed. It was part of the mangled 
landscape. […] 
She dropped the book. 
 She kneeled. 
 The book thief howled. (23) 
It is thus immediately clear from this very early excerpt that Liesel’s writing will eventually 
serve her as a refuge and safe haven amidst the traumatic experiences of her life – an idea 
very similar to the one embodied by Briony. Only the shock of utter destruction is then shown 
as being strong enough to “mangle” this sacred space and to render it, at least temporarily, 
meaningless. As Liesel consequently drops the book which both “had saved her life” (503) 
and by nature of being her autobiography contains her life, and as the girl subsequently hits 
the ground at the same time as the book does, it is her entire sense of self that is portrayed as 
falling apart, reducing the otherwise eloquent book thief to a howling animal. 
Yet strikingly, even as Zusak and Death thus acknowledge that books and concepts of 
home, self and personal narrative can lose their meaning for an individual in the face of 
trauma, they also repeatedly point out that such discarded books and narratives can still 
impact the lives of others meaningfully. The mayor’s wife, for example, even though she 
herself has given up on reading, is portrayed as still capable of realising that the books in her 
                                                 
38 For a fascinating study analysing Zusak’s text from the specific perspective of bibliotherapy cf. Abate. 
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library might be useful to Liesel (cf. e.g. 142). And true enough, as The Book Thief 
demonstrates, without access to the mayor’s library, Liesel’s life would certainly have 
developed very differently. Similarly, when Liesel herself abandons her book after the 
bombing, it does not remain discarded for long. Instead, it is picked up by Death himself and 
thus gives life to the entire The Book Thief narrative. For as Zusak’s narrator points out 
already at the beginning of the novel, once he acquires it, Death cannot stop re-reading 
Liesel’s story “marvel[ling] at what the girl saw and how she survived” (24).  
Two further functions of books suggested by The Book Thief in the process are their 
ability (1) to allow readers to partake in the life of others, and (2) to consequently open up 
new worlds, insights, perspectives and experiences to the readers. These new insights and 
perspectives in turn are shown to enrich the readers’ own views and experiences by expanding 
the readers’ horizons and by enriching their cognitive networks. In regards to his perusal of 
Liesel’s story, Death eventually points out that “the best [he] can do” is to “watch [her story] 
fall into line with everything else [he] spectated during that time” (24). In other words, while 
Death – just like all readers – is unable to change anything about Liesel’s tragic life story, he 
still suggests that meaning can be derived from it through learning from and contextualisation 
of the experiences contained within it.  
This idea of the importance of passing on experiences by passing on stories is central to 
the entirety of The Book Thief. In the novel, similarly to McEwan, Zusak repeatedly stresses 
the seemingly limitless potential of narratives to carry ideas and experiences across time and 
space. In fact, even in a world full of bombs and Nazi bonfires, The Book Thief portrays not 
only narratives but even books as nigh impossible to destroy. They are kept safe in libraries; 
they are collected by Death himself and carried across time; and even the book burnings are 
revealed to frequently perpetuate instead of to destroy the narratives contained therein. For 
Death explains that the Nazis’ love for bonfires only “gave people who were partial to books 
the opportunity to get their hands on certain publications that they otherwise wouldn’t have” 
(89).  
Still, even with this highly symbolic portrayal of books as nigh immortal and 
transcendent, it is important to note in the context of The Book Thief’s wider metareferential 
complex that the novel never fully neglects the physical aspects and characteristics of its 
written texts. In fact, as Rebecca-Anne Do Rozario has pointed out, Zusak’s text outright 
“celebrates the tactile nature of bibliophily” (104, my emphasis). For example, from the 
beginning of the novel, Death always makes a point of describing the covers of the books 
Liesel steals (cf. e.g. 31-32, 90). Furthermore, when Liesel first gets access to the mayor’s 
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library she spends her whole initial visit just enjoying the sight of the full shelves as well as 
the possibility of running her fingers over the books’ spines: “It sounded like an instrument”, 
Death describes, “or the notes of running feet. She used both hands. She raced them […] and 
when she eventually stopped and stood in the middle of the room, she spent many minutes 
looking from the shelves to her fingers and back again.” (141). This multi-sensory experience 
is equally essential to Liesel’s first reading of Max’s self-made booklet:  
The pages crackled. Just slightly. One edge of them curled into the floor. […] She reached 
down and picked them up, listening to the paper as it rippled in her early-morning hands. 
[…] As she turned them, the pages were noisy, like static around the written story. […] 
There were the erased pages of Mein Kampf, gagging, suffocating under the paint as they 
turned. (246) 
Finally, Liesel is also described as carrying one of her stolen books with her because “[s]he 
like[s] to feel it in her hand. Either the smooth spine or the rough edges of paper” (310). In 
short, The Book Thief – much more so than Atonement – is not only a novel about narratives 
and cultural and personal stories, but it is also a novel about books as such, as corporeal 
objects.  
Furthermore, books are not the only text-containing objects portrayed throughout The 
Book Thief’s narrative. In fact, the novel is filled to the brim with references to a variety of 
written text forms. For example – in addition to all the letters and newspapers already 
mentioned – on his train journey across the country, Max is depicted as armed with a book, an 
identity card and a map (cf. 146-147); the instructions for his journey are said to have been 
delivered to him through letters (cf. 203); and the entire journey is the result of an address 
scribbled on a note (cf. 202). Continuing the motif, Liesel is shown to search garbage bins for 
newspapers and crosswords she can bring Max to help him pass the time in the basement (cf. 
229). In fact, Death describes that Liesel “could never dampen the feeling of victory each time 
she found a Molching Express, or any other publication. Finding a newspaper was a good day. 
If it was a paper in which the crossword wasn’t done, it was a great day” (257). In other 
words, in this world in which Max is deprived of everything, printed words in combination 
with the communal spirit of Liesel are shown to be his only escape.  
Of course, even with all these references to other forms of texts, the most central text type 
referenced in The Book Thief remains the book. Especially the ten “stolen” books which form 
the backbone of Liesel’s life and development are equally central to Zusak’s novel structure. 
Death summarises the girl’s “illustrious career” as a book thief as follows: 
       
100 
 
I should hasten to admit, however, that there was a considerable hiatus between the first 
stolen book and the second. Another noteworthy point is that the first was stolen from snow, 
and the second from fire. Not to omit that others were also given to her. All up, she owned 
fourteen books, but she saw her story as being made up predominantly of ten of them. Of 
those ten, six were stolen, one showed up at the kitchen table, two were made for her by a 
hidden Jew, and one was delivered by a soft, yellow-dressed afternoon. 
When she came to write her story, she would wonder exactly when the books and the 
words started not just to mean something, but everything. Was it when she first set eyes on 
the room with shelves and shelves of them? Or when Max Vandenburg arrived on Himmel 
Street carrying handfuls of suffering and Hitler’s Mein Kampf? Was it reading in the 
shelters? The last parade to Dachau? Was it The Word Shaker? Perhaps there would never be 
a precise answer as to when and where it occurred. (37) 
And this passage, which can be found merely twenty or so pages into the text, strikingly 
foreshadows all turning points crucial to Liesel’s story. Consequently, it also provides an 
implicit index for the entirety of The Book Thief’s narrative which, in accordance with 
Liesel’s view of her own life, is divided into ten parts, each named after one of the ten books 
which make up the girl’s story. 
As hinted in this early paragraph, Liesel finds her first ever book in the snow, more 
specifically in the snow near her baby-brother’s grave, where it has fallen out of a 
gravedigger-assistant’s pocket. It is described as black with silver writing on the cover (cf. 31-
32) and thus the reader might initially be misled to believe it to be a bible. Once Liesel’s 
foster father reads the title for her, however, it turns out to be The Gravedigger’s Handbook. 
This clash between the readers’ expectation and the reality of the book serves as a symbol for 
the way in which death and more precisely burials are generally perceived in Liesel’s world: 
despite the presence of a priest, there is nothing spiritual about the activity; it is just a chore to 
be completed as efficiently as possible. In contrast, for Liesel, the book is portrayed to 
actually have a spiritual meaning even after she learns of its contents. Since the girl is unable 
to read, the book is not treasured by her because of its words anyway (cf. 45, 70) but because 
of what it represents. As Death explains, it is important to Liesel because it is her last link to 
her dead baby-brother (cf. 45). 
Liesel saves her second book, The Shoulder Shrug, from a Nazi bonfire. Death describes 
the event as particularly important for the whole story because “when the book thief stole her 
second book, not only were there many factors involved in her hunger to do so, but the act of 
stealing it triggered the crux of what was to come” (89). Therefore, a closer look at these 
factors serving as catalysts is warranted. 
Firstly, even at this early point in her life, Liesel’s relationship with books is already a 
highly complex one. While the two children’s books she receives from her foster parents for 
Christmas in recognition of her growing literacy are portrayed as filling her with some of the 
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strongest joy she has ever experienced (cp. 91, 94), this joy is also immediately depicted as 
unsustainable. Her parents simply do not have the financial means to reliably satisfy Liesel’s 
desire for new reading material on a regular basis. And since the girl’s reading experiences at 
school are charged with highly negative emotions, borrowing books from there is equally 
unthinkable (cf. 93-94). Thus stunted in her development, Liesel is then confronted with the 
idea of the book burnings – an event specifically designed to further withhold books from 
people. No wonder this confrontation further fans the flames of her desire and sparks her act 
of stealthy defiance. 
In addition, the book burning itself also demonstrates to the girl for the first time the 
power texts and words can have within society in general, beyond providing personal 
satisfaction. The propaganda-permeated event is in fact as eye-opening for Liesel as the 
fountain scene is for Briony. As a result of the hateful proclamations against Jews and 
communists, which accompany the book burning, Liesel for the first time makes the 
connection between Hitler, the dangerous label “Kommunist” (a word she had heard before 
but of which she had never understood the meaning), and the loss of her biological family (cf. 
117-119): “The word communist + a large bonfire + a collection of dead letters [she wrote to 
her mother] + the suffering of her mother + the death of her brother = the Führer” (120). 
Furthermore, as Liesel processes this epiphany and exclaims that she hates the Führer, the 
slap she immediately receives by her otherwise gentle foster father together with a warning 
about just how dangerous the words she has just uttered are, fully cements her image of words 
as so powerful that they can be deadly (cf. 121-122).  
Finally, watching the people she now recognises as responsible for her family members’ 
deaths equally attempt to destroy books causes Liesel to form an even closer bond with the 
objects thrown on the pyre. On the one hand, she sees the burnt books as victims of Hitler’s 
destructive machinery, just like her parents and brother. On the other hand, the books she 
finds to have survived the flames provide her with her first proof that Nazi destruction can be 
escaped. Discovering these “small section[s] of living material” (125, my emphasis), these 
“[s]urvivors” (125) “pok[ing] their noses out” (126) from the ashes, “unhurt” (126), Liesel 
picks up the one closest to her and hides it underneath her uniform in an act of defiance which 
further demonstrates her growing identification with these increasingly anthropomorphised 
objects. Carrying it, the text explains, makes her feel the book heat up again as if igniting 
from the inside, burning her chest (cf. 127). The Book Thief thus quite literally depicts the 
power of narratives to ignite symbolic fires in our chests. Specifically, Liesel’s second stolen 
book ignites the flame of the girl’s personal rebellion against the Nazis. When Liesel 
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eventually shows her foster father the book and asks him whether he will tell on her, Death 
describes her actions as follows: “She brandished it in the air, as if waving a gun” (133) – the 
image of a rebel leader brandishing his weapon as a threat to the establishment is thus evoked 
by Zusak’s narrator. 
The third book which impacts Liesel’s life – in this case without her even opening it – is 
Mein Kampf. Brought into her home by Max, the book is already significant by being a 
manifesto of the Nazi ideology which shapes her life. Furthermore, it is however also one of 
the safety measures which make it possible for Max to equally enter and shape Liesel’s life. 
Finally, by providing Max with whitewashed paper for his own book, Max’s specific copy of 
Mein Kampf plays an even more central role in the girl’s development. Even while Liesel’s 
interaction with this particular work is rather limited, The Book Thief still successfully uses 
the text to demonstrate two central qualities of the medium in question: its physicality as well 
as its physicality-transcending role as a vehicle for society-shaping discourse. 
The fourth book important for Liesel’s development is another work she is gifted. Whilst 
a book she receives from her foster parents for her twelfth birthday is once again appreciated 
but barely impactful (cf. 229), the text she receives from Max soon after is what really makes 
a difference to the girl’s life. Written by Max himself onto the white-washed paper of his 
Mein Kampf copy as a response to Liesel hugging him, the thirteen-page booklet called The 
Standover Man is The Book Thief’s most striking example of re-appropriation. Through it, in 
addition to physically transforming the pages of Mein Kampf, Max also transforms the image 
of people standing and towering above others. Whilst normally linked to threat and danger, in 
Max’s story the image is re-coded as something positive, as a symbol of love referring to 
Liesel’s stance whilst watching over Max (cf. 233-246). In the end, through both of these re-
appropriations, Mein Kampf – a book written to (amongst other things) divide Germans and 
Jews on multiple levels – is transformed into the first verbal acknowledgement, expression 
and documentation of the strong bond between Max and Liesel which forms the core of a lot 
of the girl’s childhood experiences. 
While the fourth book thus stands for interpersonal bonding and an emergent communal 
spirit, the fifth book in Liesel’s story is the result of, as well as at the basis for, conflict. It is 
furthermore the first text the girl actually steals. Specifically, The Whistler is a crime novel 
Liesel keeps reading at the mayor’s house. Once the girl’s and her foster mother’s services are 
rejected, the mayor’s wife tries to give Liesel the book as a parting gift but the latter is too 
angry to accept the gesture. Not wanting to “be bought” she throws the book at the mayor’s 
wife’s feet (cf. 272-273) only to steal it shortly after for the specific purpose of experiencing 
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victory (cf. 293). As Death puts it, “[s]he wouldn’t tolerate having it given to her by a lonely, 
pathetic old woman. Stealing it, on the other hand, seemed a little more acceptable. Stealing 
it, in a sick kind of sense, was like earning it.” (297). In other words, hurt by the mayor’s 
wife, Liesel steals her first book in an attempt to regain some of her own dignity and power 
and arguably to regain some control over her own narrative as well, “preserv[ing] her ‘self’ 
during the chaos of war” (Ceccio and Ceccio 51) in the process. 
Furthermore, the significance of the fifth book does not end with it being another act of 
rebellion and defiance. Instead, it also forms the core of a series of events central both to 
Liesel’s relationship with Rudy and to her personal identity. When Liesel chooses to steal the 
book, she does so instead of stealing food as she had promised her starving best friend (cf. 
299-301). And the fact that Rudy never complains on the one hand indicates the strength of 
the boy’s feelings for the girl, but on the other also shows that the two children are slowly 
growing up and reaching a stage of development in which they are acknowledging that certain 
things, concepts and actions are more important than their base physical needs. Both these 
ideas are immediately reinforced when soon after the theft Rudy jumps into a freezing river to 
save and return the book to Liesel after a confrontation with a local bully without any 
consideration for his own health and safety.  
Admittedly, all throughout these passages The Whistler could easily have been replaced 
with any other item for the book itself is not what is of value to either of the children. Still, the 
fact that Zusak does use a book for these scenes adds to The Book Thief’s overall 
metareferential message which establishes all books as potential carriers of meaning and ideas 
more important than food, as well as as potential sources for (in this case Liesel’s) personal 
growth and further development of abstract, ideological thinking. Finally, the sequence 
triggered by the theft of the fifth book is also what eventually leads to Liesel’s nickname and 
The Book Thief’s own title. For once the children return after their experiences, Rudy is 
described by Death to “brand[ Liesel] with her title” as he parts from her with the words 
“Goodnight, book thief” (302). 
Liesel acquires her sixth book once again by stealing it from the mayor’s library, only 
this time it is not revenge she has in mind. Instead, Liesel simply wants a new book to read to 
the ill and unconscious Max. Consequently, she breaks into the library and this time chooses 
The Dream Carrier because the name reminds her both of Max’s and of her own nightmares, 
and of the bond they have formed over them (cf. 336). “It’s a new one, Max. Just for you.” 
(337), she announces, thus for the first time actively committing theft as an act of love and 
hope rather than as a form of anti-establishment transgression. Through Liesel’s sixth 
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important book Zusak in other words further develops the theme of reading out loud to each 
other as a communal bonding experience. 
The seventh book to have an impact on Liesel’s life is a copy of The Complete Duden 
Dictionary and Thesaurus which the mayor’s wife leaves out for the girl in an act of 
reconciliation. While the narrative never explicitly shows Liesel making use of her new book, 
Death himself increasingly keeps using dictionary-based asides throughout the subsequent 
part of the novel to convey Zusak’s related metareferential message. Already before Liesel 
receives the book, there is a first aside giving the “DUDEN DICTIONARY MEANING” and 
“related words” of a German word, in this case of “Zufriedenheit – happiness” (366) when 
describing the last happy and peaceful days Liesel experiences before the bombs begin to fall. 
The next Duden-aside gives the definition of the word “Verzeihung – forgiveness” (376) 
when Liesel reads the mayor’s wife’s letter. This is followed by definitions of “Angst – fear” 
(383) when Liesel and her neighbours spend their first night in a bomb shelter, of “Wort – 
word” (390) when Liesel finishes reading out loud to her neighbours for the first time, and of 
“Gelegenheit – opportunity” (393) when a neighbour hires Liesel to read to her in private. The 
next word explained is “Elend – misery” (397) when a mass of starving Jewish prisoners is 
marched through town on their way to Dachau. The second-but-last definition is that of 
“Schweigen – silence: the absence of sound or noise. Related words: quiet, calmness, peace.” 
(404) when Liesel walks in on her stock-still foster parents after Max has had to leave – a 
definition which Death immediately rejects with the words “Now more than ever, 33 Himmel 
Street was a place of silence, and it did not go unnoticed that the Duden Dictionary was 
completely and utterly mistaken, especially with its related words. Silence was not quiet or 
calm, and it was not peace.” (405). The final definition given is ultimately that of 
“Nachtrauern – regret” (408), which is what Liesel’s foster father has to live with every day 
after his instinctive act of trying to help one Jewish prisoner jeopardizes Max’s safety and 
forces him to leave.  
What is striking about Zusak’s use of all these definitions and asides is the intricate 
nature of the relationship between words and their meanings, which is portrayed thereby. 
Traditionally, as Joseph F. and Cathy M. Ceccio have pointed out, dictionaries and thesauri 
are meant to hold the “keys to understanding” (53). Yet as Liesel with the help of her seventh 
book learns more complex words for more complex concepts, she is repeatedly confronted 
both with the immense power and with the limitations of language in relation to expressing 
these complexities. On the positive side, the juxtaposition of short definitions with lengthy, 
detailed narrative sections portraying Liesel’s experiences of “misery”, “happiness”, 
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“forgiveness” etc. shows just how much meaning and densely packed emotions can be 
contained within one single word. On the negative side, the juxtaposition of the definition of 
“silence” with the realities of Liesel’s experience demonstrates that some words and 
experiences have far more nuances to them than could ever be included in a basic definition. 
What is particularly notable is the fact that it is precisely “silence”, a state without words, 
which is shown to carry more meaning than the word supposed to denote it ever could. And as 
Liesel learns this lesson, Zusak’s use of asides makes sure this metareferential issue is 
brought to the reader’s attention as well.  
The eighth and arguably most impactful book described in The Book Thief enters Liesel’s 
life at a time during which she is growing increasingly disillusioned with the heroes and 
heroines of the usual books she has access to, heroes and heroines whose circumstances are so 
far removed from Liesel’s life that she feels the characters do not even know what they are 
talking about (cf. 433). In this time of crisis, Liesel’s faith in the written word is only restored 
when she is gifted a book much more relevant to her situation, namely Max’s THE WORD 
SHAKER. A Small Collection of Thoughts for Liesel Meminger (449). Thus Zusak stresses the 
importance of the existence and distribution of as many different narratives as there are 
different personal experiences. 
Hand-written and hand-drawn by Max, the short eighth book contains mostly stories and 
sketches inspired by topics Liesel and Max have already discussed. Only the actual name-
giving story “The Word Shaker” is new and has the strongest impact on the girl. Death 
describes it as “a fable or a fairytale. Liesel was not sure which. Even days later, when she 
looked up both terms in the Duden Dictionary, she couldn’t distinguish between the two.” 
(450). Meanwhile, Max’s own introductory note explains that he almost removed the story 
from the collection for being too much like either of these classic genres: “I thought you 
might be too old for such a tale, but maybe no-one is. I thought of you and your books and 
words, and this strange story came into my head. I hope you can find some good in it.” (450). 
In other words, in an approach very different from the one voiced by Briony, Max and 
through him Zusak suggest that rather than being something to be outgrown, fairy tales and 
fables can be eternal.  
Max’s particular tale of “The Word Shaker” – as highly metareferential as The Book 
Thief itself – begins with the story of a young Hitler witnessing a mother first admonishing 
and then comforting her child. Through this experience, young Hitler is portrayed to realise 
that he could rule the world without ever having to pick up a weapon. Words, he suddenly 
understands, would be enough (cf. 451). Consequently, he plants and cultivates words and 
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symbols as literal trees all throughout Germany to once again literally feed the word-fruits to 
his people. Furthermore, he tasks a select number of people called “word shakers” to climb 
the trees and shake the boughs to drop the words down to the rest of the populace. The best 
word shakers are said to be those “who understood the true power of words”, especially one 
girl who “knew how powerless a person could be without words. She had desire. She was 
hungry for them” (452). Eventually, that girl acquires her own word seed from a tear shed in 
friendship and plants her own tree (cf. 452). Hitler, disconcerted by the latter’s quick and 
strong growth, tries to have the tree cut down yet as long as its word shaker stays with it, high 
up in its branches, secretly provided with supplies by other word shakers, the tree does not 
yield (cf. 453-454). Only once the girl is reunited with her friend and they leave the forest 
together does the tree finally fall (cf. 454-456). Though even then, as the two walk away, they 
can still hear words being spoken behind them, coming from the direction of the girl’s fallen 
tree, most likely carried by the voices of the people who had witnessed it all.  
As this summary shows, “The Word Shaker” is the most densely metareferential book as 
well as section in the entirety of The Book Thief, to a point where it almost resembles 
Atonement’s poetological discussions. It explicitly references the power of words to both 
punish and comfort. It demonstrates how people can shape and “cultivate” individual 
discourses, how they can “feed” them to others, and how those others can in turn “consume”, 
internalise and “live off” these discourses, blindly. Yet the story also shows how one 
individual, even a little girl, can take control of her narrative and change it, in the process 
changing the narrative and life of others. By embracing the power inherent in words shared in 
love and friendship, such an individual can gain an indestructible means of fighting 
oppression. Furthermore, he or she can trigger a chain reaction, the new narrative being 
communicated from person to person, indefinitely – until it maybe, one day, makes its way 
into a book such as Max’s. 
The importance of the ninth book significant to Liesel’s life pales by comparison with the 
eighth, yet it is still worth mentioning. Once again it is a work the girl steals from the mayor’s 
library. Specifically, Liesel is described to pick the book called The Last Human Stranger at 
random (cf. 466), and the effect it has on her life is twofold. Firstly, The Book Thief portrays a 
scene in which Liesel is reminded of a quote from the stolen book whilst lying alone and 
vision-plagued in bed during the war: “There were people everywhere on the city street, but 
the stranger could not have been more alone if it had been empty” (479). In this scene, the 
book serves as an example of how relatable passages in texts can help us put our own 
experiences into words. Beyond that, ironically, this book seemingly dealing with feelings of 
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estrangement is also significant in its role as the one thing which finally helps Liesel and the 
mayor’s wife to bridge the gap between them. The theft of the book is shown to trigger 
Liesel’s first proper deep conversation with the woman, which in turn sets the girl on her 
Briony-esque path of recognizing and valuing the mayor’s wife despite her trauma as a fellow 
human being, as complex and alive as the girl herself.  
The tenth and final significant book in Liesel’s life is the one she eventually comes to 
write herself. This book is born once again out of a crisis of faith in the girl’s relationship to 
words, which The Book Thief describes as follows: Soon after Liesel witnesses Max being 
marched through town, she is said to once again climb into the mayor’s library looking for 
“[b]ooks and pages and a happy place.” (524) only to this time get frustrated with her own 
book-based happiness in a bout of survivor’s guilt.  
She had seen a Jewish man who had twice given her the most beautiful pages of her life 
marched to a concentration camp. And at the centre of all of it, she saw the Führer, shouting 
his words and passing them around.  
Those images were the world, and it stewed in her as she sat with the lovely books and 
their manicured titles. It brewed in her as she eyed the pages full to the brims of their bellies 
with paragraphs and words. 
You bastards, she thought. You lovely bastards. 
Don’t make me happy. Please, don’t fill me up and let me think that something good 
can come of any of this. (524-525)  
In other words, in this one moment, the clashes between neat, orderly narratives and the 
turmoil of war, between literary escapism and the harsh reality, between Max’s beautiful, 
elevating, life-giving words and the ugliness and violence of Hitler’s rhetoric all rise to the 
forefront of Liesel’s awareness as Zusak metareferentially brings them to the attention of his 
readers. Soon, the girl cannot help but ask herself the ultimate question(s) with which I 
introduced this chapter:  
The words. Why did they have to exist? Without them, there wouldn’t be any of this. 
Without words, the Führer was nothing. There would be no limping prisoners, no need for 
consolation or wordly tricks to make us feel better. What good were the words? She said it 
audibly now, to the orange-lit room. ‘What good are the words?’ (525) 
More than just criticising the words’ potential for both good and evil, Liesel thus eventually 
even suggests that words are the origin of all evil. Fully disillusioned and furious, the girl – 
who at the beginning of her story notably felt that burning books was a crime – subsequently 
begins to randomly tear pages out of one of the library’s books. As she writes in the letter she 
afterwards leaves behind to apologize to the mayor’s wife: “I was just so angry and afraid and 
I wanted to kill the words. […] I love this place and hate it, because it is full of words.” (526) 
The eventual resolution to Liesel’s crisis of faith comes in the form of an empty book the 
mayor’s wife soon after brings the girl to encourage her to channel the talents visible in her 
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letters into at least writing if she does not want to read any more (cf. 527). Further developing 
The Word Shaker’s implied symbolism of the importance and power of planting your own 
tree, and transforming this symbolism into explicit words, the mayor’s wife thus falls in line 
with The Book Thief’s general metareferential commentary. The fact that the empty book is 
accompanied by the previously unimaginable sight of a smile on the mayor’s wife’s face, as 
well as by the most articulate and thoughtful sentences the woman has spoken since the death 
of her son, only stresses the significance of her communication. Moreover, it also 
immediately and directly demonstrates how impactful overcoming one’s silence and voicing a 
suggestion can be (cf. 527-528). For, eventually, Liesel takes her new book into the basement 
where she first learnt to write, the basement in which Max wrote his stories, and she begins 
her own writing which is to have a major effect even on Death himself. In a clear homage to 
the title of Max’s The Word Shaker, Liesel titles her work The Book Thief. A Small Story by 
Liesel Meminger.  
 
3.2.7 Writing as Story-(Re-)Telling as Communal Experience 
The way in which the process of writing and its functions are depicted in The Book Thief 
varies starkly from the one portrayed in Atonement. Specifically, as with many previously 
discussed metareferential topics of Zusak’s novel, the focus is once again placed much more 
strongly onto writing’s communicative aspects. 
Already the very first time in the story Liesel is depicted as writing longer texts 
exemplifies this different focus. In the relevant scenes, the girl is told in school to compose a 
letter to a friend. Yet Liesel immediately rejects the assignment as a pointless and 
meaninglessly abstract exercise and asks to write to her absent mother instead (cf. 101). In 
other words, right from the start, Liesel expresses a desire for real, meaningful 
communication through writing instead of an interest in writing games, fictional assignments 
and fanciful experiments of the kind Briony is shown to enjoy. The fact that Liesel, however, 
does not need her writing to be a two-way communication is demonstrated immediately 
thereafter as well. Even when Liesel’s mother never responds to the letter her daughter ends 
up writing, Liesel is still not dissuaded from writing. In fact, she continues to write five more 
letters even if she never sends them due to the initial lack of response (cf. 104). The focus of 
Liesel’s early writing is thus eventually placed on the inherent meaning of self-expression and 
of the verbalisation of her own experiences, independent of the arrival of her message at any 
recipient. 
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A similar oscillation between needing and not needing a recipient for one’s writing is 
depicted in Max’s early attempts at the craft. His process of writing is described by Death as 
follows:  
In his loneliest moments in the basement, the words started piling up around him. The 
visions began to pour and fall and occasionally limp out of his hands. 
[…] 
Originally, Max had intended to write his own story. 
The idea was to write about everything that had happened to him – all that had led him to 
a Himmel Street basement – but it was not what came out. Max’s exile produced something 
else entirely. It was a collection of random thoughts and he chose to embrace them. They felt 
true. They were more real than the letters he wrote to his family and to his friend Walter 
Kugler, knowing very well that he could never send them. The desecrated pages of Mein 
Kampf were becoming a series of sketches, page after page, which to him summed up the 
events that had swapped his former life for another. Some took minutes. Others hours. He 
resolved that when the book was finished, he’d give it to Liesel, when she was old enough 
[.] (287) 
Initially in this passage, Max’s writing is shown to be a near intuitive, free-flowing form of 
(self-)expression. Described as barely bound to their author’s original intentions, words are 
portrayed as bursting out of the young man. Max’s writing is furthermore depicted as a 
replacement for letters to his family, which, due to his exile, his family will now never be able 
to read. And yet, by the end of the passage, Max is also shown to have decided to transform 
his text and thoughts into a book specifically intended for Liesel to read. Through this 
decision, the importance of sharing and communicating one’s experiences with loved ones is 
immediately reinstated. 
The next example of possible functions of writing depicted in The Book Thief can be 
found in the section portraying Max’s illness. When Liesel on a walk with her foster father 
sees an interesting cloud, she wonders how she could bring it home to Max to lift his spirits, 
asking “How do you give someone a piece of sky?” (330). To this her foster father 
immediately responds with “Memorise it. Then write it down for him” (331). Once home, 
Liesel does so and places the piece of paper containing her words with other items she has 
collected as presents for Max. As she does so, The Book Thief further reinforces its 
metareferential message of writing as a means to capture moments forever and to carry them 
across time and space so they can be shared with and experienced by others. 
Soon after this portrayal of Liesel’s first short narrative creation, Death increasingly 
begins to foreshadow how the experiences he is describing will eventually find their way into 
the girl’s own book. From an actual sample of Liesel’s final work presented in an aside (cf. 
362) to individual quotes (cf. e.g. 395, 505) and paraphrases (cf. 399) of her text incorporated 
into Death’s narration, Liesel’s own voice begins to be more and more visible to the reader 
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during the subsequent passages of The Book Thief, highly symbolic for how Liesel’s voice 
itself develops increasingly throughout this period of her life. Furthermore, in addition to 
portraying Liesel’s growing identity through an increased reference to her actual words, these 
passages also constantly remind the readers that Death himself is not actually telling a story 
he has created, witnessed or one which he knows because of his omniscience but that he is, in 
fact, relating and commenting upon a story he has acquired through reading himself (cf. e.g. 
507, 508). Rather than representing a factual report or a unique product of Death’s 
imagination, The Book Thief’s main narrative thus positions itself firmly within the usually 
oral tradition of narrative story (re-)telling. In the process, the focus of the narrative – and of 
writing(s) in general – is placed even more firmly on the idea of sharing stories through 
writing rather than on scribbling down ideas in the privacy of one’s study, as is the case in so 
many scenes of Atonement.  
Once Liesel receives her empty book in the final part of The Book Thief, Zusak’s 
narrative emphasis switches even further towards an explicitly metareferential depiction of the 
girl’s writing process and what writing means to her. Specifically, at the very beginning of 
this stage in Liesel’s life, writing down her own thoughts in the basement where she first 
bonded with her foster father and Max over words is portrayed to serve as a reminder “that 
words had also brought her to life […] there would be punishment and pain, and there would 
be happiness, too. That was writing” (528). And it is exactly in the harnessing of this life-
bringing potential as well as in the sharing of it with others as the two men had with her that 
Liesel sees the purpose of her written work from the start. In fact, already when she receives 
the book from the mayor’s wife the girl immediately promises that if she ever finishes writing 
something, she will show it to the woman (cf. 528). As a result, even though Liesel 
consequently retreats to the solitude of her basement to write, her writing is never linked to a 
desire for isolation. Instead, just like with her very first letters, Liesel is interested in 
communicating, and her only creative worry is “not knowing how she was ever going to get 
this right” (529).  
The way Liesel is subsequently portrayed to “get it right” is by keeping her book with her 
at all times and trying to write down ten-pages-worth of her life-story “exactly as she 
remembered it” (531) every night, no matter how emotionally daunting the process is, how 
physically (cf. 530-531) and cognitively (cf. 532) challenging, and no matter how strong her 
fear is that with “so much to consider, so many things [were] in danger of being left out” 
(531). Eventually, as the girl’s writing experience grows, so does her skill in all of these areas, 
until Liesel is finally able to produce a work which contains her own experiences, both past 
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and present, as well as her memories of Max and pieces of his writing (cf. 531). In this, the 
structure and concept of Liesel’s The Book Thief implicitly mirror those of Death’s story and 
Zusak’s novel. 
Just like Zusak’s entire text, Liesel’s book is shown to contain an experience-focused 
plot, intertextuality and (meta)reflections – raising the question in the readers’ minds of just 
how much of the depiction of Liesel’s writing process applies to Zusak’s as well. The fact that 
Liesel’s book is furthermore divided into the same ten book-based parts as Death’s narrative 
and Zusak’s novel draws further parallels between the intra- and extradiegetic narratives, 
partially conflating their respective authors (cf. 532). Finally, when a quote from Liesel’s 
book describing Rudy’s dive into the freezing river (cf. 532) reveals that the words Death 
used to describe the same scene (cf. 251) are in fact Liesel’s, the line between these two 
narrative voices is blurred even further: for once the reader has realised this direct 
appropriation, he or she can never be sure anymore which parts of Death’s narration are really 
his and which are just him directly relaying Liesel’s words without marking them as quotes 
anymore. In the end, the readers are left with an increased sense of immediacy (Death not 
always being an additional narrative filter) and a devaluation of the identity of the narrator, 
both of which place the focus of The Book Thief on the experiences shared therein and the 
sharing itself rather than on the person doing the sharing. Once again, the difference to 
Atonement and Briony’s pivotal role in it is striking. 
 In addition to all these specific examples of directly portrayed interrelationships between 
narratives and interpersonal exchange, the general motif of stories, language and knowledge 
as shared, communal experiences can really be found throughout the entirety of The Book 
Thief. To start things off, Liesel only succeeds in learning to read within an encouraging 
social setting. Whilst she is described to have serious trouble with the subject in school, under 
her foster father’s tutelage the girl soon begins to show signs of progress – not because his 
instruction method is different (it is explicitly mentioned it is not) but because the girl for 
once is not intimidated by or uncomfortable with her surroundings but is being taught by 
someone she loves (cf. 72). Once established, this motif of the social component of successful 
knowledge acquisition keeps reappearing throughout the rest of Liesel’s learning experience 
as well: for example, whilst she expands her vocabulary through books she reads on her own 
she also explicitly always brings the new words home with her so she can discuss them, 
initially with her foster father (cf. 152) and subsequently with Max (cf. 258).  
Building upon these communal learning experiences the novel further depicts many 
instances of actual oral storytelling as crucial social interactions. For example, both Liesel’s 
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foster father’s sharing of his story (cf. 210) and Max’s sharing of his own (cf. 224-225) are 
depicted as having a strong emotional impact on the respective listeners, and the same applies 
to Liesel’s and Max’s re-telling of their nightmares to each other. In all these cases the 
communal aspect of the sharing of experiences is shown to create and/or tighten interhuman 
bonds. Admittedly, for the respective story-tellers, this communication of their experiences is 
often shown to be a difficult, strenuous task: for example, Death describes Max’s narration as 
“[t]he course of his survival” which he “related, piece by piece, as if he were cutting each part 
out of him and presenting it on a plate” (225-226, my emphasis). Yet the resulting social 
bond, according to The Book Thief, is always worth the pain. After all, in the end, it 
constitutes a significant part of what saves both Max’s and Liesel’s lives.  
In a much less dramatic manner than through the sharing of such existential stories, 
bonds in The Book Thief are also shown to be formed through conversations in general, no 
matter the topic: from seemingly irrelevant subjects such as Liesel’s descriptions of the 
weather to Max (cf. 259), to emotionally impactful ones such as Max’s and Liesel’s exchange 
about their feelings for each other (cf. 342-343) or Rudy’s expression of just how badly he 
needs a win (cf. 293), the sharing of thoughts and emotions is what repeatedly helps 
characters connect. And as the following quote shows it is not even the contents of these 
shared stories that are crucial to the process. For as Death points out when Liesel accompanies 
her foster father to his window-blackening job: “Every day when they worked together, he 
would tell Liesel his stories. […] Each day there was a story, and Liesel forgave him if he told 
the same one more than once.” (363) In other words, the value of shared stories, according to 
this passage, explicitly does not lie in the communication of ‘new’ information but in the 
underlying communal spirit. 
Finally, just like the oral telling of stories, the communal reading of books is also 
depicted in The Book Thief as being capable of creating bonds. Already from the beginning of 
the novel, rather than only being something characters do in private and on their own, reading 
is depicted as a shared activity reminiscent of parents’ reading of bed-time stories to their 
young children. Initially, it is Liesel and her foster father who are portrayed as always reading 
together. This dynamic changes once the foster father purposefully pairs up Liesel and Max 
for these reading sessions to on the one hand help Liesel get over her discomfort around the 
young man, and on the other to help Max feel included (cf. 221-222). The first actual 
conversation between Liesel and Max is consequently the discussion of a book (224) – 
another form of sharing one’s reading experience, portrayed again and again as Liesel shares 
stories of books and words she has discovered in the library (cf. 257-258). Liesel and Max’s 
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bond is further cemented by her reading to him while he is ill, evoking again the image of 
parental bed-time comfort (cf. 327).  
Eventually, the motif of communal reading culminates in what is arguably the strongest 
and most symbolic metareferential image of the entire novel: the depiction of Liesel as 
reading to an entire basement full of her family, friends and neighbours hiding from the 
falling bombs. Firstly, Liesel begins to read out loud simply to distract herself (cf. 388), yet 
soon she focuses specifically on distracting everybody else as well:  
She didn’t dare to look up, but she could feel their frightened eyes hanging on to her as she 
hauled the words in and breathed them out. A voice played the notes inside her. This, it said, 
is your accordion. 
The sound of the turning page carved them in half. 
Liesel read on. 
For at least twenty minutes, she handed out the story. The youngest kids were soothed by her 
voice, and everyone else saw visions […] Liesel did not. The book thief only saw the 
mechanics of the words – their bodies stranded on the paper, beaten down for her to walk on. 
Somewhere, too, in the gaps between a full stop and the next capital letter, there was also 
Max. She remembered reading to him when he was sick. […] 
Everyone waited for the ground to shake. 
That was still an immutable fact, but at least they were distracted now, by the girl with the 
book. One of the younger boys contemplated crying again, but Liesel stopped at that moment 
and imitated her papa […] She winked at him and resumed. (389) 
At this moment, Liesel thus realises that what for her foster father is his accordion – the 
symbol of one of his strongest interpersonal bonds, the instrument which makes him feel most 
social and communal – for the girl are books and the words contained therein. The act of 
reading itself, just like the acts of personal story-telling discussed before, is once more 
depicted as difficult and physical, the words need to be “hauled”, “beaten down”. Yet sharing 
them, “hand[ing them] out” in that moment is shown to be as rewarding and as needed as the 
handing out of blankets, food, or life-vests. And whether the audience is old enough to 
understand the text or whether they are just listening to the girl’s voice, they are all enticed, 
just like Liesel used to be by her foster father’s early readings. Once more, the passage is thus 
not about the comforting potential of the content of any given story but about the potential of 
story-telling as such.  
In the process, the initially highly intimate act of a (foster) father reading to his little girl 
is willingly shared by the girl in question with her entire community, to equal bonding 
success. At the end of the reading, even a previously hostile neighbour is not only shown to 
explicitly thank Liesel (cf. 390) but also to begin to pay the girl to read to her outside of the 
shelter as well (cf. 394-395). And this neighbour continues to do so even after she receives the 
news that one of her sons has been killed at the front and the woman retreats into an otherwise 
nearly catatonic state of silence (cf. 473, 492), an even more extreme version of the mayor’s 
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wife’s response to trauma. Even though, as Death points out, the broken woman from that 
moment on does not actually hear the words which are read to her (cf. 476) she still is 
portrayed as repeatedly “asking” for Liesel to come (cf. 473). Liesel does and thus keeps 
reading, day after day, night after night, “for that’s why she’s there, and it feels good to be 
good for something in the aftermath of the snows of Stalingrad” (477, cf. 510). 
 
3.2.8 Conclusion: The Book Thief’s Metareferential Focus 
All these passages make it very clear where the focus of The Book Thief’s metareferential 
message about books and narratives lies. Just like Liesel eventually learns that the library she 
keeps stealing from does not actually belong to the mayor but to his wife, and that its function 
therefore is not to provide a man in power with knowledge (cf. 467) but to provide a mother 
with material to “read[…]on the floor with a young boy pointing at the pictures and the 
words” (467), The Book Thief’s readers are encouraged to come to the same realisation about 
the social purpose and significance of stories. 
Furthermore, similarly to Atonement, The Book Thief presents life stories as being 
synonymous with their respective protagonists’ lives, and even with the protagonists 
themselves, as the following foreshadowing of Max’s arrival by Death clearly demonstrates: 
“In the times ahead, that story would arrive at 33 Himmel Street in the early hours of 
morning, wearing ruffled shoulders and a shivering jacket. It would carry a suitcase, a book, 
and two questions. A story. Story after story. Story within story.” (76, my emphasis, last 
italics in original). Equally similarly to Atonement, life stories – the sum of people’s 
experiences – are also portrayed as not needing to be plausible or to “make sense” in the way 
young Briony’s understands these words. For as Death points out in the context of Liesel’s 
foster father’s life: “They’re strange, those wars. Full of blood and violence – but also full of 
stories that are equally difficult to fathom. ‘It’s true’, people will mutter. ‘I don’t care if you 
don’t believe me[..]’” (181). The only thing stories need to be able to do, according to Zusak’s 
novel, is to communicate people’s experiences to others. 
The reason for this, The Book Thief further shows, is that this type of communication is 
central for different people to be able to understand the value of each other’s experiences. In 
fact, according to the text, such communication is crucial for people to be able to understand 
the value of human life and humanity as such. After all, Death himself explains his reasons 
for picking up Liesel’s book and for collecting human stories in general as follows: “[I]n one 
of my vast array of pockets, I have kept her story to retell. It is one of the small legion I carry, 
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each one extraordinary in its own right. Each one an attempt – an immense leap of an attempt 
– to prove to me that you, and your human existence, are worth it” (24). In other words, 
according to Death, our personal stories are what justifies the existence of humanity as a 
whole. For as Death elaborates in a later passage describing his view of the German civilians 
hiding in shelters: “As is often the case with humans, when I read about them in the book 
thief’s words, I pitied them” (384). It is thus only Liesel’s stories which help Death empathise 
with the average German perspective on the Nazi era and World War II experience, resulting 
in him developing pity and at least a partial understanding for a people who otherwise could 
be so easily vilified during this period of history. In fact, Liesel’s story is shown to not only 
incite sympathy in Death himself but to cause him to want to spread his sympathy further by 
in turn sharing the girl’s story with others – us readers – until it becomes part of our collective 
cultural narrative (cf. also Henke 95). 
In the end, according to The Book Thief, these collective, communally shared and 
disseminated narratives are what keep our memories alive even past the expiration date of 
books as material, degradable objects:  
I [Death] remember clearly what Liesel Meminger had to say […] A lot of the words have 
faded over the decades. The paper has suffered from the friction of movement in my pocket, 
but still, many of her sentences have been impossible to forget. (362) 
[…] 
That’s why I tell this story. […] Say something enough times and you never forget it. (533) 
In Death’s own words – and what stronger authority on the topic could there be – stories, lives 
and ideas through re-telling can and do become immortal. And this immortality together with 
the aforementioned achievement of mutual understanding is the main purpose of stories 
according to Zusak’s novel. It is what makes the tremendously difficult work of overcoming 
trauma-based silence worthwhile39. 
The Book Thief ends with a portrayal of Death’s first actual interaction with Liesel on the 
day of her death, many decades later. Death shows the girl that he has picked up her book and 
explains that he has read it many times over. The one thing the dying Liesel then wants to 
know is if he was able to understand (cf. 553), thus one final time reinforcing her writing goal 
as well as the importance of successful communication. Death’s answer is as follows: 
I wanted to tell the book thief many things, about beauty and brutality. But what could I 
tell her about those things that she didn’t already know? I wanted to explain that I am 
constantly overestimating and underestimating the human race […] I wanted to ask her how 
the same thing could be so ugly and so glorious, and its words so damning and brilliant. 
                                                 
39 This highly complex topic has of course been discussed by many other authors and scholars, especially in the 
aftermath of Adorno’s famous proclamation in “Kulturkritik und Gesellschaft”. For a more in-depth analysis of 
The Book Thief’s position within this discourse cf. Wehming. 
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None of those things, however, came out of my mouth. 
All I was able to do was turn to Liesel Meminger and tell her the only truth I truly know. 
I said it to the book thief and I say it now to you.  
A LAST NOTE FROM YOUR NARRATOR. I am haunted by humans. (554) 
This one concluding paragraph sums up the entirety of The Book Thief’s metareferential 
views on language and stories brilliantly: once again there is the power of words, containing 
within themselves both the ability to create meaning and beauty, and the ability to cause utter 
destruction; there is once again the impossibility of expressing or sharing anything more than 
one’s personal experience, one’s personal “truth”, as well as the importance of doing just that; 
finally, there is the ultimate image of the never-dying memories of people haunting Death, 
and all of us, forever, in the form of stories.  
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4. Metareference in Contemporary Film 
Most of film’s metareferential discussions have their origin in the complex and ever-changing 
relationship central to the history of cinema between reality and its representation through the 
new medium. Consequently, an understanding of the way in which people viewed and view 
film’s mediality is integral to a study analysing how metareferences are used to address that 
mediality. The following short diachronic summary of the prevalent perceptions on the matter 
during different periods of cinema’s history shall provide the necessary basics.  
In the first years after the invention of the medium, as Werner Wolf has pointed out, film 
seemed to almost entirely take over the field of illusionist narration since it was actually 
considered to be a near-transparent medium (cf. Ästhetische Illusion 683-684). In fact, as 
Matthias Hurst has explained, in the early days of cinema, the new medium’s entire potential 
for art was repeatedly questioned based on this idea that all it was capable of showing was an 
unadulterated reproduction of the reality it captured (cf. 235). Film, early critics furthermore 
argued, would as a result forever be artistically constrained by the superficial material and 
visual nature of the items and occurrences it depicted (cf. Hurst 235). And it was not even just 
critics of the fledgling medium who held these views. Early supporters shared the same 
beliefs, merely with the difference that they considered film’s bond to reality to be something 
positive since consequently film, and only film, was capable of depicting reality (cf. Hurst 
236).  
Only as time went on and the medium developed beyond the short documentary clips of 
the Lumière brothers, did these early ideas about film begin to change. By the 1920s, Sergei 
Eisenstein was experimenting with montage techniques, F. W. Murnau and Georges Méliès 
were using trick photography and early forms of special effects, cameras were mounted on 
cranes and dollies, and film had thus moved universes away from its beginnings as a static 
and comparatively straightforward reproduction of reality (cf. e.g. Pramaggiore and Wallis 
103-120). As Keith Cohen has pointed out, for audiences at the time all these cinematographic 
innovations were so jarring that they forced the medium’s recipients to “pay at least as much 
attention to the film’s process of production as to its unfolding fiction” (9). Through this, in 
an unintentional yet typically metareferential manner, the medium-awareness and -
knowledgeability of audiences began to rise. 
As time moved on even further, these initial innovations became, however, so 
commonplace that their potential for illusion-breaking began to decline. After all, an average 
audience member today would be hard-pressed to name, for example, the number of jump- or 
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cross-cuts her or she has witnessed in any given film, having internalized this technique as 
well as others as just another basic part of the medium’s language. Consequently, over the last 
few decades, filmmakers wanting to draw attention to the mediated nature of their work began 
to look for new, increasingly explicit means to achieve their goal: the use of shaky hand-held 
cameras, the portrayal of objects seemingly on the camera lens, the inclusion of purposefully 
exposed on-screen and in-frame equipment such as cameras or microphones, having 
characters break the fourth wall and address the audience or even just look straight at the 
camera, special effects mimicking the forwarding, rewinding or burning of film stock – these 
are only a few of the techniques employed to achieve the desired effect (cf. e.g. Hauthal 586; 
Limoges “Gradable Effects” 393). 
As a result of these developments – just like literature – cinema by now has developed a 
strong tradition of metareferential works. Also just like in the case of literature, this 
metareferential cinematic tradition includes a variety of very different films (cf. e.g. Ames 18-
19; Aubrey 18-19; Pfeifer 410). For example, in some genres such as that of the horror movie, 
self-reference is used as a means to add entertainment value and to rope in a usually 
particularly genre-loving and genre-savvy audience by challenging viewers to recognise all 
tropes (cf. e.g. de Villiers 357-377). In other, frequently auteur-focussed, films, metareference 
is used to achieve illusion-breaking, Brechtian effects (cf. Nöth et al. 34; Reinecke 13). A 
third type of film is specifically interested in the processes of film-making and film-watching 
(a theme that can be traced back at least as far as Dziga Vertov’s Man with a Movie Camera 
(1929)), especially in the context of these processes being part of an entire movie industry. A 
fourth type of metareferential film discusses cinema as a medium frequently used for 
adaptation and examines for example what “metadaptations” (Voigts-Virchow 137) reveal 
about film’s representational potential (cf. Faubert 160; Voigts-Virchow). A fifth type uses 
the deconstruction of roles and characters to portray identity crises. Finally, a last group of 
films tackles the even broader Postmodernist issue of the increasingly blurred borders 
between truth and illusion, reality and fiction, reality and film. In fact, some scholars such as 
Barbara Pfeifer have argued that film might be particularly well-equipped for the discussion 
of this last topic due to the aforementioned nigh-transparent quality assigned to the medium at 
its conception (cf. 410). 
In short, the metareferential topics addressed by metafilms over the last decades are as 
complex and varied as those discussed in metanovels. Furthermore, as the previous paragraph 
shows, the topics under discussion are also frequently similar to the ones thematised in 
metareferential literature. There is, however, one subject matter which is nearly unique to the 
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newer medium’s metareferential explorations, and that is their frequently strong focus on the 
medium’s technological component as a feature which distinguishes the medium film from its 
text-based and stage-based predecessors. After all, in the words of Keith Cohen, “movies 
were the first ‘invented’ art” (8, my emphasis). Furthermore, as Christopher Ames has pointed 
out, movies are also still a comparatively new art and thus “their status as technological 
novelty is still in recent memory, and the discourses of magic, illusion, and wonder still 
influence how the moviegoing experience is depicted and marketed” (3). The amount of time, 
effort and not least of all money our present-day film industry spends on the development of 
new CGI- and 3D-technologies for particularly illusionary special effects certainly confirms 
Ames’ observation. Furthermore, in an era in which grand silver screen magic seems to 
increasingly be considered the only way to tempt audiences away from their television- and 
computer-screens, this type of cinematic self-stylisation could even be considered crucial to 
the industry’s survival. 
In addition, the technological aspects of film production can be seen as particularly well-
suited for the depiction of (post-)Postmodernist ideas and thus lend themselves particularly 
well to metareferential treatments. As Keith Cohen has observed,  
rather than becoming more complete, more all-encompassing, or more efficient 
through automation, [filmic representation] is full of deletions, ellipses, and partial 
views. Cinema can be seen as the epitome of twentieth-century relativism for the 
way in which it cuts up reality, endows these ‘rescued fragments’ with special 
significance, and combines them in an order at odds with their lived sequence. (8)  
In other words, the purely mechanical processes of creation involved with the highly 
technological medium film can serve as a perfect symbol for our current technological 
society’s general processes of creation of meaning. 
A final essential aspect of the medium as well as of the industry of film and therefore 
often used as a centre-piece of medium-specific metareferential discussions is the idea of 
stardom. Christopher Ames has formulated the brilliant phrase that “[a]ll Hollywood movies 
are about Hollywood; some just happen to be set there as well” (2, my emphasis). What he 
specifically refers to with this statement is the fact that, in one way or another, “all Hollywood 
films contribute to the larger story of film and celebrity that gives ‘Hollywood’ its complex 
meaning” (Ames 2). “Celebrity” – or stardom – is thus acknowledged by Ames as a crucial 
component of the movie industry’s appeal. As he further elaborates, “[a]lmost from the 
beginning of the film industry, its artistic productions have been associated with the glamour 
and luxury of those who make them” (Ames 3). 
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Already this prominent role which stardom plays within the medium of film would be 
enough to explain filmmakers’ frequent metareferential interest in the subject. However, the 
relevance of this motif extends well beyond the realm of cinema itself. Winfried Nöth, Nina 
Bishara and Britta Neitzel describe a star as an actor who constantly oscillates between 
referring to him-/herself and referring to his/her role (cf. Nöth et al. 52-53), and Erika Greber 
has similarly suggested that stardom is “fuelled by [actors’, directors’ etc.] self-exploration 
and self-fashioning” (616). In other words, stardom can thus also be seen as a fruitful 
metaphor for our processes of identity-creation in general. Consequently, any related 
metareferential explorations have the potential to discuss a universal theme of high social and 
cultural significance as well as a medium-specific characteristic. 
For a case study on how exactly all these themes are approached and deliberated upon 
specifically in contemporary Anglophone cinema, once again many films could have served 
as a basis: For an analysis of the parallels between stardom, roles and identity creation, as 
well as of the blurry lines between reality and fiction, the Charlie Kaufman-penned Being 
John Malkovich (1999), Adaptation (2002) and Synechdoche, New York (2008) would have 
constituted perfect subjects. In contrast, Quentin Tarantino’s Inglourious Basterds (2009) 
would have lent itself perfectly for a demonstration of the increasingly explicit use of 
metareference in cinema – after all, while all of Tarantino’s films are filled with intertextual 
references, in this one for the first time a cinema, a propaganda film and an actual movie star 
play central roles in the film’s story. Finally, many people would argue that the entire barrage 
of found-footage films and mockumentaries which has flooded the market over the last 
decade or so just has to be included in a study such as this. I, however, would argue that not 
all found-footage films are really fully-metareferential works. 
 While the footage presented in films such as Daniel Myrick’s and Eduardo Sánchez’s 
The Blair Witch Project (1999) or Neill Blomkamp’s District 9 (2009) is actually meant to 
have been shot in the process of making a film and thus is highly metareferential, the footage 
used in films such as Matt Reeves’ Cloverfield (2008) or David Ayer’s End of Watch (2012) 
says much more about the role of online video in our society than about that of cinema. And 
then of course there are films such as George A. Romero’s Diary of the Dead (2008) which 
are located somewhere in the middle of the spectrum opened up by the previous two extreme 
examples. The complexities of this genre, in short, would be better served by a separate study 
than by an exemplary inclusion in a case study on metareference such as mine. 
For the purposes of this thesis, therefore, setting the found-footage genre aside, I looked 
for examples of movies which include all metareferential themes central to the other films just 
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listed as well as metareferential comments on the technological features which make film so 
different from literature. Fulfilling all these requirements, E. E. Elias Merhige’s Shadow of 
the Vampire (2000) and Martin Scorses’s Hugo (2011) will be the two works under discussion 
for the remainder of this main chapter. 
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4.1 Metareference in Shadow of the Vampire40 
Our battle, our struggle is to create art. Our weapon is the moving picture. […] We are 
scientists engaged in the creation of memory. But our memory will neither blur, nor fade. 
(Shadow of the Vampire 0:14:01-0:14:56) 
E. Elias Merhige’s Shadow of the Vampire is a Gothic film which makes the Gothic nature of 
all films its main topic. And while this would already be enough to classify this work as 
highly metareferential, the fact that its main plot revolves around the production of a classic 
Gothic film makes it even more so. 
 
4.1.1 The Self-Referential Use of Gothic Tropes 
Firstly, with a focus much more similar to that of Atonement than to that of The Book Thief, 
Shadow of the Vampire is hyper-aware of its Gothic genre’s traditions across all media, and 
Merhige clearly situates his film within this lineage. Stylizing itself as a perfect example of a 
work within a movement, Shadow of the Vampire consequently incorporates elements from 
all of the genre’s developmental stages. The stock-characters and -settings typical of the 
eighteenth century Gothic novel are combined with the ambiguities, the psychological debates 
and the social critique of works from the nineteenth century. In addition to these traditional 
features, Shadow of the Vampire further includes the most recent discourses of the Neo-
Gothic, displaying a high level of intertextuality: just like Gothic literature constantly pays 
homage to its predecessors, Merhige’s film acknowledges its cinematic heritage by making 
the creation of a genre classic, F. W. Murnau’s Nosferatu (1922), its subject. This elevates 
Shadow of the Vampire from a mere prototype of a Gothic vampire tale to a self-reflexive 
meta-film, which not only deconstructs the Gothic by exposing how it is constructed for film, 
but also deconstructs film itself by revealing its Gothic nature. 
Already the initial title sequence of Shadow of the Vampire (cf. 0:00:51 – 0:05:38) sets 
the mood for a Gothic adventure. Through arched palace gates the viewer is led into a golden 
and exotic world which already foreshadows the motif of the magical, curtain-framed cinema 
screen. The world displayed is inhabited by heroic knights in strange armour fighting against 
unknown forces and mysterious creatures peering out from thick and wildly interwoven 
foliage. The repeated focus on a particularly beastly face and on a decorated letter “V” 
                                                 
40 For a previously published essay of mine on this topic with a slightly different focus cf. Baeva, “As Gothic as 
It Gets?” 
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resembling a family crest are first hints at the vampire motif. Together with the title 
sequence’s two-dimensional monochromatic style and its emphasis on the depiction of battle 
scenes, they evoke images both of medieval tapestries and of cinema’s early Art Nouveau 
influences. This intermedial invocation of a strange historical framework is furthermore itself 
in perfect accordance with the traditions established by early Gothic fiction (cf. e.g. Snodgrass 
xiii; Taubenböck 36), and it remains a central feature of Shadow of the Vampire throughout its 
entirety. 
For not only does Merhige’s film open on a historic scene in 1922 Berlin, but the 
majority of the story takes place in the even more “exotic” historical setting of an isolated 
rural area in Czechoslovakia. In the process, the Eastern European region and its inhabitants 
are presented with all the inherent racism and focus on ‘otherness’ which is typical of early 
Gothic literature. The emphasis lies clearly on the suggestion of “primitivity”, epitomised in 
the one single car available in the area, the lack of electricity at the merely rudimentarily 
equipped old inn in which the film crew is staying, and the strong superstitiousness of the 
“simple” locals who seem to not even have reached the Age of Enlightenment yet.  
This setting stands in stark contrast to the highly technological nature of even the earliest 
film shooting equipment which Murnau and his crew are shown to be using. Through this 
simple juxtaposition, Shadow of the Vampire both metareferentially draws the audience’s 
attention to the suddenly conspicuously mechanical aspects of filmmaking and simultaneously 
creates a typically Gothic scenario which isolates the protagonists through alienation. 
Believing themselves to be superior to their surroundings, Merhige’s fictional film crew 
chooses to always keep to themselves and considers their hosts unworthy of any form of 
exchange. The only occasion on which one of the locals attempts to communicate her beliefs 
and worries to the visitors ends with Murnau’s scream of “Albin, a native has wandered into 
my frame!” (0:19:38). In other words, unlike the medium of books in The Book Thief, the 
medium of film in Shadow of the Vampire is introduced as a distance-creating and isolating 
one. 
The Gothic motif of ‘the other’ is furthermore not the only trope Merhige’s film genre-
consciously employs on a regular basis. Describing stock-features of the eighteenth-century 
Gothic setting, Maggie Kilgour pointedly lists “one castle – preferably in ruins” and “some 
gloomy mountains – preferably the Alps” (4), and Charles L. Crow adds “dark forests” (1) to 
this list. In Shadow of the Vampire, all these elements are present and fulfil their traditional 
functions of evoking deterioration, entrapment, danger and wilderness (cf. e.g. Snodgrass 15; 
Baldick quoted in Grunenberg 195). In addition, Merhige’s film is filled to the brim with 
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genre-typical premonitions of evil. Sometimes, these premonitions are provided on a 
symbolical level – for example, the train which takes the film crew to Czechoslovakia is 
called “Charon”. Most premonitions, however, are conveyed in the form of blatantly used 
traditional Gothic motifs: there are uneasy restless horses (cf. 0:14:57), mysterious bottles 
filled with a red liquid which looks like blood (cf. 0:15:00), dramatic thunder and lightning 
(cf. 0:16:34), crew-members who suddenly seem to suffer from mysterious illnesses the 
origins of which remain unknown, etc. And just in case all these visual narrative 
foreshadowings are not enough, there is always the film’s highly moody and atmospheric 
soundtrack, its minor scales and tense strings consistently conveying a sense of danger even 
in the seemingly most peaceful and harmless moments of the film. 
Even more than the score and the aforementioned plot elements, it is Merhige’s use of 
lighting which accounts for the gloomy Gothic atmosphere of Shadow of the Vampire. Many 
of the film’s scenes are kept very dark. The darkness is so heavy, in fact, that even the sepia 
coloured scenes in the inn with all their candles and fires do not feel warm and cosy but heavy 
and impenetrable. Furthermore, the heavy shadows present in most of these scenes are rarely 
static. Instead, they constantly press in on the characters, forcefully restricting the audience’s 
sight and thus producing the atmosphere of oppression and claustrophobia so typical of the 
Gothic. This effect is probably the strongest in the scene in which Gustav enters Orlock’s ruin 
for the first time: when both the (fictional) actor and his character move forward, the tree 
branches start to cast their shadows on the man, giving the impression that they are embracing 
him and pulling him more and more into the darkness (cf. 0:22:42). What is particularly 
metareferentially striking in all these scenes is the fact that the Gothic imagery thus invoked is 
always tightly linked to features of the medium film itself: from symbolic nods to the 
significance of shadow-play for the medium’s history, to the encroaching shadows mirroring 
and thus further foregrounding the medium-specific feature of a closing iris, to this iris being 
– from today’s perspective highly unusually – visible in the film-within-film sequences, 
Shadow of the Vampire portrays features of the Gothic and features of the medium film as 
nigh inseparable.  
A final prototypically Gothic sensation successfully evoked by Shadow of the Vampire is 
that of paranoia. In addition to his use of the already mentioned shadows to generate a fear of 
what could be crouching and hiding inside them, Merhige repeatedly employs an extreme 
bird-eye perspective to frame some of his film’s most pivotal scenes. For example, both 
during Murnau’s debaucherous nightclub visit in Berlin (cf. 0:10:34) and during the film 
crew’s first visit to the ruin (cf. 0:21:45, 0:25:52), the extremely steep camera angle used by 
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Merhige places a strong emphasis on the image of characters being watched without their 
knowledge and/or consent. Murnau’s decadent sexual voyeurism in the early scenes is 
equated with that of the vampire Schreck/Orlock in the later scene, and even with that 
inherent to every film director’s view from behind the camera. Furthermore, the unusual 
extremity of Merhige’s chosen framing device additionally draws the audience’s attention to 
the mediated nature of the scenes they are watching and thus to the voyeurism inherent to that 
process as well. 
In addition to all these form-based and implicit (meta)references to typically Gothic 
tropes and cinematic devices, Shadow of the Vampire also contains plenty of explicit 
discussions of these very same topics, curtesy of the fact that the creation of a Gothic film 
(Nosferatu) is portrayed on the narrative level of Shadow of the Vampire as well. By showing 
Murnau and his crew prepare and discuss shoots and by having Murnau give audible, explicit 
directions such as “darker and smokier, dustier” (0:27:57), Merhige’s film constantly brings 
the constructed nature of both Murnau’s and Merhige’s creations to the audience’s attention. 
Mary Ellen Snodgrass has argued that such conscious play with traditional Gothic traits is one 
of the most important features of the highly metareferential Neo-Gothic genre (cf. 250) – and 
Shadow of the Vampire incorporates this feature of this newest Gothic tradition seamlessly.  
Furthermore, Shadow of the Vampire’s setting and atmosphere are not the film’s only 
elements which are in perfect accordance with the many traditions of the Gothic genre. 
Merhige’s protagonists are equally representative thereof. The most common character 
constellation in early Gothic fiction has been described by scholars as follows: “a passive and 
persecuted heroine, a sensitive rather ineffectual hero [and] a dynamic and tyrannical villain” 
(Kilgour 4) all joined in a “maiden-in-the-castle” (or -in-the-abbey) needs-to-be-rescued plot 
(Snodgrass xiv). In contrast, late Gothic texts are characterised by more and more 
disappearing heroes, increasingly complex heroines and villains which arguably grow more 
charismatic than ever (cf. e.g. Landsteiner 54-61) – if it is, in fact, even possible to make such 
clear distinctions between the three types of roles at all. Returning to our contemporary 
Gothic film at hand, Shadow of the Vampire once again clearly draws from all of these 
traditions. 
Merhige’s film keeps the early Gothic character constellation of heroine, hero and villain 
intact but portrays especially the first two types highly ironically. Murnau’s lead actress 
Greta, for example, might be prototypical in her role as a female victim sacrificed by an evil 
tyrant but she is definitely not a pure maiden-in-distress. Instead, she has quite the loose 
tongue, is decadent, promiscuous and a drug addict. The Gothic heroine’s traditional 
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passiveness and fainting at the sight of danger need, in the case of Greta, to be induced by 
sedation. The movie star heroine – arguably exactly as a result of the effects of her stardom on 
her personality – is thus portrayed as being far from heroic. And the concept of hero is 
questioned even more.  
Gustav plays the part in the film-within-film but in Merhige’s story he is nothing more 
than a continuous subject of ridicule. As a result of his stardom he is portrayed to be too vain 
and too pleased with himself to be able to be effective. His power in the film industry is thus 
shown to render him powerless in his real life. In fact, Gustav never even realises that the 
whole crew is laughing at him behind his back and that Murnau keeps calling him “imbecile” 
(0:09:46) and “leading mule” (0:15:48). Finally, in the climactic scene of Greta’s sacrifice, he 
not only is not able to save his “damsel” but he is not even physically present. 
Gustav is furthermore not the only ineffectual hero of Merhige’s story. In the second half 
of Shadow of the Vampire, new cameraman Fritz Arno Wagner swoops in, quite literally, on 
an airplane brandishing his gun, his technological “magic skills” and his masculinity, all the 
while referring to his time in the war. Introduced in this way, Wagner seems predestined to 
become a hero when Schreck’s real identity and the terms of his contract are revealed, yet the 
cameraman’s first thought is to flee the island. That being impossible, he eventually not only 
does not prevent but he contributes to Greta’s sacrifice, and he is portrayed as fascinated by 
the cinematographic qualities of the scene. The same level of inefficiency applies to producer 
Albin Grau, despite his position of power within the industry and his seeming role as the 
representative of reason. Greta’s last hope for a saviour thus lies in script writer Henrik 
Galeen. He is the only crew member portrayed by Merhige as moved by the demise of the 
first camera man Wolf; the only one to suspect Schreck and to criticise Murnau’s obsession; 
the only one who does not put their film first – his professional link to the mesmerising 
medium being the weakest. As a writer of words on paper Galeen is depicted as the one 
member of the film crew with the strongest morals and the most independent views. Yet his 
exclusion from the inner circles of the movie industry is also exactly what causes Galeen to 
arrive at the scene of Greta’s sacrifice too late to be of any help. His fate, typical of the 
“sensitive rather ineffectual hero” (Kilgour 4) of early Gothic literature thus implies an 
impotence of old(er) media to interfere with cinematic developments. 
Finally, Merhige’s villains are equally built around eighteenth- and nineteenth-century 
Gothic models. Murnau, for example, is the perfect prototype of a Gothic tyrant who needs to 
control everything and everybody around him. With him being the director of the film, this of 
course addresses a variety of questions about authorial control, reminiscent of the ones asked 
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in Atonement. As long as Murnau is fully in charge, he is calm and composed, speaking 
slowly and quietly. Yet even the slightest disruption is shown to send him into a fit of rage 
during which he becomes as wild, aggressive and violent as any vampire. When the landlady 
in Slovakia walks into his frame (cf. 0:19:38), he not only screams at her furiously and treats 
her with utter contempt, but for a moment there is even a slight note of panic in his voice as 
he calls on his producer to sort things out. Similarly, it is Murnau’s realisation of his loss of 
power and control which leads to the first of two dramatic confrontations between him and 
Schreck (cf. 0:40:23-0:44:55), during which the vampire is the one to show composure and 
indignation while the director is reduced to raving. 
Another quality of Murnau’s which combines classic Gothic villain traits with film 
industry and stardom tropes is the director’s portrayed history of transgressions: his sexual 
“escapades” (there are several explicit references to his bisexuality (cf. e.g. 0:09:59) and to his 
sadomasochism fetish (cf. 0:10:00-34, 1:02:25)) and drug addiction41 (cf. 0:09:48) – 
representative of Hollywood’s negative sex and drugs image – are known to everybody and 
he even flaunts them in front of his crew (cf. e.g. 0:08:30, 0:12:25).  
Thus combining tyranny and transgression, Merhige’s Murnau joins a long line of 
eighteenth-century villains. Yet he is also a perfect example of those populating the 
nineteenth-century Gothic texts. For Murnau is further portrayed as the prototypical “mad 
scientist” popularised by novels such as Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein (1818) or Robert Louis 
Stevenson’s Strange Case of Dr Jekyll and Mr Hyde (1886). Keith Cohen, in addition to 
calling cinema “the only truly invented art” (49), has described film as “the first artistic brain-
child of modern industrial science” (49), a medium “entirely dependent on the tools of 
modern technology” (9). Consequently, it is only fitting that Merhige’s Murnau, a man in 
charge of making films and thus creating art through science, is depicted as wearing a lab coat 
and goggles and as responding to the nickname ‘Herr Doktor’.  
In perfect accordance with the Gothic trope of the “mad scientist”, Murnau begins his 
journey into darkness as a man with a vision: 
Our battle, our struggle is to create art. Our weapon is the moving picture. Because we have 
the moving picture, our paintings will grow and recede. Our poetry will be shadows that 
lengthen and conceal. Our light will play across living faces that laugh and agonize. And our 
music will linger and finally overwhelm because it will have a context as certain as the 
grave. We are scientists engaged in the creation of memory. But our memory will neither 
blur, nor fade. (0:14:01-0:14:56) 
                                                 
41 For a more detailed exploration of the addiction motif in the film cf. Davison. 
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According to this explicit manifesto, Merhige’s fictional director is specifically looking for a 
way to make memory and art last for eternity – or in other words, like many Gothic scientists 
before him, he is on a quest for immortality. And just like McEwan and Zusak argue through 
their novels that their medium of literature is capable of giving everlasting life, so Murnau 
believes his medium of film to be the one through which immortality can be achieved. By and 
by, however, the director’s initial vision becomes an obsession until, to fulfil his dream, 
Murnau willingly enters into a Faustian pact – another typically Gothic motif (cf. e.g. 
Snodgrass 124, 144-145, 210) – and sells his lead actress and with her his conscience not to 
the Devil but to an equally demonic figure: a vampire.  
According to Shadow of the Vampire, the reason for Murnau’s willingness to employ a 
vampire at all cost is the director’s ultimate desire to achieve new levels of realism. This 
statement is of course highly ironic if one considers the tantrums Murnau throws whenever 
locals walk into his frame or if one considers his demands for added and thus unnatural 
darkness or dust. Clearly, even Murnau himself is thus actually aiming for a balance between 
realism and creative composition. As for Merhige’s views on the subject, through his 
depiction of both of these opposing forces prevalent in Murnau’s work, Shadow of the 
Vampire’s director brings the complexities of cinema’s relationship with reality to the 
foreground of his audience’s attention.  
Through his collaboration with Schreck, Murnau eventually seems to achieve the realism 
for which he is aiming – yet he does so at a very high price. More and more isolated and torn 
between ambition and traces of his conscience, Merhige’s director slowly begins to lose his 
sanity. As Shadow of the Vampire approaches its finale, the initial “Herr Doktor” is more and 
more frequently portrayed as a mad man who has been scratching symbols into the walls of 
his cell-like bedroom (cf. 1:08:28). As a result of his fanaticism and arguably of his denial of 
the film medium’s inherently non-realist nature, Murnau is shown to regress from a pioneer of 
the technical avant-garde to a “savage” who paints on cave walls. In the end, during Shadow 
of the Vampire’s last scene, Murnau – having abandoned all which remained of his scruples 
and humanity in the name of his art – completely loses touch with reality in a truly Gothic 
manner (cf. Landsteiner 81): after Albin Grau is murdered by Schreck during the filming of 
Greta’s sacrifice, the director continues to talk to his producer and to give him instructions as 
if nothing has happened (cf. 1:21:29) – even if the sadness in Murnau’s transfixed eyes 
suggests that somewhere deep inside he is still aware of the horror. 
Throughout his deterioration, Murnau loses more and more control over his film project 
while Schreck’s power increases. And this circumstance and their bargain are not the only 
       
129 
 
two things linking director and revenant. Shadow of the Vampire constantly keeps drawing 
parallels between the two men so that one more highly Gothic motif, that of the doppelganger 
(cf. e.g. Snodgrass xiv), is established. On the most basic level, Murnau and Schreck are 
connected through the vampire’s actual immortality and the man’s desire for it. In his 
isolation and degeneration, Schreck foreshadows what Murnau will become if he continues on 
his quest for everlasting life. By thus holding up a mirror to Murnau, Schreck’s character and 
the whole story of the two men are in themselves highly self-referential.  
Throughout Merhige’s film, Murnau never wants to see these parallels and always makes 
sure to stress Schreck’s ‘otherness’ by calling him “Nosferatu” (e.g. 0:31:30), “vampire” (e.g. 
0:31:54) or other more colourful names (cf. the curse tirade during the shooting of Orlock’s 
death scene at 1:17:52). Still, for the audience, this pejorative name-giving carries a lot of 
irony. A good example is the scene in which Murnau confronts Schreck for having killed the 
film’s cinematographer by using the words “Why him, you monster, why not -- the -- script 
girl?!” (0:41:43, my emphasis). The fact that Merhige’s director seems to seriously mean this 
and is thus shown to rate human life according to the importance of a person for the creation 
of a film, automatically raises the question of who the real monster is in this scene. In other 
words, while Murnau’s attempt at othering aims to construct an antithesis between himself 
and Schreck, it simultaneously points out parallels between the two characters, hence blurring 
the lines between identities, between human and monstrous in a typically nineteenth-century 
Gothic fashion (cf. Botting 140). 
The similarity between Schreck and Murnau is further underlined by a couple of 
cinematographic devices employed by Merhige. Firstly, there is the use of spirit photography 
during Murnau’s manifesto monologue, which superimposes the director’s face over the 
crew’s train journey and gives Murnau a larger than life and ghostlike quality. From this 
rather general association of the fictional director with the supernatural, Shadow of the 
Vampire moves on to a more specific focus on the vampiric darkness inside him by 
continuously placing Murnau in shadows (cf. e.g. 0:32:58). Finally, there are scenes which 
visually link Merhige’s director to his vampiric counterpart. One good example can be seen 
when the crew shoots Gustav/Hutter’s arrival at the castle and Murnau gives the following 
direction: “You are afraid. Who is the person who brought you?” (0:21:20). Gustav 
subsequently turns around to an imaginary coachman yet through an elegant shot reverse shot 
Merhige makes the actor appear to be looking at Murnau. Through this choice of technique, 
the mysterious and powerful Gothic nature of both Shadow of the Vampire’s director 
character and arguably all film directors in general is exposed. Another example is the similar 
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framing of the shadow cast by Murnau when he brings the vampire a bottle of blood (cf. 
0:33:33) and the one cast by Schreck when he creeps around the hotel in Wismar (cf. 
1:04:33). Finally, a parallel is also drawn by Merhige having Murnau’s gesture when he 
attacks Schreck for endangering his film (cf. 1:01:58) clearly resemble that of the revenant 
when he feeds on the ship set in Czechoslovakia (cf. 0:51:50). 
Notable in all these scenes, in addition to the parallels drawn between the film’s two main 
characters, are the highly striking and anything but realistic and/or naturalistic 
cinematographic means used to portray them. Especially from the perspective of a present-day 
audience, spirit photography, dramatic shadows and the exaggerated gestures and facial 
expressions of both Schreck and Murnau are undeniably unusual. So much so, in fact, that 
they cannot help but draw the audience’s attention to the mediality of what they are seeing at 
least as much as they contribute to the creation of a Gothic atmosphere and stylistically 
connect Shadow of the Vampire to the classic Nosferatu. That is to say, Merhige’s chosen 
cinematographic techniques constantly oscillate between drawing audiences in (through 
atmosphere) and repelling them (through foregrounding of the medium), between 
familiarizing and de-familiarizing audiences with the action on screen in a prototypically 
‘uncanny’ manner. 
As the previous paragraphs suggest, one of the main functions of the vampire in 
Merhige’s film is to be a doppelgänger to Murnau, a personification of his darker drives. Still, 
Schreck is also a typically Gothic character in his own right and an interesting combination of 
old and modern features of the vampire motif. His deformed looks and animalistic noises, 
adopted from the original Nosferatu, associate him with the traditional view of revenants as 
mere predators – primitive, monstrous and ‘other’. Yet while in early texts and films these 
features made vampires frightening, Schreck’s physicality and ticks are more likely to subject 
him to ridicule from present-day audiences, thus exposing a change in visual cinematic 
conventions.  
Be it through fear or ridicule, as Heidi Kaye has suggested, the portrayal of physical 
monstrosity in film is usually employed to lessen the ambiguity of characters and distance 
them from the viewers’ sympathy (cf. 190). Shadow of the Vampire, however, with the help 
of Willem Defoe’s mesmerising performance, achieves the opposite effect. Admittedly, 
Schreck’s oddities make him an unlikely candidate for easy identification but through Defoe’s 
portrayal they also endear him to the audience and depict him as deformed to the point of 
triggering pity. As for the matter of a lessened ambiguity, it is exactly the paradox of 
Schreck’s ridiculous features and the vampire’s at times utterly hypnotizing presence which 
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gives the character its depth. After all, it is not too big an achievement to be charming and to 
evoke sympathy when you look like Gary Oldman (Bram Stoker’s Dracula (1992)) or Brad 
Pitt (Interview with the Vampire (1994)) and are wearing a tailored suit. Yet to be hypnotic 
and emotionally moving with bat-like ears, rodent teeth and inch-long nails requires that the 
viewers really engage with the character and the existential issues he (or she) represents. 
Luckily, profiting from developments within the Gothic genre of the last century (cf. e.g. 
Brittnacher 124), Schreck is given the voice as well as the opportunity to explicitly address 
these issues. When asked by Albin Grau and Henrik Galeen what he thinks of Stoker’s novel, 
the vampire replies the following: 
It made me sad […] because Dracula had no servants. […] Dracula hasn’t had servants in 
400 years and then a man comes to his ancestral home and he must convince him that he is – 
that he is like the man. He has to feed him when he himself hasn’t eaten food in centuries. 
Can he even remember how to buy bread? How to select cheese and wine? And then he 
remembers the rest of it, how to prepare a meal, how to make a bed, he remembers his past 
glory, his armies, his retainers and what he’s reduced to. The loneliest part of the book 
comes when the man accidentally sees Dracula setting his table. (0:48:35-0:49:51) 
This passage includes all Gothic motifs which Schreck represents: loneliness and isolation, 
melancholy and longing, nostalgia and decay – themes which are also present in Tennyson’s 
“Tithonus” (1860) poem, which the vampire keeps reading (cf. 0:33:50-0:34:02) as well as 
reciting (cf. 0:45:30-0:46:03). The millennia (he tells Fritz later on that he knew Plato (cf. 
0:55:58), which would make him at least 2,300 years old) have taken away the vampire’s 
wealth, his power, any form of company, his humanity and even his identity. Asked by Albin 
and Galeen where and when he was born he responds that he does not remember. In fact, he 
does not even have a name. I have been referring to him as Schreck because that is how he is 
credited, but of course this is only the name of the actor he is playing for Murnau’s crew. This 
lack of a clear identity transforms “Schreck” from being a particular individual into being an 
embodied concept: it increases his indefiniteness and thus makes him the perfect Gothic 
figure. And as the rest of Shadow of the Vampire shows, it also makes him the perfect subject 
for a medium itself so closely linked to isolation, longing and de-humanisation. 
 
4.1.2 The Gothic Nature of Cinema 
Fred Botting has argued that the medium of film has played a crucial role in the sustenance of 
the Gothic genre throughout the twentieth century (cf. 156). This is not really surprising if one 
considers how many qualities cinema and cinemas have which make them perfect for the 
telling of Gothic stories. Firstly, the visual component of motion pictures arguably increases 
the impact of the supernatural elements by giving them a higher degree of graphic reality (cf. 
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Silver and Ursini 57) – an idea clearly in line with Murnau’s self-proclaimed realist goals. 
Furthermore, the mere atmosphere within a film theatre helps to underline the Gothic mood of 
any story: everything is dark and the only things visible are the flickering shadows and lights 
on the screen (cf. Merhige quoted in Houswitschka and Meyer 179). And how these silver 
spectres actually come to exist was, especially in the early days of cinema, a mystery to most 
audience members, who were therefore as mesmerised by the spectacular effects and illusions 
created for them (cf. Kaye 180) as they would have been by a real ghost. Some early critics 
and viewers, in fact, even compared the very first films to black magic (cf. Kaye 180) – a 
theme explicitly picked up in Shadow of the Vampire when Albin Grau refers to Fritz 
Wagner’s knowledge of slow motion as an “esoteric skill[]” (0:53:47).  
In addition to these general links between cinema and the Gothic mode, Shadow of the 
Vampire suggests through an extensive accumulation of implicit, double-coded 
metareferences that film is not only the most suitable medium for this type of fiction, but that 
it is also the most Gothic medium as such, and that film watching and film making are two 
very Gothic businesses. As a first example of ‘uncanny’ and mystical film industry behaviour, 
Merhige lists our society’s tendency to put the people involved in the production of films onto 
a superhuman pedestal comparable to that of the Gods and idols of Old (cf. Merhige in DVD 
audio commentary 0:03:03) – an idea visually portrayed in Shadow of the Vampire by 
Merhige’s repeated framing of Murnau’s crew as standing on scaffolds, evoking the image of 
Mount Olympus. And if one considers the auteur and star cult which has characterised cinema 
from its early beginnings, it is undeniable that actors and directors really are often treated as if 
they were supernatural beings. Shadow of the Vampire’s particular interest in this regard lies 
in the dark side of this elevation.  
First, there are Greta and Gustav, whose stardom-fuelled decadence is the origin of their 
ineffectuality as hero and heroine. Even more strikingly, however, there is Schreck, who 
serves as the epitome of an actor who as soon as he (or she) realises his (or her) star function 
becomes increasingly demanding and despotic. As Thomas Elsaesser has observed, the 
vampire motif is particularly well-suited to expose the monstrosity of a star’s egocentricity 
(cf. 15): the more destruction Schreck gets away with and the more power and energy he can 
“suck” from Murnau and his surroundings, the more does the revenant feel his own strength 
and glory return. He does not care about the production, he has no artistic ambitions, he 
merely enjoys to sadistically exercise his power by torturing Murnau (cf. 0:43:01). The latter, 
however, is in no way less Gothic than the vampire. As already argued before, he is a 
prototypical tyrant willing to sacrifice everything and more importantly everyone for his 
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obsession, and Merhige portrays Murnau’s godlike position as director as the thing which 
gives him the chance as well as, as he thinks, the right to do so.  
Another metareferential argument Shadow of the Vampire makes is that that cinema has 
uncannily changed our perception of the world. Fred Botting has identified the subversion of 
the distinction between fiction and reality as a typical element of not only general 
Postmodernist fiction but also specifically of Neo-Gothic texts (cf. 169). And it is exactly this 
subversion which Merhige suggests is an inherent feature to the medium film, which 
according to him always blurs the line between reality and fiction and even defies the idea of 
a chronologically organised (hi)story through techniques such as editing (cf. DVD audio 
commentary 0:03:16, 0:21:03). In a way, therefore, according to Merhige, there is something 
‘monstrous’ about the whole medium of film as such since it is at least as transgressive as 
Schreck or Murnau.  
There are many scenes in Shadow of the Vampire which exemplify this particular idea. In 
addition to the discrepancy between Murnau’s desires for realism and his use of highly 
constructivist techniques mentioned before, a further element questioning the link between 
film and reality is Merhige’s use of a very similar visual style – black and white, chiaroscuro 
lighting, visible iris – both for the film-within-film sequences and for Greta’s flashbacks of 
her “real” memories when sedated (cf. 1:15:44). Furthermore, there are scenes in Shadow of 
the Vampire in which the question of what constitutes reality is explicitly addressed by 
several of the film’s characters: Galeen, for example, when he still believes Schreck to be an 
actor, is shown to wonder if the latter ever forgets that he actually is not Count Orlock (cf. 
0:33:17); approaching the topic from his cameraman perspective, Wagner is portrayed as 
proclaiming that “everything can be engineered” and that “that’s the only reality” (0:56:23); 
Murnau, even more existentially, even voices the belief that “if [something i]s not in frame, it 
doesn’t exist” (1:21:54). Finally, Merhige himself gives the whole topic an additional 
intertextual twist by seamlessly embedding short sequences of original footage from 
Nosferatu into his own film (cf. e.g. 0:20:28), thus entirely dissolving all dividing lines 
between narratives and diegetic levels. In short, all these examples leave no doubt that for 
Shadow of the Vampire and its director, film eliminates the borders between fiction and 
reality. The medium is depicted as the ideal transgressor and therefore as ultimately Gothic. 
And the fact that within Shadow of the Vampire there is the film-within-film and there is 
reality, but that this reality in turn is merely a film to the real-life audience, only adds one 
more level of complexity. 
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Yet the movie business and film production are not the only aspects of cinema which 
Merhige depicts as highly Gothic affairs. Instead, he portrays the process of film watching as 
equally uncanny. This idea is developed very early on in Shadow of the Vampire as it can 
already be seen in the design of the title cards used throughout the film (cf. e.g. 0:06:17). The 
pattern around the borders of the cards resembles the silhouettes of moths and therefore 
immediately draws a parallel between the power of cinema to attract people and the 
hypnotising yet destructive power of light over insects. This image is picked up again in one 
of Shadow of the Vampire’s central scenes in which Schreck is left alone with a projector (cf. 
0:38:33-0:39:45). Again, Merhige’s emphasis lies on the attraction of the medium as the 
vampire is portrayed to be physically drawn to the machine. The scene reaches its emotional 
climax when the footage the vampire is viewing shows him the sun. This causes a deeply 
emotional reaction in the revenant, which in turn culminates in Schreck staring directly into 
the projector, mesmerised by the image of the one thing he simultaneously desires and fears 
the most.  
Applying this concept back to the everyday viewer, Merhige thus suggests that the 
fascination of cinema lies in its ability to show the audience things otherwise dangerous and 
forbidden (cf. Houswitschka and Meyer 175). Film-viewing, in other words, is represented as 
a form of socially acceptable voyeurism. By his repeated interspersion of point-of-view shots 
of Murnau filming and of the vampire observing Merhige further encourages this idea and 
invites the audience again and again to see the world as Murnau and Schreck do. The viewers 
are thus constantly made accomplice to the characters’ transgressions, madness and murder 
(cf. Kaye 21) – arguably becoming Gothic figures themselves.  
Still, according to Shadow of the Vampire, there is one element of cinema even more 
Gothic than the people and processes involved, and that is the medium itself. Christoph 
Houswitschka and Michael Mayer have defined Shadow of the Vampire as “a film on film 
making and the power of the technical apparatus over reality” (178), and it is exactly this 
unique relation between fiction, technology and reality which Merhige’s film depicts as 
utterly Gothic. In Shadow of the Vampire, the motion picture camera itself is portrayed as a 
technological vampire (cf. DVD audio commentary 1:24:12): it gives immortality by taking 
away the flesh and blood of its subjects (images on film do not have physical bodies, after all) 
and by transforming them into mere spectres and shadows on a screen – or in other, slightly 
more drastic words, it gives everlasting life by killing. This idea is already visually evoked in 
Merhige’s film by the make-up Gustav and Greta wear in the film-within-film scenes. Whilst 
clearly intertextually inspired by early cinematic traditions, it also makes the actors’ skin look 
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pale and greyish, and their eye sockets appear hollow due to the strong use of shadows – in 
short, on camera, both characters are shown to look dead and ghostlike. This sentiment, full of 
traces of Walter Benjamin (cf. Kunstwerk), is even voiced explicitly when Murnau’s leading 
actress answers the question as to why she would rather star in a play than in a film with: “A 
theatrical audience gives me life, while this -- thing merely takes it from me” (0:08:37).  
As the story of Shadow of the Vampire progresses, the “thing” in question increasingly 
begins to develop a life of its own. Time and time again, there are shots of the diegetic 
machinery towering and looming into the frame (cf. e.g. 0:08:40). Every time Murnau’s first 
cinematographer Wolf is seen to operate the camera, he looks weaker and more lifeless, as if 
the apparatus itself is what is draining him (the audience never sees Schreck’s nightly 
feedings on him in between the shooting of scenes). In short, the supposedly familiar, 
harmless, man-made and man-controlled machine appears to become a revenant itself – a 
motif as ‘uncanny’ and as Gothic as they come. In the film’s final scene when Murnau is 
filming the deaths of Wagner, Grau and Schreck (cf. 1:21:06-1:25:55), the crosscuts to the 
diegetic camera become more and more frequent. All the while, the rhythmic movements of 
its machinery become faster and faster, its noises more and more intense, the camera eye 
glows stronger and stronger until the audience gets the pressing feeling that the apparatus 
itself has taken complete control of Murnau, whose usually intense and powerful facial 
expression simultaneously dissolves more and more into an empty stare.  
Of all the deaths Shadow of the Vampire portrays as related to the medium of film, 
Schreck’s is the one which Merhige portrays with the strongest and most salient 
metareferential symbolism. Already Murnau’s plan of opening a gate to kill the vampire with 
the sunlight which subsequently floods the room clearly resembles the process of filmstock 
being exposed. Merhige cinematographically takes the metaphor even further, however, by 
overlaying and eventually fading Schreck’s death scene into footage of burning celluloid (cf. 
1:24:16-1:24:28). Schreck, the revenant, is thus once more symbolically equated with the 
medium film, which in turn is irrevocably portrayed as the most destructive force in the story 
– as a truly Gothic villain, and a very classical one at that. In the end, many nineteenth-
century texts and tropes of the genre originated in their authors’ fears that society’s 
increasingly mechanistic and atomistic view of the world would eventually lead, on the 
individual level, to a loss of humanity and, on a more general level, to a loss of community 
and wholeness (cf. e.g. Botting 157; Kilgour 11). Merhige’s Shadow of the Vampire clearly 
expresses similar concerns with respect to the arguably equally mechanistic medium of film. 
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4.1.3 Conclusion: Shadow of the Vampire’s Metareferential Message 
In an interview, E. Elias Merhige has argued that with Shadow of the Vampire he never 
wanted to create a vampire genre movie about blood and seduction. Instead, it was the 
exploration of “art-making obsession, the idea of science and the quest for immortality, the 
cinema as life and art coming together as an immortal fusion” (quoted in Houswitschka 68) 
which interested him. What Merhige’s film actually achieves, however, is a typically Gothic 
mixture of both. It tells a traditional vampire tale, in which the motifs of blood and life, 
seduction and passion are present, just as a battle between good and evil and a general 
atmosphere of gloom and nostalgia are. Yet in a next step, Merhige also takes these simple 
eighteenth- and nineteenth-century formulas and in a truly Neo-Gothic manner transforms 
them into metareferential symbols complex enough to represent all his ideas about cinema.  
Heidi Kaye has suggested that Gothic tropes in general lend themselves particularly well 
to such transformations as they 
seem destined to be continually reborn to suit the fears and desires of each new period. The 
monsters, their creators and their victims are sufficiently malleable in their indefiniteness to 
allow them to convey ongoing human concerns and tensions: the need for love, the fear of 
suffering, the yearning for knowledge, the anxiety over isolation, the desire for power, the 
terror of mortality, war, sexuality, science, government, economics (191) 
and, in Merhige’s case, art. The uniquely Gothic motif of vampirism is a particularly good 
example of this tendency as over the last few centuries it has been invested with meanings 
ranging from psychoanalytical questions of sexuality and obsession, to scientific concerns 
with illness and the search for ways to prolong life, to social problems such as xenophobia, to 
many, many more (cf. e.g. Botting 146; Snodgrass 345-346). With Shadow of the Vampire, 
Merhige further expands this list to hold the transgressive power of film as well. 
As an homage to F. W. Murnau’s Nosferatu, Shadow of the Vampire pays tribute to the 
artistry and power of cinema while at the same time expressing a highly critical opinion of the 
effects the medium has had and still has on society by reshaping our approaches to both art 
and reality. Merhige thus portrays film as a medium which is simultaneously both beautiful 
and frightening – a seeming paradox which, however, comprised in terms such as Edmund 
Burke’s “sublime” or Edgar Allan Poe’s “pleasurable pain” has always formed a central part 
of the Gothic.  
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4.2 Metareference in Hugo 
If you’ve ever wondered where your dreams come from, you look around. This is where 
they’re made. 
(Hugo 1:11:59) 
Martin Scorsese’s Hugo is the perfect film to compare to Shadow of the Vampire for whilst it 
thematises many of the same aspects of cinema – the traditions, the magic, the technology – 
and whilst it also builds its story around a fictional version of a historical director, George 
Méliès, the overall view of the medium depicted within Hugo is highly different. Scorsese’s 
film is also particularly interesting within the context of my thesis because it is a blockbuster 
movie aimed (at least partially) at children and as such is a rather atypical example of the 
metafilm genre, which, according to Barbara Pfeifer, till the present day is still mostly 
associated with arthouse cinema (cf. Pfeifer 420). Finally, Hugo is also an interesting piece of 
art from an intermedial perspective since it is the filmic adaptation of Brian Selznick’s novel 
The Invention of Hugo Cabret (2007), which in turn tries to imitate cinematic angles and 
story-board art in its illustrations to support its film-related story and to engage with an 
audience “conditioned by visual culture” (Seeber 445).  
Whilst an analysis of Scorsese’s adaptation process (including a detailed comparison 
between individual Selznick illustrations and their cinematographic executions) would 
certainly be a productive study subject, for the purposes of this chapter I will restrict myself to 
an exclusive analysis of Scorsese’s film. While a discussion of the potentially different effects 
achieved by Selznick’s barely self-referential book-about-film and Scorsese’s highly 
metareferential film-about-film would certainly be interesting42, I fear it would exceed the 
scope of this dissertation. Furthermore, I see myself forced to mostly restrict my analysis to a 
study of the 2D-version of Scorsese’s film since this is the only version currently available for 
repeated re-viewing. Considering the symbolic significance of 3D technology in this 
particular Scorsesean work, I will still refer to its general use and effect – detailed scene-
based references, however, are outside of the realm of my capabilities43. 
 
                                                 
42 For a first step in this direction cf. Clement and Long. 
43 For more detailed analyses of the film’s use of 3D cinematography cf. Annett; Erstić; Higgins. 
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4.2.1 The Metareferential Portrayal of the Early History of Cinema 
Even more so than Shadow of the Vampire, Hugo is explicitly and extensively steeped in 
cinematic traditions. Whereas Merhige’s film only actually namedrops Nosferatu, Scorsese’s 
film references a large number of its cinematic predecessors by name from very early on. In 
this, Hugo strongly resembles Atonement, even if the film only covers the first few decades of 
its medium’s history in contrast to McEwan’s overview of the history of literature. As with 
Shadow of the Vampire, already the title sequence of Hugo symbolically and implicitly sets 
the historical, metareferential scene. Opening his film with steam train noises which 
accompany the production company logos, and then slowly transitioning into frames 
depicting an actual train arriving at the film’s central location of a grand Paris train station (cf. 
0:00:05:-0:01:35), Scorsese immediately evokes the birth(place) of cinema by referencing the 
Lumière brothers’ famous train-sequence from their cinematograph piece A Train Arrives in 
the Station (1895) – a motif which, for multiple reasons to be discussed throughout the rest of 
this chapter, keeps recurring throughout the entirety of Scorsese’s film.  
Once the film proper starts, Hugo slowly and intermittently takes the audience on a 
journey through the entire early history of cinema. Even before the first intertextual references 
to classic films appear, Scorsese’s introduction of Hugo’s sketchbook contains a striking 
homage to one of cinema’s early predecessors, the 1868-patented kineograph or as it is more 
commonly known today, the flipbook. As Hugo thumbs through his notebook, the sketched 
automaton face therein seemingly turns to face both him and the audience (cf. 0:05:47). The 
resulting illusion of movement immediately references the quick consecutive display of 24 
still frames per second which forms the basis of all “moving pictures”. This technique is 
referenced again an hour later when Méliès’ granddaughter Isabelle stumbles with a box 
containing sketches of her grandfather’s work, sending the papers flying into the air (cf. 
0:58:18). With the help of added CGI effects, Scorsese once more makes these still images 
come to life like a flipbook. In the process, he combines present-day cinematographic 
techniques with those of the past and implicitly comments on the still shared core and 
function of both. 
Moving on from cinema’s predecessors, as Hugo progresses, its audience is soon 
introduced to a first selection of early film classics when the movie’s two child protagonists 
sneak into a silent-film festival so that Isabelle can see her first film. The cinema’s outer walls 
are shown to be covered in old posters of Charlie Chaplin and Charley Chase films, as well as 
to exhibit a singular Max Linder film poster which becomes highly symbolic in a later scene. 
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Once inside the theatre, Hugo introduces Isabelle to his favourite medium through a screening 
of Safety Last (1923). At the same time, Scorsese equally introduces his audience to the 
Harold Lloyd classic by incorporating authentic footage from the movie into his own film. In 
particular, Hugo includes the iconic scene of Lloyd’s character trying to climb the outside 
wall of a twelve-storey building only to end up precariously dangling from the face of a clock. 
Soon after the two child protagonists leave the film theatre, they discover the connection 
between Isabelle’s supposed toy-maker grandfather Méliès and early cinema. Eager to know 
more, the children visit the Paris Film Academy library, in which Hugo, Isabelle and the 
audience receive their first comprehensive lesson in cinema history through the (fictional) 
book The Invention of Dreams by René Tabard. From this book, the children and the audience 
first explicitly learn about A Train Arrives in the Station and the effect it had on its audience. 
Accompanied by the voice-over narration of the children reading Tabard’s text out loud, this 
scene in Hugo contains a second example of authentic early film footage. Only this time, 
Scorsese soon merges the original footage with images of a Technicolor audience watching 
the Lumière brothers’ film. Finally, by adding even more present-day CGI-effects to the 
scene, Scorsese literally has the train drive out of cinema’s past into its and our 
cinematographic present (cf. 1:06:15-1:06:42).  
The passages the children read out-loud from Tabard’s book describe the cultural impact 
of A Train Arrives in the Station as “no one had ever seen anything like it before” (1:07:37). 
And a real-life eye-witness report by Maksim Gorky from 1896 describes the early-twentieth-
century audience’s response to the Lumière brothers’ creation as follows: 
From far away a courier train heads right at you—watch out! It rushes on just as if it had been shot out 
of giant cannon, it rushes right at you, threatening to squish you; the station-master runs hurriedly 
beside it. The mute, noiseless locomotive is at the very edge of the picture… The viewing public 
nervously shifts in their seats—this machine of iron and steel at the last second will burst out into the 
darkness of the room and crush everything… (2) 
In other words, for the film’s contemporary audiences, the scene on the screen seems to have 
felt uncomfortably real, leaving viewers with the feeling that the train might at any point 
break free and roll over them. Scorsese’s narrative framing of the original Lumière footage 
specifically stresses this effect early films used to have on their audience. By including the 
portrayal of the audience’s reactions in his shots, Scorsese visualises both Gorky’s and 
Tabard’s words. Furthermore, through his use of 3D-effects commonly used for shock-effect 
in theme parks, Scorsese comes as close as possible to recreating the movie’s original effect 
on its contemporary audience by having the on-screen train protrude from and thus seemingly 
burst out from our modern-day movie screens as well. 
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The thus described iconic nature of A Train Arrives in the Station is one probable reason 
Hugo, in addition to containing classic Lumière brothers footage, is also set in a train station, 
and train motifs keep recurring throughout the entirety of Scorsese’s film. Another notable 
reason is the fact that A Train Arrives in the Station is nowhere near the only early film using 
trains as a trope or setting (cf. e.g. Cohen 58 for an extensive list), thus making the motif even 
more evocative of the entire early age of cinema. In addition, scholars have also argued that 
trains, and locomotives in particular, are generally a great symbol for the medium of film 
since they are both “the first major invention of the steam age” (Cohen 56) and “the first 
object whose ‘meaning’ lay entirely in the fact of its motion through space” (Cohen 56). In 
this, they closely mirror cinema’s nature as the aforementioned first invented art form as well 
as as an art form characterised by physical “perspective mobility” (Cohen 159-160; cf. also 
Reinecke 12) and defined by – and as – “moving pictures”. Finally, on a much more practical 
level, a lot of early cinema’s moving shots were achieved by mounting cameras on train-like, 
rails-following constructs (cf. Cohen 159-160), thus cementing the link between the two 
technologies. Combining all these concepts, it can consequently be argued that trains are, in 
fact, the perfect objects to be employed as symbolic representations of film technology, film 
techniques and traditional film tropes at the same time. Scorsese’s use of the trope, therefore, 
strongly – if implicitly – contributes to Hugo’s metareferential density. 
Continuing onward from its description of A Train Arrives in the Station, Tabard’s book 
takes Hugo, Isabelle and the audience through the rest of cinema’s early history, with 
Scorsese including even more authentic classic footage (cf. 1:06:54-1:07:42): from Workers 
Leaving the Lumière Factory (1895), to first attempts at story in Buster Keaton and Harold 
Lloyd comedies or in melodramas such as Pandora’s Box (1929), to early forms of Western 
and Gothic movies, etc. The development from black-and-white to tinted films is equally 
represented until, finally, the children – and with them the audience – encounter the iconic 
screenshot of a rocket protruding from the moon’s eye from Méliès’ A Trip to the Moon 
(1902). This image is accompanied by Tabard’s words that “[t]he filmmaker Georges Méliès 
was one of the first to realize that films had the power to capture dreams” (1:07:47-1:08:00). 
In addition to this explicit poetological sequence depicting Tabard’s views on early 
cinema and introducing the audience and the child protagonists to the early history of the 
medium, Scorsese furthermore pays homage to his classic predecessors through many 
implicit, double-coded means interspersed throughout Hugo. Firstly, the iconic scenes from 
both Safety Last and A Train Arrives in the Station are recreated in Scorsese’s film as parts of 
the main narrative. For example, just like his cinematic predecessor Lloyd, Hugo eventually 
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ends up hanging precariously from the face of his clock(tower) home after his ultimate flight 
from the Station Inspector (cf. 1:44:28). Similarly, after reading about A Train Arrives in the 
Station, Hugo is portrayed to have a nightmare of an unstoppable train which drives into, 
through and out the back wall of his station, ending in a recreation of the famous photograph 
of the 1895 derailment incident at Paris’ Montparnasse station (cf. 1:18:43-1:20:38). 
These two scenes, in addition to once more paying tribute to two classic films and to the 
Studio Lévy and Sons photograph, present an interesting relationship between film, reality, 
and the Tabard-suggested power of cinema to “capture” or maybe also to influence dreams. 
Firstly, Hugo’s clock-tower scene demonstrates that filmic tropes can find their way into our 
“real” world by being – just like literary motifs – strongly ingrained in our cultural 
consciousness. For arguably, it is exactly Hugo’s familiarity with Safety Last which gives him 
the idea that surviving by hanging onto the clock hands might be possible. Meanwhile, the 
boy’s train nightmare clearly demonstrates that film tropes most definitely find their way into 
our dreams, cinematic imagery thus being shown to be absorbed into our subconscious. The 
fact that the audience initially receives no indicator that what it is watching is a nightmare and 
not reality further emphasises just how vivid and realistic both our dreams and the processed 
cinematic images in our minds can be. And when Scorsese eventually uses the exact same 
footage of the incoming train and its operators for a later scene in which Hugo really is almost 
hit by an incoming train (cf. 1:46:29), the director’s stylistic choice further dissolves the 
boundaries between film, dream and reality. 
In addition to these two very specific homages to two very specific iconic films and 
scenes, Scorsese also intersperses smaller and more general stylistic references to film 
classics and tropes throughout his movie. For example, Hugo contains multiple scenes which 
contain highly traditional slapstick-comedy elements first introduced by, amongst others, the 
aforementioned comedians Chaplin, Keaton and Lloyd. Whether included in one of Hugo’s 
multiple chase scenes (cf. e.g. 0:06:57-0:08:50) or in the technically more dramatic incoming-
train sequence, the extreme gestures, the increased speed of movement, the style of the 
accompanying music, the use of tropes such as sooty faces or near-collisions with cakes – 
many of Hugo’s elements could easily belong to films from the early days of cinema. And the 
same goes for Scorsese’s individual uses of old-school cinematographic techniques such as 
ghost-photography (cf. 0:44:36).44 
                                                 
44 For a more detailed and extensive list of Hugo’s intertextual references cf. Higgins 206. 
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Hugo guarantees the salience of all these metareferences by combining these implicit 
tributes with the aforementioned examples of authentic footage, which consequently helps the 
audience recognise the tributes as such. Furthermore, Scorsese’s film also includes explicit 
conversations between characters discussing not only the history of film but also specific 
cinematic techniques used in the early days of cinema. As usual, both the child protagonists 
and the real-life audience get their first introduction into the topic at the same time, in this 
case when Tabard gives a description of his childhood visit to one of Méliès’ filmsets. 
Sharing his memories of that inspiring experience, Tabard explains a lot about how filming 
used to be done. He recounts how directors used to shoot in glass-houses to let in the natural 
light, and how everything had to be achieved with practical effects, props and optical illusions 
(cf. 1:10:58-1:11:30). How the very first non-practical special effects were accomplished is 
later on described by Méliès himself when he shares his personal story together with his 
insider knowledge of movie magic (cf. 1:31:41-1:35:42). Finally, Madame Méliès shares her 
own expertise and experiences as well, for example explaining how actors did not use to be 
stars (cf. 1:26:33) and how films shot in black-and-white needed to be tinted by hand to 
appear in colour (cf. 1:27:05-1:28:43).  
 
4.2.2 The Wonders of Cinema’s Mechanical Magic and Its Limitations 
All these scenes, whilst explicit in regard to old-school film techniques, simultaneously 
provide implicit commentary on the differences to twenty-first-century filmmaking. After all, 
even the youngest present-day audience members can be expected to know that special effects 
and colour imagery are achieved very differently today. The result of these sequences in Hugo 
is thus the foregrounding of the ever-changing capabilities of the medium film as well as of 
the involved technologies. Furthermore, these scenes also aim to rekindle a feeling of awe and 
respect for especially these early magical films and for the vast amount of work, ingenuity 
and cutting-edge technology involved in their creation. 
Scorsese further achieves this implicit foregrounding of film’s technological aspects and 
their magic by building a lot of Hugo’s visual style around beautiful images of things 
mechanical. Already the film’s title sequence, for example, introduces a gears and cogwheels 
motif which spans across the entirety of Hugo’s aesthetic. Mirrored in the image of the initial 
train’s turning wheels, central to the visual design of Hugo’s highly mechanized clock-tower 
home, picked up again through the automaton Hugo is trying to fix, through Tabard’s 
manually-operated portable projector, through Méliès’ mechanical toys, even through the 
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Station Inspector’s metal leg supports, the motif of traditional mechanical elements and 
machinery is omnipresent in Scorsese’s world. And the film’s many camera flights along 
pipes and narrow tunnels, enhanced by 3D-depth-effects which in themselves carry a strong 
high-tech connotation, only increase the audience’s feeling of seeing inside a complex 
apparatus.  
In addition to this general mechanical aesthetic motif, Hugo also contains multiple set 
pieces which specifically evoke the image of a film camera or projector. For example, already 
Scorsese’s introduction of the name-giving protagonist as someone who looks out through the 
glass of a mechanical apparatus (cf. 0:01:36) is highly evocative of the view from behind a 
camera (lens). In fact, this image of the boy as looking out from behind industrial components 
is picked up again and again throughout the entirety of Scorsese’s film (cf. e.g. 0:23:06, 
1:44:33, 1:44:42), establishing the motif even further. The inner workings of a historical 
camera or projector are further evoked by multiple shots throughout Hugo in which the 
framing combines light effects with lens-like elements, rotating gears and sometimes even a 
crank (cf. e.g. 0:02:15, 0:10:11).  
Finally, one more visual and one narrative element complete Hugo’s implicit 
metareferential tapestry by filling in the last few referential gaps. Firstly, Scorsese introduces 
the automaton which forms the mechanical heart of his film’s story as a mere shadow of a 
bulging object hidden beneath a white cloth, its outline flickering in the light of a candle (cf. 
0:16:27). Through this, Scorsese manages to include a reference even to the earliest pre-form 
of cinematographic “technology”, the shadow-play. Secondly, even the early references to the 
death of Hugo’s clock-maker father in a museum fire can be read as implicit, double-coded 
and highly symbolic metareferences, as the threat of fire used to be particularly relevant to 
film museums and archives due to the highly flammable nature of celluloid. 
Noticeable throughout all of Scorsese’s mechanical aesthetic is the fact that – unlike 
Shadow of the Vampire’s portrayal of film technology as an undead and monstrous apparatus 
– the machinery in Hugo, even with that last interpretation of Cabret senior’s death, is 
depicted strikingly positively. Firstly, Hugo never blames the museum or the items his father 
worked on therein for the man’s death. Secondly, the boy’s home, despite all the narrow 
spaces, industrial steam and metal, is never portrayed as cold or harsh. Thanks to Scorsese’s 
choice of brassy colour-palette, warm lights and an either soft or lively score permeating the 
respective scenes, the clock tower more often than not appears quite cosy and inviting (cf. e.g. 
0:10:08-0:10:19, 0:11:03-0:11:22). Even the work Hugo has to do to keep the clock running, 
while shown as strenuous, is never presented in the dark and ominous way one would expect 
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from a depiction of what is essentially child labour. Instead, Hugo is shown to actively care 
for the clock, in both the physical and the emotional sense of the word, the omnipresent 
machinery seemingly making the boy feel less rather than more lonely. 
This emotional connection between man and machine is a central theme throughout the 
entirety of Hugo, most densely represented in the figure of the automaton45. By the end of 
Scorsese’s film, that figure is revealed to be the one creation Méliès, even during his worst 
days, is unable to destroy and merely gifts to a museum in the hope that “he would find a 
home” (1:37:32) – “he”, not it. Hugo and his father are similarly shown to start referring to 
the automaton as “him” (cf. 0:16:56-0:17:14) almost immediately upon finding him. This idea 
of the machine having a form of life of his own is further reinforced when Hugo and his father 
first look at the automaton from up close. In the subsequent scene, Scorsese includes a warm 
light glowing from the upper left side of the figure’s torso where his heart would be (cf. 
0:17:48) whilst Hugo’s father comments that “the secret” – or based on Scorsese’s choice of 
visualisation arguably ‘the heart’ or even ‘the soul’ – “was always in the clockwork” 
(0:17:47). Combined with the heart-shaped key required to make the clockwork come to live 
(cf. e.g. 0:18:46), the automaton is thus clearly portrayed as having at least the potential of 
being a type of living creature. Furthermore, in stark contrast with Shadow of the Vampire’s 
depiction of an all-devouring apparatus or with popular culture’s classic trope of a calculating 
and scheming artificial intelligence such as Skynet, Hugo’s technological life-form is 
portrayed as one full of heart and soul, and magic. 
Whereas Shadow of the Vampire focuses on the mysterious, uncanny “magic” of film 
technology, the magic depicted in Hugo is that of stage acts and entertainers. When Hugo’s 
father introduces his son to the automaton, he specifically explains that “[m]agicians used 
machines like this when [he] was a boy. Some walked, some danced, some sang” (0:17:38, 
my emphasis), and Méliès’ writes. In other words, all of Hugo’s automatons – and the equally 
technological medium of film they represent – are made to perform and celebrate different art 
forms and to spread wonder and awe.46 More specifically, they are meant to evoke the most 
pure and childlike form of these emotions as embodied by Hugo’s child protagonists, by the 
child versions of Tabard and Cabret senior, and arguably by Scorsese’s chosen young target 
audience for his film as well.  
                                                 
45 For a more detailed analysis of Hugo’s automaton specifically in relation to the ‘automaton’ trope as it appears 
throughout film history cf. Meikle 178-179. 
46 This quality of early cinema in general and of Méliès’ works in particular has led to Tom Gunning labelling 
the period and style in question as the “cinema of attractions”. For more on this as well as for a more detailed 
analysis of Hugo’s relationship with this period and style cf. Gunning; Clement and Long; Erstić. 
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From the explicit references to the fantastical novels of Jules Verne, which Hugo and his 
father used to read together (cf. 0:28:29), to the fact that old Méliès, even whilst otherwise 
crippled with depression, works as a repairman and builder of children’s toys of all things, to 
the fact that he immediately starts to perform and teach little card-tricks for/to Hugo as soon 
as the two start bonding (cf. 0:31:38-0:32:20), the sharing of one’s sense of wonder and joy, 
the inspiration of others through little feats of magic is portrayed in Hugo as a central source 
of happiness. It is also portrayed as the key motivator for Méliès’ – and arguably Scorsese’s – 
filmmaking. For as a young Méliès announces to the boy Tabard stepping onto his filmset, the 
early director’s goal with his movies is to “make” his audiences’ dreams (cf. 1:11:59). And 
unlike the drug- and obsession-fuelled nightmares of Shadow of the Vampire, the cinematic 
dreams depicted in Hugo are the most exuberant and uplifting flights of fancy one could wish 
for. Furthermore, rather than being solitary experiences, dreams in Hugo are explicitly 
portrayed as uniting creators, audiences and even critics such as Tabard in their communal 
sense of wonder. When in the film’s finale Méliès addresses the audience of a movie theatre 
event held in his honour with “And now, my friends, I address you all, tonight, as you truly 
are: Wizards. Mermaids. Travellers. Adventurers. Magicians. Come and dream with me.” 
(1:51:16-1:51:48), he is thus inviting his wife, Hugo, Isabelle, Tabard, every stranger in the 
theatre as well as Scorsese’s real-life audience to equal degrees to share in the magic of his 
creations. In this, Hugo’s metareferential message closely resembles The Book Thief’s 
approach to communal reading. 
Whilst propagating the magical power of cinema to inspire joy and wonder, Hugo also 
acknowledges the potential limits of the medium in this regard when confronted with the 
ghastly extremes of reality. Specifically, during Hugo’s portrayal of Méliès’ early life and of 
why he stopped making films, Scorsese uses a highly symbolic fluent visual transition (cf. 
1:35:42) between authentic footage of the mesmerising explosions in Méliès’ films and 
equally authentic newsreel footage of the brutal, deadly explosions of the Great War, to 
demonstrate just how jarring the juxtaposition between dreams and reality suddenly became at 
the time. Furthermore, Hugo has Méliès himself explicitly and succinctly summarise the 
effect of war on (his) art as follows: “youth and hope were at an end. The world had no time 
for magic tricks and movie shows. The returning soldiers, having seen so much of reality, 
were bored by my films. Tastes had changed, but I had not changed with them. No one 
wanted my movies anymore.” (1:35:54-1:36:20) – a sentiment which Scorsese further 
visualises through a symbolic shot of Max Linder posters peeling in the rain (cf. 1:36:20).  
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Eventually, bankruptcy and depression cause the decay of Méliès’ magical glass-house 
over several seasons (cf. 1:36:28), and Scorsese’s visually beautiful portrayal of that process 
through the use of time-acceleration and CGI effects – two magical tools of cinema, one old, 
one new – adds an additional metareferential layer of bittersweet regret to the scene. When 
Méliès is finally shown to burn his set-pieces and props, including his iconic moon (cf. 
1:36:35-1:36:53), and to sell his films so they can be melted down into chemicals for 
something as mundane and literally down-to-earth as shoe-heels (cf. 1:36:54-1:37:07), the 
audience is invited to weep for the loss of magic and innocence in the world.  
 
4.2.3 The Importance of the Preservation of Our Personal and Cultural Heritage 
And yet, in its entirety, Hugo also postulates that such a loss of magic and wonder is never 
and can never be allowed to be final. In Scorsese’s film, the preservation of our culture as 
well as of our personal sense of awe is portrayed as vital to our happiness and existence. Hugo 
emphasises this idea through its high number of positively connotated protagonists who are in 
one way or another involved in the collection and/or restoration of seemingly broken, 
“abandoned” (0:17:03) and unwanted (cf. 0:54:48) items: Méliès repairs toys, the Cabrets 
repair clockwork, Tabard looks for and restores old films, and even the minor character of the 
train station bookseller makes sure old second-hand tomes remain read.  
The repairs performed by all these characters and the masterpieces many of them are 
shown to bring back to life serve as first pieces of proof that the hard work and the difficulty 
of finding the right “parts” involved in the restoration process is worth it, as Cabret senior 
explicitly points out (cf. 0:17:58-0:18:18). A second piece of proof is Hugo’s mirroring of the 
broken and discarded items motif with a motif of equally “broken” and “discarded” people. 
The orphan Hugo, the depressed and angry Méliès, the many lonely regulars at the train 
station, even the war-veteran Station Inspector who serves as a villain throughout most of the 
film are all characters the lives of which are eventually transformed for the better, 
demonstrating that nothing and nobody is beyond worth and repair. 
Whilst Hugo thus portrays every character and every item, even the smallest toy, as worth 
restoring for their own sake, for the joy and happiness they can bring, the film further explains 
why it is particularly important to preserve pieces of art. Specifically, Hugo draws the 
audience’s attention to the vast amount of personal as well as cultural heritage contained 
within individual artefacts. For example, Hugo’s automaton serves as a cultural representative 
of the clockwork men era of Cabret senior’s childhood whilst also reminding the Cabrets of 
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Hugo’s otherwise never mentioned dead mother who shares the figure’s place of “birth” (cf. 
0:17:31). Similarly, Tabard is portrayed as admiring Méliès for his skill as a filmmaker, for 
his impact on the history of cinema, and also for the fact that his filmset introduced young 
Tabard to a world of magic and wonder. Both cultural and personal memories are thus shown 
to be closely intertwined and preserved within pieces of art. 
Being a highly metareferential film, Hugo particularly emphasises cinema’s power to 
preserve and relay personal as well as cultural memories. Firstly, through Scorsese’s repeated 
inclusion of authentic footage, Hugo demonstrates cinema’s power to show both the culture 
(through movies) and the reality (through newsreel footage) of a time period captured on film. 
Furthermore, through his own use of early twentieth-century Parisian costumes and set-
pieces, Scorsese demonstrates how cinema, even a century later, has the ability to recreate and 
evoke a past time, place and its unique atmosphere and culture. Finally, Hugo also picks up 
on a belief shared by all metareferential works analysed up to this point, namely on the motif 
that art can immortalise people. When Madame Méliès at one point explains that she used to 
be a different person when she acted for her husband, Tabard asks her whether she would like 
to meet that person again (cf. 1:25:27). He then takes out his portable projector and shows the 
aged actress, the child protagonists and Scorsese’s real-life audience one of Madame Méliès’ 
films. The moved expressions on all of the characters’ faces throughout the subsequent 
sequence consequently leave no doubt that on the silver screen, the young Madame is still 
very much alive. 
In addition to memorialising the people, places and cultures captured and/or recreated 
within them, films are also depicted in Hugo as being able to prevent their creators from 
disappearing into oblivion. At the beginning of the film, Hugo and Isabelle learn that Tabard 
and his colleagues believe Méliès to have died in the Great War since he never resumed his 
craft after it ended (cf. 1:12:42). Simultaneously, Hugo’s early scenes also show that Méliès, 
whilst physically alive, is barely living, suffocated by his belief that his life’s work has 
become irrelevant. It is only Tabard’s and the children’s insistence on proving to Méliès that 
“he’s not forgotten” (1:13:27) by restoring his films and the automaton and sharing them with 
the world, which eventually brings the magician “back from the dead” (0:59:03) by proving to 
him that now that the immediate crisis of the war was over, people were eager to dream with 
him again. Culminating in Hugo’s final movie theatre event, the restoration and re-screening 
of (in this case Méliès’) films is thus portrayed as an important way of honouring both past 
works and their creators by acknowledging them as worthy of being shared with new 
generations. 
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The exact processes involved in preserving and sharing our cinematic heritage are 
portrayed at length throughout Hugo. At the centre lies the hunt for and restoration of old film 
stock, described by Tabard as follows: “We began a search, we looked through vaults, 
through private collections, barns and catacombs. Our work was rewarded with old negatives, 
boxes of prints and trunks full of decaying film, which we were able to save.” (1:49:11-
1:49:28). Tabard’s choice of the words “rewarded”, “boxes”, “trunks”, “vaults” and 
“catacombs” immediately evokes images of adventurers finding chests full of treasure. And 
once the footage has been “saved” and restored, Hugo makes it clear that it is vital for it to be 
shown and not merely shelved in a museum or archive. From the early film festival which 
returns the peeling Max Lindner poster to its former function and introduces Isabelle to the 
magic of cinema, to all the smaller and larger scale screenings of Méliès’ films portrayed 
throughout the rest of the movie, Hugo’s focus is unmistakably on the sharing, not storing, of 
our cultural heritage. Furthermore, Scorsese’s film also suggests that collecting and exhibiting 
memorabilia such as old photographs, props, programmes or antique cameras (cf. 1:09:37-
1:10:05) can equally contribute to the recording and sharing of cinema’s history, as can the 
writing of books such as Tabard’s (cf. 1:53:15-1:53:25). Finally and most importantly, 
however, Hugo emphasises the importance of sharing and thus passing on one’s “passion” 
(1:09:37) for the medium, as Tabard’s brother did with him, as Hugo’s father did with his son, 
as Hugo does with Isabelle, as Tabard does with both the children and the Méliès, as Méliès, 
through his films, did and does with the world, and as Scorsese, through Hugo, does with his 
audience. 
 
4.2.4 Conclusion: Hugo’s Ultimate Metareferential Message 
This motif of sharing one’s passion is the final core metareferential trope in Hugo. Similarly 
to The Book Thief, Scorsese’s film repeatedly emphasises the communal aspect of cinema and 
the shared experiences which can result from engaging with the medium. Already the 
portrayal of Hugo’s very first movie-watching experience focuses strongly on the emotional 
reactions of the child protagonists watching Safety Last, as well as on their interactions with 
each other. As Scorsese repeatedly cuts between the on-screen footage and the two children’s 
faces, he continuously draws attention to Hugo’s and Isabelle’s bonding over their shared 
feelings of suspense and laughter, even including the classic trope of Isabelle jumping and 
grasping for Hugo’s hand when she is frightened by an almost-slip of Lloyd’s (cf. 0:38:15-
0:38:58). All the while, Scorsese’s framing of the scene envelops both children in the 
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projector’s bright light (cf. 0:38:15) and literally highlights their awe and wonder by forming 
halos around them (cf. 0:38:23).  
Eventually, the film festival scene ends with Hugo explaining his own induction into the 
medium of cinema to Isabelle as follows: 
My father took me to the movies all the time. He told me about the first one he ever saw. […] 
He said it was like seeing his dreams in the middle of the day. The movies were our special 
place. Where we could go and watch something and we didn’t miss my mum so much. 
(0:39:38-0:40:07, my emphasis)  
Thus for Hugo’s name-giving protagonist, movies are explicitly shown to be a form of 
magical, dream-like escapism – yet not in the solitary sense frequently associated with that 
final word. In Scorsese’s film, a visit to the cinema allows people to dream and escape 
together, thus connecting people and helping them, once they are back in the real world, to 
communally overcome their sorrows. Whether it is Hugo and his father coping with the loss 
of the mother, whether it is Tabard and the children helping the Méliès cope with the loss of 
their dreams, whether it is Hugo finding a new family in the process, or whether it is the 
variety of train station regulars finding new friends and lovers, in the end, Hugo is a film 
about forging interpersonal bonds as much as it is a film about film. Scorsese’s implicit 
metareferential comment is that the latter can contribute to the first. Specifically, cinemas can 
serve as physical locations for people to bond over their love of film, or the medium of 
cinema as such can form bonds between whole generations by showing them their shared 
cultural heritage (cf. e.g. 0:18:00-0:18:35). Just like one lonely, discarded automaton can 
bring together Hugo’s father (who finds it), Hugo himself (who keeps repairing it), Isabelle 
(who contributes the heart-shaped key), both Méliès (who built it), Tabard (who is the key to 
the Méliès) and all the train station regulars, cinema’s magic is portrayed as capable of 
bringing together everybody who wishes to experience a sense of awe and wonder. 
In fact, not only cinema but any type of art, according to Hugo, carries this same precious 
potential. For even if Hugo’s main metareferential subject is the medium of film, the movie’s 
core message of coming together and sharing in each other’s passions is only cemented 
further by bringing together a variety of different artistic media as well. To make this point, 
the Paris train station in which most of the film is set is presented as a perfect microcosm of 
art and culture: there is music (cf. e.g. 0:07:27) and dancing (cf. e.g. 0:02:14), paintings hang 
on the walls (cf. e.g. 0:23:34), there is a book store, and even the prototypically French 
croissants (cf. e.g. 0:23:51) and lavender flowers (cf. e.g. 0:25:15) for sale can be seen as 
cultural motifs. Throughout Hugo, they all, at one point or another, serve as the basis for the 
formation of interpersonal bonds. Similarly, in the movie’s final sequence, not all of Hugo’s 
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protagonists are portrayed as pursuing a future in film (cf. 1:53:15-1:54:36): Méliès and 
Tabard are portrayed as working on scholarly texts on film history, Hugo is learning new 
magic tricks, and bibliophile Isabelle (cf. e.g. 0:15:21-0:15:42, 0:26:20-0:27:58, 0:42:48-
0:42:56) begins to write a novel about Hugo’s adventures. Scorsese’s homages to his own 
medium of cinema are thus never done at the expense of other art forms. As long as people 
can connect over a piece of art and are inspired by it to explore their own creativity, the piece, 
according to Hugo, fulfils a valuable purpose and is worth preserving and passing on. 
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5. Metareference in Contemporary Television Series 
Whilst forms of entertainment have existed since the dawn of humanity, scholars have argued 
that society as a whole has never before spent as much time indulging in them as it does today 
(cf. e.g. Vorderer 70). We live in what has been called an “Entertainment Age” (Vorderer 70), 
and there are few media which embody that title as much as the medium of television. Louis 
Bosshart has argued that our desire for entertainment results from the latter’s ability to satisfy 
a variety of human needs: it fulfils our aesthetic needs for beauty, harmony and closure; it 
fulfils our psychological needs for escapism, stimulation and emotional experiences; finally, it 
also fulfils our socio-psychological needs for orientation and belonging – partially through the 
quasi-interactions between, for example, show-masters and audiences, and partially through 
viewers’ sense of belonging to a whole community which participates in that specific form of 
entertainment (cf. 23).  
Bosshart’s observations are particularly interesting from the perspective of a study of 
metareferences for two main reasons. Firstly, they raise the question of how metareferential 
devices traditionally accused of being disorienting and illusion-breaking are being 
incorporated into a medium seemingly so focused on escapism. Secondly, Bosshart’s last 
category of socio-psychological needs already draws attention to the one quality of the 
medium of television which both literature and film – no matter what The Book Thief and 
Hugo suggest – lack to this extent, namely the strong communal component to the medium’s 
immediate reception. 
As David Marc has pointed out, from the early days of television, the idea of a family 
sitting together in front of the television set has been central to the medium’s image as well as 
to its production and reception (cf. 136). In fact, especially in the first few decades after the 
introduction of the medium, many scheduling and programming decisions were based on this 
idea that people watch television together, in family units (cf. e.g. Casey et al. 109). And 
while audiences can also go to the cinema in groups, the context is clearly very different: the 
grandness of the movie screen, the darkness, the expectancy of silence and the strangers in the 
theatre result in a very different viewing experience than that of a group of friends or family 
members sitting in a circle formed by couches and armchairs in the comfort of their own 
home (cf. e.g. Casey et al. 110-111).  
This much more casual atmosphere of television’s viewing experience further 
complicates the concepts of illusion- and immersion-breaking so central to the study of 
metareferences. The fact that viewers can be talking to their friends whilst watching 
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television, that there are generally more possible distractions in a home than in a cinema, that 
television sets can be run as mere background noise, not to mention the fact that any possible 
narrative tension is continuously interrupted by add breaks, all these features of the television 
viewing experience suggest, as Marion Gymnich has pointed out, that the medium’s illusion-
creating potential can be much lower than that of cinema (cf. 132, 135). From the perspective 
of metareferential studies, this observation of course immediately begs the question whether 
metareferential devices are consequently more or less easily accessible in television – more 
because illusion-breaks are already part of the medium’s language, or less since television 
needs to try particularly hard to create and sustain narrative immersion.  
Another question arising from television’s arguably lower immersion potential is that 
whether this specific characteristic of the medium clashes with television’s predominantly 
assumed escapist nature (cf. e.g. Maase 53). This, however, would only be the case if we 
presume all escapist narratives to be automatically illusionist to the point of being naïve and 
simplistic, and only appealing to audiences who lack any reflective distance. As Werner Wolf 
and Michael Dunne have pointed out, however, such a simplistic view on escapist narratives 
is nonsense, for very few (and no mentally stable) members of those narratives’ audiences 
ever fully lose their distance to the shows they are watching (cf. Wolf, Ästhetische Illusion 63; 
Dunne 18). Instead, the reception of escapist work is always a simultaneous activation of the 
audience’s imagination (which produces illusion) and of its reason (which creates distance). 
After all, when viewers (or readers) engage with something fictional, the knowledge of its 
fictionality always remains present at the back of their minds (cf. Wolf, Ästhetische Illusion 
64-67). Of course, over the course of a work’s lengthy reception process recipients might be 
more or less focused on this knowledge at any given time – still, it is always present.  
If this was not the case, as Hans-Otto Hügel has correctly observed, many of the 
enjoyments derived from watching television would be impossible. Firstly, in regards to the 
communal viewing experience mentioned before, the pleasure of that type of experience often 
results from the simultaneous shared emotional engagement with the content and the provided 
opportunity to comment and reflect upon that content, often ironically (cf. Hügel, “Genaue 
Lektüren” 44). This reception process – perfectly suited for the reception of metareferential 
content due to its oscillating, reflective nature – would be entirely impossible if escapism 
meant a (temporarily) full disengagement from reality. Furthermore, as Hügel has also 
pointed out, if viewers were losing all sense of detachment whilst engaging with escapist 
media, they would be living in fear of, for example, every act of violence they might see 
portrayed on their screen (cf. Lob des Mainstreams 20). 
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This objection by scholars such as Dunne, Hügel and Wolf furthermore puts an end to the 
typical simplistic criticism of television as an inherently manipulative medium. Specifically, it 
demonstrates that immersion into television (just like into any other medium) and the 
consequent absorption of any ideas presented therein still requires the audience’s initial 
willingness to engage with the medium, to partially and temporarily ignore its medial 
framework and to dive into the illusion before ultimately oscillating back towards distance 
and reflection (cf. e.g. Hügel, Lob des Mainstreams 20). This is, however, not to say that 
television does not have any – or even a particularly strong – perspective-shaping effect on its 
viewership.  
In the late 1970s, Jeff Greenfield described television as follows:  
With the single exception of the workplace, television is the dominant force in 
American life today. It is our marketplace, our political forum, our playground, and 
our school; it is our theater, our recreation, our link to reality, and our escape from it. 
It is the device through which our assumptions are reflected and a means of 
assaulting those assumptions. 
Most starkly, television is the pervasive American pastime; cutting through 
geographic, ethnic, class, and cultural diversity […] A country too big for 
homogeneity […] America never had a central unifying bond. Now we do. Now it is 
possible to answer the question, ‘What does America do?’ We watch television. (11)  
Similarly, in the late 1980s, Sarah Kozloff called television “the principal storyteller in 
contemporary American society” (67). Even as late as the 2000s, Bernadette Casey and her 
co-authors still argued that “[t]he centrality of television in public and private life means that, 
for most people, it is a primary source of news, information and entertainment” (169), which 
gives television, and in particular its news programmes, the role of a “cultural intermediary” 
(169). In other words, whilst not being inherently more manipulative than other media, 
television has still been acknowledged by many scholars to have been the most discourse-
shaping medium of its (pre-internet) time. Even critics of the medium have always credited 
television with a strong influence over people – in fact, this influence is usually the main 
source of the criticism in question. Put into a political context, far-right critics have repeatedly 
accused television of single-handedly destroying family values and far-left critics have 
objected to the medium’s supposed sustenance and perpetuation of consumerism (cf. e.g. 
Dunne 183-185; Greenfield 13-14). And whilst the two parties might disagree on the exact 
detrimental effects of television, it is important to note that both sides seem to hold the 
medium “morally culpable” (Dunne 185) for a deterioration in society – an observation which 
in turn lends moral value to any metareferential discourse engaging with the medium’s 
consequent moral responsibilities. 
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The exact ways in which television is capable of influencing society have been discussed 
by many scholars. In the words of Bernadette Casey and her co-authors, “television can ‘set 
the agenda’”, meaning that “television programmes can help define the boundaries of what 
audiences talk about and think” (9-10, cf. also 11). For example, news programmes are able to 
push certain topics and/or views by privileging certain voices and positions, by interviewing 
the people sharing these positions more or less combatively, and even just by choosing who 
gets the last word (cf. Casey et al. 10). Consequently, television and its decision makers – its 
editors and producers – function as mediators or potentially even as gatekeepers for the 
knowledge and values which are perpetuated by their medium and/or channel (cf. Casey et al. 
10, 169). Consequently, in the words of Michael Dunne, a lot of our culture is thus “brokered 
for us” (15) by television (and other mass media), as is easily proven if we consider just how 
strongly we associate historically significant events of the last few decades (the assassination 
of Kennedy and 9/1147 being two sad yet salient examples) with the images we have seen of 
them on television. As David Marc already pointed out in the 1980s, our lives for decades 
now “have been accompanied by a continuing electronic paratext to experience”, by a 
“shadow memory” which interacts with our individual memory and provides “images that 
function as personal signifiers” (135), as a personal soundtrack to our individual experiences 
if you will, whilst simultaneously documenting and re-documenting our collective experience. 
This central role television plays in our views of the world can be highly problematic for 
multiple reasons. Firstly, it is vital to remember that the medium frequently setting our public 
agenda depends strongly on corporate, commercial and/or governmental funding for its 
survival (cf. e.g. Casey et al. 11; Gymnich 131). As a result, corporations, commercial and 
governmental parties can easily end up being the ones de facto setting the agenda, as has been 
so frequently pointed out within the framework of the current “fake news” movement. The 
second problematic effect of television’s function as a cultural mediator is the fact that, as 
Neil Postman argued already in the 1980s, if all public discourse is being mediated through a 
mass entertainment medium, all public discourse can suddenly begin to take on the form of 
entertainment. Before we know it, in the words of Postman, “[o]ur priests and presidents, our 
surgeons and lawyers, our educators and newscasters [then] need worry less about satisfying 
the demands of their discipline than the demand of good showmanship” (98). Postman further 
suggests that “under the governance of the printing press, discourse in America was different 
from what it is now – generally coherent, serious and rational” while “under the governance 
                                                 
47 For a certainly interesting if controversial essay on the latter cf. e.g. Žižek. 
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of television, it has become shrivelled and absurd” (16) to the point where “culture-death is a 
clear possibility” (156). Obviously, Postman’s prediction of a “culture-death” is ridiculously 
fatalistic. Yet it is undeniable that now, thirty years after his work’s publication, our wars are 
increasingly presented as media events, and entertainment shows like Jon Stewart’s The Daily 
Show (1999-2015) or John Oliver’s Last Week Tonight (2014-present) are often pulling higher 
viewership numbers than traditional news (cf. e.g. Colapietro 32; Hügel 34-35). The only 
questionable aspect of Postman’s theory, therefore, is that of whether the consequences of the 
development need to be quite as deadly and dire as Postman would have them. 
In the mid-1980s, critics of a less pessimistic disposition began to suggest that one way of 
averting an apocalyptic fate would be to combat any illusions of objectivism and medium 
transparency related to television and to expose the ideological dimensions at play. In other 
words, critics began to advocate for an active enhancement of the audience’s media awareness 
and, luckily, many television creators soon got on board with this agenda. Consequently, the 
increased inclusion of metareferences into television programmes began despite early 
producers’ doubts about their audience’s willingness to accept metareferential elements (cf. 
Dunne 56-57; Gymnich 131).  
Throughout the 1980s, creators began to build upon parodistic, intertextual and 
intermedial references characteristic of pop-culture in general and to incorporate those 
elements into their own medium and works48 (cf. Dunne 10). They furthermore utilized the 
fact that the audience’s strong familiarity with the medium at this point had already resulted 
in viewers beginning to learn and understand the medium’s language on their own, similarly 
to how we all learn human speech through extensive exposure (cf. Dunne 191). In the end, by 
the late 1980s, open, public, popular televised discussions on topics such as the “spin 
doctoring” during televised presidential debates were increasingly common (cf. Dunne 6). By 
the 1990s these and similar discussions were, in fact, even considered commonplace enough 
to be incorporated into fictional television shows and series as well, resulting in a first peak of 
metatelevision (cf. e.g. Gymnich 128-129; Rajewsky, “‘Metatelevision’” 415).  
The incorporation of metareferential discussions into television programmes helped the 
medium retain those members of its audience who – by then fully aware of the not-so-new-
anymore medium’s tricks – were becoming increasingly wary of what television was trying to 
“sell” them (cf. Dunne 18; Keazor “Stuff” 482-483). Furthermore, television creators and 
producers soon realised that the serial aspect of many of the medium’s creations lent itself 
                                                 
48 For specific examples cf. Dunne, especially p. 10. 
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particularly well to metareferential purposes. After all, the inherent repetitive structure of a 
television series automatically results in later episodes referring to their predecessors, and 
thus to the entire series referring to itself (cf. e.g. Gymnich 133; Rajewsky, “‘Metatelevision’” 
415-444). Television’s potential for inside “jokes” was consequently equally recognised and 
complex referential schemes began to be developed, the understanding of which provided 
additional entertainment value as well as intellectual stimulus for television’s increasingly 
media-competent audience (cf. Rajewsky, “‘Metatelevision’” 438-439; Seeber 447-448). 
According to Henry Keazor, the first metareferential elements incorporated into 
television series were basic self-references introduced in later episodes of long-running shows 
(cf. Keazor, “Stuff” 482). By choosing such late entry points, producers hoped to (1) be 
addressing an audience proficient enough in the show at hand to not be too disoriented by any 
illusion-breaking elements, and (2) to have an audience already engaged enough with the 
narrative to not walk away even if they should be temporarily disoriented (cf. Keazor, “Stuff” 
482-483). With time, emboldened by early successes and increasingly confident that their 
target audiences are used to certain metareferential elements, creators furthermore began to 
include metareferences into new series right from the start (cf. Keazor, “Stuff” 482-483). 
Finally, during the aforementioned first peak of metatelevision in the 1990s, as Gaby Allrath, 
Marion Gymnich and Carola Surkamp have pointed out,  
TV series increasingly began to employ experimental narrative techniques like 
multiperspectivity and unreliable narration as well as innovative functionalizations of voice-
over narration and of audiovisual presentation of consciousness. One can also quite often 
observe such experimental techniques as intramediality, intermediality and metafictionality 
(Allrath et al. 4), 
the most central reason for this development most likely being the burgeoning idea of “quality 
television” and television series’ consequent desire to be considered as innovative and “high-
brow” as their more established medial predecessors (cf. Starre 206). 
All these developments over the last quarter of a century have resulted in a versatile 
tradition of metareferential television series. From critically acclaimed shows such as Twin 
Peaks (1990-1991) or The Simpsons (1989-present), which are filled to the brim with 
metareferential elements, to pop-series with merely individual metareferential episodes (e.g. 
Charmed (1998-2006)49) or even just metareferential episode-titles (e.g. Friends (1994-2004), 
Sabrina, the Teenage Witch (1996-2003)50) – going through the entire list would warrant its 
                                                 
49 Cf. e.g. episode “Chick Flick” 
50 Cf. e.g. episode “Really Big Season Opener” 
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own separate study. For the mere purposes of this dissertation, for example, I considered all of 
the following series as possible subjects for my analysis: 
The Sopranos (1999-2007) and their (in)famous ending would have provided great 
material for a study of the depiction of communal television-viewing habits. I could have used 
the early episodes of Six Feet Under (2001-2005) and even most of 24 (2001-2010) to look at 
the role which add-breaks play within the medium. I could have analysed recent cases of 
individual metareferential episodes through series such as Supernatural (2005-present)51 or 
Stargate SG-1 (1997-2007)52. I could have studied series such as 30 Rock (2006-2013), Extras 
(2005-2007) or the short-lived Cult (2013) as great examples of shows with ‘life behind-the-
scenes of a TV production’-components. I could have analysed the development of David E. 
Kelley’s work from Ally McBeal (1997-2002) to Boston Legal (2005-2008) for its move from 
generalised fictum-metafiction depicting the sometimes blurry lines between reality and 
fantasy, to its explicit fictio-metareferential criticism of programming politics, scheduling 
times, target audiences and, eventually, Boston Legal’s own cancellation. As a parallel to 
Hugo, I could have used several episodes from the early seasons of the new run of Doctor 
Who (2005-present)53 to demonstrate how metareferences can even be incorporated into a 
series made to be accessible for children. Finally, the mock-reality-show boom which has 
been going on ever since Ricky Gervais’ and Stephen Merchant’s The Office (2001-2003) and 
its American reiteration (2005-2013) – from full mockumentary series such as Modern Family 
(2009-present), Parks and Recreation (2009-2015) or the short-lived My Generation (2010), 
to the mere incorporation of reality-TV elements into otherwise non-metareferential series 
such as Defying Gravity (2009) – would warrant another entirely separate study as well. In the 
end, I settled on Aaron Sorkin’s Sports Night (1998-2000), Studio 60 on the Sunset Strip 
(2006-2007) and The Newsroom (2012-2014) for the wide, interwoven and unusually in-depth 
insight they provide into the American television landscape by having television professionals 
working within three different sub-genres of the medium form the main focus of their stories. 
 
 
 
                                                 
51 Cf. e.g. episodes “The Monster at the End of This Book”, “Changing Channels”, “The Real Ghostbusters” 
52 Cf. e.g. episode “200” 
53 cf. e.g. episodes “The Long Game” (07. May 2005), “Bad Wolf” (11. June 2005), “The Parting of the Ways” 
(18. June 2005), “The Idiot’s Lantern” (27. May 2006) 
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5.1 Metareference in Sports Night, Studio 60 on the Sunset Strip and The Newsroom 
Will: What does winning look like to you? 
MacKenzie: Reclaiming the Fourth Estate, reclaiming journalism as an honourable 
profession, a nightly newscast that informs a debate worthy of a great nation, civility, respect, 
and a return to what’s important, the death of bitchiness, the death of gossip and voyeurism, 
speaking truth to stupid, no demographic sweet spot, a place where we all come together.  
(The Newsroom 1x01 36:08-37:58) 
Sports Night, Studio 60 on the Sunset Strip and The Newsroom are prime examples of critical, 
fictio-metareferential television. Furthermore, all three series are also filled to the brim with 
both intra- and extra-compositional metareferences, thus always putting Sorkin’s54 views on 
television in a wider historical and cultural context. 
 
5.1.1 Honouring Television’s History and Traditions 
All three of Sorkin’s metareferential series are built around (in the first two cases eponymous) 
shows-within-shows which in turn are homages to real-life television programmes such as 
ESPN sports news in the case of Sports Night, Saturday Night Life-like satirical sketch-
comedy shows in the case of Studio 60, and a variety of anchor-based prime-time news 
programmes in the case of The Newsroom. In fact, especially Sports Night episodes often 
open directly with footage from the series’ show-within-show (cf. e.g. 1x04; 1x06-1x09; 
1x13-1x15; 1x19; 2x09-2x11; 2x13; 2x18; 2x21), thus blurring the distinction between the 
two Sports Night shows for the audience. As with all metareferential works discussed up to 
this point, however, Sorkin’s acknowledgement of his shows’ predecessors does not restrict 
itself to such mere implicit references through imitation. Instead, all three series repeatedly 
thematise television’s history quite explicitly.  
In Studio 60, for example, actor Tom is shown to give his visiting parents a tour of the 
venerable theatre building in which the show-within-show is filmed. Whilst doing so, with 
shining eyes, Tom also explains the history of the sketch-comedy genre as a whole, how it 
developed out of burlesque and vaudeville and moved from the stage to film to radio and, 
finally, to the medium of television (cf. 1x06 9:41-10:52, 18:00-19:51). The same episode 
                                                 
54Assigning authorship of a television series to one individual is a blatant simplification considering the number 
of rotating scriptwriters, producers and directors usually involved in each project (cf. e.g. Allrath 6-7). For the 
purpose of brevity, however, and considering the strong auteur-ship traditionally accredited to Sorkin, I will refer 
to him as the main driving force behind each of these three series throughout this dissertation. 
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also contains a guest character who further elaborates on the hard times the genre and its 
contributors experienced during McCarthyism (cf. 1x06 27:02-28:15). With the help of this 
character, Studio 60’s entire sixth episode is transformed into one explicit ode to the show-
within-show’s genre, which furthermore pays tribute to the people who suffered because of 
their love for their art. Beyond that, Studio 60 characters are repeatedly shown to bond over 
inside jokes stemming from old television programmes (cf. e.g. the reference to The Mary 
Tyler Moore Show (1970-1977) in 1x02 34:24), thus portraying the show-within-show’s 
professionals as people who live, breathe and think in television but also suggesting that all 
our cultural vocabularies are equally permeated with television tropes. Finally, when Studio 
60’s team is portrayed to choose their musical guests based on the specific question of “What 
do we have that says legacy of television, like Arturo Toscanini and the NBC Orchestra?” 
(1x02 27:49, my emphasis), Sorkin explicitly shows his characters – and arguably himself – 
as actively wanting to contribute to this very same cultural legacy.  
Similarly to Studio 60, The Newsroom also constantly references its predecessors. 
Already the title sequence of the show’s first season opens on the footage of a flying 
broadcasting satellite (cf. N 1x01 08:02), followed by a series of black-and-white anchor desk 
footage of Edward R. Murrow, Walter Cronkite and Chet Huntley, as well as by backstage 
images from other historical broadcasts (cf. N 1x01 8:06-8:34). Eventually, exactly at the 
opening theme’s crescendo, all this classical footage transitions into comparable sequences 
depicting Sorkin’s News Night team in action, thus framing the show-within-show and the 
characters behind it as the latest link in a long chain of traditions. In addition to 
contextualising both The Newsroom and News Night, the famous anchor men portrayed in the 
series’ opening sequence are also repeatedly mentioned by name throughout Sorkin’s series 
with characters explaining their significance. For example, when the managing director of the 
news division, Charlie Skinner, at one point tries to convince main protagonist and anchor 
man Will McAvoy to not hold back on important issues in front of the camera he does so with 
the following words: “Anchors having an opinion isn’t a new phenomenon. Murrow had one 
and that was the end of McCarthy. Cronkite had one and that was the end of Vietnam.” (1x01 
1:02:10). Similarly, when two episodes later Will broadcasts a public apology for not having 
done what Charlie asked him to do earlier, he does so by admitting his regret for the fact that 
“honest-to-God newsmen with names like Murrow and Reasoner and Huntley and Brinkley 
and Buckley and Cronkite and Rather and Russert now [had] to compete with the likes of 
[him]” (1x03 5:02). In short, Studio 60’s idea of a legacy which deserves to be upheld and 
predecessors which deserve to be emulated is reiterated within The Newsroom as well. 
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5.1.2 The Steps and Elements Involved in the Production of Live Television 
In addition to their repeated depiction of homages, Sports Night, Studio 60 and The Newsroom 
are further highly metareferential because of their overall narrative focus on the work and 
personal lives of professionals involved in the production of live television shows. Thus 
already the series’ settings and the characters’ day-to-day actions and concerns help Sorkin 
expose the practical, technical and commercial components involved in the making of these 
types of television programmes. Furthermore, Sorkin’s famous dialogues full of typically 
vocal discussions on matters of ideology add many explicit debates on the merits, problems 
and functions of television to the three series’ metareferential tapestry. 
In regards to the exposure of production elements, each of the pilot episodes of Sports 
Night, Studio 60 and The Newsroom contain a variation of the same line which immediately 
stresses the show-within-show’s nature as a live broadcast. Sports Night opens with an 
establishing shot of the New York city skyline accompanied by a voice-over announcement 
spreading through the studio’s diegetic communication system: “Studio 8, this is master 
control, you’re up on router 7, have a good show.” (1x01 0:07). Similarly, within three 
minutes of the beginning of Studio 60, as the flying camera establishing the show’s setting 
enters the production room, the announcement of “Studio 60, this is Broadcast Center, you’re 
up on router two, have a good show” (1x01 03:05) can be heard. Finally, The Newsroom’s 
first footage of the News Night control centre is also accompanied by a voice-over announcing 
“Studio 1-A, this is Broadcast Centre, you’re up on router 3.” (1x01 49:33). All these 
establishing lines, combined with the behind-the-scenes visuals, immediately draw attention 
to the production side of Sorkin’s shows-within-shows. Furthermore, since all three lines are 
voiced by Sorkin himself, they also serve as a metareferential signature and reference that 
with those words of their pilot episodes, Sports Night, Studio 60 and The Newsroom 
themselves are equally going on air.  
Building upon these one-line introductions, all three pilot episodes of Sports Night, 
Studio 60 and The Newsroom include multiple sequences which aim to give audiences an 
overview of the people, stations and technology involved in the production of television 
content. In Sports Night, this overview is kept comparatively to the background and is mostly 
achieved through the inclusion of representative items (e.g. TV-monitors showing sport 
events, people walking around with video tapes, research being done at computers), dialogue 
asides (e.g. about the bad weather impacting the satellite reception cf. 1x01 9:57) and more or 
less complex professional jargon in the framing of scenes in which the main narrative focus 
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lies elsewhere (cf. e.g. 1x01 10:47). In other words, all these introductory metareferential 
scenes are double-coded both with narrative-progressing elements and with metareferences 
which help establish the atmosphere of the workplace setting. Furthermore, the jargon used in 
these scenes portrays the characters speaking it as professionals with a high level of 
competence in their field (cf. e.g. 1x01 12:11-14:08). Sorkin’s ideal of a professional, 
knowledgeable media elite is thus introduced immediately. 
In Studio 60, the metareferential overview sequence is already much more explicitly and 
exclusively just that. Rather than establishing the setting through what is happening in the 
background of different scenes, Sorkin and his frequent collaborator, the episode’s director 
Thomas Schlamme, include a several-minute long sequence which focuses exclusively on the 
view of a flying camera soaring across different areas of the theatre in which the show-within-
show is about to be recorded. In the process, Studio 60’s audience is introduced to the show’s 
diegetic control room, in which the crew is implementing schedule changes (cf. 1x01 3:08-
3:32), to the backstage area, in which a variety of people are getting ready (cf. 1x01 3:33-
4:56), to the show-within-show’s stage itself as it is visible in one of the production monitors 
(cf. 1x01 5:00) whilst a producer is making adjustments to the corresponding camera’s angle 
and frame, and finally, the flying camera and the audience catch a glimpse of the diegetic 
theatre audience as the final countdown to the show-within-show’s airtime begins. The whole 
flying sequence eventually ends in a shot of the show-within-show’s opening as seen through 
one of the cameras recording and broadcasting the live footage (cf. 1x01 5:27). In fact, this 
metareferential capture of scenes by pointing the extra-diegetic camera at diegetic monitors 
and/or cameras showing and/or filming that exact same scene within the diegetic world is a 
common technique Sorkin and his team employ across all three series (cf. e.g. SN 1x01 1:17, 
1:43; 1x02 4:12; S60 1x01 6:12 – 6:45; N 1x01 52:54, 53:08, 53:16), thus constantly 
reminding their viewers that what they are seeing is an equally constructed television show. In 
the case of Studio 60’s overview sequence, the final view of the stage through the 
broadcasting camera’s viewfinder is eventually replaced by a cut to the actual footage of the 
show-within-show’s first sketch that particular camera would be broadcasting (cf. 1x01 5:28). 
In the process, the real-live audience’s point of view is conflated with that of the show-within-
show’s diegetic television audience, and the introduction to how a television programme 
arrives on our screens is complete. 
Finally, in The Newsroom the introduction to the production aspects of television is 
disconnected even more from the narrative by being provided through the series’ title 
sequences instead. Already the season one titles mentioned before include footage of producer 
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rooms, of actual broadcasts, of anchor desks, cameras, teleprompters, lighting rigs, 
information gathered on computers and phones, news bulletins and alerts, etc. (cf. 1x01 8:34-
9:26). The title sequence of the following seasons only takes the idea even further, being 
comprised almost entirely of close-ups of items and actions which represent the backstage 
processes at work in a newsroom (cf. 2x01 0:07-1:03). To name only a few: a wall full of 
international clocks represents the scope, complexity and relevance of news content; footage 
of journalists speed-reading newspaper articles and exchanging documents depicts the 
research involved in the compilation of news; the company logo visible in multiple frames 
draws attention to television’s corporate aspects; the shot of an anchor fixing his tie addresses 
matters of presentation; and an entire series of close-ups introduces the technological tools of 
the trade such as alert tickers, stage floor cables connecting cameras, the operating room 
switchboards, teleprompters, and, of course, the classic red “on-air” light. In short, The 
Newsroom’s second title sequence’s main function is to evoke the metareferential production 
setting of its show-within-show. In fact, during the entire sequence, apart from the last two 
seconds or so, the audience never sees the faces of the people performing all these actions. 
The focus lies less on the introduction of the characters of the show and more on The 
Newsroom’s portrayal of the production processes of television. 
In addition to these three condensed introductory overviews, all three of Sorkin’s series 
contain a continuous backdrop of jargon and of exposed production elements such as 
specifically referred to microphones and ear-pieces or visible cameras, monitors, television 
screens, show-within-show set elements, etc., all of which help to establish the setting of the 
series at any given time. Furthermore, throughout all three series, additional production 
elements are exposed through a variety of metareferential asides which further flesh out the 
setting and refer to concepts and processes which cannot easily be indexed through a prop in 
the background.  
In Studio 60, for example, multiple episode titles serve as such asides and introduce 
audiences to medium-specific terms such as “The Cold Open” (1x02), “The Focus Group” 
(1x03), “The West Coast Delay” (1x04), “The Long Lead” (1x05) or “The Wrap Party” 
(1x06). The first of these episodes furthermore includes a scene in which a character explicitly 
lists every individual profession involved in set design by name: set construction, camera 
department, sound, set dressing, wardrobe, props, graphics, video playback, gaffers, grips, 
electrics, FX (cf. 1x02 24:00-24:30). Similarly, scenes interspersed across all three series 
further reference issues regarding colour (e.g. a backdrop suddenly looking beige cf. SN 1x02 
17:38), stage lighting (e.g. concerns regarding the different directions an anchor has to face at 
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different times cf. N 2x03 4:22-4:40 or regarding an anchor’s potential facial hair changes cf. 
SN 1x05 6:58) and audio (e.g. soundboard issues endangering a producer’s ability to do her 
job cf. SN 1x03 11:08-11:24, 12:03-12:19). The three series furthermore reference daily 
schedules (e.g. the number of run-down meetings cf. SN 1x07 6:57), rehearsal processes (cf. 
e.g. S60 1x05 22:33-23:44) and interview practices (cf. N 1x02 14:07-15:56). They contain 
explanations of what an “overnight book” is (cf. N 2x07 21:38-22:14) and of how focus 
groups work (cf. S60 1x03 34:53-35:06). They make jokes about television using unusual tape 
formats (cf. S60 1x01 11:48-11:58) and about everyone choosing to shoot in Vancouver as a 
way to save budget (cf. S60 1x01 31:54). Finally, they reference what audiences in the first 
few centre rows of a live show need to wear so as not to pull focus (S60 1x03 5:27) and what 
guest-hosts need to know to hit their camera mark and plug their own shows correctly (cf. S60 
1x10 0:37-1:40).  
As already this limited list shows, the number of referenced production elements 
throughout Sorkin’s three series is astronomical. The function of each of these hyper-specific 
metareferential asides, however, is mostly the same. Namely, the focus of all these references 
lies on the enormous amount of people, work, technology, steps, considerations and 
cooperation involved in even the smallest production aspects of television. Through their 
metareferential asides Sports Night, Studio 60 and The Newsroom expose both the highly 
constructed nature of television and the skill this construction requires from creators. In the 
process, the three series increase their audiences’ medium-awareness whilst simultaneously 
voicing and demanding respect for the people working in television. 
In addition to all these individual elements mentioned once or twice throughout the three 
series, there are certain aspects of television production which receive a more in-depth 
exploration in Sorkin’s series. Firstly, both Sports Night and The Newsroom repeatedly 
portray the research process involved in the production of news shows. Throughout the first 
of those series, the Sports Night characters are shown making phone calls (cf. e.g. 1x01 3:03), 
keeping up with trade reports (cf. 1x13 3:35-3:46) and cultivating sources (cf. 1x13 12:26-
12:53; 14:00-14:11; 14:42; 15:54-16:50; 18:56). Connectedly, the series also explicitly 
discusses the question of how much of the information they present anchors should be able to 
understand (cf. 1x21 5:25, 6:32).  
While few of these scenes are actually central to the dramatic arcs of their respective 
episodes, their existence – even as background – always emphasises the importance of well-
sourced knowledge and of skilled staff for the creation of a respectable news show. Thus 
already through these minor metareferential asides, Sorkin expresses his poetological views 
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on what good television should be like. These views and the related portrayal of research 
processes are picked up again in The Newsroom and provided with even more explicit 
commentary on the professional responsibilities of newsmen and -women – which is why I 
will address them in detail later in the corresponding section of this chapter.  
The next production aspect discussed repeatedly throughout all three series is the process 
of script writing. This being Sorkin’s own domain, he unsurprisingly has a lot to say on this 
most self-referential of topics. On the psychological level of character development, both 
Sports Night and Studio 60 are riddled with depictions of anchor man Dan Rydell and head 
writer Matt Albie, respectively, suffering from writer’s block (cf. e.g. cf. SN 1x07 3:50-5:02, 
13:14-14:03, 16:19-17:03; S60 1x16, especially 1:56-03:12). More importantly for a 
metareferential study such as mine, however, both series also portray a lot of the practical 
aspects of the writing process.  
For example, throughout Studio 60, Matt’s segment board is one of the most frequently 
seen background props. All three shows furthermore explicitly discuss the effect of different 
script formats on timing (cf. S60 1x09 1:34), they include arguments about rhyme-structures 
and rhythm/sentence distribution (cf. SN 1x01 14:17-:46), and they portray possible reasons 
for and consequences of plagiarism (cf. S60 1x04 23:58-24:26, 35:24). Moreover, the 
dynamics of a writers’ room are exposed as well: who comes up with ideas, who pitches to 
whom, who makes decisions, who then works on what (cf. e.g. S60 1x02 11:52-12:03, 14:43; 
1x04 0:10-1:57, 5:07-5:20, 31:49-32:05; SN 1x01 14:17-14:46); who writes for which actors 
(cf. S60 1x02 14:36); can one person possibly write a whole show on his or her own (cf. S60 
1x03 21:00); what happens to writers whose ideas do not make it into the show (cf. S60 1x04 
35:24); etc.  
Finally, Studio 60 also addresses the necessity for (racial) diversity on a writing staff by 
making the topic one of the central plotlines of its sixth episode. Specifically, the episode 
points out that a lack of diversity limits a writer’s room’s potential drastically (cf. 1x06 11:50-
13:57): it restricts the cultural fields accessible to writers in their search for source material 
and inspiration, and it even limits the writers’ ability to make certain jokes without fear of 
being called racist for making them “as a white guy”. Furthermore, the episode also includes 
two concrete examples of minority-culture-based stand-up comedy: a bad one which shows 
that merely belonging to a minority is not enough to be able to write about it interestingly and 
without the perpetuation of internalised minority stereotypes (cf. 1x06 21:43-23:20), and a 
good one which succeeds in portraying a specific culture through insight and precision (cf. 
1x06 30:50-32:27). The actual skill involved in the process of writing is thus also emphasised 
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by Sorkin in his portrayal of some of the cultural consideration relevant to television 
programming. 
In his audio commentary to the The Newsroom pilot, Sorkin explains his reasons behind 
the recurring writer motif as follows: “I like writing about writers who are struggling with 
writing. Especially when I’m struggling with writing. It seems like my easiest way in.” (1x01 
14:58, commentary track). Looking at the variety of writing-related features portrayed within 
his three series, however, it becomes clear that this form of self-therapy is not the only effect 
achieved through Sorkin’ portrayal of writers. Instead, his work also provides audiences with 
a highly detailed and informative insight into the writing process, thus once again exposing 
the number of steps and considerations, the amount of work and construction which goes into 
writing a television show. Last but not least, Sorkin’s metareferences on the topic also expose 
the emotional and psychological battles as well as the interpersonal and cultural aspects 
involved in writing. In other words, his procedural references are always imbued with cultural 
commentary and potential for character development as well, in a perfectly double-coded 
manner.  
Moving on from writing, the next link in the television production chain portrayed 
repeatedly throughout Sorkin’s three series is the editing involved in the creation of the 
television shows. Specifically, the selection of “worthy” footage (cf. e.g. SN 1x07 7:48-8:22) 
and the cutting down of this footage to fit a designated segment length (cf. e.g. N 1x05 4:42-
5:31) are the two most common processes brought to the viewers’ attention. In the relevant 
scenes, the fact that the choice of footage can strongly influence the audience’s views on any 
given matter is acknowledged and the seemingly merely practical issue of creating footage of 
a certain length is presented as a far more complex and ethically significant matter worthy of 
careful consideration further complicated by the question of who and/or what makes any 
footage “newsworthy” (cf. SN 1x02 13:20-14:40, 16:00-17:00, 18:31-18:45).  
Continuing from there, after an individual reference to producers and crew double-
checking audio- and video-feeds and rearranging segments till the very last minute (cf. SN 
1x01 0:08-1:12), Sorkin’s three series move on to portray their characters’ jobs and 
experiences while their respective shows-within-shows are on air. Once again, the complexity 
and intensity of the duties performed is particularly emphasised in the process, as are the 
many stages and segments which constitute the final product. Notably, in more than one 
episode, the skeleton of segments making up the show-within-show also provides the 
extradiegetic show with its structure. Especially in the case of Sports Night, many of the 
narrative-progressing scenes are set during advertisement breaks and cuts to correspondents, 
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thus further emphasising the show-within-show’s segmented structure so typical of television. 
In addition, episode intros and outros of the extradiegetic Sports Night are frequently 
conflated with those of the show-within-show, thus further stressing the similarities between 
the two series’ structures.  
For example, in Sports Night’s seventh episode, the initial going-on-air announcement of 
“music - go, roll credit - go” (1x07 0:28) applies to both the diegetic and the extradiegetic 
show. In fact, the diegetic theme music which consequently does begin to play is immediately 
revealed to be the same as that of the extradiegetic Sports Night. Studio 60’s pilot does 
something similar by including footage of the show-within-show’s studio audience as they are 
welcomed and introduced to Studio 60’s proceedings, the announcer’s information being 
equally relevant for the extradiegetic audience seeing the studio for the first time (cf. 1x01 
0:00-1:19). Finally, the very last shot of Sports Night’s pilot picks up the motif in reverse by 
having the episode close on both anchors sitting behind their desk, bantering, with the sound 
slowly fading out and the extra-diegetic camera panning out to show the full studio – a shot 
clearly reminiscent of the few seconds often seen at the end of real-life news broadcasts, 
during which muted co-anchors seemingly continue to talk to each other until the titles appear 
(cf. 1x01 21:40-21:52). In short, in their choice of framing devices, Sorkin and his team 
repeatedly blur the lines between diegetic levels by constantly zooming in and out across 
them. In the process, the audience’s field of view constantly fluctuates, at some points 
inviting viewers to immerse themselves in the story and the characters’ ordeals, and at others 
gently repelling them and reminding them of the mediated nature of the television product 
they are consuming. 
In addition to thus using on-air sequences to blur diegetic lines, Sorkin’s three series 
furthermore use these sequences to portray television production elements specific to live 
television. Firstly, through repeated comic references to anchors not wearing pants on air (cf. 
SN 1x01 02:02; 1x22 02:58) or to them making silly faces at their co-anchor while the latter is 
talking (cf. e.g. SN 1x13 11:27, 14:16), the three series draw attention to the very restricted 
field of view employed in live television, thus raising awareness of the highly controlled and 
mediated nature of even supposedly one-to-one live broadcast content. To a similar effect as 
well as for the purpose of once more demonstrating the high level of professionalism and skill 
required, Sorkin’s shows also repeatedly portray the tense work of live television producers 
who constantly have at least three different people talking to them at the same time (cf. e.g. 
SN 1x15 1:12; N 2x08 23:03, 23:27-23:43), and who need to keep their eye on a complex 
multi-camera, multi-feed setup, always ready to edit or reroute feeds on the fly to respond to 
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technical issues or new developments effecting individual segments (cf. S60 1x04 36:36, 
37:52; N 2x01 8:58-12:30). Finally, the uniquely American television phenomenon of having 
the possibility to change and re-tape segments before their West Coast time-delayed broadcast 
is equally addressed (cf. e.g. S60 1x04 27:25-28:50).  
Also included in Sorkin’s portrayal of live television broadcasts are, of course, the many 
difficulties which can arise from the partially unpredictable nature of live, unscripted 
television. From sports matches taking much longer or far less time than expected and thus 
compromising both scheduling and viewer retention/attraction (cf. e.g. SN 1x17 0:50-1:58, 
2x11), to the idea that there actually can be too much audience laughter during a comedy 
show since it can begin to impact the segment length (cf. S60 1x04 19:22), to journalists 
going too far on camera in their pursuit of a story (cf. N 1x06 26:06) – once again Sorkin and 
his team present us with a variety of fictio-metareferences depicting the realities and pitfalls 
of the medium.  
The final unique aspect of live television broadcasting which all three of Sorkin’s series 
address are the potential legal ramifications of things said or done on air. From humorous 
scenes depicting anchors getting in trouble for singing Happy Birthday on air without 
acquiring the rights to the song in advance (cf. SN 1x04 6:44-8:56), to the much more sombre 
tone of Studio 60’s pilot episode during which disillusioned showrunner Wes’ industry-
exposing opening monologue is cut short when he uses one of the words banned by the 
Federal Communications Commission (FCC) from live broadcasts (cf. 1x01 7:22-7:30, 7:48-
8:48), the topic is referred to again and again. In fact, the FCC restrictions are further 
parodied in Studio 60’s eleventh episode during which the show’s whole network gets fined 
for airing a news segment which contains a soldier swearing during a live broadcast when he 
is almost hit by a grenade mid-coverage (cf. 1x11 8:58-9:46, 10:16-10:37; 23:07-25:04). In 
none of these scenes do Sorkin and his team mention the word censorship explicitly – yet by 
merely metareferentially exposing the absurdity of the industry-specific rules the creators of 
live television broadcasts need to follow, the makers of the three series discussed here still 
voice a clear criticism of the medium’s and the industry’s current state of affairs. 
 
5.1.3 Television as an Industry 
Such commentary on the general state of the television industry today is another common 
thread across Sports Night, Studio 60 and The Newsroom. In addition to the references to the 
FCC regulations, Sorkin’s series contain multiple mentions of Hollywood’s insurance policy 
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practices when it comes to actors or directors with drug problems or drug abuse histories (cf. 
SN 1x02 9:58; S60 1x01 29:00-29:57). The series furthermore portray how open job positions 
in the industry are filled – both based on merit and “grooming” (cf. SN 1x12 3:49-5:46) and 
on knowing the right people (cf. SN 2x07 10:06-10:47). The series also include references to 
union strikes (cf. S60 1x17 2:35-03:15; 03:42-03:52) and to the impossibility of actors having 
the same name as another union member (cf. SN 2x12 0:13). Finally, questions of diversity 
are addressed in this context as well, and they are once more portrayed in a multifaceted 
manner. 
In addition to the Studio 60 scene mentioned before, the question of race is also featured 
quite prominently in the eleventh episode of Sports Night. Portraying a scenario still 
depressingly familiar to audiences twenty years later, the story of the episode centres around 
the coverage of an African American college football player’s refusal to play at a stadium 
flying a confederate flag (cf. 1x11 5:41-6:40). As soon as the subject is introduced, Sports 
Night’s network head – a Caucasian Southerner and alumnus of the college in question – is 
portrayed as wishing the topic to be covered with an emphasis on the Southern sport and 
cultural traditions which are symbolised by the flag. Through the inclusion of this character, 
Sports Night immediately demonstrates how easily and inappropriately personal, political and 
commercial concerns can drive news coverage’s agenda – at least if nobody in charge 
intervenes. Dan, however, immediately urges African American managing editor Isaac Jaffe 
to fight this demand. Yet interestingly, Isaac’s first response is to exclaim that he does not 
want to have to always be “the champion of all things black” (1x11 7:40). Eventually, Isaac of 
course does take the moral high-road and atypically goes on air himself to read out a 
statement in the form of an editorial (cf. 1x11 16:00-18:18), yet only after Sorkin and his team 
have thus taken the time to show that matters of race are never simple. On the one hand, the 
series eventually stresses the importance of using one’s medium and position to join the 
public debate and combat injustice. On the other hand, it, however, also acknowledges that 
just because a member of staff belongs to a certain minority group that does not make him or 
her automatically responsible for everything related to the minority in question. After all, he 
or she is a professional with skills and interests and work to do first, and a member of a 
minority second. 
Whilst racial diversity is thus given centre stage at least twice throughout the three series, 
gender diversity is seemingly only touched upon, yet with a similar and similarly strong 
message. All three shows make a point of portraying competent, strong women in positions of 
power: Both Sports Night and News Night have women producers, the newly-appointed 
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president of Studio 60’s broadcasting company is a woman, the company behind News Night 
is owned by a woman and its financial news are presented by a woman who gives lectures at 
university in parallel to her job as an anchor. Yet when Studio 60’s president Jordan McDeere 
is asked whether she thinks more high-ranking female television executives like her would 
help bring a different sensibility to the industry (cf. 1x02 0:15), she responds that she does not 
actually think gender really matters that much (cf. 1x02 0:23). This answer clearly echoes the 
idea that just because Isaac is black that does not mean that he has to champion all things 
black: here, just because she is female, Jordan does not need to champion all things female, 
neither does she even need to believe that there is anything unique about women executives. 
This particular approach to the topic is what characterises Sorkin’s own portrayal of gender 
issues as well. Once he and his team have made sure to portray strong women characters in 
important positions, any further long and explicit elaboration upon their womanhood becomes 
unnecessary and arguably inappropriate. Once their competence and importance within the 
shows’ narratives have been established, Sorkin’s women are treated just like every other 
character, as a complex individual with interests and pet-peeves, admirable qualities and 
flaws, their gender (just like Isaac’s race) purposefully never mentioned as a main defining 
characteristic. 
Staying within the realm of Sorkin’s character portrayal, a next important component of 
the production of television thematised in Sports Night, Studio 60 and The Newsroom are of 
course the people who work within that environment. The most metareferentially interesting 
aspect of their depiction is the effect the three series suggest that working in television has on 
its professionals. Firstly, Sorkin and his team frequently depict the loss of privacy which 
stardom – or specifically one’s role as the public face of a show and/or company – can bring, 
as well as the standards one’s behaviour needs to consequently meet as a result. From 
references to the tediousness of obligatory galas, black-tie events (cf. SN 1x03 3:41-4:47, 
10:07) and even talk shows (cf. SN 1x11 3:44) which medium representatives need to attend 
to sustain or better even increase their fame and likeability and thus grow their business and 
ratings (cf. e.g. SN 2x20 15:57-16:44, N 2x06 28:25-29:12), to mentions of the ridiculous 
extent to which what an anchor wears on camera matters (cf. N 1x01 50:51), to the portrayal 
of anchors being reprimanded by lawyers and “a guy from ‘Standards and Practices’” (SN 
1x02 4:00) for breaking the “morals clause” in their contract (SN 1x02 9:26) and for not 
fulfilling sponsor expectations by not projecting “an image of good health and clean living” 
(SN 1x02 8:38)), to plot-arcs in which an old D.U.I. mug-shot of Jordan (cf. S60 1x03 2:56) 
and nude pictures of Sloan leaked by a vengeful ex (cf. N 2x05) become press fodder, to 
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references to focus group data being gathered purely about whether an anchor is liked or not 
(cf. N 1x01 19:17) since his or her likeability has such a strong impact on ratings that positive 
focus data can affect a professional’s creative freedoms as well as his or her salary (cf. N 1x01 
20:16-20:44, 22:11-22:17, 30:12-30:47) – Sorkin’s three series make it very clear that being 
the public face of a television show places high demands not only on a person’s behaviour at 
work but on his or her personal life as well. 
In addition to having to be liked for professional reasons, television men (and 
interestingly enough only men) in Sports Night, Studio 60 and The Newsroom are also 
repeatedly shown to eventually begin to crave the love and admiration of their millions-strong 
audiences for themselves, usually with negative effects on the men’s psyche as well as on 
their creative and journalistic integrity. Both Sports Night’s Dan and The Newsroom’s Will, 
for example, are portrayed as news anchors who, at least temporarily, have become addicted 
to their on-screen popularity (cf. e.g. SN 2x05 0:11-0:30; N 1x02 7:20-7:42) to the point 
where it is damaging their interpersonal relationships and own moral compasses (cf. N 1x02 
46:37). Sports Night explains Dan’s behaviour with a lack of real-life social skills and family 
life (cf. e.g. 2x06 1:28). Meanwhile, The Newsroom’s MacKenzie explicitly accuses Will of 
being afraid (cf. 1x02 46:30) in addition to the show’s implicit portrayal of Will’s love-life as 
just as empty and in need of filling as Dan’s (cf. e.g. N 2x06 39:15-39:54). In both cases, the 
love an audience can give is shown to serve as a form of comfort and affirmation of self-
worth, be it a rather unhealthy one.  
Consequently, in The Newsroom, both MacKenzie and the show’s managing director 
Charlie Skinner repeatedly try to dissuade Will from constantly checking his and the show’s 
ratings – yet as the series also points out, matters are not as simple. After all, when Will 
eventually rejects his friends’ advice with the argument that it is him – not them – who 
actually has to sit in the anchor chair every night and publicly own the show’s content (cf. N 
1x02 44:14), he is neither lying nor mistaken. In the end, every story the News Night team 
covers, every sentence they broadcast, gets directly associated by millions of people with 
Will’s face, with him as a person. Every emotion the audience feels as a result of the show, 
they, eventually, connect to him. If they grow angry or disappointed, it is not only with the 
programme but with him. In other words, in Sorkin’s series, the ability to reach an immense 
number of people is portrayed as a double-edged sword which can provide comfort but also 
cause an intense fear of making a mistake and wronging and/or disappointing millions of 
people. Furthermore, these passages of The Newsroom simultaneously draw the audience’s 
attention to flaws in their own (viewing) behaviour. After all, any thoughtless equation of one 
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figure head or showrunner with a programme created by hundreds of people – as Sorkin 
emphasises time and time again – is unreasonable, simplistic, and actively putting an 
unhealthy amount of pressure on that individual. 
In addition to this specific effect of ratings on the self-perception of individual key 
figures, the general effect of ratings on entire shows and networks is of course also thematised 
in Sorkin’s three series. In fact, ratings being arguably the perfect signifier for the commercial 
side of television, for television as a business rather than as a medium, and for the impact this 
business side has on the medium, they and their effects are unsurprisingly the most-discussed 
aspect of the television industry throughout the entirety of Sports Night, Studio 60 and The 
Newsroom. All three of Sorkin’s series, at one point or another, portray their shows-within-
shows’ existence as threatened by financial troubles resulting from ratings-related concerns. 
Whilst providing drama and narrative tension, this double-coded metareferential motif also 
consistently provides Sorkin and his team with opportunities to discuss the business practices 
of the television industry.  
The list of examples Sports Night, Studio 60 and The Newsroom provide of commercial 
aspects relevant to the making of television is long. From references to press, advertiser and 
affiliate relationships needing to be considered when decisions are made (cf. e.g. S60 1x01 
14:03-15:49), to the importance of appealing to “alpha consumers” and influencers (cf. S60 
1x04 16:09-17:08), to economic-jargon-filled budget meetings discussing add-revenues, 
personnel cost and the value difference between add-breaks (accepted as part of the medium) 
and product placement (still seen as a form of conscious endorsement) (cf. e.g. S60 1x09 
9:12-10:10, 15:05, 22:31-24:01), to explicit criticism of CEOs cashing-in huge bonuses while 
award-winning shows and staffers are facing personnel cuts (cf. e.g. SN 2x19 0:00-3:42) – the 
role commercial considerations play in television is proven by Sorkin’s three series to be so 
big that when Studio 60’s network chairman Jack Rudolph at one point exclaims that 
“Hollywood isn’t run by liberals, it’s run by companies” (1x07 33:13), the now 
metareferentially-educated-on-the-topic audience is likely to agree. 
According to Sorkin’s three series, these commercial influences are particularly troubling 
when it comes to the production of news shows. In their seminal introduction to the field of 
television studies, Bernadette Casey, Neil Casey, Ben Calvert, Liam French and Justin Lewis 
have pointed out that unlike, for example, in British television – which as a result of the 
dominance of the BBC is strongly influenced by the ideal of ‘public service broadcasting’ – in 
American television “commercial sponsors and advertisers have [always] exerted a good deal 
of direct and indirect control over content, style and scheduling of programmes” (45, cf. also 
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46). However, Casey and her co-authors also acknowledge that “[i]n both Britain and the 
United States, news programmes [specifically] are [still] often regarded by broadcasters as a 
‘public service’” (183-184, my emphasis). In fact, as Sorkin and his team explain both in an 
aside in Studio 60 (cf. 1x11 8:38-8:50) and in the following excerpt from the lengthy apology 
Will gives on air in The Newsroom, this idea of ‘public service’ is what forms the legal basis 
for networks in America not being required to pay for the use of the country’s broadcasting 
systems. As Will elaborates: 
In the infancy of mass communication, the Columbus and Magellan of broadcast journalism, 
William Paley and David Sarnoff, went down to Washington to cut a deal with Congress. 
Congress would allow the fledgling networks free use of taxpayer-owned airwaves in 
exchange for one public service. That public service would be one hour of air time set aside 
every night for informational broadcasting, or what we now call the evening news. Congress, 
unable to anticipate the enormous capacity television would have to deliver consumers to 
advertisers, failed to include in its deal the one requirement that would have changed our 
national discourse immeasurably for the better. Congress forgot to add that under no 
circumstances could there be paid advertising during informational broadcasting. They 
forgot to say that taxpayers will give you the airwaves for free, and for 23 hours a day you 
should make a profit, but for one hour a night, you work for us. (N 1x03 4:08-5:01) 
This passage, whilst once again paying homage to the medium’s past – this time in the form 
of broadcast network presidents Paley (CBS) and Sarnoff (NBC) – clearly identifies the 
purpose of news shows as that of “working for”, of serving the people. This purpose, 
however, as this excerpt also shows, can be in direct opposition to the present-day need for 
news to be advertiser-friendly. This opposition leads to the central dilemma of the television 
industry depicted in Sports Night, Studio 60 and The Newsroom, namely the constant conflict 
of creators desiring to preserve their own and their work’s integrity whilst needing to achieve 
the ratings necessary to stay on the air. 
This conflict is presented in its most condensed form in The Newsroom’s third episode, 
which juxtaposes Will’s highly moralist and idealist apology about the current state of news 
media with multiple scenes from meetings between Charlie, the company owners and a 
market analyst, which all focus solely on the mercantile, financial and ratings-related aspects 
of the show-within-show’s performance in the months after the speech (cf. 1x03 7:20-7:37, 
9:19-9:55, 11:34-12:14, 16:30-16:56, 19:56-20:07, 22:44-23:09, 25:30-26:03, 30:01-30:10, 
34:30-35:20, 48:02-53:52). Contrasted with Will’s apology – the pathos and inspirational 
grandeur of which are established beautifully through Sorkin’s writing, Jeff Daniels’ delivery, 
the quiet yet dramatic background music and the reference to the apology given by the 9/11 
Commission – the board meetings appear base and almost demeaning. Sorkin’s presentation 
of them thus clearly supports Will’s apology in its statement that these kinds of meetings are 
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the crux of contemporary news’ problem: “The reason we failed isn’t a mystery. We took a 
dive for the ratings.” (N 1x03 4:06). 
This idea of having to “take a dive for the ratings” is a common theme throughout Sports 
Night, Studio 60 and The Newsroom. Already in Sports Night’s pilot, there is the portrayal of 
an argument between anchor man Casey McCall and a network representative, the latter 
demanding certain segments of the show-within-show be dropped because they are of no 
interest to the network’s key demographic (eleven- to seventeen-year-olds) according to a 
“ratings book on [his] desk that is very instructive” (1x01 7:25). Casey’s immediate response 
to this is to point out that his and his partner’s experience in the business as well as their 
“awards for journalistic excellence” (1x01 7:48) make them better suited to make 
programming choices than teenagers and financial advisors. The concept of making decisions 
based on ratings is thus portrayed by Sorkin as the antithesis of making decisions based on 
journalistic competence.  
To corroborate this statement, throughout his three series, Sorkin provides many concrete 
examples of how attempts at chasing ratings can result in the need to make moral and 
professional concessions. In Sports Night’s fifth episode, for example, the team’s excitement 
over an exclusive interview which they have been promoting for days since it is guaranteed to 
bring them high ratings and a breakthrough into a wider market (cf. 1x05 0:00-2:52) is soon 
dampened by the fact that the interviewee’s lawyer and agent, fully aware that Sports Night 
cannot afford to reject their terms, force strict guidelines on the interview (cf. 1x05 3:52), 
preventing the team from asking any actually important questions, such as questions relating 
to the interviewee’s physical abuse of his girlfriend.  
The conditions for the interview are soon complicated even further when producer Dana 
Whitaker subsequently attempts to get better answers from the misogynist interviewee by 
purposefully sending her female senior associate producer to do the pre-interview (cf. SN 
1x05 14:57) – a choice which results in the man sexually harassing and physically assaulting 
the journalist (cf. SN 1x05 7:30-8:20). Whilst it can be argued that Dana’s decision is made 
for the purpose of an interesting interview rather than just for the purpose of ratings, the 
context of the episode certainly adds this extra connotation. After all, the explosive interview 
she is looking for might be good journalism addressing important topics but it also most 
definitely would be good for the show’s ratings. The fact that Dana, after the assault, even 
offers the interviewee’s legal team her silence on the matter in exchange for a loosening of the 
interview restrictions only makes the length to which she is willing to go for this story more 
questionable (cf. SN 1x05 10:42-11:30). In the end, Sports Night’s entire fifth episode – 
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technically named after the abused girlfriend, Mary Pat Shelby – ends up being less about the 
girlfriend and more about the explicit, content-based metareferential discussion of how far a 
producer should be willing to go for ratings (cf. 1x05 4:25, 9:27-10:27, 11:24-11:56, 14:37-
15:50, 18:46-19:30). 
The motif of interviews coming with too many strings attached is picked up again in the 
twelfth episode of the second season of Sports Night, this time in the context of an upcoming 
interview with Michael Jordan. As a result of press kits for Jordan accidentally reaching the 
Sports Night studio, the team soon learns that rather than being willing to answer deep 
questions about sports, Jordan has been instructed by his marketing team to consistently bring 
the conversation back to his new cologne (cf. 2x12 6:18-7:30). Jordan’s team furthermore 
soon contacts Sports Night directly and explains that the star player will, in fact, only make an 
appearance if the cologne company gets full editorial control over the final cut of the 
interview (cf. 2x12 15:40-15:55). In stark contrast to the “Mary Pat Shelby” case, in which 
the importance of the story compelled her to go too far, Dana this time immediately pulls the 
interview in response to the demands made by Jordan’s team, drawing a clear line in regards 
to how much dilution of content she is willing to accept for the sake of ratings. 
What is interesting about both these episodes from a metareferential perspective is the 
fact that in addition to portraying moral debates about industry practices, the episodes 
simultaneously expose the existence and details of those practices in the first place. To an 
uninformed audience, interviews are usually presented as unscripted affairs, led entirely by 
the questions which come from the journalists. Both episodes of Sports Night, however, 
demonstrate both the vast amount of conditions, restrictions and guidelines which in reality 
are imposed upon interviews by legal, publicity and marketing departments, and the amount 
of interviewee-coaching which precedes them. As a result, the influence of powers from 
outside the journalism sphere is uncovered, as is the constructed nature of one more television 
genre.  
Continuing this trend of exposing details concerning ratings-related industry practices, 
Sports Night’s second season moreover introduces the profession of a ratings consultant to its 
audience and portrays the immense power over editorial as well as creative decisions, which 
is invested in a person who holds that position (cf. e.g. 2x02 17:06, 19:43). All three of 
Sorkin’s series furthermore repeatedly portray meetings in which owners, studio 
representatives, and other “suits” equally try to “give notes” to their creative team despite, as 
is explicitly stated in Sports Night, not having any credentials or experience related to writing 
       
175 
 
and/or producing a television show (cf. 2x03 3:49-4:04). The collaboration between ratings-
driven and creative departments is thus recurrently portrayed as antagonistic and strained. 
Yet for all their criticism of ratings and their explicit references to working for ratings 
being comparable to “whoring out” (cf. SN 1x05 4:06), Sports Night, Studio 60 and The 
Newsroom also make sure to portray that matters are of course not always simple and that the 
supposed dichotomy presented is not always as black and white – especially since ratings are 
not actually entirely abstract, meaningless numbers but are representative of certain serious 
and relevant issues. 
Firstly, all three series make it clear that ratings are relevant to sponsors, and that by 
being reflective of the relationship between a show and its viewers, they can even be relevant 
to governments. Both sponsors and government-collaboration, in turn, are not only relevant 
but essential for a network and show to be allowed to exist and to have certain freedoms (cf. 
S60 1x03 18:19-18:39, 28:28) – or in the words of The Newsroom’s company president Reese 
Lansing, ratings equal power which equals autonomy and freedom on air (cf. 3x01 42:49-
43:04). And without that freedom or even without a show in the first place, creators lose their 
platform and thus their opportunity to do the valuable work of integrity they wish to do. 
Therefore, ratings do matter. 
To prove this point, The Newsroom’s third episode, for example, lets company owner 
Leona Lansing explain very clearly to Charlie what disastrous effect Will’s antagonizing of 
the Tea Party and of gigantic and influential companies such as Koch Industries is having on 
her ability to run her business and fulfil her responsibilities towards her shareholders (cf. 1x03 
49:46, 50:41-53:50). In a similar spirit, several asides in The Newsroom’s second season list 
the conditions attached to a journalist’s visit to American troops in Uganda and thus depict 
the good relationship with the government required for journalists to be able to do their jobs 
(cf. N 2x02 44:08, 2x03 50:03-50:20). Finally, The Newsroom also makes sure to explicitly 
portray direct consequences resulting from the voicing of politically problematic views on air. 
For example, Will’s on-air referral to the Tea Party as “the American Taliban” (N 1x10 50:44) 
is shown to have undeniable fallout: News Night’s network loses access to the judiciary 
committee working on SOPA (cf. N 2x01 5:16-6:25), one of their team is repeatedly bullied 
and denied time with the presidential candidate whose campaign he is covering (cf. N 2x01 
22:08-22:29), and even the otherwise idealist Charlie feels the need to pull Will off the 9/11 
anniversary-coverage out of fear of potential boycotts and advertiser fall-out but most 
importantly out of respect for the concerns voiced by 9/11 widows and first-responders in 
response to the quote-containing broadcast (cf. N 2x01 14:25-15:35). 
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This last aspect brings us to the second reason why ratings, according to Sorkin’s three 
series, cannot be simply dismissed – namely, the fact that they are representative of viewer 
reactions. While all three series firmly believe in exposing audiences to opposing opinions 
and perspectives, they also emphasise that this should not be done in a mean, purposefully 
offensive and audience-alienating manner. According to Sorkin’s shows, it is too easy to just 
treat viewers who are easily offended – or who simply do not understand what a show is 
trying to say (cf. e.g. SN 2x03 15:06; S60 1x03 0:44-1:06) – as stupid and not worth 
consideration (cf. e.g. S60 1x08 27:56). It is too easy to proclaim that the risk of being 
offended is part of living in a country with free speech (cf. S60 1x01 1:30-2:07). Instead, 
Sorkin’s characters repeatedly acknowledge – as in the case of the aforementioned 9/11 
coverage – that recognising and engaging with the origins of certain viewer responses is a 
worthy endeavour. Especially if the offended parties really are lacking the intelligence to 
understand what is being said, in which case simply talking above their heads and expecting 
someone else to provide them with “tutorials” does not change anything (cf. S60 1x03 0:44-
1:06).  
In short, Sports Night, Studio 60 and The Newsroom make it very clear that in today’s 
climate ignoring realities – and ratings representative of these realities – is not viable 
behaviour (cf. S60 1x03 2:15-:45). In fact, when Matt, towards the end of season two of 
Studio 60, exclaims that “If we go on the air with sketches that ignore the world, then we’re 
irrelevant” (1x20 14:04), his comment cuts both ways: yes, satire (or news for that matter) 
cannot and should not ignore the problems of the world just because they might be considered 
not funny or inappropriate; however, it should also not ignore the fact that certain things are 
inappropriate (cf. e.g. S60 1x01 34:58; 1x19 14:20-15:10, 16:56, 21:25-22:45).  
As Studio 60’s first season already points out, for example, jokes against power are fair 
game but maybe comedians could consider not taking aim at underprivileged, simple people 
“just trying to raise their kids” (1x03 27:30) – even if those people are trying to do so by 
doing something as “stupid” as trying to forbid certain theatre plays (cf. S60 1x03 27:16-
27:45). Instead, as both Studio 60 and The Newsroom argue explicitly, creators should try and 
engage those very people as an audience and help them grow to appreciate more complex 
input such as the one creators wish to create (cf. e.g. S60 1x03 25:30, 26:12; N 1x01 36:08-
37:58). In other words, Sorkin encourages television professionals to abandon the simplistic 
binary of audiences as either smart or stupid, as either on-board-from-the-beginning or as 
hopeless. Finding a middle-ground should be a main goal, and reaching it constitutes 
according to Sorkin one of the television industry’s main challenges. 
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Consequently, another central topic of Sorkin’s three series, and especially of The 
Newsroom, is the idea of (potentially) worthy compromises. Over the show’s three seasons 
the News Night team is repeatedly portrayed as searching for this exact right balance. Already 
Sloan Sabbith’s appointment as the show’s economic segment presenter can be seen as a first 
example of producer MacKenzie McHale’s purposeful acknowledgement of the importance of 
catering to some audience preferences for the greater good. For while The Newsroom in a 
later episode ridicules the fact that there are agents in the industry whose main job it is to find 
particularly “sexy” witnesses, accused, police officers, etc. (cf. N 1x08 31:00-31:25) – another 
metareferential industry titbit exposed to the audience – the reason MacKenzie explicitly 
gives to Sloan for hiring her is the fact that her degrees and her professional skills are 
accompanied by the attractiveness of her legs (cf. N 1x02 17:57-18:32, 46:01-46:09). By 
already having established MacKenzie as a positive and idealistic character at this point, The 
Newsroom thus in one at first glance joking metareferential aside acknowledges that “sex 
sells” and portrays MacKenzie as not considering herself “above” utilizing Sloan’s 
attractiveness to help their mutual goal of educating audiences about the realities of our 
economy. 
Even more in detail and as a central topic, the question of potentially worthy 
compromises is discussed in the two-part episode preceding The Newsroom’s first season 
finale. Throughout the respective story arc – in a manner reminiscent of the interview 
negotiations depicted in Sports Night – the News Night team is portrayed to make one 
concession after the other to the quality of their programming in the name of a greater goal: in 
this case, the rights to stage and re-design the Republican presidential debate (cf. N 1x08 
10:12). Instead of covering stories they actually consider important (cf. N 1x08 20:17-20:53) 
such as the congressional debt ceiling debates and their potential devastating consequences 
(cf. N 1x08 11:00-11:51, 50:14-52:02), the News Night team agrees to cover the Anthony 
Weiner “scandal” (cf. N 1x08 14:50-15:23) and, most importantly, the Casey Anthony murder 
trial (cf. N 1x08 6:40-8:50, 9:34-9:49). They furthermore agree to do so in a purposefully 
“exploitative” (N 1x08 20:56) manner (cf. N 1x08 27:42-32:04) as long as this helps raise 
their ratings as well as their standing with certain GOP members.  
As the story arc progresses and the concessions grow bigger and bigger, Will defends his 
decision with another reference to his predecessors – arguing that Murrow himself had been 
willing to do “puff pieces” when necessary (N 1x08 9:43), even if not actual “poison” (N 
1x08 9:44) “just this side of a snuff film” (N 1x08 7:58) as the News Night team call their own 
Casey Anthony coverage. Still, in the end, no concessions and no ratings spikes are enough to 
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convince the Republican party to accept the team’s proposed changes to the debate format, 
thus rendering all qualitative sacrifices of the story arc meaningless. And yet, even in the 
moment of their defeat, the The Newsroom characters never voice regret or retract their belief 
that while concessions for ratings ad abstractum are morally dubious, concessions for ratings 
which result in opportunities to influence public debate and the political landscape can be 
worth it. 
This acknowledgement that an utter disregard for ratings is not a simple solution to the 
problems caused by the tension between the creative and/or idealist and the financial and/or 
realist sides of the television industry – an acknowledgement for which critic Tim Gibson has 
denounced Sorkin as not being radical enough – naturally raises the question of what 
solutions, if any, the series propose instead. The answer to this question is seemingly simple: 
Sports Night, Studio 60 and The Newsroom all advocate for a clear separation of the 
responsibilities of the creative divisions of a network from the responsibilities of the financial 
divisions – a clear separation of church and state, if you will. In accordance with this idea, the 
personnel working for the latter divisions would be required to relinquish any and all rights of 
final say over editorial decisions, and the creative personnel would have to be freed from any 
and all obligations directly related to the raising ratings. All contract mandates exposed in The 
Newsroom in that regard (cf. N 1x03 8:01-8:35, 32:10-32:21), according to Sorkin’s three 
series, would equally need to become obsolete. 
In a highly double-coded comment, this idea is already expressed in a small aside in 
Studio 60 when producer Danny Tripp is shown to wonder whether box office numbers 
actually belong in the review/art section of a newspaper or whether it would be better to move 
them to the financial section instead (cf. 1x10 23:21-23:51). In addition, the idea of a clear 
line between departments is also presented in the form of a much more explicitly 
metareferential verbal argument between two of The Newsroom’s main characters. When Will 
in the series’ pilot tries to dissuade Charlie from hiring MacKenzie for personal reasons, the 
official reason he gives is that “[s]he’s indifferent to ratings, competition, corporate concerns, 
and, generally speaking, consequences” (N 1x01 1:02:55) – to which Charlie immediately 
responds with “Good, ‘cause you just described my job.” (N 1x01 1:03:00). Charlie further 
makes it clear just how serious he is about this separation of jobs when in the following 
episode he tries to convince Reese to stop showing any ratings numbers to Will with the 
following words: “There are two important conversations, how do we do the best news 
possible, and how do we get the most people to watch. I don’t want one of those 
conversations to have anything to do with the other” (N 1x02 6:39). 
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Whilst the three series under discussion thus advocate for a clear divide between 
corporate and creative divisions, it is important to note that Sorkin and his team do not 
suggest that this divide should never be bridged. As mentioned before in the context of the 
significance of ratings, all three series do provide guidelines as to when and how anchors, 
producers, writers, etc. should engage with ratings as well as with matters of public opinion. 
Similarly, Sports Night, Studio 60 and The Newsroom also present examples of how corporate 
personnel can contribute to the achievement of creative goals and what their exact ideal role 
in the industry consequently should be. Firstly, little sarcastic asides such as the following 
from Studio 60 in which a character comments that “[i]t’s unusual to see the arts and leisure 
section in a boardroom” (1x12 12:22) indirectly request that company executives take the 
time to keep themselves informed about the cultural context of the medium their company is 
producing. Secondly and more importantly, however, Sorkin’s three series further suggest that 
executives should function as facilitators for their creative divisions. 
This idea is most directly expressed in Sports Night’s second season when ratings 
consultant Sam Donovan gives a speech to a room full of overstepping executives about what 
they should be doing instead of harassing the creative department. In the episode, Sam tells 
the story of Cliff Gardner – the brother-in-law of Philo Farnsworth, the “inventor” of 
television – the point of the story being that aware of his lack of an “inventor’s mind”, 
Gardner still offered to support his more creative brother-in-law’s endeavour by learning how 
to and by producing the glass-tubes required for the invention to work (cf. SN 2x03 17:17-
19:37). Through this highly metareferential analogy from the field of television history, 
Sorkin thus fully acknowledges the value of practical skills and business sense, and presents 
them as essential to the realisation of even the most ingenious creative idea. According to this 
scene, the successful collaboration between people from different fields is what makes world-
changing masterpieces possible – as long as all contributors focus on doing what they are 
actually good at (cf. also N 3x06 42:19-43:00).  
This ideal of an executive skilled in financial and commercial matters, interested in the 
medium and always having her (or his) creative team’s back, is personified in Studio 60’s 
Jordan McDeere. In the pilot episode of the show, she is introduced as being lauded for 
having helped to keep up and raise the ratings of many other television networks and 
programmes: NBC’s The Tonight Show with Jay Leno (1992-2014) is namedropped as 
reference, as is CBS’s This Morning show (1992-present) (cf. 1x01 9:11-10:10). And yet, by 
the end of the pilot episode, Jordan also proves multiple times that she does not only care 
about ratings. Through her character and characters like her, Sorkin and his team demonstrate 
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that, with the right people and attitude, creative and financial considerations need not always 
be in conflict. Sources of friction certainly exist but friction does not need to result in disaster 
– especially not if executives follow Jordan’s example to coax the best out of their creative 
talent and to then use their own business skills to make that product profitable. If they cannot 
do that, then in the words of Sports Night’s new owner in the final episode of the series: “It’s 
a good show, Dana. Anybody who can’t make money of Sports Night should get out of the 
money-making business.” (SN 2x22 18:40). 
 
5.1.4 Television’s (Ideal) Role in Society… 
In addition to discussing the functions and roles different divisions should play in the 
television industry, Sorkin’s three series also repeatedly discuss the functions and roles the 
industry and the television medium as a whole should or could play in society – in stark 
contrast to the dangerous and detrimental role a lot of television, according to the three series, 
actually plays today. This seemingly terrible state of present-day television is most 
emphatically summarised and explicitly voiced in Wes’s opening monologue at the beginning 
of Studio 60’s pilot. The most relevant passage of the whole speech in this regard is the 
following: 
We’re all being lobotomized by this country’s most influential industry. It’s just thrown in 
the towel on any endeavor to do anything that doesn’t include the courting of 12-year-old 
boys. Not even the smart 12-year-olds, the stupid ones, the idiots – of which there are plenty, 
thanks to no small measure to this network. So why don’t you just change the channel? Turn 
off your TV. Do it right now, go ahead. [inaudible] --struggle between art and commerce. 
Well, there’s always been a struggle between art and commerce. Only now, I’m telling you, 
art is getting its ass kicked. And it’s making us mean and it’s making us bitchy. It’s making 
us cheap punks. That’s not who we are! People are having contests to see how much they 
can be like Donald Trump? [inaudible] We’re eating worms for money. Who Wants to Screw 
My Sister?! Guys are getting killed in a war that’s got theme music and a logo – That remote 
in your hand is a crack pipe. Oh yeah, every once in a while, we pretend to be appalled. 
[inaudible] Pornographers! It’s not even good pornography. They’re just this side of snuff 
films. And friends, that’s what’s next because that’s all that’s left. (S60 1x01 7:39-9:23) 
According to this blatant homage to the classic metafilm Network (1976) – the monologue’s 
source is even explicitly identified within the episode – the central issues with the current 
state of the medium of television are the restrictive target audience, the consequent “dumbing-
down” of content, and the rise of increasingly extreme shows – including news shows – 
produced for effect rather than content. Furthermore, Wes’ monologue also draws attention to 
the fact that all these bad medium practices are affecting our society as a whole: “[I]t’s 
making us mean and it’s making us bitchy. It’s making us cheap punks. […] That remote in 
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your hand is a crack pipe.” The television medium in its current state is thus presented as a 
mind-altering drug which deteriorates our character and behaviour. 
What seems to bother the creators of Sports Night, Studio 60 and The Newsroom most 
about all this is their firm belief that television has the potential to be so much more than it 
currently is. Especially Studio 60 contains several explicit metareferential conversations 
between characters advocating for a more professional and serious approach to the medium. 
From comments as seemingly trivial as Matt admonishing his writer colleagues for coming to 
work dressed “as if they are in junior high-school” (cf. S60 1x02 17:48), to more earnest 
discussions between Danny and Simon suggesting that television should not be treated by 
actors and directors as a place to “slum in” between film and drama engagements (cf. S60 
1x02 25:31-:40, 32:31-:52), to Jordan’s explanation to Danny that she thinks it important that 
high-quality, smart programmes are aired on freely accessible public networks such as theirs 
and not always hidden behind HBO-like paywalls (cf. S60 1x05 3:59-5:01, 36:21-36:31) – the 
series’ defences of the medium of (public) television are legion. Furthermore, these expressed 
beliefs are also all rules which Sorkin himself clearly attempts to live by, as demonstrated by 
his own dress style, his extensive work in the medium, his high-end casting choices (often of 
actors with theatre background) and his (admittedly not always successful) attempts at finding 
public networks for his series. In short, when Matt asks a prolific journalist in Studio 60 why 
after covering presidential campaigns, presidents and wars she is now choosing to write about 
their television show, and she answers “I think what’s happening here is important. I think 
popular culture in general and this show in particular are important.” (1x05 1:42-1:49), the 
journalist’s opinion is undoubtedly as much Sorkin’s as it is the character’s. 
When Sports Night, Studio 60 and The Newsroom advocate for a more serious approach 
to television, that of course does not mean that the people in the business need to take 
themselves too seriously (cf. S60 2x02 27:18) or even worse, that television itself needs to 
always be serious. When Tom’s visiting father in Studio 60 criticises his actor son’s work as 
being meaningless and valueless compared to his brother’s service in Afghanistan (cf. 1x06 
19:54), Tom – the moral authority in that scene – is portrayed to defend his profession with 
the following words: “I’m just telling you a story, Dad. I’m trying to take your mind off of it. 
That’s what I do.” (1x06 19:25, cf. 35:10). Through this statement, the worry- and pain-easing 
qualities of comedy and entertainment are acknowledged, as is the genre’s ability to 
temporarily distract audiences from everyday woes. Both effects are further presented as a 
decidedly meaningful and important function of television. In other words, even whilst 
Sorkin’s three series advocate for smart and sophisticated programming, they never deny the 
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value of all escapist media. In fact, through their narrative focus on interpersonal 
relationships, their numerous comedic elements and Sorkin’s overall idealistic approach to his 
subject matter, all three of his series themselves are hardly purely intellectual, educational and 
“serious” works. 
The second central ability of television acknowledged and propagated by Sports Night, 
Studio 60 and The Newsroom is the medium’s power to inspire people. This idea is first 
introduced ex negativo when Casey admits to being unsatisfied with his job because it has 
stopped being about getting people excited about sports and instead consists mostly of 
reporting on athlete violence and misbehaviour (cf. SN 1x01 15:12-16:11). “I have a 7-year 
old son I get to see on Wednesdays and alternate weekends and these are his heroes. And now 
6 days a week they’re also his male role models” (SN 1x01 15:57-16:06), the freshly-divorced 
Casey explains, dissatisfied with the fact that sports anchors today are increasingly forced to 
take on the role of “PR-m[e]n for punks and thugs” (SN 1x01 15:29).  
What ideal sports news content should look like, instead, is portrayed soon after in the 
same episode when the Sports Night team accidentally notices on a background monitor that a 
41-year-old, unknown South-African runner with a history of seemingly unsurmountable 
political and physical adversities is about to set a world record. Whilst the rest of the team 
gathers in front of the monitor to cheer the man on, Casey is shown to immediately run to a 
telephone to wake up his son so the latter can turn on the TV and witness the runner’s feat of 
resilience (cf. SN 1x01 18:46).  
For Casey and Sorkin, this moment right there epitomises the magic and purpose of 
sports television. Whilst multiple side-characters throughout Sports Night repeatedly express 
an utter lack of understanding for why anybody would take the genre seriously (cf. e.g. SN 
1x13 15:05, 1x17 13:39), this initial scene of Sports Night already provides the answer: when 
not misused for the idolisation of “punks and thugs” just because they are famous, sports 
television has the potential to show millions of people how persistence and hard work can 
lead to victory over adversity. As is voiced even more explicitly by assistant producer Natalie 
Hurley several episodes later concerning a Mount Everest ascent, sport achievements are 
symbolic proof of what we humans and humanity in general can accomplish if we set our 
mind to it (cf. SN 1x09 09:10-09:21). Sports television, consequently, by broadcasting these 
achievements to people around the world has the potential to inspire others to attempt and 
accomplish similar feats of greatness. 
This idea of the inspirational potential of television is picked up again in Studio 60’s 
portrayal of a New Orleans brass band’s performance after Katrina (cf. 1x11 36:56-40:51). 
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Furthermore, it forms a central motif throughout the entirety of The Newsroom as almost 
every news segment the News Night team airs – and especially the two manifesto segments of 
Will’s apology and his coverage of the Tea Party – is meant to inspire diegetic as well as 
extradiegetic audiences to affect change. In this context, the cinematographic choices made by 
Sorkin’s directors throughout these scenes are particularly interesting. Again and again, 
across all three series, inspirational scenes are always filmed as multiple shot reverse shots 
which depict the story unfolding on diegetic screens in parallel to a diegetic audience’s 
reactions: Casey’s excited eyes and voice, his team’s cheering, Matt and Danny’s admiration 
whilst watching the brass band perform, the variety of emotions triggered in News Night 
staffers throughout their coverage of different stories. Through this implicitly metareferential 
choice of editing, Sorkin and his directors thus always simultaneously present their audience 
both with inspirational diegetic content and with a depiction of characters actively being 
inspired. In the process, Sorkin and his team not only increase viewer response through a 
triggering of empathy as is the traditional function of this cinematographic technique, but they 
also actively portray the fact that watching television can be inspiring.  
The final function of television discussed by Sorkin is the medium’s ability to keep 
people informed – an ability which has been increasingly questioned in recent years under the 
banner of “fake news”. This, according to The Newsroom, is the most central function of news 
shows and one which the News Night team are shown to both implicitly try to fulfil and to 
explicitly advocate for. Why the show’s characters consider information dispersal such an 
important part of their work is already explained in the very first few minutes of the series 
when during a speech on the current bad state of America as a nation, Will suggests that this 
was not always the case. According to Will, there was a time in which America was a front-
runner of civilisation (cf. N 1x01 6:22-7:13) and its people used to achieve great things. 
Will’s explanation for that period is as follows: “We were able to be all these things and do all 
these things because we were informed.” (N 1x01 7:15-7:23, my emphasis). With these 
words, Will and through him Sorkin insist that information, knowledge and awareness of 
what is going on in the world form the basis for a successful country, and specifically for a 
successful democracy.  
Will’s and Sorkin’s views on the subject are further elaborated upon by MacKenzie, who 
in the second long speech of The Newsroom’s pilot episode explains her vision for News 
Night as follows:  
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MacKenzie: 
There’s nothing that’s more important in a democracy than a well-informed electorate. […] 
When there’s no information or, much worse, wrong information, it can lead to calamitous 
decisions and clobber any attempts at vigorous debate. […] I’ve come here to produce a 
news broadcast that more closely resembles the one we did before you got popular by not 
bothering anyone, Leno. 
Will: 
I think Jay and I would rather be employed if it’s all the same to you. 
MacKenzie: 
It’s not all the same to me, you punk. I’ve come here to take your IQ and your talent and put 
it to some patriotic fucking use. And where does it say that a good news show can’t be 
popular? […] 
Will: 
It’s impossible, Mac! […] Social scientists have concluded that the country is more polarised 
than at any time since the Civil War. The Civil War. […] People choose the facts they want 
now. So what you’ve just described is impossible. 
MacKenzie: 
Only if you think an overwhelming majority of Americans are preternaturally stupid. 
Will: 
I do. 
MacKenzie: 
I don’t. And if you let me, I can prove it. […] People will want the news if you give it to 
them with integrity. Not everybody, not even a lot of people, 5%. And 5% more of anything 
is what makes the difference in this country. (N 1x01 36:08-37:57) 
In short, according to MacKenzie, a well-informed electorate is crucial for a democracy 
because only an electorate in possession of all the facts can make thoughtful, reasonable 
political decisions. And while Will interjects that the voting public today are “stupid” and that 
they do not care about hard facts – this is, arguably, only the case because journalists are not 
doing their job of explaining things to the electorate in a way the latter can understand but are 
instead too busy maintaining their ratings by either entirely staying away from hard facts or 
by focusing on facts which please their respective viewers by confirming the latters’ pre-
existing beliefs and biases. In fact, it could even be argued that this latter approach, in a 
medium landscape filled with a multitude of networks catering exclusively to specific 
demographics, is what enables people in the first place to simply escape and/or ignore 
disturbing realities by “choosing their own facts” through their choice of channel. 
MacKenzie’s solution to the problems at hand is to demand that Will and News Night do 
their journalistic duty of dispersing accurate information to their millions of viewers even at 
the risk of losing some of them. For in the end, even if the team only succeeded in increasing 
the number of well-informed voters by 5%, they would still have made an impactful political 
difference. Consequently, MacKenzie proclaims her final goals for News Night as follows: 
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Reclaiming the Fourth Estate, reclaiming journalism as an honourable profession, a nightly 
newscast that informs a debate worthy of a great nation, civility, respect, and a return to 
what’s important, the death of bitchiness, the death of gossip and voyeurism, speaking truth 
to stupid, no demographic sweet spot, a place where we all come together. We’re coming to 
a tipping point. […] There’s gonna be a huge conversation. […] You and I have a chance to 
be among the few people who can frame that debate. (N 1x01 40:17-41:01)  
Reiterating Wes’ complaints about the meanness of current television culture, MacKenzie 
thus stresses her wish to instead create a news programme which encourages, fosters and 
informs a civil, intelligent and active public debate as a means of encouraging and fostering a 
more civil and politically active society in general. In fact, as seen before, she considers this 
her, Will’s and the medium of television as a whole’s patriotic duty. 
 
5.1.5 …and How It Can Be Achieved 
How exactly journalists can “Reclaim the Fourth Estate” is the final metareferential message 
of Sorkin’s series. Will states in his opening monologue that “[t]he first step in solving any 
problem is recognizing there is one” (N 1x01 7:25) – and with their critical portrayal and 
exposure of medium-specific problems, all three of Sorkin’s metareferential series contribute 
to this step. Furthermore, all three series also show many examples of characters attempting to 
fix these problems. The Newsroom in particular depicts multiple model cases of how news 
stories, according to Sorkin, should be covered correctly. The fact that all these cases are built 
around real-life stories further allows viewers to compare the ideal version of the coverage on 
screen with the on average far less ideal coverage they have seen from their real-life media. 
Finally, in addition to implicitly modelling journalistic practices, Sorkin as usual also has 
many of his characters explicitly discuss these practices, their merits, and the reasonings 
behind them.  
The pilot of The Newsroom, for example, focuses on the BP oil spill from April 10th, 
2010. In addition to demonstrating one way of how journalists can be alerted to news in the 
first place – namely, through computer programs tracking information from sources such as 
The Associated Press (AP) (cf. N 1x01 32:14) – the episode mostly focuses on how the staff 
proceeds once they have received the alert. The central metareferential statements made in the 
process are the following: journalists should not rush stories (cf. N 1x01 32:35, 33:58-34:35); 
they should keep a constant eye on the story’s progression (cf. N 1x01 33:12, 33:54-34:12, 
34:40-36:20, 41:48-44:00, 48:54-50:47); they should research and acquire additional 
information, backing each new fact up with at least two reliable sources (cf. N 1x01 38:38-
38:54, 41:17-45:46); finally, news teams should ideally consist of a group of knowledgeable 
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people, each with different fields of expertise, so that the team as a whole can look at a story 
from many different angles to find out what about it is really (most) important (cf. N 1x01 
42:40-45:02, 47:25-47:41). Following all these rules, the News Night staff’s actions 
demonstrate, improves the accuracy and truthfulness of the subsequent coverage – both 
characteristics which The Newsroom portrays as ethically, financially and legally vital for a 
news network’s reputation and quality standards (cf. N 1x01 46:10). 
Once News Night has acquired its basic story in accordance with these rules, the team is 
shown to move on to the actual production process of their news segment: staff members call 
contacts looking for further information, official statements and experts to book; graphics are 
created; cameras and sound equipment are set up and checked; a script is written for the 
anchor – or, as in this case, is drafted by Will himself whilst he is already sitting at his anchor 
desk surrounded by hair and make-up personnel (cf. N 1x01 47:55-51:16). For after having 
acquired such exclusive information, the team is portrayed as having no time to lose, not even 
for the purpose of writing a full script and putting it up on a teleprompter. Throughout its 
portrayal of the news production process, The Newsroom’s pilot episode thus once more 
emphasises the immense amount of (construction) work and personnel involved in the 
creation of a single television segment whilst also demonstrating the high level of 
competence, responsiveness and flexibility required from everybody working in especially 
live television since breaking news rarely follow a pre-planned schedule or allow for lengthy 
pre-scripting. The importance of Will not just being a teleprompter-reading figurehead but 
also having the skills and rights to make creative decisions is particularly emphasised. For 
according to Sorkin’s series, only if news anchors – like many of the previously referenced 
“newsmen of old” – are (at least partially) investigative journalists themselves can they be 
expected to react competently in urgent, live broadcast situations. 
The third step of the broadcasting news process portrayed in The Newsroom’s pilot is the 
actual news broadcast itself. To demonstrate the end-result of the News Night team’s efforts, 
the episode shows an edited version of the show-within-show’s breaking-news segment cut 
down from one hour to roughly seven minutes. The focus of exemplary news-coverage, 
according to this segment, lies on the presentation of facts and on the conducting of 
interviews with top scientists as well as with professionals directly involved in and/or 
responsible for the subject matter. The portrayed interviews are furthermore characterised by 
hard questions and by being fact-driven whilst still allowing for the expression of compassion 
towards interviewees as required (cf. N 1x01 52:55-1:00:27). Once News Night’s model 
broadcast ends, the AP news alert is shown to switch to the highest urgency level (cf. N 1x01 
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1:00:52) and the White House is portrayed as calling to ask for more information (cf. N 1x01 
1:01:02). With this Sorkin firmly establishes his message that, if done correctly, news 
broadcasts can and should contribute discoveries and influence events rather than just report 
on them.  
Finally, The Newsroom’s second episode, which brings the oil spill plotline to a 
conclusion, also depicts the importance of knowing exactly when to end the coverage of a 
story. Sorkin and his team portray the factors which can contribute to whether or not coverage 
is continued in the following argument between Will and MacKenzie, which results from the 
latter’s suggestion to start reducing the amount of air-time News Night assigns to the oil spill: 
Will: 
[But] the spill is all anyone’s talking about! 
MacKenzie: 
Because we’re the ones telling them to! We’re still reporting on it, just not at the top.  
Will: 
I’m looking at film of an oil rig sinking into the ocean. That’s pretty good television.  
MacKenzie: 
We don’t do good television, we do the news. (N 1x02 3:36-3:47)  
In other words, MacKenzie and through her Sorkin suggest that the right time to stop covering 
a story is when there is no new information left to add and hence there is nothing left to say. 
An ideal news show’s main purpose is thus once again portrayed to be the contribution of new 
facts and information to a public debate, and not the airing of striking and emotionally 
manipulative images on repeat. 
This idea of ‘facts or nothing’ is picked up again and again throughout the rest of The 
Newsroom. In the same second episode, for example, when planning News Night’s coverage 
of Arizona’s immigration bill SB 1070, MacKenzie is portrayed to reject interviews with 
militia members or with impacted illegal immigrants on the basis of such interviews being 
merely exploitative, “emotionally manipulative” content (N 1x02 11:50) since neither of the 
suggested guests would be capable of providing any actual facts (cf. N 1x02 11:59). Similarly, 
a demand for an increased focus on facts during the coverage of governmental elections is 
also voiced repeatedly throughout The Newsroom. Both in the context of televised debates (cf. 
N 1x09) and in the context of campaign trail coverage (cf. N 2x03 8:36-9:56, 12:49-14:51, 
30:43-31:08, 33:34-34:48, 45:24-48:40), Sorkin and the News Night team relentlessly request 
that journalists ask real questions, demand real answers and follow up on any factual 
discrepancies rather than simply allowing politicians to regurgitate the same pre-approved and 
pre-written statements. At the same time, media’s own tendency to abuse politicians’ verbal 
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slip-ups as soundbites for effect even when it is very clear what the speaker truly meant is 
equally criticised (cf. e.g. N 2x06 30:00-30:16). 
In addition to advocating for a stronger focus on facts, The Newsroom also repeatedly 
stresses that one of the main goals of a good journalist must be to ensure the veracity of those 
facts. On a practical, process-exposing level the series expresses this belief by constantly 
portraying the News Night team’s diligent and extensive research process in detail (cf. e.g. N 
2x01-2x05 with an explicit summary of the process in 2x06 1:08-3:48, 2x07 3:30-4:00): their 
search for credible sources, their revision of hundreds of documents, their employment of a 
“red team” – a group of staff members purposefully kept in the dark during research – to 
double-check their facts. Furthermore, in addition to this depiction of model behaviour, 
Sorkin’s series as usual also includes multiple explicit arguments between characters on the 
topic. The most emotionally impactful one takes place in episode four of The Newsroom 
during News Night’s coverage of the shooting of congresswoman Gabrielle Giffords: Whilst 
Reese is depicted as storming the studio demanding that the staff announce Giffords’ death 
since “[e]very second you’re not current, a thousand people are changing the channel to the 
guy who is. That’s the business you’re in. MSNBC, Fox and CNN all say she’s dead.” (N 
1x04 53:08), the news team stands its ground and waits for official confirmation. “It’s a 
person,” one of them exclaims, “a doctor pronounces her dead, not the news” (N 1x04 53:21).  
Eventually, Sorkin’s and his team’s ideas as to what well-done television journalism 
should look like culminate in two manifestos postulated by the News Night team throughout 
The Newsroom’s first season. The first is presented through the following set of questions 
MacKenzie demands the staff always ask themselves when preparing a story: “(1) Is this 
information we need in the voting booth? (2) Is this the best possible form of the argument? 
(3) Is the story in historical context? (4) Are there really two sides to this story?” (N 1x02 
7:55-8:10). During the consequent discussion with her team, MacKenzie further defines “best 
possible form” as opposed to “most colourful” (N 1x02 9:55) and “most outrageous” (N 1x02 
9:56) and as defined by the quality of the source, which she in turn defines “by the number of 
relevant facts it contains, and I define it by an X factor that I trust Will and myself to 
determine, using our combined five decades in the field.” (N 1x02 10:01-10:12). Through this 
definition provided by MacKenzie, The Newsroom reinforces its message that news media’s 
purpose is to provide relevant and accurate information to voters. Journalists are supposed to 
find and prepare stories accordingly, with the most experienced amongst them making the 
ultimate decisions. Finally, the exact contribution of anchor men and women to this process is 
defined by MacKenzie’s as follows: “That studio is a courtroom, and we only call expert 
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witnesses. Will is the attorney for both sides. He examines the witness and reveals facts.” (N 
1x02 9:18-9:30). Once again, the focus is placed on finding and portraying all facts, with as 
little self-proliferation, personal agenda and driving of the narrative as possible. 
The second manifesto of The Newsroom comes in the form of Will’s on-air apology to 
the American public which follows the introduction of MacKenzie’s new rules and explains 
them to the diegetic viewers. The relevant passages of Will’s speech are the following: 
[T]onight I'm beginning this newscast by […] apologizing to the American people for our 
failure. The failure of this program during the time I've been in charge of it to successfully 
inform and educate the American electorate. […] I'm a leader in an industry that miscalled 
election results, hyped up terror scares, ginned up controversy, and failed to report on 
tectonic shifts in our country. […] I'm a leader in an industry that misdirected your attention 
[…] From this moment on, we'll be deciding what goes on our air and how it's presented to 
you based on the simple truth that nothing is more important to a democracy than a well-
informed electorate. We'll endeavor to put information in a broader context because we 
know that very little news is born at the moment it comes across our wire. We'll be the 
champion of facts and the mortal enemy of innuendo, speculation, hyperbole, and nonsense. 
[But we’ll not be] computers dispensing only the facts because news is only useful in the 
context of humanity. I'll make no effort to subdue my personal opinions. I will make every 
effort to expose you to informed opinions that are different from my own. (N 1x03 3:20-
6:49) 
In short, with this public manifesto, the News Night team once again renounces current news 
media’s focus on drama, hype and bombastic narratives – even if those narratives are 
government-created (cf. N 1x03 3:51-4:02) – and instead vows to focus on facts, and more 
specifically, on politically relevant and useful facts. That these facts of course rarely exist in 
an abstract and absolute form in a vacuum but usually have a context and are shaped by 
opinions (cf. also Casey et al. 184-191) is, however, also acknowledged by Will and his 
colleagues. As a result, News Night’s public manifesto opens up several questions as to what 
journalists consequently need to do to still achieve an as unbiased and factual presentation of 
information as possible. The end of Will’s speech provides some answers and more are 
contributed throughout the rest of The Newsroom. 
The first question related to coverage objectivity presented by Sorkin is that of which 
facts an inherently opinionated news team should eventually present. Bernadette Casey and 
her co-authors have observed that contemporary news media frequently see the answer to this 
question in the presentation of the two major opposing positions (cf. 190) on each topic for 
the purpose of creating a semblance of objectivity. At first glance, Will’s apology seems to 
advocate for a similar approach according to the last two sentences of the excerpt quoted 
above. The Newsroom as a whole, however, makes sure to explain that this solution in fact 
only applies to certain situations and that there is a danger to what MacKenzie and Will refer 
to as being “biased towards fairness” (1x02 10:27). For, as these two characters explain to the 
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rest of their team as well as to the real-life audience, not all stories have exactly two valid 
sides, some have five and some have only one (e.g. our world is flat and it would remain so 
even if an important government official suddenly proclaimed otherwise). 
Another issue resulting from the awareness that news stories can be shaped by different 
opinions is the question of how much of their own opinions journalists should be actively 
voicing during broadcasts. During the opening scenes of The Newsroom, one of the major 
criticisms directed towards Will in his pre-apology state is that that he has “almost religiously 
avoided stating or even implying a political allegiance” (1x01 2:16), causing people to 
wonder if his behaviour is due to a desire to not compromise the integrity of his broadcasts or 
simply due to a wish to increase his popularity by “not bothering anyone” (cf. N 1x01 2:34). 
And The Newsroom’s later developments make it clear that it was, in fact, the latter 
motivation which affected Will’s actions since a news show’s integrity is not based on a lack 
of opinion from its anchors. After all, as Charlie points out towards the end of the pilot: 
“Anchors having an opinion isn’t a new phenomenon. Murrow had one and that was the end 
of McCarthy. Cronkite had one and that was the end of Vietnam” (N 1x01 1:02:10). Or in 
other words, newscasters owning their opinions, standing their ground and using their reach 
and power to affect corresponding political change constitutes a display of moral strength and 
of integrity in action. In contrast, according to The Newsroom, anchors who remain silent on 
important topics can be seen as acting cowardly and immorally. Expressing their opinions is, 
instead, the right thing to do – as long as the anchors and their team make sure that these 
opinions are expressed, as demanded by News Night’s second manifesto, in combination with 
a presentation of all accompanying facts as well as of any valid contrasting opinions, so that 
the audience can make an informed decision as to whether the opinions and arguments 
presented to them seem conclusive.  
Finally, the last aspect of television (journalism) discussed in Sports Night, Studio 60 and 
The Newsroom are the lines that professionals within the industry should not cross and the 
limits to their power they need to respect. Starting off with the previous topic of voicing 
beliefs on air, Sorkin’s series acknowledge that there is such a thing as television personalities 
expressing too many opinions on air, to the point where they themselves become the story, 
which in turn begins to distract audiences from the respective show’s actual content. This idea 
is mostly portrayed in Sports Night (cf. e.g. 1x21 12:28) and in Studio 60 (cf. e.g. 1x01 22:03-
22:30) yet it stands in no opposition to The Newsroom’s proclamations since for the News 
Night team, which constantly demands a focus on facts and information above all, any 
distractions are detrimental to the quality of a broadcast. 
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Another item television personalities need to consider, according to Sorkin’s three series, 
is the fact that they are in a position of power from which their actions and expressed 
opinions matter. Consequently, they should exercise caution – not out of fear for their ratings 
or of ramifications but simply because they acknowledge their influential role as “leaders” (cf. 
e.g. SN 1x02 10:47, 18:17-20:26; N 1x02 46:30-46:43) whose actions and words can impact 
what happens in the world, at their most extreme even causing actual casualties (cf. N 1x07 
30:55-32:52; 2x06 34:06-34:47; 3x04 14:27-14:50), especially when topics related to national 
security are concerned (cf. season three’s central debate on whether newsworthy leaked 
classified government documents should be made public or not since reporting on the 
information is every journalist’s “responsibility to a democracy” (N 3x02 10:34) but it can 
also endanger the lives of both civilians and soldiers involved in any given conflict (cf. N 
3x02 10:17-11:11, 21:07-21:32, 37:10-37:32)).  
Furthermore, according to Sports Night and The Newsroom, television journalists should 
also acknowledge and respect other institutions with power. From Isaac’s instruction of his 
team to hand over their hooligan riot footage to the police since no actual sources or 
informants are in it (cf. SN 2x14 17:00-17:37), to Will’s refusal to use his legal knowledge to 
practically re-try the Troy Davis case on camera before the latter’s execution – a refusal 
explained by Will with the words that the courts and judicial system have done their job and it 
is not the media’s place to do it for them (cf. N 2x02 10:16-11:57) – Sorkin and his team 
make it very clear that for all their advocacy for media power and freedoms they do see limits 
to what media can and should do. 
Finally, in this same context, Sorkin’s three series also list a variety of other lines 
journalists should not cross, even with the best of intentions: Asking hard-hitting questions is 
important but journalists should not bully, no matter how reticent and frustrating an 
interviewee is behaving (cf. N 1x06 41:09-47:12). Journalists should not use overheard 
conversations (even when legally permissible) or otherwise trick people into giving 
statements even if it is hard to get honest on-the-record comments (cf. N 3x02 22:02-25:08, 
31:30-32:53). Journalists should furthermore never overstep their role and start taking over a 
translator’s job, answering questions instead of interviewees or making statements in the 
name of third parties (cf. N 1x06 25:00-26:55). Journalists should never break off-the-record 
agreements, no matter how important the information gained off-the-record is (cf. N 1x06 
24:09-29:20). Journalists should also never break privacy laws in pursuit of a story (cf. N 
1x08 25:48-26:32). Journalists should be very careful with what they ask of their sources, 
especially when it comes to the sharing of classified information (cf. N 3x01 45:54-46:45; 
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3x02 7:05-8:30, 10:42-10:55, 47:25-47:35; 3x04 44:22-46:50). And last but not least, no 
matter how certain journalists are of their story, falsifying evidence to convince more people 
of it is absolutely unacceptable (cf. N 2x07 46:57-47:20). 
 
5.1.6 Conclusion: The Metareferential Functions of Sorkin’s Metatelevision Triad 
Having thus analysed the roles and functions assigned to television by Sorkin’s three series, 
the last thing which remains to be done in this chapter is an examination of the metareferential 
functions of Sports Night, Studio 60 and The Newsroom themselves. The relationship between 
these functions and those ascribed to television by Sorkin shall form the starting point for this 
analysis since, at a closer look, both sets of functions are revealed to be nigh-identical. For in 
the end – just like television in general according to Sorkin – all three series discussed in this 
section are escapist, informative and aim to inspire their audiences. Both Sorkin himself and 
his directors describe Sports Night, Studio 60 and The Newsroom as dramatizations (cf. SN 
“Face-Off” DVD bonus feature 5:29) which present “the appearance of reality” (SN “F-O” 
3:46, my emphasis) whilst focusing on getting the material “emotionally right” (SN “F-O” 
5:17) rather than factually capturing every detail of a television professional’s live. And this 
approach to the subject matter is exactly what makes it possible for Sorkin’s three series to 
fulfil all three functions listed above. 
The inclusion of enough facts to create an “appearance of reality” is what fills Sports 
Night, Studio 60 and The Newsroom with enough metareferential information to be eye-
opening for most audiences in regards to industry practices, and to thus help raise the 
audience’s medium-awareness. The focus on getting things “emotionally right”, meanwhile, 
helps the three series to not get lost in their portrayal of technical details. In a scene early on 
in The Newsroom a side character voices the opinion that “Nobody’s gonna watch a 
classroom” (1x02 48:26) implying that dry information dispersal is boring to audiences. And 
while the rest of the series goes on to prove that statement wrong in the context of an evening 
news show, Sorkin’s three narrative series take this objection to heart and consequently 
package their media critique and information with emotionally engaging, character-driven 
stories which provide an emotional as well as an intellectual experience to the audience. As a 
result, Sorkin is able to educate his viewers on problems within the television medium as well 
as within our society – the relationship between the two being portrayed as reciprocal – whilst 
still delivering an engaging form of escapist entertainment. 
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One of the main reasons why Sports Night, Studio 60 and The Newsroom constitute 
particularly good examples of escapist television is the highly idealist and thus inspiring 
nature of all three series. For even whilst Sorkin’s three shows depict many troubles plaguing 
the medium and industry of television, the main focus is always on how great television, 
technically, could be. A quick look at the reception of some of The Newsroom’s most 
significant speeches online shows that many people in the top comments of clips posted on 
platforms such as youtube usually express the sentiment that viewers wished Will and News 
Night were real55. And this effect is exactly what Sorkin’s writing and his directors’ 
cinematographic choices of swirling cameras and swelling music in those scenes aim to 
achieve. They are meant to accentuate the fact that the diegetic Sports Night, Studio 60 and 
News Night each represent “the very model of a modern network TV show” (S60 1x02 38:30-
40:40), the “media elite” (N 1x03 7:03).56 After all, as The Newsroom explicitly states, it is 
one of the (shows-within-)shows’ main goals to reclaim this term and – as Sorkin explains in 
the third episode’s DVD audio commentary – to “turn it into a badge of honour” (1x03 6:46). 
As MacKenzie points out when a staff member expresses the worry that Will’s clothing on-air 
makes him look like “an elite Northeastern prick” (N 1x01 51:01): The News Night team (and 
Sorkin’s series in general) plan on making that “sexy again” (N 1x01 52:08).  
On the story and character level, Sorkin’s three shows further propagate this idea by 
depicting the earnest, eager and idealistic nature of their respective teams. Furthermore, The 
Newsroom in particular continuously emphasises the courage and willingness to face physical 
dangers which are required from journalists as members of an ‘in-the-trenches’ profession: 
three of The Newsroom’s major characters are introduced as having experience with reporting 
out of warzones (cf. 1x01 13:33, 19:20-19:51, 30:54-31:32), an entire episode centres on the 
story of how two other staff members and their informant are physically attacked while 
covering the Arab Spring on the ground (cf. 1x05), and the entire second season portrays the 
post-traumatic stress disorder of one of the team’s youngest members following horrific 
events she witnessed (cf. 2x04 45:27-54:00) whilst covering a joined-task-force operation in 
Uganda. In short, throughout all these examples, Sorkin and his team clearly attempt to break 
the usual ivory tower associations and/or accusations directed towards the ‘media elite’ and to 
                                                 
55 Cf. e.g. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GXrOqjS9ZyA [10. 01. 2018] for the on-air apology, 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yGAvwSp86hY [10. 01. 2018] for the Tea Party story, 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AF-BZsrtoPs [10.01. 2018] for the mock debate  
56 For a fascinating study which takes these quotes onto a further meta-level than this chapter allows for and 
discusses how Sorkin’s actual shows were in turn used by their respective networks to rebrand themselves as the 
real-life media elite cf. Szalay. 
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present a different definition of the term instead. The repeated invocations of the medium’s 
pioneers throughout all three of Sorkin’s series provide further examples of what really 
constitutes a ‘media elite’. For even if outside journalists throughout The Newsroom criticise 
Will’s orientation on predecessors such as Murrow as an embarrassing refusal to move with 
the times (cf. N 1x10 9:15) and even if they call the anchor’s attitude “irrelevant and 
pompous” (N 1x10 9:21), News Night’s as well as The Newsroom’s creators clearly disagree.  
Still, Sorkin’s three series as a whole definitely can be accused of portraying a certain 
amount of “refusing to move with the times” as well as of “pomp” – at least at first glance. 
When, for example, Studio 60’s Danny and Matt explicitly choose John Mauceri, the West 
Coast Philharmonic and the L.A. Light Opera Chorus as the musicians to “say[…] legacy of 
television” (1x02 27:49) and implicitly juxtapose them to and thus present them as superior to 
the show-within-show’s usual contemporary rap/pop/rock musical guests, the series definitely 
exudes a certain level of elitism. Similarly, Sorkin’s repeated derogatory statements directed 
towards seemingly all social and new media57 can easily be read as unnecessarily stubborn 
and outdated, and as indicative of a better-than-thou attitude. However, a deeper and closer 
look past some of the characters’ polemics soon makes it clear that the complaints which 
Sports Night, Studio 60 and The Newsroom direct towards all here listed modern, pop-cultural 
items are very specific. 
Firstly, Danny and Matt’s choice of musical guests is not a general dismissal of 
contemporary music but merely fits the episode’s theme of ‘Returning to the Golden Age of 
Television’ better. Secondly, and more importantly, social and new media really are not 
without problems: The unreliability of social media-led witch hunts (cf. 3x01 34:13-37:27) is 
a fact, as are the psychological problems caused for creators by the increased amount of 
predominantly negative (cf. N 1x06 9:08) critique by random, often anonymous people on the 
internet (cf. e.g. S60 1x02 12:22-13:15; 1x10 23:25-23:58, 34:34-34:52). The same applies to 
the ease with which (sexist) death threats can be sent digitally (cf. SN 1x06 5:32, 6:18-6:35, 
13:06-14:22). Leaks of (personal) information online more often than not result in vile and 
destructive smear campaigns (cf. e.g. S60 1x02 21:51-23:55, 34:27-35:06; N 1x04 46:32-
47:43) and can become particularly dangerous in the context of the aforementioned death 
threats (cf. e.g. N 3x05 45:45-48:30). Finally, anonymous twitter opinions and comments 
                                                 
57 It is important to note at this point that within the series most discussions of “new media” are concerned with 
different forms of social media. Beyond that, as a number of critics have pointed out, Sorkin does not show 
much interest in discussing television within a wider (digital) media context (cf. Keilbach; Duffy, Liss-Mariño 
and Sender). 
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really do not belong on a scroll running across the bottom of a news show which is set on 
presenting verified facts (cf. e.g. N 3x05 46:32-47:01). 
Of course, all these new types of media also have as much potential as they have 
problems – but Sorkin’s series never deny that, no matter what critics such as Judith Keilbach 
seem to think. The News Night team itself is shown to use twitter as a resource when staff 
members need to gauge initial reactions or research first-hand observations about and 
descriptions of public events (cf. N 2x03 33:02-33:30). One of the younger main characters’ 
backstory consists of him deciding to go into journalism after his ability to take out his phone 
and capture what is happening around him during the 7/7 London underground attack shows 
him the potential of modern-day journalism (cf. N 1x05 13:36-13:49). The usefulness of 
working with local bloggers and vloggers to portray stories such as the Arab Spring is fully 
acknowledged (cf. N 1x05), as is the informational potential of digital whistleblowing (cf. N 
1x05 26:52 as well as the entirety of season 3). Even the idea of online comment sections as 
valid platforms for public debate – if anonymity were to be removed and people were forced 
to own their comments – is thematised (cf. N 1x06 7:35-10:16). In short, despite many of his 
characters’ often polemic, derogatory remarks about new media, Sorkin’s series as a whole 
fully recognise and demonstrate that the internet is merely a tool, that its quality is entirely 
user-dependent, and that it is therefore the job of skilled media professionals to find ways to 
utilise this tool to its full potential (cf. N 3x06 44:24-44:52). 
Indeed, what makes all of Sorkin’s positive examples of new media usage different from 
the previously discussed negative ones is the fact that the material provided through them, 
before it makes its way onto a broadcast, is shown to be filtered through a group of 
experienced professionals, through Sorkin’s ‘media elite’. Neal, the Londoner mentioned 
before, for example, does not become a vlogger as a result of his phone-footage collecting 
experience, he gets a low-level job in a renowned news division and begins to work his way 
up. Similarly, the initially gathered twitter information by staff members only makes it on the 
air once it has been processed, compared to pre-existing credible sources and potentially used 
to find additional ones. Finally, the vlogger who is permitted to contribute to News Night’s 
Arab Spring coverage is meticulously chosen by MacKenzie herself based on the quality of 
his previous footage, of the questions he is shown to ask, and based on the fact that he always 
uses sources which can be double-checked. He is furthermore initially instructed by 
MacKenzie as to who and what to film and only once he has proven himself is he allowed 
further contributive freedoms.  
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In short, what lies at the heart of Sorkin’s criticism of new media – and of all media in 
general – is simply a demand for high standards of credibility and professionalism, on all 
levels of the production process. In fact, the word ‘elite’ in Sorkin’s series explicitly does not 
refer only to the highly educated, high-earning executives and creative minds of the industry 
but it encompasses all competent professionals contributing to a show’s creation, from stage 
workers to personal assistants (cf. e.g. Sports Night’s on-camera portrayal and 
acknowledgement of the (show-within-)show’s entire production crew, extradiegetic 
members portraying their diegetic counterparts with metareferentially overlapping names 
1x11 19:30-21:10).  
The word ‘elite’ in Sorkin’s series furthermore explicitly does not mean to imply that 
these competent professionals working in the television industry are in any way superior to 
their audiences. For even if Sorkin’s shows portray characters who in moments of frustration 
lament the ostensible stupidity of their viewership (cf. e.g. Will’s exclamation during 
MacKenzie’s 5%-speech in N 1x01 38:16), the moral authority in these scenes always lies 
with the characters that contradict them (cf. e.g. MacKenzie’s response in N 1x01 38:17). The 
most prominent example of such a contradiction is voiced by Jordan in Studio 60, who in the 
series’ second episode proclaims: “I believe that the people who watch television shows 
aren’t dumber than the people who make television shows. I believe that quality is not 
anathema to profit.” (1x02 1:59). This statement is probably the most condensed depiction of 
the core desired ideal portrayed in all three of Sorkin’s metareferential series: a wish for 
audiences, high-quality content producers and the financial branches of the television industry 
to come together. 
Naturally, this ideal state is far removed from current reality, and Sorkin’s idealist 
characters’ ability to achieve their goals within that reality is hence portrayed to be limited. 
News Night’s brilliant oil spill coverage is explicitly acknowledged to have been only possible 
due to an insane amount of luck (cf. N 1x01 45:51). And when luck is removed from the 
equation, the characters of all three series are repeatedly depicted as failing to achieve their 
ideal for a variety of reasons too numerous to list.58 In fact, the characters’ often seemingly 
endless struggle to process and overcome such failure is arguably the main narrative-driving 
force at work throughout Sorkin’s series. For in the end, as mentioned before, Sports Night’s, 
                                                 
58 Interestingly, many real-life journalists especially in their early responses to The Newsroom seemed to 
overlook this aspect of the series and to instead treat especially the presented best-case scenarios as personal 
attacks on their own work, ethics and integrity. For a collection of these responses as well as for a more in-depth 
analysis of their significance in relation to the current state and (self-)image of journalism cf. Koliska and Eckert 
as well as Peters. 
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Studio 60’s and The Newsroom’s main goals are to inform audiences of existing problems and 
to inspire them to attempt to fix them. And as Sports Night’s portrayal of the South-African 
runner’s world record already demonstrated, what better way to do that than to show 
characters who relentlessly battle to overcome adversity through willpower, hard work, and 
the firm belief “that we can do better” (N 1x01 38:28). 
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6. Metareference in Contemporary Computer Games59 
For well over a decade now, video games have been the most successful entertainment market 
in the world, their sales widely surpassing those of the film or music industry (cf. 
Adamowsky 22; Jahn-Sudmann and Stockmann xiii). Unsurprisingly, therefore, scholarly 
interest in the medium has also been growing exponentially since the early 2000s. With 
predecessors60 in cognitive and educational science studies about ‘play’ in general (cf. 
Neitzel, “Gespielte Geschichten” 2), over the last decade or so, Game Studies have developed 
as a separate field in acknowledgement of the fact that games are, as Espen Aarseth puts it in 
his introduction of the first ever issue of the Games Studies journal, “a cultural field whose 
value is hard to overestimate” (“Computer Games” online). Of particular interest for my study 
is the fact that many Games Studies scholars consider video games to be the most inherently 
metareferential medium of all. 
Firstly, any kind of play can be seen as highly metareferential. As Winfried Nöth, Nina 
Bishara, and Britta Neitzel have pointed out, already Friedrich Schiller referred to the playing 
of games as a fully self-reflexive action since the action’s entire goal lies in the playing of the 
game itself (cf. Nöth et al. 119). Furthermore, Gregory Bateson has argued that the playing of 
any game, even amongst animals, always includes an understanding of and engaging in 
metareferential communication, since that is what is required to be aware that what is 
happening is play and not serious (cf. 179; cf. also Neitzel, “Metacommunication” 237). In 
the words of Bateson himself, successful play is only made possible by the highly self-
referential, mutual understanding that “[t]hese actions in which we now engage do not denote 
what those actions for which they stand would denote” (180; cf. also Nöth et al. 125). And as 
Nöth, Bishara and Neitzel have further observed, Bateson’s postulation is valid for both rule-
less and rule-based games: for in the case of the first, every play action needs to send meta-
signs to communicate that it is (still) part of the game; and in the case of the second, the rules 
themselves are self-referential, usually applying only to the one game in question (cf. Nöth et 
al. 129, 132). 
The second highly metareferential aspect of video games is the fact that the interactivity 
which distinguishes the medium from most of its predecessors is inherently metaleptic. After 
                                                 
59 I use the term ‘computer games’ for this title because all three games I will analyse in this section (1) can be 
played on a computer (in fact, The Stanley Parable is only available on PC and not for consoles), and (2) have 
been beaten by me on a computer for the purpose of this dissertation. Since most medium-specific features I 
discuss throughout this section, however, are present in all types of video games, I often use this umbrella term 
when applicable throughout the text. 
60 For examples cf. e.g. Bateson or Sutton-Smith. 
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all, at the core of interactivity lies a desire to experience (cf. Wilhelmsson 69) scenarios, 
sensations, feelings – yet only vicariously (cf. Schank 50), thus positioning play on the 
borderline between real and fictional experience. As Hans-Otto Hügel and Louis Bosshart 
have pointed out, in fact, a lot of the enjoyment of entertainment – no matter through which 
medium the latter is provided – is often derived from such mediated experiences, which, 
importantly, do not have direct consequences and do not push the experiencing party towards 
anything (cf. Hügel, Lob des Mainstreams 25, 28; Bosshart 21).  
Through such vicarious experiences without consequences, audiences and game 
participants are given the opportunity to visit strange and fanciful places, to experiment with 
behaviour and social norms, to contemplate different views and positions, and even to 
partially experience certain feelings such as fear without exposing themselves to any actual 
dangers (cf. Klimmt 249, 252; cf. also Maase 53-54; Venus 119-122). Thus, especially in the 
context of play, safe learning experiences are made possible and encouraged (cf. Klimmt 250, 
253). And as Ralf Adelmann and Hartmut Winkler have explained, such safe learning 
opportunities are particularly valuable in our contemporary society in which the gap between 
the supposed ideal of an ‘acting subject’ and the actual possibilities (or rather lack thereof) for 
the average, routine-encrusted individual to even attempt to show self-motivated actions is so 
large (cf. Adelmann and Winkler 5; cf. also Neitzel, “Involvierungsstrategien” 86).  
In addition, the metaleptic nature of video game interactivity does not end with this 
general in-between position of all play experiences. For as scholars such as Alice Bell or 
Britta Neitzel have argued, ontological metalepses are especially typical of – and possibly 
even form the basis for – specifically video games since what the video game player does in 
the real world (e.g. pressing a button) has direct effect on the fictional world of the game (e.g. 
an action is performed), which in turn causes the player to react in the real world, etc. (cf. 
Bell, “Interactional Metalepsis” 296; Neitzel, Gespielte Geschichten 52 and 
“Metacommunication” 248). This phenomenon, which Karin Kukkonen has labelled 
“interactional metalepsis” (“Metalepsis” 18), arguably contradicts Jeff Thoss’ statement that 
metaleptic border-transgressions between reality and fiction are never literal and/or physical 
(cf. Thoss, “Storyworlds” 10-11). For in fact, based on the level of immediacy created by the 
respective game, as Nöth, Bishara, Neitzel and Timo Schemer-Reinhard have pointed out, 
from a player’s perspective the real-world and the game-world actions can very well be 
perceived as being performed simultaneously (cf. Nöth et al. 119; Schemer-Reinhard 42). The 
player, in other words, can feel as if he or she is acting on two separate diegetic levels, in the 
fictional as well as in the real world, at the same time. And even if this sense of immediacy is 
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not achieved by a particular game, then players are still nigh-simultaneously acting (in the 
real world) and observing their own acting (in the game world). That is to say, as Jochen 
Venus and Britta Neitzel have suggested, video game players are constantly performing self-
observation (cf. Neitzel, Gespielte Geschichten 56, “Point of View” 8-9; Venus 105-106) – a 
perfect example of metareference in action.  
Another highly metaleptic video game aspect is the medium’s frequent use of an in-game 
player avatar. Within Games Studies, there are many different approaches as to what an avatar 
actually is: According to Alice McMahan it is an in-game personification of the player (cf. 
74), but as Winfried Nöth, Nina Bishara and Britta Neitzel have pointed out, this view is 
highly simplistic since the avatar does not share any actual characteristics with the player (cf. 
Nöth et al. 157; Neitzel, “Involvierungsstrategien” 96). Approaching the topic from a 
different perspective, for Ulf Wilhelmsson the avatar is the player’s ‘Game Ego’ which 
“serves as an anchoring force within the system of the game and provides a key element in the 
process of engaging the player and providing a sense of being within the fictional space time 
of the game through the possibility of exerting force upon the environment” (64). Meanwhile, 
for Rob Fulop the avatar is little more than a cursor (cf. quoted in Rosenberg online) whilst 
for a next group of scholars it is a figure into which the player eventually transforms once – 
through continuous playing of the game – the initial distance created for players through 
distracting, unfamiliar rules and mechanics disappears in favour of increasing immersion (cf. 
e.g. Venus 108-110). Finally, Marshall McLuhan-based (cf. e.g. Understanding Media) 
approaches see the avatar as a tool and thus as an almost cyborg-like extension of the player 
(cf. e.g. Nöth et al. 157-158).  
All the while this critical debate is raging, game developers themselves equally have 
strongly diverging approaches to the role, function and utilisation of this particular video 
game device. On one end of the spectrum, some developers design avatars which are little 
more than empty hulls for the players to fill, whilst on the other end of the spectrum others 
create fleshed-out, film-like characters with which players can identify and empathise (cf. 
Nöth et al. 159).61 In short, the only thing all avatars – in theory and in practice – seem to 
have in common is their borderline-existence as the focal point in which the extradiegetic 
player world and the diegetic game world intersect, causing players to frequently switch 
between first and third person when narrating their exploits (cf. Venus 109-110; Tavinor, 
                                                 
61 For a survey-based study of how players see themselves in relation to their avatars cf. Calleja. 
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“Videogames” 28) and thus constantly raising questions of somatic displacement (cf. 
Holopainen 46, 54). 
Widening the focus of analysis again, avatars – while arguably the most obvious – are not 
the only game features inherently metaleptic due to the interactive nature of video games. For 
example, as a result of the double-coded nature of avatars as both a character in the game 
world and as some form or aspect of the player, conversations between non-player characters 
and player characters frequently become highly metaleptic themselves. After all, when a non-
player character addresses the avatar, it addresses both of the latter’s implied identities. As a 
result, game world (player) characters often end up being given instructions (especially in 
tutorial situations) which only make sense in the context of the extradiegetic world: for 
example, a soldier character will be instructed to make something happen by pressing a button 
on a controller which he or she of course does not have, the extradiegetic player controlling 
him or her does62.  
Similarly, certain components of a game’s head-up display can be depicted as diegetic 
elements (e.g. as being part of the avatar’s visor in a first-person game) whilst still clearly 
being an extradiegetic user interface tool for the player (who they provide with the 
information needed for play). Likewise, interactive in-game objects (e.g. loot chests) form 
part of the diegetic world whilst frequently showing extradiegetic markers (e.g. colours, 
outlines, etc.) which communicate their interactive quality to the player. Finally, today even 
gaming peripherals such as certain force-feedback-including controllers attempt to further 
blur the line between what happens in and outside of the game by causing an actual physical 
impact on the extradiegetic player (e.g. through controller vibration) as a result of something 
happening on the diegetic level of the game. 
Looking at all these metaleptic qualities of video games, it is not surprising that active 
metareferential discussions have also become increasingly common over the last two decades 
both within video games themselves – on the content level as well as through mechanical 
and/or rule-based elements – and within Games Studies. Specifically, many scholars have 
argued that intermedial references, references to other games and rulesets, and breaks of the 
fourth wall are the most common types of metareferences in video games (cf. Jannidis 541, 
554, 557, 563; Kampmann 219-221). Furthermore, most of these scholars have proposed that, 
in the words of Bernhard Rapp, video games have adopted these metareferences from other 
                                                 
62 This particular example is taken from the beginning of the very first game-play sequence in Metal Gear Solid 
(1998). For more examples cf. e.g. Neitzel, “Metacommunication” 249; Nöth et al. 144-148; Ryan, “Metaleptic 
Machines” 460-461. 
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“more mature” media (“Self-Reflexivity” 261, cf. also Selbstreflexivität) mainly for the 
purpose of entertaining and flattering players who “get the reference”, as well as to provide 
replay value since players can go back to the game to look for little hidden references they 
might have missed during their first playthrough (cf. Jannidis 541, 554, 557, 563; Kampmann 
219-221; Rapp “Self-Reflexivity” 261).  
While there are undeniably countless video games which to the present day employ 
metareferential elements purely for the sake of their entertainment value, it will be one of the 
main goals of the rest of this section to prove that there are also many games which use 
metareferences for much more complex and critical purposes, the medium of video games 
today being (and having been for a while) far more “mature” than Rapp gives it credit for. 
Rather than just to entertain, all games (the oldest of which was published well before Rapp’s 
second essay) I will discuss in the following chapters instead use their metareferential 
elements to conduct serious discussions on the topics of identity, agency, self-determination 
and personal responsibility, as well as on the role of their medium in our society. 
Before I get to my analysis, however, one last aspect of the medium of video games 
needs to be discussed. In my introduction to my study, I explained that I will restrict my case 
study to the analysis of narrative media – yet whether or not video games fall under that 
category is a topic which is still contested. At the birth of Game Studies, scholars such as 
Espen Aarseth, Markku Eskelinen and Jesper Juul, whilst trying to establish the importance of 
their subject as an independent field of study, radically declared themselves against the 
“colonization” (Eskelinen, “Towards Computer Game Studies” 36) or at least the “colonising 
attempts” (Aarseth, “Computer Games” online) supposedly perpetrated by narratologists 
against the field of Game Studies. To defend the sovereignty of their field, Aarspeth, 
Eskelinen and Juul specifically proclaimed that Games Studies deserve their independence 
because games, in fact, are not a narrative medium at all. 
Admittedly, in the years since, many scholars have tried to reduce the impact of these 
initial proclamations: Espen Aarseth himself already toned down his statement in his editorial 
to the first ever issue of Game Studies by saying that “[o]f course, games should also be 
studied within existing fields and departments […] games are [merely] too important to be left 
to these fields” (online, my emphasis); Jesper Juul eventually acknowledged that “[m]ost 
video games are ruled and make-believe” (Half-Real 13, my emphasis; cf. also “Games 
Telling Stories?” online), and thus are of interest to both ludologists and narratologists; 
finally, Gonzalo Frasca has even argued that the debate between the narratologists and the 
ludologists never took place (cf. “Ludologists” 92-99) but was merely something that was 
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blown out of proportion much later for dramatic effect. Still, just a glance at a prominent 
collective Games Studies volume such as First Person shows a sharp separation of topics into 
two separate categories of “Cyberdrama” (cf. Wardrip-Fruin and Harrigan 1-33) vs. 
“Ludology” (cf. Wardrip-Fruin and Harrigan 33-69), making it very clear that the two camps 
definitely existed, and arguably still exist. For if one looks at the highly aggressive, anti-
narratologist and frequently polemic language Markku Eskelinen uses in his essay for this 
publication as well as in his other work (cf. e.g. “Towards Computer Game Studies” 36; “The 
Gaming Situation” online) it is easy to see that the debate is far from over. 
At their core, the ludologists were of course not entirely wrong in their protest against 
video games being treated as merely a different kind of story-telling. After all, as Jesper Juul 
has observed, it is perfectly possible to have a game without narrative, it is even possible to 
have a good game without narrative, while it is not possible to have a game without rules, and 
a good narrative in a game does not automatically make a good game – in other words, for a 
video game, story is optional, while rules are not (cf. Juul, Half-Real 13). Still, this position 
does not explain, as Marie-Laure Ryan has pointed out, why if a good narrative is irrelevant to 
the medium’s enjoyment numerous developers keep investing so much time, effort and 
money in the creation of a narrative, rather than just presenting players with, for example, 
basic moving targets they need to hit with an equally basic cursor (cf. Avatars 117, 182). 
Furthermore, it does not explain why players commonly use guides or cheats to beat certain 
games and still derive enjoyment – after all, as Andrew Mactavish has pointed out, clearly 
those players’ enjoyment of these games cannot come from the overcoming of mechanical 
skill-challenges since the players chose to circumvent those by “cheating” (cf. 40). 
Another convincing ludologist argument has been brought forth by Markku Eskelinen 
who has argued that, even in the case of games with story, “a mere story is not sufficient to 
make something a narrative, as there must also be a narrative situation implying the presence 
of narrators and narratees” (“The Gaming Situation” online) – and undeniably, a lot of video 
game characteristics play havoc with and stretch many traditional narratological concepts. An 
in-depth discussion of this topic would unfortunately go beyond the scope of this chapter but 
two basic, introductory examples shall be given:  
Firstly, as Gonzalo Frasca and Britta Neitzel have argued, the player’s ability to influence 
the outcome of some events within the game world (Jan-Noël Thon suggests calling them 
“ludic events” (32) which eventually form a “player story/narrative” (41)) while the player 
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certainly is not in control of others (namely not of what Jan-Noël Thon calls predetermined 
“narrative events” (32) forming the “designer story/narrative” (41))63 poses a lot of questions 
as to who exactly the author, creator, and/or narrator of a video game story is (cf. e.g. Frasca, 
“Simulation vs. Narrative” 226-227; Neitzel, Gespielte Geschichten 130-131 and “Frage nach 
Gott” 65; versus Murray, Janet H. 152). Furthermore, the existence of strong modding 
communities64 for many computer games only complicates matters even more. 
Secondly, as Winfried Nöth, Nina Bishara and Britta Neitzel have pointed out, we 
normally speak of the three narratological levels (story, discourse, narration) with the 
expectation that we encounter the discourse and narration through a medium after the story 
has happened. In a video game, however, technically the story has not happened yet and the 
player, rather than just being a receptive narrattee-equivalent, actually has to play the game to 
make the story happen in the first place (cf. Nöth et al. 182-183; Neitzel, Gespielte 
Geschichten 9, 131). Very differently from other media, therefore, one could argue, as Britta 
Neitzel has done, that video games do not depict a story, do not narrate what has happened, 
but instead merely present the conditions for something, for a story, to happen (cf. Gespielte 
Geschichten 108; cf. also Ryan, Avatars 189). Once again, the one-to-one application of 
narratological terms and concepts developed for other media onto video games thus proves 
difficult.65 
Finally, in addition to these questions of how video games fit into our narratological 
terminology, as a result of (initial) technological restrictions and of early examples of video 
games with either no or merely with a very basic, stereotype-laden story, the narratological 
capabilities of the medium per se have been questioned. In 1997, Janet H. Murray argued that 
games cannot tell good stories since the inherently happy ending of “beating the game” 
prevents the medium from dealing with complex, impactful and dark material (cf. 142). In 
2001, Andreas Lange, while acknowledging the dramatic increase of narratives in video 
games (cf. 79), still argued that these narratives, however, serve merely as backdrop (cf. 83) 
whilst players focus on the objects they can interact with and the mechanical tasks at hand (cf. 
81). Similarly, in 2005, Grant Tavinor wrote that “rather than a focus on interpretive and 
                                                 
63 For a terminologically different but conceptually similar distinction to that of Thon, cf. also Ryan, 
Avatars 201. 
64 Online communities in which players modify the game code, create modifications (or “mods”) which impose 
the mod maker’s (or “modder’s”) rules, aesthetic choices or even story contributions onto the original game, and 
then share these mods with other players. 
65 For one approach to a possible narratological solution as well as for a much more in-detail analysis of the 
problem cf. Neitzel, Gespielte Geschichten; for a different approach trying to circumvent the problem by seeing 
video games as simulations rather than mere narratives cf. Frasca, “Simulation vs. Narrative”. 
       
205 
 
sympathetic engagement with narratives, videogames involve their appreciators in an active 
engagement with the problem spaces or kinetic narratives of gameplay” (“Videogames” 25). 
The main motivation for designers to include story elements, therefore, according to Lange, is 
to facilitate rule-learning and the engagement with “problem spaces” by associating them with 
familiar tasks, objects and situations (cf. 81). In 2004, Ken Perlin further suggested that video 
game characters can never seem as “real” and fleshed-out as those in films or novels since in 
the older media recipients get to see characters act independently and thus express a 
personality while in video games players only see themselves act – no perceivable agency, for 
Perlin, then equals no personality (cf. 12, 15; cf. also Aarseth, “Genre Trouble” 51). Finally, 
also in 2004, whilst acknowledging the possibility of games to grow in the future, Gonzalo 
Frasca still began an essay on the topic with the observation that video games are “far away 
from becoming a mature communication form that could deal with such things as human 
relationships, or political and social issues” (“Videogames of the Oppressed” 85). 
In fact, not only have many scholars criticised the ability of video games to tell better 
stories, but some critics such as Will Wright have even objected to the idea that video games 
should aspire to do so, arguing that as a new independent medium, games should not copy 
elements from their predecessors (cf. 12-14). Similarly, critics such as Chris Crawford have 
suggested that improved narratives more often than not come at the cost of good gameplay 
since most video games add narrative complexity through the inclusion of lengthier and more 
frequent cut scenes and similar non-interactive elements taken from older media, all of which 
interrupt and sometimes even replace actual interactive gameplay (cf. 259-262; cf. also Nöth 
et al. 180; Ryan, Avatars 117).  
I could at this point refute all six of these claims with examples from recent games. I 
could argue that games such as Mass Effect 3 (2012), Brothers, a Tale of Two Sons (2013), 
This War of Mine (2014) and many more prove that beating the mechanical challenges of a 
game does not need to translate into a narrative happy end. I could demonstrate with the help 
of let’s-play videos and game wikis that there are many players who will search every nook 
and cranny of a game for hidden lore, clearly caring for the story at least as much as for the 
mechanics. I could elaborate on how repeated voice-over commentary by the main character 
during the gameplay sections of the Tomb Raider (2013) reboot or of Hellblade: Senua’s 
Sacrifice (2017) succeeds perfectly in keeping the players aware of their avatar’s independent, 
facetted personality. I could point out that even though there are still plenty of cut-scene 
heavy games like Beyond Two Souls (2013), large portions of which have been screened 
unedited at film festivals to critical acclaim, there are also games such as the aforementioned 
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Brothers, a Tale of Two Sons which succeed in relaying their core narrative message through 
their use of controls – moving some players (myself included) to tears by one particular use of 
key-binding. Finally, I could list dozens of games – in addition to the three I will discuss in 
this section – which deal maturely with mature topics. 
I could do all this but I would rather not spend too much time on such a one-sided, 
reductive defence of video games as capable of narratives: firstly, because the vast number of 
different types of video games and of ways in which people play them makes generalised 
statements about what “games” are and what they do unsustainable; secondly, and more 
importantly, because this war between narratologists and ludologists misses the possibly most 
central quality of games, namely the fact that they exactly include elements from both fields, 
and that therefore, every study of works from this medium needs to include an analysis of 
ludological as well as of narratological elements. In their work on television, Gaby Allrath, 
Marion Gymnich and Carola Surkamp have adapted Seymour Chatman’s idea of two 
information tracks – in the case of television an audio and a visual one – and presented the 
analysis of the relationship between the two tracks as crucial for the interpretation of 
television narratives (cf. Allrath et al. 2-3). This concept applies equally well to the medium 
of video games in which audio, video, game mechanics, and actual gameplay equally come 
together to contribute to an overarching narrative.  
For the purposes of my study of metareference in contemporary video games, I have 
consequently chosen three computer games which use all tracks at their disposal to convey 
metareferential commentary. And rather than only doing so for the sake of entertainment – the 
unreliable narrators of Dragon Age II (2011) and Call of Juarez: Gunslinger (2013), the 
intermedial references, self-awareness and fourth-wall-breaking of Deadpool (2013), the 
creative use of user interface and game code elements in Pony Island (2016) and Kingsway 
(2017) all would have been great examples of that – my chosen games, as mentioned before, 
additionally engage in wider social, cultural and psychological discussions of identity, 
agency, fiction, reality and mediality. As a result, these games facilitate the drawing of 
parallels between themselves and the works previously discussed in this dissertation. 
Furthermore, they demonstrate beyond any doubt that by now video games have definitely 
reached the maturity Gonzalo Frasca was still missing only a decade ago.  
There were many games I considered for the purposes of my analysis: Undertale (2015), 
ICEY (2016), Nier: Automata (2017), Hellblade: Senua’s Sacrifice (2017) to name only a 
few. They all fulfil the criteria just listed and thus would have made great subjects for my 
study. In the end, trying not to burst the scope of this paper as well as to remain firmly within 
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the most fundamentally anglophone realm, I confined my choice to what I consider the 
possibly most multi-layered three, namely BioShock (2007) – arguably one of the first games 
to signal the possibility of “moral seriousness” in video gaming (Tavinor, “BioShock” 99) –, 
Spec Ops: The Line (2012) and The Stanley Parable (2013). 
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6.1 Metareference in BioShock 
 Andrew Ryan reminds us, we all make choices. But in the end, our choices make us. 
(BioShock, repeatedly played announcement) 
2K’s BioShock, as a result of its narrative as well as mechanical choices, is a metareferential 
computer game which repeatedly addresses questions of agency, (acting) authority and 
choice, all of which are topics central to the medium of video games as a whole. After all, 
what distinguishes this particular medium the most from its predecessors is the sense of 
agency inherent to its interactive reception process (cf. Tulloch 30).  
Set in a time long before the invention of videogames and never actually breaking the 
fourth wall, BioShock relies almost exclusively on implicit, double-coded means to convey its 
metareferential message. In the game, players find themselves in the year 196066, controlling 
an unnamed male protagonist who has just survived a plane crash in the middle of the ocean. 
Almost immediately, players discover a hidden underwater city named Rapture built in 1946 
by a man named Andrew Ryan as an ideological haven for scientists, artists and “common 
people” who share Ryan’s individualist and objectivist67 ideals. Yet by the time the 
protagonist arrives, Rapture has decayed into madness, violence and chaos and the game’s 
overall goal appears, at least initially, to be to find a way to survive and return to civilisation.  
 
6.1.1 Linearity, Choice and (Presumed) Ludonarrative Dissonance 
Because of this last thematic component, BioShock has often been classified as survival 
horror. On a more basic, mechanical level, however, the game belongs to the genre of first-
person shooters. Following the advice of an inhabitant of Rapture who calls himself Atlas68, 
and who communicates with the protagonist through a shortwave radio the latter picks up at 
arrival, the player and protagonist progress through the city accumulating an arsenal of guns 
as well as gene-manipulation-based superhuman powers. This progress itself is strictly linear 
since the game mechanics do not allow players to do much more than complete Atlas’s 
instructions one after the other. Some independent exploration of the city is possible and is 
                                                 
66 For a more in-depth analysis of BioShock’s creation of an ‘alternate history’ cf. Lizardi. For an ever more 
specialised study examining BioShock’s intertextual use of music to evoke this alternate history cf. Gibbons. 
67 The name ‘And(rew) Ryan’ is even build upon an anagram of ‘Ayn Rand’, further justifying the many studies 
that have been written on the parallels between Ryan’s and Rand’s worldviews (cf. e.g. Krogulec; Nelis; Packer; 
Schubert).  
68 This name is, of course, another reference to Ayn Rand, her Atlas Shrugged being a central point of 
intertextual reference throughout BioShock’s entire story (cf. Krogulec 83). 
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rewarded with hidden useful items as well as with tape recordings of different citizens 
illuminating the history and goings-on of the city, but this does not in any way contribute to 
the actual progression of the game.  
Initially, this linearity can seem like a poor choice for a game which outside of its actual 
mechanics focuses on questions of choice and on the portrayal of a city founded upon Ryan’s 
belief in the almost God-like power of the individual, as summarised in the following 
manifesto found in the game as soon as the protagonist sets foot in Rapture: 
I am Andrew Ryan and I’m here to ask you a question: Is a man not entitled to the sweat of 
his brow? No, says the man in Washington. It belongs to the poor. No, says the man in the 
Vatican. It belongs to God. No, says the man in Moscow. It belongs to everyone. I rejected 
those answers. Instead, I chose something different. I chose the impossible. I chose… 
Rapture. A city where the artist would not fear the censor. Where the scientist would not be 
bound by petty morality. Where the great would not be constrained by the small. And with 
the sweat of your brow, Rapture can become your city as well. (chapter 0, my emphasis) 
Through the inclusion of this manifesto, from the beginning of the game’s narrative, a strong 
emphasis is placed on the idea that people should make their own choices in life instead of 
listening to other people’s demands. At the same time, however, in seeming contradiction, the 
game’s linear level design requires players to do just the opposite and merely follow Atlas’ 
instructions.  
As the protagonist progresses through the city, he passes by many banners and plaques 
which further advocate for the power of man-made choices, with slogans such as “Rapture. 
One Man’s Vision. Mankind’s Salvation.” or “No Gods or Kings. Only Man.” expressing the 
idea that making personal, individualist choices can elevate mankind above even the gods. In 
fact, the first time the protagonist encounters the second slogan, it is accompanied by a 
gigantic golden statue of Andrew Ryan looming above the protagonist in a very god-like 
manner. This statue literally embodies the idea that men are worthy of the same reverential 
and iconographic treatment as gods – yet it also immediately asks the question whether 
Ryan’s vision was not in the end mostly about elevating himself rather than about elevating 
mankind in general.  
As another excerpt from Ryan’s manifesto heard later on in the game points out, 
however, these last two goals do not actually need to be contradictory, at least not from 
Andrew Ryan’s perspective. In this second tape recording segment, Ryan can be heard to 
argue the following: “What is the greatest lie ever created? What is the most vicious obscenity 
ever perpetrated on mankind? Slavery... the Holocaust... dictatorship... NO! It's the tool with 
which all that wickedness is built. Altruism.” (ch. 2). In other words, for Ryan, the way to 
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elevate mankind is for everyone to shake off any shackles of altruism and to, radically 
individualistically, elevate themselves – as he has.  
Rapture is thus shown to have been built on the ideal that every person should not only be 
allowed to but should be encouraged to reach for his or her own, individual greatness without 
any consideration for social, political, religious or other limitations. Yet significantly, as the 
player and protagonist soon find out, this ideal has also been what has caused the city’s 
downfall. BioShock portrays the former haven of Rapture as torn apart by individuals waging 
civil war on each other for power. Furthermore, the consequence of scientists being freed 
from socio-ethical restraints is shown to be surgeons disfiguring their patients to free them 
from their restrictive human form (cf. J. S. Steinman’s audio-logs in ch. 2, especially 
“Adam’s Changes”, “Higher Standards”, “Surgery’s Picasso”) and citizens modifying their 
genetic makeup in an attempt to improve themselves to the point of insanity-inducing 
overdose.  
Almost all inhabitants of Rapture the player and protagonist encounter throughout 
BioShock are portrayed as having, in their search for ultimate individuality, actually lost their 
selves to madness and as having been reduced to rambling monstrosities unaware of their 
surroundings, only recognisable as types based on their preferred mode of attack, but not as 
individuals. In fact, many of these creatures (for they are barely human), known within the 
game worlds as splicers, when encountered are all repeating the exactly same phrases. This 
could of course be seen as a mere example of poor, time-saving writing by the game’s 
developers – yet it also suits the portrayal of the splicers as devolved monstrous beings 
without individual thought or personality. In splicers’ mouths, formerly meaningful individual 
phrases become empty mantras, still containing words yet as meaningless as a rabid animal’s 
howl. 
Yet if BioShock’s central themes are so focused on questioning the value of individualism 
and choice for mankind, the question still remains why the game’s developers have chosen a 
strikingly linear level design and formulaic mechanics for the portrayal of those themes. After 
all, considering the seemingly inherent contradiction, this makes it easy for critics to accuse 
the game of ludonarrative dissonance and to use it as an example for how the video game 
medium has only limited narrative potential since it is always held back by its mechanics (cf. 
e.g. Hocking). This interpretation of BioShock, however, is highly short sighted. For, two-
thirds into the game, the highly metareferential reason behind 2K’s choice of mechanics is 
revealed when the protagonist and through him the player discover that very few of their 
actions up to this point have really been the result of their own decisions. Instead, both player 
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and player-character are revealed to have been, in Grant Tavinor’s perfectly chosen words, “a 
pawn in someone else’s game” (“BioShock” 92).  
 
6.1.2 The Illusion of (Player) Agency 
BioShock’s tenth chapter discloses that the protagonist himself is a genetic experiment, a man-
made weapon created by Atlas for the sole purpose of killing Ryan. The chapter furthermore 
reveals that the protagonist does not have a fully free will but that he has been conditioned to 
blindly obey any order given to him accompanied by the phrase “would you kindly”. This 
narrative twist firmly grounds the player’s lack of mechanical choice within the story and 
explains it with the fact that the character the player controls does not have a choice either. In 
addition, BioShock’s narrative revelation gives the game its ultimate metareferential quality 
by raising one crucial question: If Atlas has been the one controlling the protagonist all the 
time – then what exactly was the role of the player up to this point? To answer this question, it 
is necessary to take a closer look at Atlas’ function in the game, at his use of the trigger-
phrase “would you kindly”, and at BioShock’s general creation of a semblance of choice 
and/or linearity through the implementation of the game’s overall mechanics.  
Firstly, Atlas. For long portions of the game, the voice coming from the protagonist’s 
shortwave radio functions as a guide for both protagonist and player: highly metaleptically, 
Atlas explains Rapture, as well as the game’s actual mechanics. Every game has rules and it 
needs to convey those to the player – and while some games achieve this by means of 
extradiegetic user interface components such as text-window tutorials, BioShock combines 
such extra-diegetic explanations with diegetic ones provided by Atlas. Sometimes, 
instructions in the game are just given through text which appears on the screen indicating to 
the player what he or she must do in the real world to achieve a diegetic action (e.g. press X to 
pull a lever). At other times, however, it is Atlas who gives explicit, diegetic orders to the 
protagonist (e.g. pick up a wrench) which the player then needs to execute. Similarly, certain 
combat mechanics in the game are explained by on-screen text (e.g. a sentence appearing on 
top of the action and explaining to the player that he or she can use pyrokinesis to set oil 
puddles on fire) while others are explained by Atlas who, for example, suggests the 
protagonist use electricity bolts to hurt enemies standing in water. In all these instances, there 
seems to be no discernible logic as to when text and when Atlas is chosen to explain the rules, 
thus BioShock portrays Atlas and the game’s ruleset as practically interchangeable. Or, more 
specifically, Atlas is shown to be to the protagonist what the game’s extradiegetic ruleset is to 
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the extradiegetic player: Atlas and the rules set the framework and goals, they provide and 
restrict possible actions – and all the protagonist and player (themselves equated through the 
conflation of Atlas with the game’s ruleset) are able to do is to operate within the given 
framework and work towards the established goals.  
Once the overlaps between Atlas and the game, between the protagonist and the player, 
are established, it becomes imperative to analyse just how Atlas is shown to control the 
protagonist – for that will demonstrate how BioShock represents the relationship between 
game and player as a whole. First of all, there is the idea of psychological conditioning: The 
protagonist of the game is eventually revealed to follow Atlas’s orders blindly because the 
rules for those interactions have been literally conditioned into him. Equally, for the player to 
have reached this point of the game, he or she must have blindly followed Atlas’ orders as 
well, completed diegetic goal after goal, extradiegetic level after level. Just like the 
protagonist would have been unable to act out of order even if he had started to question 
Atlas’s character and motivations, the player has no choice but to do as he or she is told – 
partially because the linearity of the game does not provide other options, but partially also 
because it would not have occurred to many players that in such a linear game they could 
even try to do something else. Seasoned players know that this is how games of this genre 
work: receive objective, complete objective, win the game. Or in other words, we as players 
have ourselves been conditioned through past experiences with the medium of video games to 
accept the blind following of quest instructions as “normal” behaviour. By exposing the 
protagonist’s conditioning BioShock thus metareferentially raises the players’ awareness of 
their own conditioned actions. 
It is, however, important to note that even though Atlas has the ability to fully control the 
protagonist, he only actually uses the “would you kindly”-phrase seven times throughout the 
whole game. In between those instances, Atlas seems to let the protagonist roam, thus 
creating an illusion of agency both for the character and for the player. Both appear free to 
explore whatever they like within the seemingly “natural” limits of a decaying city filled with 
stone walls, unsurmountable piles of post-civil-war rubble, passages cut off by faulty 
electrics, etc. The fact that all those limits and blockages are of course not created by a dying 
city but by purposeful game-design is as elegantly covered in a semblance of normality as is 
the protagonist’s acting according to Atlas’s will. 
The closest BioShock gets to providing opportunities for choice is the protagonist’s and 
the player’s ability to decide how to dispose of the creatures they encounter. In the case of the 
splicers, the game’s primary enemies, this choice merely restricts itself to the method of 
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execution. In the case of the Little Sisters (genetically altered children created to harvest and 
produce the material used for the genetic injections), however, protagonist and player get an 
active choice as to whether they want to kill the girls to drain them for power or whether they 
prefer to miss out on the additional power and save the girls instead. Thus the only choice 
player and protagonist are ever given is strikingly the same one between self-gain and 
altruism which lies at the core of Andrew Ryan’s and Rapture’s whole ideology, and thus at 
the centre of BioShock’s ethical and philosophical discourse (cf. also Tulloch 34-36).69 
Apart from this one context, however, the protagonist’s and the player’s options are 
extremely limited, and they are entirely nullified in the seven aforementioned cases in which 
Atlas issues a “would you kindly” order. These commands are given to (1) make the 
protagonist pick up the shortwave radio through which he will be able to receive further 
instructions, (2) to make him pick up his first weapon, (3) to make sure the protagonist pauses 
to witness the core of what Rapture has become in the form of the first encountered Little 
Sister, (4-6) to make the protagonist move on to the next relevant part of the city, and finally, 
(7) to order the protagonist to kill Andrew Ryan. In other words, Atlas’ orders can be 
paraphrased as follows: Pick up the item which will give you your objectives, pick up the 
tools you will need to achieve these objectives, take your time to notice the backstory but 
mainly keep progressing down your designated path until you complete your final 
assignment. Phrased like this, Atlas’ commands are revealed to be exactly the same 
commands every player automatically follows when he or she engages in many types of video 
games. In fact, players usually accept these rules as an unobtrusive and natural part of the 
medium. By linking them to a ruthless, abusive, mind-controlling killer such as Atlas, 
however, BioShock unveils this game structure’s strikingly despotic nature. 
In addition to these seven uses of the trigger-phrase, Atlas employs one more subtle 
method to control the protagonist – a method which once again is highly familiar to players. 
Atlas repeatedly provides the protagonist with emotional incentives for the actions he wants 
him to perform: do this, and you can save a multitude of little girls; do this, and you can save 
my family; do this, and you can liberate the city from the clutches of an evil tyrant and 
become a hero. In short, Atlas keeps motivating the protagonist with classic game tropes, all 
of which are, eventually, revealed to be nothing but lies, nothing but blatant, conscious 
manipulation of the protagonist by Atlas. Consequently, when the latter finally reveals their 
                                                 
69 For three very different perspectives on the ethical subtleties of this choice and especially on the question of 
what might be motivating players to choose either course of action cf. Hocking online; Tavinor, “BioShock” 105; 
Wysocki and Schandler 3890-3891. 
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nature (cf. ch. 14) and bursts out into deprecating laughter ridiculing the protagonist for 
falling for his tricks, players are enticed to feel that same ridicule directed against them for all 
the times in their lives in which they have been drawn into playing (video) games, seduced by 
the exact same tropes and ideals. 
The culmination of the player’s loss of control amidst tropes and conditioned obedience 
is reached in the scene during which the protagonist confronts and kills Andrew Ryan, who in 
turn reveals Atlas’ true nature and the meaning of the words “would you kindly” (cf. ch. 10). 
Cornered and accepting defeat, Ryan chooses the only form of self-assertion he has left, 
namely to take charge of his own death. With the words “In the end, what separates a man 
from a slave? Money, power? No. A man chooses. A slave obeys. […] Kill. A man chooses. 
A slave obeys. OBEY.” he takes away all the power and control from his killer-to-be by 
actually ordering him to kill him, using the conditioned trigger-phrase himself. With the 
protagonist obligated to follow blindly, the player is forced to watch him bludgeon Andrew 
Ryan to death, an event presented as a cut-scene without any form of interactivity so that the 
player is as powerless as his or her protagonist. 
As pointed out before, this climactic scene takes place about two thirds into the game. In 
its wake, Atlas tries to kill the protagonist, who has now outlived his usefulness, but the latter 
is saved by the Little Sisters and the woman who created them. Wanting to make amends for 
her past actions, the scientist from that point on takes over as the protagonist’s shortwave 
radio guide and helps him to free himself from Atlas’s mental control so that he can hunt the 
latter down, kill him and truly liberate the city. What is particularly striking about this final 
third of the game is the fact that its rules and mechanics do not change after the “would you 
kindly” revelation. Admittedly, before being fully removed with the help of the scientist, 
residuals of Atlas’ control cause sudden temporary gameplay restrictions such as detriments 
to health and a loss of superhuman abilities salient enough in the context of BioShock’s larger 
metareferential control motif to demonstrate just how much at the mercy of a game’s 
framework and code a player really is. Soon, however, these conditions are remedied and the 
game returns to its established pattern: A voice (now the scientist’s) gives instructions 
through the radio, which the protagonist (once more prospective hero and saviour) follows to 
reach a ‘final boss’ (this time Atlas) whose defeat would constitute a successful completion of 
the game.  
In fact, BioShock is fully self-aware of this continuation of the pattern and Atlas explicitly 
voices this awareness when he points out that even after freeing himself from his conditioning 
the protagonist is not really acting less like a slave. Or in Atlas’ exact words: “Has Mother 
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Goose really got her hooks into you. You can knock Ryan all you want, but the old man was 
bingo on one point of fact: you won’t even walk till somebody says ‘go’!” (cf. ch. 13) – a 
statement which, whilst accurate on the narrative level regarding the dynamic between the 
protagonist and his guides, is also metareferentially significant as representative of the general 
dynamic between protagonist and player. After all, the first cannot do anything unless the 
latter presses a key. 
 
6.1.3 Conclusion: BioShock’s Metareferential Function 
This continuation of gameplay patterns despite the protagonist’s and player’s increased self-
awareness reveals a lot about BioShock’s overall metareferential function. Unlike Sorkin’s 
series discussed before, the game at no point presents a solution to the medium-specific 
feature of merely illusionary player freedom and control. In fact, BioShock never even 
expresses the opinion that within the context of the medium itself a lack of complete, 
meaningful agency is in any way game-breaking or enjoyment-diminishing. After all, even 
with the raised awareness of their restrictions, most players still enjoy the last third of the 
game. They do so, however, in a much more medium-conscious and self-aware manner.  
In the end, 2K’s game is not about whether the player and the protagonist actually get to 
choose to kill Andrew Ryan, or whether or not they actually get to choose to kill Atlas. 
BioShock, instead, merely focuses on having the protagonist and player stop and question why 
they are executing those kills – because they are mind-controlled weapons doing what they 
have been conditioned to do without even noticing, or because they have consciously 
considered the larger narrative and ethical context and have purposefully agreed to play along. 
This distinction – especially in the context of a game genre as frequently criticised for 
containing nothing more than hours-worth of mindless, endless killing as the first-person 
shooter – is undeniably an important one. And BioShock, through its use of metareferences, 
successfully portrays this idea from within the medium whilst still acknowledging and 
upholding the genre’s entertainment value. 
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6.2 Metareference in Spec Ops: The Line 
Think of the children! […] Where’s all this violence comin’ from, man? Is it the video games? 
I bet it’s the video games.  
(Spec Ops: The Line, chapter 11) 
This criticism of shooter games as a medium encouraging mindless killing lies at the heart of 
the second game I have chosen for my analysis – a game which Matthew Thomas Payne has 
called “the game industry’s first major, anti-war military shooter” (266, my emphasis) and 
which Miguel Sicart suggests has been designed to “present[] players with a progressively 
challenging ethical experience” (112, my emphasis). A revival of an older series of tactical 
shooter games, Spec Ops: The Line’s main metareferential subject matter is the depiction of 
violence, particularly in modern warfare shooters such as the highly popular Call of Duty 
series. By being a third-person shooter itself, Yager’s Spec Ops: The Line metareferentially 
exposes and discusses many tropes of the genre – and of present-day militainment in general 
– either by saliently reproducing them or by actively breaking them. Furthermore, by being an 
adaptation of both Joseph Conrad’s Heart of Darkness (1899) and Francis Ford Coppola’s 
Apocalypse Now (1979), Spec Ops: The Line draws comparisons between the three different 
media of literature, film and video games in the context of their respective depictions of the 
experiences of battle and war. In the process, Spec Ops: The Line demonstrates what medium-
specific tools computer games in particular have at their disposal to portray these topics in a 
challenging manner. Consequently, the game not only criticises the frequent glorification and 
glossing-over of violence in traditional shooters but it also demonstrates the strengths and 
advantages video games could have in relation to the depiction of the dark and traumatising 
sides of violence and war, if only the medium was used to its full potential. 
Spec Ops: The Line is set in an alternate reality. More specifically, in an alternate 
modern-day Dubai in which the city has been hit by multiple all-devouring sandstorms. 
Through this choice of a literally “desert storm”-riddled setting, the game retains the real-life 
relevance of its war-commentary despite the dissociative placement of its action in an 
alternate reality. Spec Ops: The Line tells the story of Captain Martin Walker, who as the 
leader of an American three-men Delta Force squad attempts to rescue one of his idols, 
Lieutenant Colonel John Konrad, and his men, all of whom are stuck in Dubai after 
volunteering to try and evacuate the city. Once their mission had failed, Konrad and his 
battalion, The Damned 33rd, had been ordered to return to the United States yet they defied 
the order and remained in Dubai to try to lead survivors out of the city. Eventually, all contact 
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with the unit was lost for nearly six months before the military received a transmission from 
Konrad reporting utter mission failure. Walker and his men are consequently sent to 
investigate, their orders being to locate any possible survivors and to then leave the city 
immediately to report to command so the latter can send in a more appropriately-sized and 
better-informed rescue-team. 
 
6.2.1 Subverting the Heroic Power-Fantasy and the Trope of the ‘Other’ 
At first glance, this narrative goal reads like the typical heroic quest trope prominent in so 
many video as well as tabletop games. This has led at least one critic to suggest that the game 
is thus “luring” (Björk 171, my emphasis) or “tricking” players into engaging with “dark 
play” which will, unavoidably, “make[] them feel bad about themselves” (Björk 171). In 
reality, however, when the players first encounter the narrative trope within Spec Ops: The 
Line, they already know that things will probably turn out very differently than the trope 
would suggest. For to reach any of this narrative data, players of Spec Ops: The Line first 
have to navigate their way through the game’s menu screen, which makes it very clear that 
this will not be your usual (cf. Keogh 1) glory-be-to-the-American-saviours story proclaiming 
the West’s supposed technological and ethical superiority.  
In an animated still shot, the game welcomes its players with a view of the skyline of 
deserted Dubai, an American flag waving on one of the rooftops. This flag, however, is turned 
upside down and is ragged as it is swaying in the wind to Jimi Hendrix’s twangy and near-
discordant electrical-guitar rendition of “The Star Spangled Banner” from 1969. As the game 
progresses, if players ever exit the game to take a break and then restart it, this already 
ominous menu screen deteriorates further and further: a body appears, then a raven feeding on 
it. The menu screen thus constantly reminds returning players straight away of how the mood 
of the game has progressed to this point. Finally, every selection made in the menu is 
accompanied by a sound reminiscent of that of a clip being loaded into a gun, thus already 
symbolizing to the player that everything he or she does at this point is to prepare for a violent 
battle. 
After pressing the start button, the player is thrown straight into the middle of a helicopter 
combat scene which functions on multiple levels. Firstly, as a highly dramatic flash-forward 
to a moment late in the game during which the player will have access to powerful, highly-
destructive weapons, the opening sequence contains many genre- and medium-typical tropes 
normally used to excite players about the formidable skills and items they are soon to acquire 
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as well as about the explosive adventures they are soon to have. However, the emotional 
chaos and disorientation portrayed in the characters as well as the fade-to-black helicopter-
crash ending of this scene already break the usual effect of this prototype of game 
introductions. Finally, awareness of the game’s source material adds one more layer of 
complexity and implicit metareferential criticism to this introductory sequence: for the 
vehicle-based association of the player with Kilgore’s helicopter-riding regiment in 
Apocalypse Now quickly causes discomfort in source-aware players since it draws parallels 
between the power-mad, desensitised soldiers shown in the film and the feeling of excitement 
and empowerment which the players themselves have just experienced if the medium trope 
has had its desired effect. 
Once the opening sequence ends in the crash of the protagonists’ helicopter, the resulting 
black-screen establishes the timeline and takes the players to the actual beginning of the 
game’s story. In a cut-scene narrated by Walker and showing Konrad wandering his quarters 
in Dubai, the players are provided with the establishing information summed up at the 
beginning of this chapter. As a fully cinematic, non-interactive cutscene, this introduction at 
first glance does not contribute much to the discussion of computer games as a medium other 
than providing an example of the theory that video games usually resort to cutscenes to 
progress their narratives. However, a closer look at the double-coded nature of the topic of 
this narrative immediately reveals a deeper metareferential layer. 
Spec Ops: The Line’s story-establishing cinematic opens with the following lines: “Is 
John Konrad the greatest man I ever served with? Well, I dunno. […] But the facts don’t lie. 
The man’s a fuckin’ hero.” The scene then superimposes Walker’s voice-over definition of 
what makes someone a hero – actively volunteering to risk his life to help the people of a 
disaster zone rather than just sending money through a charity – onto Konrad’s array of 
combat medals, further establishing the image of the war hero as a central theme of Spec Ops: 
The Line’s narrative. However, Walker’s commentary is soon contrasted with the recording of 
Konrad’s broken-voiced transmission of his mission failure report and thus the hero-image is 
immediately called into question. This instant challenging of the viability of the hero ideal is 
already highly self-reflexive in the context of a medium such as video games which is entirely 
built around the idea of the player as hero. Yet Spec Ops: The Line takes its introspection 
even further. By having Konrad report on his mission with the words that “[mission] ended in 
complete failure… Death toll… too many…” (ch. 0) and by having these words be the trigger 
for the narrative of a shooter game – a genre specifically criticised for its high death tolls – 
Spec Ops: The Line further establishes its highly metareferential nature. 
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 After this introductory cinematic scene, the gameplay section of the game begins with 
another cutscene which slowly transitions into interactive gameplay. In the cutscene, Walker 
and his two squad members, Sergeant Lugo and Lieutenant Adams, are portrayed during their 
final approach towards Dubai, continuously bantering in a manner typical of most video 
games containing party member dynamics and particularly typical of squad-based shooters. 
Once the squad reaches the city’s outskirts, the three soldiers and the player – bound to a 
fixed path by narrow, linear level design – have no choice but to pass and thus notice an 
American flag hanging upside down as well as a centre-screen-positioned stop-sign, both 
indicating that the squad is not welcome. Yager’s choice of early game design and mechanics 
such as pathing thus complement the game’s cut-scene-led narrative message right from the 
start.  
Additionally, Spec Ops: The Line also utilises the verbal audio track created through the 
squad-member banter to further establish the game’s central setting and themes: Lugo, for 
example, at the sight of numerous cars and structures buried under desert sand, is shown to 
joke that “what happens in Dubai, stays in Dubai” (ch.1). And while this aside is meant by the 
character as a mere pun connecting the famous idiom about Las Vegas with the literal 
stagnation of a city plagued by sandstorms, in the wider context of Spec Ops: The Line’s 
setting and themes, Lugo’s joke evokes more complicated issues. Most importantly, it raises 
questions about the responsibility soldiers should take for their actions in war and/or disaster 
zones, as well as about the responsibility players should take for their actions in video games, 
considering that “what I do in games has nothing to do with my actions in real life” is a 
typical justification of players accused of exhibiting dangerously murderous even if mediated 
behaviour in their pastime. This of course is not to say that the distinction made in this 
justification is entirely invalid. Lugo’s comment in its war zone context merely raises 
awareness of the fact that matters are not quite as simple. 
As the squad enters the outskirts of Dubai, Walker and his team begin to come across 
human corpses – some buried, some lying out in the open corroded by the sand. Other than 
Lugo once more joking, this time about how he prefers his vacation locations to have a three-
to-one sexy ladies/dead bodies ratio, the men show no further reaction to the sight. Instead, 
they display a numbed down attitude towards death which once more functions both on a 
narrative and on a metareferential level. Within the game world, these scenes portray a level 
of disassociation from the soldiers which already could lead players to wonder about the 
characters’ mental health. In the metareferential context of the game, these scenes furthermore 
mirror behaviour commonly criticised in shooter game players who are often reprimanded for 
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not being perturbed by the number of enemy corpses they see (not to mention leave behind) 
throughout their gaming experience. 
The first emotional reaction the player sees from the squad in response to finding a body 
occurs when the three soldiers eventually come across the first dead member of the Damned 
33rd (cf. ch.1). Thus, right from the start, a very clear us (American soldiers) versus them 
(everybody else) mentality is established, which is typical of video games in which nameless 
enemies are the ultimate ‘other’, yet which is also typical of real-life war scenarios in which, 
for the sake of the soldiers’ psyches, every enemy combatant needs to be treated in this same 
highly problematic manner. The ‘us versus them’ motif is hence central to Spec Ops: The 
Line’s commentary both on video game tropes and on the experiences of war, and it is 
consequently developed even further throughout the first chapter of Yager’s game when the 
squad as well as the player encounter the first members of the local populace (cf. ch. 1).  
Firstly, these local men are all depicted as wearing desert-typical, generically Arab head 
wraps which, in addition to culturally othering their wearers, also hide their faces and thus 
further depersonalise them70. Secondly, though the strangers technically speak English, Lugo 
in the spirit of diplomacy is soon shown to switch the negotiation to Farsi, which, despite the 
positive message of Lugo’s intentions, de facto results in the conversation becoming 
incomprehensible for the player since no translation, not even in the form of subtitles, is 
provided. As a result, the player is left with Adams and Walker discussing if-things-go-wrong 
tactics in English in the foreground while the unknown men and Lugo are trying to establish 
communication in Farsi in the background. Thus the strangers’ perspective on things is never 
heard (or at least never understood) by the player and at the same time the player’s attention is 
directed to the only conversation he or she can understand, namely the one which focuses on 
what to do if, or basically when, the strangers turn violent. The fact that the whole encounter 
initially begins with the locals exclaiming in English (before Lugo switches to Farsi) that they 
think Walker’s squad, too, has come to kill them – thus unmistakably suggesting that the 
hostility from those men’s perspective has been initiated by others (most likely the 33rd) – 
remains unnoticed and uncommented.  
This first meeting between Walker’s squad and the locals eventually escalates and the 
first combat sequence of the game begins. It starts off strikingly clean and non-personal with 
                                                 
70 Elements like this have led critics such as Soraya Murray to criticise the game for being progressive in its 
critique of genre conventions but not in its portrayal of race (and gender) (cf. 39, 44). Criticism like this, 
however, seems to neglect the full extent of the game’s metareferentiality and the fact that the non-progressive 
portrayal of race and gender is itself one of the genre conventions which the game, progressively, is trying to 
criticise. 
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Walker burying a large group of enemies under a sand avalanche he causes. From this highly 
tactical and surgical example of in-game killing onwards, however, the combat progresses in 
a manner which brings the fight increasingly physically closer to the protagonists, and 
consequently to the player: The sequence, which opens with Walker’s precision shot, soon 
transitions through multiple exchanges of long-range gunfire accompanied by varying levels 
of blood-spatter (depending on the player’s skill and weapon of choice) to a final scripted 
scene of close combat in which Walker knocks out an enemy by kicking a door open into the 
latter’s face before (most likely) executing him.  
Throughout this whole first combat sequence, the player is guided by short extradiegetic 
sentences which appear as text on the screen to introduce the game’s key-bindings and 
mechanics by instructing players to press different buttons to achieve certain actions: run, 
vault, take cover, shoot, etc. Eventually, after Walker’s ultimate door-kick, this text is also 
what instructs the player to execute the knocked-out enemy by pressing a designated key. And 
yet, notably, in this instance as in many later ones, the game code in no way forces the player 
to actually follow this instruction. Unlike other game tutorial sections which require players to 
complete every proposed action before being allowed to continue, Spec Ops: The Line’s 
tutorial does not care if the player actually presses the execution key or simply walks past the 
knocked-out man on the ground. It does, however, never explicitly tell this to the player. The 
extradiegetic text never acknowledges the existence of a non-lethal option. The protagonist 
and the narrative do not express this idea, either. Therefore, the only way for the player to 
discover that he or she is not obligated to perform the execution is for him or her to actively 
decide to try and disobey the instruction given by the extradiegetic tutorial text.  
Since this, however, is not how players are used to interact with games, especially not 
during tutorial sections, and since at this point in the game the player has just spent several 
minutes painstakingly following text-commands to learn the game’s mechanics, it is highly 
unlikely that (m)any first-time players of Spec Ops: The Line will choose not to execute the 
man on the ground. In fact, most players will follow the given instructions automatically 
without even realising they have a choice or that there should be a choice in the first place. 
Through their decision to not advertise the non-lethal option, Spec Ops: The Line’s developers 
thus put players in a position where their behaviour directly mirrors that of Walker, who, as a 
trained delta operative, in this scene similarly never stops to consider any non-lethal solutions 
to his problem. In other words, with this sequence – and similarly to BioShock – Spec Ops: 
The Line exposes both Walker’s and the player’s conditioning into unaware “killer 
machines”. And whilst this scene might be too highly implicit for many players to notice, 
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many metareferential repetitions of this unaware-of-choice motif throughout Yager’s game 
retroactively increase this element’s salience. 
The player’s obedient execution of the action requested by the tutorial prompt, 
meanwhile, leads to the first up-close-and-personal kill of the game: Walker puts his heavy-
army boot on the helpless man’s neck and breaks it. When the protagonist then straightens up 
again and wipes his mouth, his slightly slumped posture, his wavering body, his heavy 
breathing, his sweat and his own comment of “Thought we were rescuin’ people” delivered in 
a deeply troubled voice form Spec Ops: The Line’s first dramatic break with shooter game 
traditions. After all, characters within genre-typical power fantasies are usually not allowed to 
show the physical as well as emotional exhaustion resulting from killing exactly so as to not 
destroy that genre-defining fantasy. Furthermore, the moral and ethical complexities of a 
quest objective such as “rescue people” are usually not questioned. This early scene from 
Spec Ops: The Line, however, does both, and in the process also demonstrates that immediate, 
up-close combat makes it much more difficult for soldiers like Walker, and arguably for 
players, to not physically see as well as mentally and emotionally acknowledge the individual 
features of an enemy but to keep him or her at an emotional distance as an unquestioned 
‘other’. 
In fact, as Spec Ops: The Line progresses, the initially clear line between ‘us versus them’ 
so typical of shooter games is blurred further and further. In chapter two, Walker and his men 
soon discover that the locals they are fighting are led by an American CIA agent. 
Simultaneously, the American soldiers Walker’s squad is trying to save are portrayed as being 
highly suspicious of the protagonists’ arrival, eventually resulting in a scene in which all 
present members of the 33rd turn hostile and force Walker and his men to kill them. Already 
this early in the game, the line between ‘us versus them’ is thus blurred into non-existence: 
the enemies look the same as the player characters, they are wearing almost exactly the same 
uniform (to the point where depending on lighting conditions and positioning it can become 
difficult for players to distinguish their own squad members from targets), they are speaking 
the same language and they are even using very similar phrases for squad-internal combat 
communication. The exclamation “We’re taking casualties!”, for example, initially a sound-
cue warning players that their own party members are taking damage, can from this point on 
be heard from one’s own squad as well as from the enemy.  
In addition to thus blurring the line between player characters and enemies, the game 
further keeps making a point of humanising those enemies. Often in shooter-games, enemies 
are not given a voice. As a result, a “shoot first, ask questions later” (ch. 2)-mentality such as 
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the one Walker orders his men to adopt in chapter two is highly common for both characters 
and players. After all, a pre-programmed, game code inherent inability to speak with the 
enemy is accepted and even expected by most players as a genre-inherent game-mechanic. 
Spec Ops: The Line, however, repeatedly plays with this common medium trope – if not to 
fully prove the players’ expectations as wrong, then at least to raise the players’ awareness of 
these expectations. 
In chapter five, for example, the squad comes upon two enemy soldiers who, unaware of 
Walker’s and his team’s presence, are having a banter-filled conversation highly reminiscent 
of the interactions between Adams and Lugo seen and heard throughout the game. As a result, 
Spec Ops: The Line invites players to sympathise with the two men and to try and avoid a 
massacre by approaching or circumventing them instead of shooting first. The fact that the 
game’s code, however, does not allow for such a peaceful resolution of the encounter is (1) 
representative or real-life war experiences during which combatants do not get to choose who 
to shoot depending on how likeable the enemy is, and (2) causes players to feel a certain level 
of focused frustration towards the game’s limiting mechanics, thus making players question 
the conventions they are otherwise so used to accept. 
Finally, to fully dissolve the initially seemingly clear line between “good” and “evil”, 
Spec Ops: The Line portrays even less likeable enemies who perform morally questionable 
acts as never inherently ‘other’ or evil. When in chapter seven Walker and his squad 
encounter two enemy soldiers tasked to kill civilians, if the player succeeds in sneaking up on 
the two men, he or she is rewarded with an overheard conversation between the two which 
shows the soldiers’ reluctance to fulfil the task. Similarly, in chapter six, the player and 
Walker’s squad can discover a recording in which the 33rd’s interrogator is shown to feel a 
bond between himself and his subjects, seeing himself and them as equal victims of the hell 
they are trapped in. Furthermore, by revealing the personal preceding trauma of the 
interrogator, the tape – and through it Spec Ops: The Line as a whole – also draws a parallel 
between the interrogator and the increasingly traumatised Walker himself, thus encouraging 
further sympathy and identification from the player. 
Still, even with its own strong emphasis on humanising the enemy, Spec Ops: The Line 
never denies that it can be difficult to let go of us-versus-them thinking, especially in a 
scenario in which this mentality is central to having a justification for one’s actions, such as 
during war time or during shooter gameplay. Adams, for example, an otherwise positive 
character, is till the end of the game portrayed as someone who finds killing American 
soldiers in particular the most difficult aspect of their mission. When in chapter thirteen, 
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Walker and his men are forced by the 33rd’s pre-programmed hostility to kill a “tower-full of 
US soldiers”, a distraught Adams asks the existential question of “What the fuck happened to 
us, man?” to which Walker responds with “Nothin’. We’re fucking soldiers.” In other words, 
while Walker recognises mass-killings as part of his job, Adams is portrayed as still needing 
to hold on to the distinction between killing American and killing foreign combatants. To be 
able to morally live with himself, Adams still needs to believe that the horrors he has 
experienced throughout Spec Ops: The Line are in some way unusual and abnormal. 
Walker, in contrast, is portrayed as the one member of the Delta Force squad who has 
accepted the moral grey zones of war and who has resigned himself to the fact that death and 
carnage are part of the combat experience. The fact that Spec Ops: The Line has the game’s 
main protagonist voice this opinion, the character who is closest to the identity of the player, 
only once more metareferentially draws attention to parallels between soldier and player 
mentality and encourages conscious examination of those parallels by the players themselves. 
Furthermore, Walker’s view of his profession in this moment also forms a strong counterpoint 
to both his own initial hero-worship of Konrad during the game’s opening cutscene, and to the 
usual – not only video game medium specific – view of soldiers in general as glamorous, 
powerful heroes. In other words, through Walker’s response to Adams, Spec Ops: The Line 
puts the visual symbolism of its menu screen and of the squad’s arrival in Dubai into words. 
As mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, already the torn American flag in both 
Spec Ops: The Line’s extradiegetic and diegetic opening sequences indicates right from the 
start that Walker and his squad will not be examples of glorious saviours. The game further 
emphasises this message by making it a recurring and increasingly explicit central theme 
throughout its whole narrative. Already as early as chapter four, the scene which introduces 
the local civilians the 33rd had supposedly come to rescue makes it clear that these civilians, 
instead of feeling gratitude, simply want the warmongering soldiers gone. And by chapter 
eleven the game fully verbalises this rejection of the saviour motif as well as of the players’ 
saviour fantasies by having the Radioman (a classic fool-character strongly inspired by Heart 
of Darkness’s Harlequin and Dennis Hopper’s Photojournalist in Apocalypse Now) announce 
after a particularly devastating encounter that the eight scariest words in the English language 
are “We’re Delta Force and we’re here to save you”.  
All of this, however, is not to say that Spec Ops: The Line does not acknowledge the 
soldiers’ (and players’) good intentions. Throughout the entire story, every party (Konrad, the 
33rd, the CIA, Walker) is given multiple opportunities to – admittedly in vain – stress how 
they have not come to fight but only to look for survivors to save. In addition, through careful 
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exploration, the player can find multiple tapes (or “intel items”) recorded soon after Konrad’s 
arrival which really do paint a positive picture of the 33rd by making it very clear that rather 
than being inherently evil, Konrad and his men initially only took over the region to try and 
end corruption and improve civilian life (cf. ch.3 “Castavin’s Diary”; ch. 7 “Radioman Tape – 
Soldier Interview”; ch. 14 “Code of Conduct”). However, as time passed, circumstances soon 
began to wear Konrad’s squad down and he and his men increasingly felt forced to employ 
more and more drastic measures to keep the peace (cf. e.g. ch. 6 “Interrogator Confession”; 
ch. 7 “Radioman Tape – After the Storm”): from torture by fire and “sandboarding”, to 
lynching, to mass executions, to the (ab)use of White Phosphorus, etc. In other words, the 
game portrays the American soldiers’ good intentions as having been eroded by the harsh 
reality of Dubai’s sandstorms just like the menu’s symbolic flag. 
Spec Ops: The Line is particularly successful in conveying this message by having the 
player witness this degeneration of values and character not only in the game’s pronounced 
enemies but in Walker and his squad as well. In the process, the game breaks many traditions 
of the shooter power-fantasy genre in which the protagonist and player normally only get 
better, stronger and more unstoppable with every level they gain and with every piece of 
equipment they acquire. In direct juxtaposition, Spec Ops: The Line depicts an increasing 
physical as well as mental deterioration in Walker and his squad, which simultaneously leads 
to an increasing dissolution of the player’s power-fantasy experience. 
Already on a purely cinematic level, throughout the game’s cutscenes, the player can 
witness the sun, the sand and the physical exhaustion taking their toll on the protagonist: 
Walker looks increasingly ragged, tired, and covered in dirt and blood (cf. end of ch. 6; even 
worse by ch. 11). More interestingly, however, Spec Ops: The Line also successfully employs 
gameplay elements to further depict the strain combat places on soldiers. It is common for 
many first-person games to visualise the damage a player’s character takes through a blood-
spatter overlay placed across the player’s field-of-vision, which simulates the diegetic 
experience of seeing through a blood-encrusted visor whilst providing the extradiegetic 
damage information necessary to the player. Spec Ops: The Line takes this idea even further. 
If Walker’s health falls beneath a certain level, the game’s colours slowly fade into black and 
white while all sounds are dampened, almost as if superimposed with white noise. As a result, 
the player’s vision is destabilised by the change, the scene gets colder and gloomier, and any 
attempt at noise-based orientation is doomed to failure. In short, despite not being an actual 
first-person game, Spec Ops: The Line thus attempts to visually and auditorily simulate the 
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perception and experience of a man stunned and traumatised by his surroundings so as to let 
the player experience that very state as much as possible through the simulation.  
The motif of exhaustion through combat is furthermore presented through Walker’s facial 
expressions. As is typical of third-person shooters, Spec Ops: The Line’s “camera” is usually 
positioned behind the main protagonist’s right shoulder so that all the player sees of Walker 
during most of the gameplay is the man’s back. When Walker goes into cover, however, he 
crouches with his back to the obstacle he is hiding behind, thus giving the player full view of 
the soldier’s face as well as of the emotional responses portrayed therein. This new angle – in 
addition to providing a possible empathic trigger for the player71 – draws attention 
specifically to the character’s emotional responses to combat, and these responses are as 
follows: as soon as Walker takes damage, his face stops being the stern, strong and collected 
mask so archetypical of shooter game protagonists; instead, his mouth falls open, teeth clench, 
he begins to breathe heavily, his eyes open wide – in short, his features are shown to be 
distorted by stress, anxiety and fear.  
Walker’s feelings during combat thus introduced through the game’s visual track are 
eventually explained on the narrative level of Spec Ops: The Line when the game reveals that 
its protagonist is suffering from post-traumatic stress disorder caused by events Walker 
experienced several years earlier during a Kabul mission with Konrad. The full extent of 
Walker’s condition is only revealed to the player in the game’s final chapter. First hints at it, 
however, can be observed already much earlier. In chapter four, for example, a first tableau of 
soldiers, violence and refugees causes Walker to comment that the scene reminds him of his 
previous experiences with the Kabul death-squads. And in chapter five, the Radioman’s voice 
– a voice Walker finally recognises as that of a journalist who used to follow Konrad in Kabul 
– triggers a memory which in turn triggers a full-blown PTSD-attack in the squad leader. By 
the player, this attack is experienced as a temporary distortion of vision: the light and colours 
on screen begin to change, the scene becomes increasingly blurry and blinding until, once 
again, the player’s overview of the situation is restricted and the game once more attempts 
through simulation to enable the player to experience a situation through the eyes of someone 
suffering from trauma.  
                                                 
71 This in direct contradiction of Britta Neitzel’s simplistic theory that all avatars are perceived as mere 
extensions of one’s self by the player and are thus incapable of being subject to empathy, or to identification for 
that matter (cf. Neitzel, “Involvierungsstrategien” 102-103). 
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Eventually, confused by what is happening to his (and the player’s) vision, Walker makes 
the wrong decision to burst through a door – a decision which the game presents as a short 
cutscene which evolves out of the usual gameplay, a cutscene just long enough to render the 
player incapable of preventing Walker’s wrong move. Through this insertion of an 
unexpected cutscene, Spec Ops: The Line lets the players experience the same feeling of 
sudden loss of control which their character is currently trying to cope with. Eventually, as a 
result of his confused actions, Walker ends up falling a very long way down a multi-storied 
building. This scene, which especially following an earlier aside by Lugo about going down 
the rabbit hole (cf. ch. 5) is highly reminiscent of Alice’s fall into the topsy-turvy world of 
Wonderland, symbolically mirrors Walker’s PTSD-triggered descent into madness. The scene 
also reveals the double meaning of the title of the game chapter in question, “The Edge”, as 
Walker’s second recollection of Kabul is shown to drive him mentally, as well as quite 
literally, over the/an edge. 
In the subsequent chapter six, Spec Ops: The Line continues its simulation of Walker’s 
mental state by forcing the player to experience the overpowering and disarming effect of the 
protagonist’s mental illness by temporarily taking away all the player’s power. The game 
achieves this by stripping the player of all the weapons he or she has collected up to this point 
as Walker regains consciousness empty-handed, having lost his (literal as well as figurative) 
arsenal during the fall. By doing this, Spec Ops: The Line thus once more breaks with shooter 
genre traditions and instead of bringing the player closer and closer to omnipotence with each 
level, decides to portray the ‘real’ effects of prolonged combat: decreasing physical, mental 
and practical resources. 
The player is, of course, soon allowed to rebuild his or her arsenal – Walker, however, 
never really recovers. By chapter ten his post-traumatic stress disorder is so acute and 
symptomatic that he begins to have visual hallucinations: Alone in a room full of nothing but 
mannequins, Walker and with him the player begin to see a particularly difficult enemy type 
appear in flashes of strobe-light. As disoriented as Walker, the player is then once more 
forced to share in the simulated experience by having to find a way to kill the enemy despite 
the seemingly random pattern according to which he keeps popping in and out of existence.  
Adding to these visual hallucinations, cutscenes in chapter eleven portray Walker as 
increasingly jittery, violent, and out of control – both out of his own and out of that of the 
cutscene-watching player. Chapter twelve, furthermore, depicts the squad leader as losing 
track of time. Containing the helicopter scene which opened Spec Ops: The Line, the chapter 
has Walker eventually comment that “This isn’t right. We did this already.” Thus whilst 
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humorously referring to the player’s déjà-vu experience resulting from the game’s initial 
flash-forward, the scene also draws attention to the much more sombre tone the experience 
takes on for a man like Walker trapped in an illness which makes him constantly relive 
traumatic moments. Finally, in chapters thirteen and fourteen, Walker’s visual hallucinations 
reach their ultimate form with the soldier (and player) suddenly seeing himself as standing 
amidst a burning, blood-red hell-scape: in chapter thirteen, a cutscene just after the helicopter-
crash shows Walker imagining himself talking to a fiery silhouette of Konrad; in chapter 
fourteen, a lengthy combat sequence is repeatedly interspersed with similar hellish images, 
building up to a scene in which Walker sees the face of the by then killed Lugo in the face of 
an attacking enemy.  
In both scenes, first Konrad and then Lugo are heard to blame Walker for everything that 
has happened in Dubai: “The only villain here is you, Walker. There’s only you.” (cf. ch. 13) 
– a line which eventually builds up to the game’s big revelation in the following and final 
fifteenth chapter: namely, that Konrad has been dead for a while now, and that many of the 
things Walker and through him the player have up to this point seen, heard and perceived to 
be real have, in fact, been hallucinations as well. For one last time, the player is invited to 
share Walker’s PTSD-experience: the confusion, the despair, and the brutal realisation that 
little throughout this (video game) experience has been what it has seemed. Furthermore, 
throughout this final revelation, both Walker and the player are also made aware of all the 
clues they have missed in regards to what is happening as a result of their unquestioning trust 
in their own abilities and in their knowledge of the “rules of the game” – be this “game” Spec 
Ops: The Line or war. 
It is, however, not only the antagonists and the already mentally unstable Walker who are 
shown to deteriorate throughout Spec Ops: The Line. Instead, the player’s entire squad 
succumbs to the pressures of combat. As the game progresses, the initially well-trained, well-
cooperating, goal-oriented unit begins to dissolve more and more. On the narrative level, 
arguments and fights erupt with increasing frequency, especially between Lugo and Adams, 
and Walker is repeatedly required to break the two apart during cutscenes for behaving like 
“kids fighting in the dirt” (ch. 7). This deterioration of squad co-operation is, however, also 
portrayed on the level of the game mechanics. Spec Ops: The Line’s initial feature allowing 
the player to assign specific targets to different squad-members becomes increasingly 
unreliable throughout the game until in the very end it becomes entirely unusable. 
Finally, the squad’s increasingly high-strung nerves can also be observed in the 
development of the language the men use during the combat sequences. While initially the 
       
229 
 
soldiers are depicted as using highly formulaic military jargon, neutral to the point of 
unnatural coldness, with time their voices become louder and more agitated, and more and 
more swearing makes its ways into their phrasing. Early examples can already be observed 
throughout chapters four to seven. By chapter twelve, however, every simple “I need back 
up.”-phrase initially used to indicate to the player that he or she needs to look after one of 
their squad-mates transforms into “Will you fucking keep those guys off me!”. Similarly, the 
straightforward announcement of “On the move.” becomes “On the move, try not to fucking 
shoot me!”. Lastly, by chapter thirteen, the squad’s responses to enemy deaths also change 
drastically. 
While, initially, successful kills are reported with the highly clinical wordings of “Tango 
down.” or “Threat eliminated/neutralized.”, by the end of the game both Walker and his men 
are shown to constantly yell “Fuck you!”s at their opponents and to scream increasingly 
animalistic “Yeah!”s when they succeed in taking a target down. In other words, by this point, 
the Delta Force members are portrayed as having lost all their composure and professionalism 
and through that most of the initial characteristics which presented them as strong heroes in 
control of the battlefield. Furthermore, these scenes and exclamations also draw 
metareferential attention to traditional player behaviour during shooter games which is often 
accompanied by similar utterances. By depicting those reactions as the result of mental and 
emotional degeneration in the protagonists, Spec Ops: The Line criticises or at least questions 
such player behaviour and exposes its inappropriateness. 
In addition to thus portraying the physical and mental degeneration of soldiers through 
the horrors of war, Spec Ops: The Line uses one more classic game medium feature to further 
deconstruct the power fantasy normally created for players, namely that of the combat music. 
It is common for many video game genres to overlay combat sequences with an extradiegetic 
music track to help set the mood and provide the player with his or her own action-packed 
soundtrack. Already the very first combat sequences in Spec Ops: The Line, however, break 
this mould by lacking any form of background music. During these gameplay moments, the 
game focuses as much as possible on a realistic representation of the chaotic sounds of battle 
(weapon noises, shouts, running feet, explosions, etc.) instead of on the creation of a 
powerful, cinematic experience for the player. Music in Spec Ops: The Line’s first chapter is 
thus only used to enhance the walking and exploration sequences of the game, during which 
twangy, melancholic, electric-guitar chords continue the motifs of the Hendrix song used for 
the menu screen to help convey the desolate atmosphere of the devastated Dubai. 
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In chapter two, in addition to not using the feature of extradiegetic combat music, Spec 
Ops: The Line moves on to explicitly thematise the topic. As Walker’s squad joins a battle in 
a derelict news station, music suddenly does begin to play – yet rather than being an 
extradiegetic game element, it is soon revealed to be a diegetic one. The song, Deep Purple’s 
“Hush” (1968), is portrayed as being broadcast by the Radioman as an accompaniment to his 
announcement that the local seize-fire agreement has just come to an end. The squad’s 
subsequent reaction to this war soundtrack is metareferentially telling. Even Lugo, usually the 
joker of the group, refers to the musical accompaniment as “weird”, and Adams calls it proof 
for things being “out of control”. In other words, the Radioman’s combination of music and 
glib commentary, purposefully broadcast across the city during active battles, is shown to be 
considered unsettling and inappropriate by the two experienced soldiers who at this point still 
form the moral centre of the game. 
The Radioman’s questionable choices of diegetic combat music accompany Walker’s 
squad throughout the next few chapters, eventually culminating in an homage to Apocalypse 
Now’s famous “Ride-of-the-Valkyries” scene (cf. ch. 6): As the 33rd attempt to eliminate 
Walker and his men by “running and gunning” them down with a fully-armed helicopter, the 
Radioman accentuates their attack with a broadcast of “Dies Irae” from Verdi’s Requiem 
(1874), in particularly beginning with the lines announcing “[t]he day of wrath, [the] day 
[that] will dissolve the world in ashes”. The subsequent sequence is a perfect example of the 
traditional function of combat music in games. After all, Verdi’s overpoweringly loud, 
dramatic and dynamic piece definitely helps to create the feeling that the 33rd have the power 
to bring on Judgement Day. However, through the intertextual link with Apocalypse Now, 
which ties the Radioman’s behaviour to that of the morally highly dubious characters of 
Lieutenant Colonel Kilgore and his men, Spec Ops: The Line questions the appropriateness of 
this type of combat mentality. In the process, players are enticed to realise that their 
traditional behaviour during combat sequences is equally reminiscent of the ruthless and 
borderline-manic behaviour of Apocalypse Now’s 9th Cavalry Regiment and to consequently 
approach the whole concept of games as vehicles for a power fantasy built upon music-
accompanied killing more critically. 72  
As the game progresses, the line between Spec Ops: The Line’s use of diegetic music-
accompaniment and traditional uses of an extradiegetic soundtrack slowly begins to blur. 
                                                 
72 For a detailed survey-based study of actual player responses to the game and an analysis of the “positive 
discomfort” (feeling queasy on the one hand whilst valuing the opportunity for personal growth) most players 
seem to experience cf. Jørgensen. 
       
231 
 
Already in chapter five, the source of the music playing throughout the different battle 
sequences is impossible to locate. While it is possible and even likely that Walker and through 
him the player are still hearing Radioman broadcasts, there are no introductory verbal 
announcements made by the latter anymore which would irrefutably situate the music on a 
specific diegetic level. Considering the fact that the fifth chapter is also the one which marks 
the beginning of Walker’s mental downward spiral, it is likely that this uncertainty as to the 
origin and thus the diegetic ‘real’-ness of the sounds is intentional and representative of the 
protagonist’s psychological state. 
Building upon this idea, from chapter six onwards all combat sequences are accompanied 
by – mostly instrumental – music which, while still more melancholy than most classic 
examples, highly resembles traditional combat music. Thus the initially disconcerting 
combination of melody and massacre becomes another symbol for Walker’s more and more 
crack-riddled psyche. The game, furthermore, never specifies (by verbal comments or 
otherwise) whether Walker himself actually hears this combat music or whether at this point it 
is fully extradiegetic and only audible to the player. The line of certainty between what is 
perceived by the player-character and what by the player him- or herself is thus also blurred, 
contributing to the game’s oscillating play with simulation which, as already seen repeatedly, 
time and time again conflates player and player-character perspectives to convey its 
metareferential messages. 
In addition to all these portrayals of the ways in which characters as well as the player 
respond to and experience violence, Spec Ops: The Line also discusses the committal of 
violent acts in detail – an element which lies at the core of the shooter video game genre. In 
its early stages, Spec Ops: The Line repeatedly depicts characters voicing explicit critique 
towards careless mass-killings: Walker orders his men to be careful when fighting near 
civilians (cf. ch. 4) and even the antagonistic CIA agent criticises his own men for recklessly 
using explosives (cf. ch. 3). In other words, both parties take a univocal stance against 
unnecessary deaths and violence. And as the game progresses and Walker and the player 
cannot avoid killing dozens and dozens of people – Spec Ops: The Line is a shooter and not a 
stealth-game after all – the protagonists’ high death-toll is criticised continuously, more often 
than not through references to Walker’s mental deterioration.  
For example, Walker’s aforementioned increasingly (hyper-)violent behaviour towards 
the last third of the game is met with visible concern and explicit disapproval from both 
Adams and Lugo on multiple occasions (cf. e.g. ch. 11). Similarly, when Walker in chapter 
twelve acquires a helicopter with an overpowered machine gun, exclaims in a manic voice 
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that he wants to “see what this gun can do” and then proceeds to obliterate an entire 
skyscraper full of members of the 33rd, the game’s exact portrayal of Walker’s behaviour 
makes it very clear that just like Apocalypse Now’s helicopter scene and in contrast to the 
33rd’s own “Dies Irae”-attack, this scene is not meant to be a glorification of a soldier’s power 
fantasy. While there is no explicit objection from the other squad members at this time, Spec 
Ops: The Line’s exaggerated depiction of Walker as an animalistic, screaming maniac 
seemingly enjoying the destruction he is causing is enough to draw attention to the grotesque 
deformation which the squad leader’s initially calm and collected professional demeanour has 
suffered. Through this, the difference between the stylised outside view of the helicopter 
massacre and the actual mental and emotional deterioration of committing mass-murder is 
firmly established. In the process, this scene also once more draws uncomfortable attention to 
parallels between Walker’s and traditional player behaviour, raising players’ self- as well as 
shooter genre awareness. 
To further break with what Holger Pötzsch calls the “selective realism” of traditional 
shooters (cf. Pötzsch 156-161) and to instead emphasise the usually omitted visceral realities 
of war, violence and killing, Spec Ops: The Line throughout its entirety repeatedly draws the 
player’s attention to the horrific, bloody, physical by-products of death and combat. While it 
is normally characteristic for combat-centric games that, once a battle is won, the enemy 
corpses are simply left behind and forgotten, Spec Ops: The Line’s code forces its players to 
stop and face the carnage. Already the game’s detailed depiction of the impoverished living 
conditions of Dubai’s civilian population in chapter four can be seen as a part of this pattern 
since it demonstrates that war is not clean and without consequences. Even more striking 
scenes, however, can be found in chapters six and seven, during which Walker’s squad comes 
across multiple mass graves of the victims of battles between the 33rd, the CIA and the 
civilian population.  
To increase the player’s proximity to the horrors of these scenes, Spec Ops: The Line 
once again chooses simulation over cinematic or verbal narration, thus utilising the strengths 
of the video game medium. Instead of just showing the player the bodies and the squad’s 
reactions to them through a cutscene, the game’s level design forces the player to manually 
navigate those areas and to consciously walk Walker and his squad through the piles of 
human remains. Furthermore, to ensure that the player actually pays attention to the horrors 
depicted, the game slows down the characters’ walking speed for these sequences and makes 
their weapons unusable. The player is thus left with nothing to do but to take their time to 
notice and absorb the state of all the decayed bodies, to hear the buzzing of the flies, the 
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groans of the dying coughing out their last breaths, and to acknowledge Adams’ and Lugo’s 
comments on the “smell of death”.  
Eventually, Spec Ops: The Line’s critique of mass-killings culminates in chapter eight of 
the game during which Walker, after just having witnessed the 33rd’s devastating use of White 
Phosphorous (cf. ch. 7) – an experience which through a change in lighting and sound is once 
more portrayed as being highly traumatic for him – faces the necessity of using the chemical 
weapon himself. The exact way in which Spec Ops: The Line depicts Walker’s deployment of 
this weapon of mass destruction is metareferentially particularly interesting: To execute the 
attack, Walker and his men are shown to use a computer to launch an air-born camera which 
they consequently fly over the targeted area to receive thermal-like imagery of the silhouettes 
of structures, vehicles and people present in the area. Walker, who is operating the computer, 
subsequently uses the camera to lock onto targets of his choice at which Lugo and Adams 
then shoot the White Phosphorous mortars. In other words, this entire sequence is presented to 
the player as a metareferential game-within-game (or “mini-game”) in which all the player as 
well as Walker have to do to commit mass-murder is to move a computer screen cursor onto a 
barely-more-than-a-blob target and press ‘Enter’. Thus the scene draws attention to the often 
strikingly clinical and dissociative nature of computer-initiated violence – be it in video 
games or in real life as a result of our modern-day warfare’s increasing reliance on game-like 
and game-based technology for soldier training as well as for drone strike operations (cf. e.g. 
Herbst 72; Kater 118; Lowood 84; Penny 75; Rentfrow 92).  
In this dissociative portrayal of violence lies possibly one of the most defining and unique 
dichotomies of the medium of (shooter) games. For whilst video games often encourage a 
very immediate experience of the action on screen to the point where players can assimilate 
the events as personal experiences (cf. Murray, Janet H. 170; Nöth et al. 161), developers still 
also frequently keep these experiences and their triggers so highly stylised – especially in the 
context of violence (cf. Kater 118) – that they remain free of any actual emotional impact and 
consequences for the players (cf. van Dreunen 6). The White Phosphorous attack scene in 
Spec Ops: The Line exposes this dichotomy perfectly, metareferentially criticising it in the 
process.  
Firstly, Spec Ops: The Line’s developers particularly emphasise the immediacy of the 
gameplay experience in this scene by merging Walker’s and the player’s view of the diegetic 
screen during the mini-game. Secondly, the instantly visible on-screen explosions 
accompanied by squad approval which follow Walker’s/the player’s button-press are a perfect 
portrayal of the instantaneous gratification usually received by players from witnessing an 
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immediate, dramatic, violently impactful, yet free of real-life negative consequences diegetic 
response to their extradiegetic actions – a sensation which many scholars have identified as 
one of the main reasons for the popularity of traditional shooter(-like) games (cf. e.g. 
Adelmann and Winkler 8-9; Bonfadelli 287; Murray, Janet H. 119). Unlike traditional 
shooter(-like) games, however, Spec Ops: The Line at the end of the White Phosphorous 
scene does not simply let its characters and players rejoice at “beating” the mini-game and 
move on with their power fantasy, but it actually forces them to acknowledge if not any 
extradiegetic consequences then at least the diegetic consequences of their actions first.  
Already during the attack, Walker and the player can hear the agony-filled screams of 
their victims which are not warded off by the symbolic technological walls of cameras and 
computers separating the burning people from their attackers. And should these horrific 
noises not be enough to break through Walker’s and the player’s dissociation with the targets, 
the following aftermath-portraying scene most definitely is. For Spec Ops: The Line follows 
up the highly abstract and mechanical sequence of shooting mortars at silhouettes with an 
immediate confrontation of both squad and player with the very gruesome, bodily reality of 
the results of a White Phosphorous attack.  
To proceed to their next destination, Walker and his men are forced to walk (once again 
slowed down) through the remains of the people they have just killed. And just in case the 
emotional impact of the burnt and disfigured bodies is not enough, the squad has to realise 
that most of the people whose faceless silhouettes they conveniently chose to identify as 
enemy ‘others’, in fact, were unarmed civilians. In full shock, Walker eventually freezes in 
front of the devastating tableau of a mother and daughter, their bodies fused together in fiery, 
chemical death. The image consequently haunts him in his hallucinations for the rest of the 
game.  
Theoretically, already the aforementioned mass graves of the previous two chapters can 
be seen as an implicit critique of the player’s own excessive number of kills. After all, at the 
moment when he or she is confronted with Konrad’s atrocities, his or her own death-toll is not 
exactly much lower. The White Phosphorous scene, however, transforms this implicit 
criticism into a highly explicit one. Realising what they have done, and how far from heroic 
their actions have become, Lugo exclaims to Adams: “He turned us into fucking killers!”. 
And while the “he” in this sentence diegetically refers to Walker, it also functions on a fourth-
wall-breaking metareferential level as a criticism directed towards the player whose input has 
been controlling the squad’s actions. 
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6.2.2 Choice, Agency and Accountability 
Whilst Lugo and Adams blame Walker for their actions in this scene, Walker himself begins 
to rage against Konrad and the 33rd for forcing his hand. In the process, Spec Ops: The Line’s 
last central metareferential motif emerges: just like BioShock before it, Yager’s game also 
discusses questions of choice, agency, personal responsibility and accountability central to the 
medium of video games as well as to any discussion of soldier behaviour during times of war.  
Throughout Spec Ops: The Line, characters are constantly shown to decry their seeming 
lack of choice. Especially Walker repeatedly keeps proclaiming his powerlessness like a 
mantra: in early chapters he keeps stressing that the squad had no choice but to shoot 
American soldiers (cf. ch. 4); at the end of chapter six he argues that he and his men had no 
choice but to work with the CIA, there being a whole desert between the squad and any other 
help; in chapter eight, as mentioned, he claims that the 33rd left him no choice but to deploy 
the White Phosphorous, and the same pattern repeats after every following massacre the Delta 
Force soldiers commit (cf. e.g. ch. 9, 12, 13). And while Lugo during the Phosphorous scene 
explicitly tries to object that there is always a choice, his opinion remains unheeded. 
Furthermore, it is even at least partially invalidated by Lugo himself, who equally blames 
Walker for his own actions and never considers that he himself would have also had a choice, 
namely to disobey Walker’s orders.  
Spec Ops: The Line’s highly critical opinion of this kind of blame-shifting is obvious 
throughout the entirety of the game. The sheer absurdity of the earliest example of such 
deflection, which shows the Radioman blame a massacre committed by the 33rd on their by 
comparison powerless victims (cf. ch. 2), already sets the player on guard against the moral 
validity of such statements. Furthermore, the increasingly numerous and extreme occasions 
on which Walker and his men use the no-choice excuse equally leave a progressively bad 
taste in the player’s mouth. Simultaneously, they also ask the question of who exactly the 
characters are trying to convince of their innocence with these assertions, their addressees or 
themselves. Walker’s hallucinations in the late chapters of the game, which portray Hell as a 
place in which everyone holds him responsible, suggest that the protagonist himself, in fact, at 
his core, does not believe that none of his actions were his fault (cf. e.g. end of ch. 12). 
Especially Walker’s vision of Konrad as a Lord of Hell who explicitly calls Walker more 
dangerous and deadly than the sandstorms (cf. end of ch. 12) is a clear indicator of the 
protagonist’s real thoughts on the matter, seeing how the game’s finale reveals Konrad to 
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have been dead the entire time and thus Konrad’s voice Walker hears to really have been the 
voice of an alter ego of the traumatised protagonist himself. 
All of this commentary Spec Ops: The Line provides on matters of denial and personal 
responsibility is culturally and ethically highly significant within the game’s narrative context 
of human behaviour in times of war. It is, however, also of metareferential importance since 
the medium of video games is full of players who, whilst praising the feeling of agency the 
medium provides, simultaneously reject the idea of there being any real-life relevance to the 
acts (of e.g. violence) they are enabled by the medium to commit. Questions of personal 
responsibility are thus particularly interesting in the context of this specific medium, and 
Yager’s game addresses them, as always, not only on the narrative but also on the mechanical 
level. 
For example, throughout most of its gameplay, Spec Ops: The Line reinforces its 
characters’ experience of lack of choice by providing its players with an equally choice-
deprived, stringently linear gaming experience which Staffan Björk has described as 
“oppressive” (183). The few times the player is seemingly given a choice, the possible 
outcomes are all equally disastrous and have practically no impact on the overall game: in 
chapter seven, for example, the player is ostensibly presented with a choice between either 
trying to save a CIA agent who has previously saved their lives and who could be the key for 
getting to Konrad or trying to save two civilians. Soon, however, it becomes clear that 
whichever path the player chooses, the agent dies; and whether or not the civilians are saved 
has no effect on the hostility Walker and his men continue to experience from Dubai’s 
populace, eventually leading to Lugo’s death. In the words of Miguel Sicart, “in Spec Ops, 
playing is ultimately failing” (112). 
This type of linear game design is generally emblematic for shooters, which – unlike, say, 
roleplaying games – usually simply guide players through a series of straightforward 
objectives which the players either complete or lose the game. By choosing this particular 
design model Spec Ops: The Line’s developers thus not only employ mechanics suitable to 
their narrative message of a perceived lack of choice but also predominantly follow genre 
traditions. Consequently, the few sequences during which Spec Ops: The Line diverges from 
these traditions become particularly striking and salient. The possibly most prominent scene 
in this respect shows Walker and his team come across two strung-up men about to be 
executed by a squad of 33rd snipers (cf. ch. 9). Once the protagonists approach, Walker hears 
Konrad’s voice through the intercom explain that one of the two men is a water-thief, a crime 
so serious in sandstorm-plagued Dubai that it is punishable by death; the other man is the 
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soldier who was sent to apprehend the thief but who got so carried away with vengeance and 
retaliation that he killed the thief’s entire family first. Konrad then asks Walker (and through 
him the player) to choose which of the two men to execute and which to let live, his exact 
words being “[W]hat is justice? How would you see it dealt? This is an order, Captain. Who 
lives? Who dies? Judge these men, or pay the price of insubordination.” (ch. 9). 
Based on the phrasing of Konrad’s order, and according to classic game conventions, the 
player at this point is presented with two options: shoot the thief or shoot the soldier. There is 
no way to interact with Konrad so refusing to make the choice should – under traditional 
video game circumstances – result in the player being stuck at this point of the game forever. 
Most players, therefore, eventually, will decide which man to shoot – only to receive the same 
in-game compliment from Konrad in both cases, namely to be called “a man of action” who 
will fit well into Dubai. Considering the desolate state of the city, this “compliment” comes 
with a bitter aftertaste, which may or may not already cause players to question their decision 
and to experience the frustration of not having had a less drastic and deprived choice so 
familiar to Walker and his men. Yet the diegetic commendation from Konrad is not the only 
reward players receive for taking the shot, an extradiegetic achievement symbol also appears 
on the screen, accompanied by the achievement name of “Damned if you do…”.  
These idiomatic words and the ultimate ellipsis are the only active hint players ever 
receive about the fact that there are actually several more possible solutions to this interaction, 
all of which require that the player “don’t” do something, namely follow Konrad’s (and thus 
the game’s own) orders. Spec Ops: The Line never traditionally offers its players (through 
extradiegetic text, diegetic dialogue or in-between user interface markers) the option of 
shooting the snipers or of shooting the nooses instead of the strung-up men themselves – yet 
both these options are permissible within the game code. All it takes for players to find them 
is an independent idea and an attempt to perform either of these seemingly divergent actions. 
Devastatingly, both of them eventually result in the death of the two strung-up men as well – 
thus justifying the name of the second extradiegetic achievement “… damned if you don’t.”. 
And yet, attempting these actions still provides players with a rare feeling of personal 
achievement for having, at least for one second, seemingly outwitted both Konrad and the 
game by following their own instincts and ideas. 
In reality, of course, even in this scene, the game is still in full control of the player for its 
code is what allows for the supposedly divergent actions in the first place. And by the end of 
its narrative, Spec Ops: The Line makes sure to draw the player’s attention to this fact through 
a typically double-coded metareference. When the full extent of Walker’s hallucinations and 
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delusions is revealed in the game’s final chapter, the player is forced to realise that the entire 
hanging scene – the one scene in which Walker and the player seemingly had managed to 
temporarily stop being Konrad’s (and the game’s) pawns – was nothing more but a figment of 
Walker’s damaged imagination. In the end, the player’s feeling of having outsmarted the 
game is thus shown to have been a mere illusion, the result of a lack of self- (and/or medium-
)awareness from both Walker and the player. 
This realisation finally brings Walker fully to his knees and presents him and the player 
with the only meaningful, story-changing decision of the game: at the end of Spec Ops: The 
Line’s grand finale, Walker must decide whether to shoot the image of Konrad he sees in the 
mirror, symbolically killing either his own demons or the externalised object of his blame, or 
whether to shoot himself. One way or another, players are asked to pronounce judgement on 
Walker – and since Walker is an avatar of the player, they are asked to pronounce judgement 
on themselves. Since a fair verdict demands for past actions to be taken into consideration, 
players are thus invited by Spec Ops: The Line to analyse both Walker’s and their own 
behaviour and reactions throughout the game. The fact that their ultimate decision impacts 
whether the protagonist of the story survives or dies, asks players to judge whether they feel 
like they actually deserve a “win” in exchange for their successful committal of what is de 
facto psychosis-inducing and -induced mass-murder throughout the game. 
 
6.2.3 Conclusion: Spec Ops: The Line’s Metareferential Message 
To sum things up, Spec Ops: The Line is a game which through intertwined double-coded 
metacommentary on a variety of topics attempts to deconstruct the tropes of violent heroism 
particularly central to so many other modern-day military shooters. Whereas traditional video 
games frequently declare their protagonists heroes and saviours for successfully murdering 
hundreds of enemies on a quest to rescue a select few, Spec Ops: The Line depicts its main 
characters as a group of men on a physically as well as mentally highly destructive path. 
When Konrad eventually asks Walker “Do you feel like a hero yet?” (cf. opening of ch. 15), 
the latter’s staggering posture, blistered face, shaking voice and blank nerves are in stark 
contrast to the image a player would normally have of his or her character at the end of a 
successfully completed video game. As Konrad continues his speech, Spec Ops: The Line 
makes its position on the matter even clearer: “You’re no savior. Your talents lie elsewhere. 
[…] The truth is, Walker, you’re here because you wanted to feel like something you’re not.” 
– to which Walker quietly replies: “A hero” (ch. 15). Spec Ops: The Line thus explicitly 
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acknowledges the usual function of video games as power fantasies, as opportunities for 
players to “feel like something they are not”. However, the game also immediately 
deconstructs this function by criticising its moral standing, and by rejecting the idea that the 
mere blind completion of a vast number of kill quests makes a person – be they soldier or 
player – a saviour. Instead, Spec Ops: The Line declares that reckless murder makes a person 
not a hero but a “monster”, for the hunt of which locals are willing to literally melt their 
jewellery into silver bullets (cf. ch. 3). 
In a co-written essay applying Albert Bandura’s theory of moral disengagement onto 
computer games, Christoph Klimmt, Hannah Schmid, Andreas Nosper, Tilo Harmann and 
Peter Vorderer have argued that there are seven methods which players usually employ, more 
or less consciously, to detach themselves from their monstrous in-game actions: (1) the 
invocation of a higher goal which justifies the means (‘moral justification’), (2) the use of 
euphemisms such as ‘neutralize’ instead of ‘kill’ (‘euphemistic labelling’), (3) the comparison 
of one’s own behaviour with that of people acting worse (‘advantageous comparison’), (4) the 
blame of one’s actions on orders from above (‘displacement or diffusion of responsibility’), 
(5) the ‘disregard or distortion of consequences’, (6) the ‘dehumanization’ of victims and (7) 
the ‘attribution of blame’ to those victims by arguing that they deserved what happened to 
them (cf. Klimmt et al. 112-113). One look at Spec Ops: The Line’s motifs described 
throughout this chapter, however, shows that Yager’s game makes it nigh-impossible for 
players to use any of these methods of justification, especially not unconsciously. For, as my 
analysis has shown, Spec Ops: The Line discusses all these dissociation mechanisms 
explicitly as central topics of its narrative and thus brings them right to the forefront of each 
player’s attention. Furthermore, by linking their increased use to Walker’s and his squad’s 
progressively deteriorating mental states, the game expresses clear doubts about the validity 
of such moral detachment as a healthy, acceptable way of dealing with the issue at hand. 
Finally, it needs to be pointed out, however, that while Spec Ops: The Line is highly 
critical of computer game violence, it also makes it very clear that violent games should not 
be blamed for real-life violence, as is so often done in other contemporary media. When 
Walker in chapter eleven goes into a first full-blown rage against an already overpowered 
enemy and beats him to death, a Radioman broadcast – here representative of broadcast and 
traditional media in general – mocks the protagonist with the following explicitly 
metareferential words: “Think of the children! […] Where’s all this violence comin’ from, 
man? Is it the video games? I bet it’s the video games.” As the player is fully aware, however, 
what really triggers Walker’s outburst at this moment is his pre-existing psychological 
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condition combined with the harsh realities of war. Add to this Spec Ops: The Line’s 
aforementioned focus on the general importance of not reassigning blame for one’s own 
actions and the game thus clearly advocates for self-awareness and personal responsibility, as 
well as for a search for the real triggers and origins of violent behaviour, in place of the base 
vilification of the entire medium of video games. 
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6.3 Metareference in The Stanley Parable 
When Stanley came to a set of two open doors, he entered the door on his left. 
(The Stanley Parable) 
Originally, the Stanley Parable was designed and released by Davey Wreden in 2011 as a free 
modification (or “mod”) for Half-Life 2 (2004). In 2013, however, in collaboration with 
William Pugh and under the studio name of Galactic Cafe, Wreden re-released a high-
definition remake of the mod as a full, standalone game. This latter version is the one which 
serves as the basis for this analysis.  
Unlike the first-person shooter which provided the basis for Wreden’s mod, The Stanley 
Parable itself is a first-person exploration game. Specifically, it belongs to a sub-genre 
sometimes also referred to as interactive fiction, which is usually characterised by so strong a 
focus on the exploration of a specific environment and story that its interactive elements and 
gameplay mechanics are highly limited. In fact, at their most extreme (cf. e.g. the Chinese 
Room’s Dear Esther (2012)), games belonging to this sub-genre often reduce player 
involvement to the manual control of a character’s linear movement throughout a story and 
area. As a result, over the last few years, such extreme works have been – sometimes 
pejoratively – dubbed “walking simulators” and their right to call themselves games proper 
has been questioned by games critics and reviewers repeatedly (cf. e.g. Bain; also bitmob; 
Fletcher; Plunkett). The fact that The Stanley Parable as one such work chooses to itself 
debate the nature of video games through metareferential commentary is thus particularly 
interesting and worthy of further examination. 
As is the case with many interactive fiction games, The Stanley Parable’s gameplay 
consists almost exclusively of walking up and down a highly restricted area. The number of 
items the player can actually interact with throughout the game is minuscule. Yet what 
differentiates The Stanley Parable from other, fully-fledged “walking simulators” is the fact 
that by deciding where to walk to, the players actually get to make a number of meaningful, 
existential choices and to explore a variety of different narratives. In fact, depending on just 
how the numerous secrets (or “Easter eggs”) discoverable throughout the game are counted 
and/or classified, The Stanley Parable contains approximately twenty different endings, all of 
which can be experienced within an average playtime of as little as six to eight hours (cf. 
howlongtobeat.com). In other words, each individual story branch of The Stanley Parable is 
kept very short so that players are actively encouraged to explore many different endings. For 
ultimately, the game’s highly metareferential message regarding questions of agency and 
       
242 
 
choice is only fully revealed through extensive exploration and a correlation of all twenty or 
so narratives. 
 
6.3.1 The Metareferential Message of the Narrator-Led Plotline 
Similarly to Spec Ops: The Line, already the menu screen of The Stanley Parable 
foreshadows the game’s highly metareferential nature. Firstly, the menu screen’s central 
graphical element consists of a picture of a desk with a computer monitor on top and already 
introduces the significance of the computer medium for the game’s story. Secondly, the 
diegetic monitor itself also displays The Stanley Parable’s menu screen, thus showing another 
monitor with another menu screen – mirroring the still image into infinity. Finally, the 
player’s movement of the mouse-cursor on his own real-life screen is equally mirrored ad 
infinitum and is visible on all mise-en-abyme monitors, as are any and all selections the 
player makes within the menu screen. Thus, right from the start, The Stanley Parable 
introduces player actions as having an impact on an infinite number of diegetic levels. And 
while all these levels are portrayed as separate monitors-within-monitors, the lines between 
them are still blurred by the fact that an action initiated on one (extra-)diegetic level is 
executed on all diegetic levels at the same time. 
Once the player starts the actual game, the desk and computer monitor visible in the 
menu screen are revealed to be those of the game’s protagonist, Stanley – though there are 
some small differences to the depicted space, such as a painting hanging from a different wall. 
An opening cutscene accompanied by voice-over narration subsequently introduces the 
game’s protagonist as follows:  
This is the story of a man named Stanley. Stanley worked for a company in a big building 
where he was Employee number 427. Employee number 427’s job was simple: he sat at his 
desk in room 427 and he pushed buttons on a keyboard. Orders came to him through a 
monitor on his desk, telling him what buttons to push, how long to push them, and in what 
order. This is what Employee 427 did every day of every month of every year, and although 
others might have considered it soul rending, Stanley relished every moment that the orders 
came in, as though he had been made exactly for this job. And Stanley was happy. 
This highly double-coded exposition speech is implicitly metareferential on multiple levels.  
Firstly, the description of Stanley’s job applies to the playing of video games as well. 
After all, reduced to their most basic core, video games also order players to press buttons 
based on prompts received through their monitors; and players are made happy by this 
obedient and successful execution of button presses, just like Stanley is. The Stanley 
Parable’s opening cutscene and especially its remarks about the protagonist’s “soul 
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rendering” actions, in other words, accentuate and expose certain video game features and 
player behaviours in a highly sarcastic, implicitly metareferential manner.  
In addition, The Stanley Parable’s opening sequence immediately draws attention to the 
fact that its story is highly medium-driven. From the start, the narrator’s words already hint at 
Stanley’s constructed nature. For the game’s protagonist, of course, has “been made exactly 
for this job” – he is a character made to fulfil a specific role in a video game. This fact is 
further stressed by the visual track of the opening cutscene, which has the “camera” zoom so 
far out during this narrator remark that the empty grey void surrounding the designed and 
animated space containing Stanley and his office is revealed. Through this cinematographic 
choice, The Stanley Parable further emphasises the highly limited and mediated nature of the 
character, his environment and the game’s narrative as a whole. 
Once the character of Stanley has thus been introduced, the game’s narrator moves on to 
describe the exact circumstances in which the protagonist finds himself at the onset of the 
game: namely, no orders have appeared on his monitor for a while. The effect of Stanley’s 
realisation of this fact is described as follows: “Shocked, frozen solid, Stanley found himself 
unable to move for the longest time. But as he came to his wits and regained his senses he got 
up from his desk and stepped out of his office.” As these lines are uttered, the game’s opening 
cutscene slowly and almost unnoticeably transitions into interactive gameplay. As Stanley 
seemingly regains control of “his” senses, it is really the player who gains control by now 
being able to affect both the camera (and thus Stanley’s vision) and the avatar’s movement. 
In accordance with typical video game traditions, most players at this point will follow 
the implied instructions included in the opening cutscene and will “get up” and “step out” of 
Stanley’s tiny office to find out why there have not been any orders. Once the player 
manoeuvres his avatar through the door, the arguably most defining feature of The Stanley 
Parable is introduced: the game’s persistent voice-over narration which resumes as soon as 
the player has executed all actions previously described by the narrator. For rather than just 
being an element of the game’s introductory cutscene, The Stanley Parable’s narrator – or 
rather Narrator – is central to the game’s message and to its whole gameplay experience to a 
degree which is highly unusual for the medium of video games (cf. Ryan, Avatars 185).  
While certain aspects of the Narrator’s role in Wreden’s game are modified and 
questioned as the story progresses, others remain constant throughout The Stanley Parable 
and frequently form the basis for the latter’s metareferential commentary. Firstly, as already 
visible from the opening cutscene, Wreden’s Narrator often blurs the boundary between 
player and avatar by double-codedly drawing attention to thoughts and behaviour which both 
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parties share. Yet these specific comments are not even required for the Narrator to cross 
diegetic lines as his entire nature is inherently highly transgressive.  
At his very core, Wreden’s Narrator functions as instruction giver to the player by 
narrating Stanley’s behaviour in advance – and this basic dynamic itself already breaks 
traditional narratological conventions as well as diegetic boundaries: for whilst the Narrator, 
imitating classic narrative voices from literature, tells his story in the past simple as 
something that has happened in his narrated world, the act is really only performed after the 
narration by an extradiegetic force located on an even higher plane than the Narrator himself. 
And once players become aware that they do not even have to do what the Narrator has just 
narrated, matters become only more complex. In fact, trying out possible deviations from the 
Narrator’s story and listening to the latter’s response to the deviant behaviour soon reveals 
itself to be the true core gameplay experience of The Stanley Parable. This experience is 
facilitated on the form level by the fact that many of the aforementioned twenty endings have 
an automatic (and often explicitly mentioned) reset-to-start included, and it is further 
supported on the content level by the Narrator whose resulting commentary often explicitly 
discusses metareferential topics such as choice, agency, narrative structure, gameplay 
mechanics and player behaviour. 
Before looking at any of the specific narratives triggered by divergent player behaviour, I 
would like to start with an analysis of the story which unfolds if the player and Stanley do 
exactly what the Narrator wants them to do. To achieve the relevant ending, the player needs 
to pass through four clearly designated forks in the narrative path and do as the narrative 
voice foreshadows: (1) “When Stanley came to a set of two open doors, he entered the door 
on his left [not right].”; (2) “Coming to a staircase, Stanley walked upstairs to his boss’s 
office [not down].”; (3) “Stanley walked straight ahead through the large door that read ‘Mind 
Control Facility’ [not left through the one that read ‘Escape’]”; (4) “he decided […] he would 
dismantle the controls once and for all [not turn the system back on]”. In all four of these 
cases – and in stark contrast to Spec Ops: The Line’s predominantly hidden options – The 
Stanley Parable’s visual track and level design make it very clear to the player that the 
Narrator’s version of events is not the only possible one. In fact, by presenting the player with 
two doors, two sets of stairs, two corridors and two different buttons to push, the game 
actively tempts the player to disregard the Narrator’s words. And the Narrator’s decisive, 
controlling, seemingly set-in-stone past simple narration only makes it even more alluring for 
players to try to test his control as well as the game’s scope by experimenting with the deviant 
routes. In other words, even whilst following The Stanley Parable’s most basic plotline, the 
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players’ attention is continuously drawn to matters of choice and to the medium’s unusual 
relationship between “recipient” and narrative (voice). 
If the player resists all temptations and Stanley plays his prescribed part in the Narrator’s 
plot, the protagonist and the player eventually uncover the following story: All employees of 
Stanley’s company up to this point have been mind-controlled by mysterious people working 
in a separate facility, who have been watching the employees on monitors and who have been 
influencing their behaviour and emotions by pressing certain buttons – not so different from 
the way in which players control avatars, in fact. Currently, however, for reasons unknown, 
the mind control facility is empty and the program is idle, providing Stanley with the 
opportunity to leave his office, to make his way into the facility, to choose (!) to turn off the 
system for good and to leave through a consequently opening gate leading to the outside. In 
short, the Narrator’s narrative is thus a story about achieving ultimate freedom by making an 
independent, unguided choice.  
Paradoxically, however, this seemingly happy ending of self-liberation is only reached by 
Stanley and the player if the latter consciously resists all choice and follows the narrative 
dictated by a highly restrictive, authoritative (and strikingly male, middle-aged and British-
accented) voice-from-the-off. Consequently, when the final gate slowly opens throughout a 
short cutscene, the following commentary provided by the Narrator is received by the player 
as being highly ironic: 
Yes! He had won! He had defeated the machine, unshackled himself from someone else’s 
command. Freedom was mere moments away. […] No longer would anyone tell him where 
to go, what to do, or how to feel. Whatever life he lives, it will be his. […] Stanley stepped 
through the open door. [pause for player now back in control to actually step out] Stanley 
felt the cool breeze upon his skin, the feeling of liberation, the immense possibility of the 
new path before him. This was exactly the way, right now, that things were meant to 
happen. And Stanley was happy. (“Freedom” ending73) 
Already on the level of the protagonist himself, The Stanley Parable’s mediated nature 
automatically questions the Narrator’s words. Firstly, Stanley, in this moment, has not really 
“unshackled himself” from anybody’s control as both the Narrator and the player have been 
making his choices for him throughout this entire sequence and continue to do so even after 
Stanley steps through the open gate. Even after the protagonist finds himself outside the office 
building and is finally able to see the wide blue sky and the open horizon – both symbolic of 
his supposed new freedoms and “immense possibility” – Stanley is still, quite literally, 
                                                 
73 Almost none of The Stanley Parable’s endings are explicitly labelled/referred to by name within the game 
itself. Rather than official titles I am therefore merely using descriptors, all of which are furthermore the ones 
commonly used by the game’s online community. 
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restricted to following “the new path” before him, namely the clearly designated pebbled 
walkway across the lawn. The game does not allow for players to move their character onto 
the grass even if they want to. In addition, the image of destiny evoked in the second-to-last 
line of the Narrator’s own words, seemingly an expression of Stanley’s own thoughts, further 
suggests that Stanley is acting in accordance with somebody else’s predetermination rather 
than his own free will. Finally, the last line itself by being an exact mirror of the last line of 
the game’s very first introductory paragraph further questions if there is any difference 
between the pre-game Stanley controlled by someone in a facility pressing buttons and the 
game-finale Stanley controlled by a player pressing buttons in accordance with instructions 
coming from a computer. In both cases, the self-unaware protagonist might be happy in his 
naivety but he is clearly not the one in charge of his life. 
Yet it is not only Stanley’s agency which is implicitly brought into question through the 
Narrator’s choice of final words. “Yes! He had won! He had defeated the machine” 
(“Freedom” ending) – these lines apply as much to the player at the end of a game as they do 
to the character of Stanley. Though it is very unlikely that many players feel any of the 
Narrator-suggested excitement and satisfaction from achieving the described “win”, exactly 
because they did not actually have to or get to “defeat the machine” to achieve it, they merely 
had to play along with the machine. In fact, such an utter lack of obstacles and ‘fail states’ is 
precisely what “walking simulators” are usually criticised for. After all, the medium jargon 
normally refers to a player’s win as the player “beating the game”, thus conjuring images of 
exerting dominance over and physically subduing a game. Merely following its story (and/or 
narrator) along to where it (and/or he) takes you, however, is a saliently different experience – 
and The Stanley Parable’s double-coded “Freedom” ending makes sure to draw the players’ 
attention to that. 
Finally, the Narrator’s commentary within this ending also reminds players that Stanley’s 
straightforward, close-minded liberation experience does not need to be the players’ ultimate 
experience as well. Several of the lines omitted from the quote above, in fact, explicitly refer 
to Stanley reflecting “on how many puzzles still lay unsolved” (“Freedom” ending) in the 
building behind him. And while the Narrator explains that Stanley does not care about those 
puzzles because all he wants is to be free, the message The Stanley Parable conveys to its 
players in that moment is that that their own freedom lies in the opportunity to go back and 
acquire the knowledge simple-minded and self-unaware Stanley, according to the Narrator, 
chooses to leave behind. The players are, in other words, encouraged once more to break free 
from the prescribed narrative and explore the deviant options. 
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6.3.2 The Metareferential Contributions of the Divergent Plotlines 
Once the game auto-restarts after a fade-to-white at the end of the Narrator’s speech, the 
player’s choice to not immediately switch off their computer but to remain within the game to 
explore other options is immediately rewarded with a variety of small visual changes in the 
environment (e.g. suddenly present papers spread all over the floor of certain cubicles, newly 
opened rooms, etc.) as well as of new Narrator lines (e.g. comments on the weather, slight 
variations in behaviour descriptions, etc.). In fact, The Stanley Parable is filled with so many 
minor (self-)references and asides that an analysis of each and every one would vastly exceed 
the scope of this chapter. However, retracing one’s steps as a player, making different choices 
at the four narrative intersections listed before and discovering a number of subsequent and/or 
hidden choices also leads to major narrative revelations comprised in The Stanley Parable’s 
different endings. Many of these are particularly relevant to the game’s overall metareferential 
message and thus require a closer look. 
 
6.3.2.1 Agency, Choice and the Role of Consequences 
Firstly, multiple endings explicitly recognise both Stanley’s and the player’s desire to retake 
control over their own actions – yet those endings also immediately point out that achieving 
that particular desire is impossible within the mediated framework of video games. If the 
player, for example, chooses to turn the mind control system of the facility back on (cf. 
“Explosion” ending) – this time seemingly with Stanley in charge – the Narrator explicitly 
acknowledges this choice as originating from a wish for “control”. He also, however, directly 
observes that “If you want to throw my story off track, you’re going to have to do much better 
than that. I’m afraid you don’t have nearly the power you think you do” (“Explosion” 
ending). Once again, the addressee of this statement is the player as much as Stanley.  
To prove his point, the Narrator (or in this case rather the game itself) suddenly 
transforms Stanley’s complete environment into an entirely new room containing many 
coloured and numbered buttons as well as a large two-minute countdown clock – thus 
showing to the player the god-like, literally world-changing powers of the game’s code over 
the player’s experience. With the Narrator explaining that a self-destruct sequence has been 
initiated (hence the timer), the players are subsequently encouraged to conclude based on 
classic game tropes that they are now expected to find the correct sequence of buttons in the 
room to push to stop the countdown. “It’s your time to shine! You are the star!”, exclaims the 
Narrator, sarcastically, only to soon after question the player’s/Stanley’s conclusion as a 
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whole by asking: “Why would you think that, Stanley? That this video game can be beaten, 
won, solved? Do you have any idea what your purpose in this place is?” (“Explosion” 
ending). Thus, through its “Explosion” ending, The Stanley Parable confronts the player with 
multiple metareferential considerations regarding the topic of control in video games.  
Firstly, the Narrator’s words draw attention to the fact that even in this divergent 
sequence of attempting to “beat” the game through puzzle solving, the players are not 
independently fighting to “defeat the machine” but are merely following tropes they have 
been taught by previous machines. Secondly, by conflating Stanley and the player by 
addressing first Stanley (by name), then the player (there is no “video game” in Stanley’s 
world) and finally both with the same “you”, the Narrator flattens and annuls diegetic 
hierarchies and presents avatar and player as equally powerless and inferior to the medium the 
latter is engaging with. Finally, by following up his questions with the observation that 
“You’re only still playing instead of watching a cutscene because I want to watch you for 
every moment that you’re powerless, to see you made humble” (“Explosion” ending), the 
Narrator even comments on the specific means the medium in question has at its disposal to 
create and convey this powerlessness in the first place.  
While the Narrator’s words expose the traditional effect of cutscenes to remove power 
from the player – an effect utilised metareferentially in both BioShock and Spec Ops: The 
Line – The Stanley Parable demonstrates that simulating powerlessness through gameplay 
can be equally, if not even more effective. Especially so if the game in question makes the 
player (self-)aware of the futility of his or her action, as the Narrator does in this scene by 
explicitly pointing it out. Eventually, no matter what the player tries to do, this ending of The 
Stanley Parable culminates in an explosion preceded by the Narrator wondering: “Will you 
cling desperately to your frail life, or will you let it go peacefully? Another choice! Make it 
count. Or don’t. It’s all the same to me. All a part of the joke.” (“Explosion” ending) – the 
ultimate joke, of course, being that all possible choices are already contained within the 
game’s code and are thus all created equal as well as are all equally created. 
An entirely different and at first glance much more developer-independent type of player 
agency discussed in one of the smaller endings of The Stanley Parable is the concept of 
hacking. For in the end, all my references to the game code as something predefined, 
developer-created and inaccessible to players are, of course, mere simplifications. Depending 
on the game, many players certainly can acquire more or less convenient and direct access to 
a game’s programming by hacking the code. If this was not the case, the making of the 
original The Stanley Parable mod for Half-Life 2 would have been impossible. The easy 
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console access in Wreden’s game, which allows for a certain amount of mid-game code 
manipulation by players, facilitates this hacking process but it is in no way a unique feature 
within the medium of computer games. What is unique about The Stanley Parable’s use of 
this feature, however, is that accessing the console triggers its own metareferential ending. 
To trigger what is known as the “Serious Room” ending, players are required to open the 
console and type in “sv_cheats 1” to attempt to activate the server cheats. If they do, Stanley 
and the player are immediately transported into an interrogation room setting marked by 
sombre stone walls and a heavy central table lit from above. There, protagonist and player are 
then submitted to a long and “serious” speech by the Narrator – so serious, in fact, that the 
word is mentioned ten times throughout the monologue. The core sentiment of the speech is 
the idea that the player’s attempt at cheating “runs the risk of breaking the entire game” 
(“Serious Room” ending). “You’ve got no respect for the strict order of scripted narrative 
events and I just can’t have that,” the Narrator exclaims and sentences the player to “one 
hundred, billion, trillion years [of] standing here in the serious room” (“Serious Room” 
ending). And true enough, there is no way for the player to escape the room other than 
manually restarting the game. In fact, if he or she tries to cheat again, the Narrator extends the 
player’s sentence to “infinity years” (“Serious Room” ending).  
This passage, whilst also functioning as a straightforwardly humorous self-referential 
joke, once more reveals a lot about the power-relationship between player and game. Firstly, 
it draws attention to the fact that code access is often referred to as using “cheats”, thus 
suggesting that while players do have the power to do so, they are normally not encouraged to 
change the code. Secondly, however, this scene also demonstrates that certain “cheat” 
commands are built into games on purpose and that they use a common language known if 
not to all players, then still to a large select group. Otherwise, players would be unable to find 
this particular ending without inputting an infinite number of sign combinations to see if 
anything happens. How far the damning word “cheating” is really applicable to the use of 
such built-in commands is thus questionable – and is questioned by the Narrator’s over-the-
top “serious”-ness on the subject. In addition to this commentary on medium jargon, the idea 
of player agency and empowerment through this type of hacking is, however, also questioned. 
For in the end, by using cheat codes, rather than fully independently interfering with a game’s 
programming, players are once more merely activating elements already contained within the 
game. Whether the input happens by using an interface or a console command does not make 
that meaningful of a difference at this point. 
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While the Stanley Parable questions how far players interacting with a game are able to 
make any impactful choices, this does not mean that the game denies the importance of 
making such decisions in the first place. There are in fact two correlated endings of the game 
in which the Narrator explicitly discusses the significance of choice. Both are initiated by the 
player choosing to go through “the door on his right” rather than left and eventually ending up 
in a room with a ringing, old-fashioned, corded telephone. 
After several hints suggesting that the person on the other end of the line is Stanley’s 
wife, the Narrator asks his protagonist to “Please, stop trying to make every decision by 
yourself” and to “If you can truly place your faith in another, then pick up the phone” 
(Crossroads between “Apartment” and “Choice” ending). With these words, The Stanley 
Parable goes beyond its usual game/player relationship commentary and draws attention to 
our choice making processes in general. Specifically, the game points out that whilst its 
players at this moment in time are treating divergent behaviour as a way to prove their 
independence, in real life, contrary behaviour just for the sake of individualism is not actually 
always considered desirable. Instead, especially in the context of relationships, following a 
mutually pre-agreed upon path to achieve pre-decided upon goals is often an accepted and 
even esteemed form of behaviour.  
Just how such collaborative choice-making could function is, however, never fully 
elaborated upon in the game for the Narrator soon reveals the wife, the family life, the 
apartment into which the protagonist is transported if he picks up the phone and, in fact, the 
whole game narrative as such to be merely a figment of Stanley’s imagination (cf. 
“Apartment” ending). According to the Narrator, this whole segment is merely one of many 
scenarios Stanley plays out in his head whilst at work to experience excitement and a feeling 
of freedom – two motivations which are usually ascribed to video game players as well.  
This idea of the protagonist being engaged in two simultaneous activities – working and 
daydreaming – is visualised for the player by the fact that floating text soon begins to appear 
on the screen instructing Stanley to press different keys. If the player wants to experience the 
entirety of the protagonist’s fantasy, he or she is required to perform these button presses to 
progress the narrative. The more commands the player and Stanley execute, however, the 
more the apartment begins to slowly transform back into the office interior, portraying 
metaleptically how the protagonist’s monotonous work keeps breaking into Stanley’s escapist 
fantasy and even into the player’s escapist video game fantasy since in the end it is he or she 
who has to perform the key presses and respond to the work orders given. 
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These orders, meanwhile, become increasingly meaningful. While the first examples of 
floating text merely provide the instruction of “Please press X”, soon the commands assume 
the format of “Press X to do Y”, Y throughout the sequence standing for ‘watch TV’, ‘spend 
time with the boys’, ‘prepare dinner’, ‘tell your kids a story’, ‘tell your wife you love her’, ‘go 
to sleep’ and ‘be at work in the morning’, respectively. In other words, in addition to 
commenting on the emptiness and monotony of Stanley’s job, The Stanley Parable’s 
“Apartment” ending also criticises the potential monotony of family life we all can succumb 
to. If we are not mindful, the game suggests, what should be meaningful and important 
experiences of love, comfort, joy and relaxation can be reduced to actions blindly performed 
because they are expected rather than because they are purposefully chosen. In the process, 
these vital interpersonal exchanges can be degraded to the point where they are as hollow as 
mindless button presses.  
In addition to thus criticising real-life behaviour patterns, The Stanley Parable throughout 
this sequence also once more exposes and discusses a traditional video game trope. After all, 
“Press X to do Y” is arguably the most common way to execute any type of action in games 
in general. By bringing this mechanic to the player’s attention in this specific context of 
repetitiveness, shallowness and monotony, however, and by further choosing entirely random 
keys for “X”, The Stanley Parable raises awareness of the emotionally, meaningfully and 
narratively flat and basic nature of this kind of interactivity. While it took popular games 
media and the wider gaming community another year to start discussing this subject – 
following a particularly egregious example of a forced attempt at interactivity in Call of Duty: 
Advanced Warfare (2014), in which a funeral cutscene is interrupted by a “Press F to pay 
respect” prompt – The Stanley Parable, thus ahead of its time, pointed out that better means 
of player engagement are worth looking for. This is not to say that it is utterly impossible to 
convey meaning and emotion through key strokes. As already mentioned in the introduction 
to this sixth chapter, Brothers, a Tale of Two Sons achieves just that in a brilliant manner. 
Still, in most cases, “Press X to do Y” is a far too simplistic interactive device, which, whilst 
suited as a provider of tactile immediacy and as a trigger for basic actions such as ‘pick up an 
item’, ‘open a door’ or ‘shoot’, is not a convincing means to engage the player, evoke 
emotions and drive the narrative. 
Finally, The Stanley Parable’s “Apartment” ending also discusses just how much choice 
is involved both in Stanley’s monotonous experiences and in our real-life routine behaviours. 
The Narrator describes the crux of Stanley’s lifestyle as follows: “Look at him, there, pushing 
buttons, doing exactly what he’s told to do. Now, he’s pushing a button. Now, he’s eating 
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lunch. Now, he’s going home. Now, he’s coming back to work. […] One might even feel 
sorry for him, except that he’s chosen this life” (“Apartment” ending) – and, strikingly, this 
last observation applies to most people’s everyday lives. On average, nobody is literally 
forced into a specific monotonous job, a monotonous personal life or a hobby which 
(seemingly) consists of nothing but button presses. And yet, most people discussing all the 
real-life aspects listed by the Narrator would argue that matters are usually not as simple. 
Only in the context of categorising gameplay do we still try to separate “choice” from “no 
choice” as if those two options are binary, a simple matter of black and white. This sequence 
of The Stanley Parable reminds players that there is, in fact, plenty of grey worth exploring. 
In the end, the only really inherently fatal behaviour presented in this scenario is that to “Press 
‘U’ to Question Nothing.”. According to Wreden’s game, executing this action to never 
question the mechanics that rule both our real lives and the media we immerse ourselves in 
ultimately leads to there only being one remaining instruction to follow, namely that to 
“Please die.”, the last prompt of the “Apartment” ending. 
The second possible ending achievable in The Stanley Parable through the room with the 
ringing telephone further elaborates on just how important it is that we question our 
surroundings and make meaningful choices. The ending is triggered if the player realises that, 
despite there being barely any objects he or she can interact with in this game and despite 
there being no indicator of there being any in this room (e.g. there is no medium-typical 
interface response to placing the mouse cursor on them), the player can actually click on the 
telephone’s cable to unplug it (cf. “Choice” ending). If the player does stop the ringing, this 
action is rewarded with the following response from the Narrator  
Oh no no no no, you can’t […] No, that wasn’t supposed to be a choice; how did you do 
that? You actually… chose incorrectly? I didn’t even know that was possible! […] None of 
these decisions were supposed to mean anything! I don’t understand. How on earth are you 
making meaningful choices? (“Choice” ending) 
before the voice-from-the-off finally has an epiphany: “You’re not Stanley. You’re a real 
person. […] This is why you’ve been able to make correct and incorrect choices!” (my 
emphasis). In other words, in this instance, The Stanley Parable directly equates being 
human, having an identity, being a “real person”, with the ability to make choices.  
Now aware that he is talking to such a real person, the Narrator proceeds to chastise the 
player for neglecting “basic safety protocol for real world decision-making” (“Choice” 
ending) and for risking a full negation of the whole game in the process. Appalled by the 
player’s irresponsible behaviour, the Narrator attempts to educate him or her by showing the 
player an instructional video on choice making: a 50s-style, black-and-white, cartoon-
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inspired, dark and racist parody which opens with the striking lines of “Choice. It’s the best 
part about being a real person but if used incorrectly can also be the most dangerous” 
(“Choice” ending). The Narrator’s video thus immediately emphasises that choices, whilst 
fun, also have consequences in the real world, and that those need to be considered in 
advance. This dual view of choices is particularly interesting in the metareferential context of 
video games. For the link between “best” and “most dangerous” implies that it is in the nature 
of choices to be both at the same time, each quality arguably contributing to the other. Yet 
how can this apply to the medium of video games, which – as suggested before – is said to 
provide pleasure exactly by providing experiences of choice without the danger of 
consequences? Can such safe choices ever be as pleasurable as the dangerous real-life ones 
which, according to the Narrator’s instructional video, constitute the best part about being a 
“real person”? And can such safe choices even be considered “proper” choices in the first 
place? 
Whilst never providing definite answers to any of these questions, The Stanley Parable 
certainly discusses multiple aspects of them throughout its narratives. At the core of many of 
these discussions lies the idea that, as the Narrator suggests in his commentary to the 
instructional video, if players are to make genuinely meaningful choices throughout the game, 
they need to actually treat their choices with the seriousness and responsibility demanded by 
the “basic safety protocol for real world decision-making” – or if they do not, they need to be 
willing to face more or less dramatic consequences for their actions. 
A first hint at this idea can be seen in The Stanley Parable’s “Reluctant” ending. This 
ending is triggered if the player realises that rather than exiting Stanley’s office at the very 
beginning of the game, he or she can direct the protagonist to close the office door and remain 
inside instead. This course of action results in the following lines by the Narrator: “But 
Stanley simply couldn’t handle the pressure. What if he had to make a decision? What if a 
crucial outcome fell under his responsibility? He had never been trained for that!” 
(“Reluctant” ending). These words serve as a very first warning about the potentially serious 
outcomes of “crucial” and impactful decisions – especially such made by the player.  
Building upon this warning, many of The Stanley Parable’s endings proceed to portray 
examples of disastrous consequences resulting from the player’s divergent choices. While 
many games usually depict choice-based consequences merely on a narrative level (e.g. 
through actions resulting in characters dying like in Spec Ops: The Line) or very rarely on a 
basic mechanical level (e.g. through side objectives being lost and players consequently being 
locked out of certain secondary content), The Stanley Parable portrays the dramatic and 
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violent nature of consequences through metareferential and metaleptic breaks in the 
characters, the narrative, the game environment and the walls between diegetic levels as such. 
These consequences bring up topics which go beyond mere matters of choice and as such will 
be discussed in the following sub-chapters.  
 
6.3.2.2 Metareferential Identity Crises and the Question of Who Is in Control 
On the character level, there are three endings which – mentally and/or physically – break 
Stanley himself: two of them are triggered by Stanley choosing to jump to his death on two 
different occasions (cf. “Death” and “Space” endings); a third ending is triggered by Stanley 
and the player choosing to go down the building’s staircase instead of up to his boss’ office, 
thus going down a literal as well as symbolic downward spiral which eventually leads to 
Stanley’s mental breakdown (cf. “Insane” ending). While the first two of these endings play 
with the common motif of suicide as the ultimate last-resort option for the (re-)assertion of 
one’s will and independence – in the “Space” ending Stanley is explicitly said to jump to his 
death to ruin the Narrator’s happiness – the third ending is of particular metareferential 
interest.  
The “Insane” ending shows that the one thing capable of breaking Stanley’s psyche – a 
psyche which has survived a devastatingly monotonous existence – is the character’s sudden 
realisation that he (as well as the player) cannot see his feet (a common feature of many first 
person games), that doors are closing behind him automatically (typical of level transitions in 
certain game genres), that rooms keep repeating themselves (typical of basic level design, 
here even portrayed as a full loop) and finally, that “there is a voice in [his] head dictating 
everything that [he’s] doing and thinking”. In other words, Stanley is driven mad by his rising 
(self-)awareness of the fact that he is a mediated character living in a world ruled by video 
game tropes related to camera angles, level design and narrative framework. After temporarily 
hoping that this experience is merely a dream and unsuccessfully trying to wake himself up, 
Stanley eventually shouts out: “Please just someone tell me I’m real! I must be real! I must 
be! Can anyone hear my voice?! Who am I? Who am I?!” (“Insane” ending). But, of course, 
nobody can hear Stanley’s voice just like nobody can answer his questions. The player hears 
even these most personal, desperate words merely through the Narrator since Stanley has no 
voice because he is a traditional silent video game avatar. Unheard and unanswered, 
increasingly losing grasp of his identity and not receiving a confirmation of his existence, 
Wreden’s protagonist, eventually, falls into an insane stupor. 
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The Stanley Parable could have easily left this ending at that, as a metareferentially 
framed portrayal of an identity crisis based on sudden self-awareness, yet the game instead 
takes its statement one step further. Once the screen fades to black on Stanley’s 
consciousness, before the game restarts, the Narrator picks up the story from a different 
perspective. Beginning with the words, “This is the story of a woman named Mariella.” 
(“Insane” ending), the subsequent game sequence portrays a scene in which that very Mariella 
witnesses a crazily raving man (Stanley) collapse face-down on the street in front of her. 
Consequently, the Narrator describes Mariella’s thoughts of gratitude for her own better 
circumstances as follows: “I am sane. I am in control of my mind. I know what is real, and 
what isn’t” (“Insane” ending). The irony of these words combined with Mariella’s utter lack 
of self-awareness – after all, she is exactly as powerless a game character as Stanley – serve 
as comic relief after the protagonist’s disturbing demise. Furthermore, they also draw the 
player’s attention to the fact that, very likely, he or she had thoughts similar to Mariella’s 
whilst watching Stanley’s nervous breakdown. By portraying these thoughts as indicative of 
Mariella’s lack of self-awareness, The Stanley Parable thus implicitly encourages players to 
question their own beliefs about their selves, and to (re)consider the ultimate certainty with 
which they approach their own perception of their arguably similarly constructed if not quite 
as externally mediated reality. 
These identity crises resulting from divergent player choices furthermore do not limit 
themselves to the character of Stanley and, potentially, to the players themselves. In addition, 
multiple of The Stanley Parable’s endings question the identity and hierarchical standing of 
the Narrator as well. Whilst the Narrator himself clearly seems to think of himself as a fully-
fledged person, fully in control of the narrative, and whilst the fact that players are able to 
“hear his voice” puts him closer than the protagonist to being “a real person” on the spectrum 
of “real”-ness which stretches between Stanley and the player, a variety of narrative branches 
still expose the Narrator as not being nearly as much the one making all the decisions as he 
gives himself the air to be. 
Already in the endings discussed up till now, there are several instances in which the 
complexity of the Narrator’s role within the story is built up. For example, in the “Explosion” 
ending, the Narrator suggests that he was the one to disrupt the mind control facility and set 
Stanley free, which would imply independent agency. Yet during the “Apartment” ending the 
Narrator explicitly acknowledges that “I don’t make the rules, I simply play to my intended 
purpose, the same as Stanley. We’re not so different, I suppose.” The exact reach and extent 
of the Narrator’s control and independence is thus brought into question. In addition, the 
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“Space” ending even questions how much the Narrator wants to be “in charge” in the first 
place. For after Stanley has wandered around the respective ending-triggering path for a 
while, the Narrator eventually is heard to voice the following opinion: “The problem is all 
these choices, the two of us always trying to get somewhere that isn’t here, running and 
running and running […] I would – we would both be so much happier if we just… stopped.” 
(“Space” ending). Choices, drive and agency are thus seemingly presented as a never-ending, 
draining and stressful activity which does not result in any real satisfaction.  
To escape this endless running, the Narrator suggests that he, Stanley and the player stay 
and rest in a newly accessible room which has no walls or furniture but consists of merely a 
circular floor surrounded by the open, star-filled vastness of space. The edges of the floor are 
rimmed with soft lights and the player can suddenly hear ethereal music – all components 
which help create (and arguably parody) a Zen-inspired atmosphere of meditation, stillness, 
and in-the-moment peace. As restful as the Narrator may find this room to be, however, for 
the player this location is a dead end. While the game allows for the player to stay in the room 
as long as he or she likes without an automatic restart, there is nothing to “do” in it, no further 
narrative to be gained. Through this void, The Stanley Parable asks players themselves to 
decide if they agree with the Narrator that this form of stagnation is a source of happiness (in 
which case players are welcome to stop playing the game and simply stay in that room 
forever) or whether they actually prefer the endless search for more despite the stress it comes 
with. Players are furthermore encouraged to consider what it is they actually want from a 
video game: an ambience piece or (inter)active gameplay. Either way, by posing these 
questions and by forcing players to actively choose whether to stay or to leave, The Stanley 
Parable raises all these choice-related questions in the players’ awareness – fully in keeping 
with the “Space” ending’s Zen motif which after all equally evokes ideas of mindfulness, self-
reflection and of a search for the ultimate self-awareness. 
In addition to these elements within the previously discussed endings, there are two 
further endings which focus on deconstructing the Narrator’s position of control. The first of 
them is triggered if the player and Stanley go through the right door instead of the left, then 
allow the Narrator to redirect them towards the “correct” path only to discover a new 
divergent option and deviate again. This repeated fluctuation between following and 
abandoning the narrative eventually leaves the Narrator utterly disorientated, having lost the 
thread of his story as well as his way around the office building (cf. “Confusion” ending). 
After reaching multiple dead ends, he eventually despairs and announces that “It’s all rubbish 
now. The whole story… completely unusable” (“Confusion” ending). He tries to restart the 
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game but this does not fix the confusion since doors and rooms still do not function as before. 
This prompts the Narrator to wonder: “[D]id something change? Stanley, did you change 
anything when we were back in that room […]? Did you move the story somewhere, or… 
Hold on. Why am I asking you? I’m the one who wrote the story. It was right here a minute 
ago. […] Okay, then, it’s an adventure! Come, Stanley, let’s find the story!” (“Confusion” 
ending). In other words, the Narrator’s personal confusion is explicitly presented as a 
confusion and consequent dissolution of hierarchical structures.  
Firstly, in this ending, the Narrator suddenly suggests that Stanley himself might be able 
to “move” the story despite the latter being located on a higher diegetic level. Secondly, the 
Narrator in this sequence also for the first time suggests that he is the one who actually wrote 
the narrative. This statement seemingly contradicts the Narrator’s previously mentioned 
assertion that he “doesn’t make the rules” (“Apartment” ending) and thus encourages players 
to consider how these two separate proclamations can be reconciled. One possible answer to 
this question is to see the two statements as metareferential commentary, which suggests that 
in the medium of video games the mechanical ruleset is located on a hierarchically higher 
level than the narrative and thus being in charge of the story does not make the Narrator in 
charge of the rules. Another possible answer is to approach this seeming discrepancy from the 
perspective of The Stanley Parable’s omnipresent theme of lacking self-awareness and to 
interpret this passage as the Narrator demonstrating that he is as unclear of his own role and 
limitations as Stanley is of his. This interpretation is further reinforced by the Narrator’s last 
words of “let us find the story” which suggest that at this moment in time the Narrator 
acknowledges himself to be on the same level of non-omniscience as his character.  
The rest of the “Confusion” ending consists of multiple attempts by the Narrator to open 
new pathways and lead Stanley back to the story, each of which is highly metareferential. 
Firstly, by soon calling the experience the “worst adventure” ever, the Narrator suggests that 
all games lacking story, direction and interactivity (beyond manual walking) might make for 
terrible adventures. Secondly, after multiple unsuccessful attempts at solving the problem 
through restarts, the Narrator observes that he “find[s] it unlikely that we’ll ever progress by 
starting over and over again” (“Confusion” ending). With these words, the narrator 
unwittingly makes fun of a central video game feature, namely the fact that players usually 
are exactly expected to keep reloading the game every time they reach a failure state in the 
hope that they will be able to do better next time. And, of course, The Stanley Parable’s own 
main gameplay loop is literally built upon such reboots, which are what allow the players to 
experience all the different endings in the first place. 
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Not being able to make progress through restarts within this particular ending, however, 
the Narrator next tries to resolve his confusion by rebranding the current dead end as a win 
condition. Out of nowhere, floating text appears announcing “You Win!” – yet even the 
Narrator himself immediately has to admit that this does not feel right since nobody had to do 
any work to earn this “win”. This admission in turn reiterates an idea already seen in the 
“Freedom” ending: namely the idea that video games, traditionally, provide satisfaction 
through a feeling of achievement resulting from overcome obstacles.  
The Narrator’s subsequent final attempt at overcoming his confusion is to introduce a 
literal, physical “Story Line TM” into the environment, a yellow line of paint across the floor 
which is supposed to help Stanley find his way back to the narrative. Happy with his idea, the 
Narrator exclaims “onward to destiny!” (“Confusion” ending) and thus once again draws 
attention to the similarities between the two goal-driven, predetermination-based concepts of 
destiny and narrative (cf. also “Freedom” ending). However, the Narrator also nearly instantly 
deconstructs this parallel again by wondering: “Though, here’s a thought: wouldn’t wherever 
we end up be our destination, even if there’s no story there? Or, to put it another way, is the 
story of no destination still a story?” (“Confusion” ending). The necessity of a predetermined 
goal for a narrative is thus brought into question.  
Of course, the “Story Line TM”, being part of a pre-constructed game, does have a 
destination and thus is not a tool capable of answering this existential question. Yet The 
Stanley Parable solves this flaw in its symbolism by having the Narrator, Stanley and the 
player never really find out what the Line’s destination is, thus arguably making the latter 
irrelevant. For as the group continues to follow the yellow (non-brick) road, the line becomes 
increasingly jagged and erratic, it is suddenly painted on walls and ceilings instead of the 
floor, and it begins to cross itself. The Narrator explicitly tries to counteract his consequently 
rising frustration by adding, commenting upon and thus exposing another medium-typical 
feature, namely that of light-hearted and dynamic background music, but to no avail. 
Eventually, the Narrator exasperatedly addresses the line with the following remark: “[H]ow 
could you have done this to us, and after we trusted you?” (“Confusion” ending). Whilst 
doing so, he draws attention to the traditional function of plotlines to serve as guidelines 
recipients can “trust” to have a point and purpose. Furthermore, the Narrator’s statement also 
once more implicitly questions his position within the diegetic hierarchical structure. After all, 
whilst earlier within this ending the Narrator announced he was the creator of the story, at this 
point he suggests the story(line) itself is in control as an independent force separate from and 
superior to him.  
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As soon as the Narrator acknowledges his own current lack of control, he immediately 
begins to try and reassert it. He asks “Why can’t we make up our own story? Something 
exciting, daring, mysterious…” and begins to open new doors which diverge from the yellow-
marked path. That is to say, the Narrator suddenly adopts a behaviour up to this point reserved 
for the players, and implicitly comments on the players’ possible motivations behind it by 
exposing his own thought processes. At the eventual sight of two open doors – a sight which 
mirrors the player’s first conscious choice in the game – the Narrator furthermore exclaims 
“Ah, a choice! We get to make a decision; from here, the story is in our control! How 
important we mustn’t squander the opportunity. In fact, I believe I need a minute to think 
here.” (“Confusion” ending). The idea of a correlation between choice-making and control is 
thus explicitly voiced. Yet all the Narrator’s thinking – presented as a highly illogical stream-
of-consciousness, for of course no amount of logic can really help a character or player 
outthink and escape the game code’s ultimate control – cannot save him from eventually 
choosing a path which leads him, Stanley and the player into a dark room with a screen, the 
latter of which bears the title “The Confusion Ending” and lists all different sections and steps 
which constitute this ending.  
At closer examination, the player and, soon after, the Narrator himself realise that the 
screen lists eight restarts as part of the “Confusion” ending, of which the player and Narrator 
up to this point have merely experienced the first four. Shocked by this revelation, his voice 
expressing sadness morphing into anger, the Narrator subsequently exclaims: “That’s what 
this is? […] It’s all… determined? […] Why don’t I get to decide?! Why don’t I get a say in 
all this?!” (“Confusion” ending). Once again, he thus acknowledges that he is as much a pawn 
of the game’s narrative and code as Stanley is, and the player is encouraged to realise that the 
Narrator’s exclamation applies to the player’s gameplay experience as well. After all, when 
the Narrator eventually attempts to establish his sovereignty by refusing to follow the on-
screen description and to restart the game for a fifth time, the player has no other options but 
to either follow the Narrator and just stand in the room with Stanley and wait – there being no 
other pathways open to explore – or to follow the game’s instructions and to manually restart.  
If the player chooses to wait, he or she is presented with further existential commentary 
by the Narrator, who begins to debate whether (and if yes to what extent) things can be 
affected by inaction – until, suddenly, the game cuts the Narrator off and automatically 
restarts, thus seemingly proving that in the end, nobody can escape its (or their) programming. 
Noticeably, however, no matter whether the player manually restarts beforehand or stays, this 
moment constitutes the end of the “Confusion” ending as this fifth reset puts all parties 
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involved back to the neutral opening state of The Stanley Parable rather than to the fifth 
restart state listed on the screen. Through this deviation from the list, the game thus after all 
suggests that the Narrator’s sudden self-awareness and his choice to refuse following 
instructions do have an impact. Since the game code, however, is incapable of processing 
aberrant behaviour it merely resets to a neutral state rather than providing real opportunities 
for independent actions. This idea of a processing error is further emphasised by the sudden, 
dissonant, loud and electronic sound which accompanies only this particular automatic reset 
of The Stanley Parable. 
The final major ending which exposes the Narrator’s lack of control is triggered if the 
player chooses to go through the door labelled “Escape” instead of heading for the “Mind 
Control Center”. Stanley’s consequent path through a long dark tunnel and industrial back-
stage area eventually leads him onto an inescapable conveyor belt and into what seems to be a 
death trap between two vertical plates rhythmically smashing against each other (cf. 
“Museum” ending). The Narrator even narrates Stanley’s seemingly last thoughts and finishes 
the protagonist’s story with the words “Farewell, Stanley”. Yet just before the plates’ last 
crushing impact, the machinery suddenly freezes into place and an escape route opens up. 
More importantly for this metareferential study, however, a female narrative voice also takes 
over the narration, beginning with the words “‘Farewell, Stanley,’ cried the Narrator”. 
This female narrator, once she has inserted herself and her narrative plane into the game’s 
hierarchical structure in this manner, continues to lead Stanley through the aforementioned 
escape route into an entirely new type of space. Passing through a door labelled with “The 
Stanley Parable”, the protagonist and player eventually find themselves in a museum which 
exhibits the game as well as some of the development processes behind it. The new area is 
filled with displays containing individual props, set pieces and even entire 3D-models of The 
Stanley Parable’s levels, Narrator quotes are mounted on walls in the form of inspirational 
posters, and paintings portraying multiple versions of the same room show how the design of 
that particular room has changed throughout the game’s development. An acoustic installation 
furthermore plays outtakes from the Narrator’s voice-over recording sessions, and, finally, the 
area also contains a wall inscribed with the names of all people involved in the game’s real-
life development, thus functioning as a first credits screen.  
In addition, all these individual pieces, as is typical of museum exhibits, are accompanied 
by small explanatory plaques which contain further explicit metareferential information. For 
example, one of these signs lets the players know that the corridor length of the opening 
section was consciously designed with a focus on pacing aiming to make sure that Stanley 
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reached the two-door intersection “in a good time”; another plaque explicitly states that the 
“contradiction” posed by the narration at this two-door intersection is the heart of the game, 
everything else being mere further elaborations upon this core idea; a third sign discusses the 
technical aspects of how, for example, the button sounds audible in the “Explosion” ending 
were created; a fourth label refers to earlier designs of the “Freedom” ending in the industry-
specific terms of them being “first iterations” during “alpha”; etc.  
In short, this entire sequence, in addition to introducing the new narrative level of the 
female narrator, also provides an entirely new level of metacommentary. Whilst in The 
Stanley Parable’s other endings medium tropes and mechanics are mostly portrayed through 
double-coded asides, contextually salient narrator remarks and implicit play with traditions 
and rules, in the “Museum” ending the constructed nature of games explicitly becomes the 
central topic of the narrative, and the metareferential focus of the game zeroes in even more 
onto the fictio aspects of the medium. All the while, the female narrator – while never 
explicitly remarking on the museum’s exhibits – takes on the role of an external critic or 
museum guide who further comments on motifs and patterns recognisable throughout the 
narrative.  
Whilst the female narrator does offer some additional commentary on certain 
philosophical questions raised by the game – e.g. by observing that “When every path you can 
walk has been created for you long in advance, death becomes meaningless, making life the 
same” and thus providing her perspective on the topics of choice and meaningful agency – 
most of her commentary is directed towards the characters of Stanley and the Narrator, and 
especially towards the relationship between them. Already right at the beginning of her 
narration, building upon the Narrator’s dramatic final farewell, the female voice observes that 
even if the protagonist’s death would have taken place as narrated by her male counterpart, 
soon Stanley “would restart the game, back in his office, as alive as ever” – so “[w]hat exactly 
did the Narrator think he was going to accomplish?” (“Museum” ending). In other words, just 
like the Narrator himself in other endings frequently points out the futility of Stanley’s 
actions, the hierarchically superior female narrator in the “Museum” ending does the same to 
her predecessor. In fact, it is one of the female narrator’s main functions in The Stanley 
Parable to point out the similarities between the two characters of Stanley and the Narrator.  
With observations such as “Oh, look at these two. How they wish to destroy one another. 
How they wish to control one another. How they both wish to be free.” and “Can you see? 
Can you see how much they need one another?” (“Museum” ending) the female narrator 
repeatedly draws attention to the fact that the two characters’ existences and identities are 
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rooted entirely within their interaction with each other. As a smaller ending of the game 
already indicates by stranding the player and Stanley, who at one point can seemingly sneak 
out on the Narrator, in front of an escape pod which explicitly can only be operated if both 
Stanley and the Narrator are present (cf. “Escape Pod” ending), the female narrator’s 
comments continuously emphasise that the two characters cannot function without each other. 
After all, an abstract idea of a story without characters is as hollow as characters standing 
around without a story. Only once their roles and fates are combined do both Stanley and the 
Narrator suddenly derive purpose, most notably from their relentless attempts to control 
and/or outsmart and/or “beat” each other – in other words from interactions typical of player 
approaches towards and engagement with the medium of video games as a whole. 
The female narrator, however, soon also points out that there is still something very 
unique about the player which separates him or her from the two in-game characters. The 
female narrator expresses her thoughts on the matter as follows: “But listen to me, you can 
still save these two […] Press ‘escape’, and press ‘quit’. There’s no other way to beat this 
game. As long as you move forward, you’ll be walking someone else’s path. Stop now, and it 
will be your only true choice.” (“Museum” ending). At the core of the female narrator’s 
argument, in other words, lies the fact that while Stanley and the Narrator are forever bound 
to each other through their existence within The Stanley Parable, the player is of course free 
to walk away from the narrative. The concept of the player as the only “real person” capable 
of making real choices is thus once again emphasised. Furthermore, the most categorical way 
of “beating” a game is metareferentially portrayed to be the setting aside of the game and 
leaving it unfinished – and thus depriving it of its impact, influence and purpose. 
 
6.3.2.3 Metareferential Easter Eggs and “Glitches” 
The next two metareferential endings of The Stanley Parable are comparatively short; yet 
they still both play an important role in the game’s medium-exploring tapestry. They 
furthermore do so by themselves being perfect representatives of two typical video game 
components, thus being metareferential on the form level as well. The first of these endings is 
an “Easter egg” or secret which is triggered if the player realises – without being given any 
clues – that he or she can open the door of one specific broom closet inside Stanley’s office 
building and lock him- or herself inside it (cf. “Broom Closet” ending).  
Once the player does that, the Narrator comments that “There was nothing here. No 
choice to make, no path to follow, just an empty broom closet. No reason to still be here”. 
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With these words, the Narrator suggests ad negativum that interactive objects, choices and 
progression are what usually provides players with “reasons” for playing. The Narrator 
further continues: “If I had said, ‘Stanley walked past the broom closet,’ at least you would 
have had a reason for exploring it to find out.” (“Broom Closet” ending). This sentence 
implicitly exposes The Stanley Parable’s “Stanley entered the door on his left”-motif as the 
purposeful, player-guiding curiosity trigger that it is. Furthermore, exploration and curiosity 
are thus also added to the list of reasons for playing video games. Additionally, the Narrator’s 
remark is also an indirect reference to the typical player behaviour of exploring everything 
else but the actual quest in any given area first to see what secrets (such as an accessible 
broom closet) might lie hidden within the level. In fact, in this sequence, the Narrator even 
explicitly mocks typical player conversations resulting from uncovering such secrets by 
proclaiming in a ridicule-exuding tone “‘Oh, did you get the broom closet ending? The broom 
closet ending was my favourite XD’”, thus emphasising the potential for social boasting 
inherent in finding secrets, which can be another driving force for players.  
Eventually, however, the Narrator comes to the conclusion that the real reason why 
Stanley is still standing in the closet might be that “you are dead”. Whilst, initially, this ‘you’ 
might be interpreted as referring to Stanley, it is soon revealed that the Narrator is, in truth, 
breaking the fourth wall and addressing the player directly. For once the Narrator reaches his 
conclusion he immediately begins to shout: “Hello?! Anyone who happens to be nearby, the 
person at this computer is dead!”. He also moves on to suggest that the player has most likely 
succumbed to one of “your countless human […] vulnerabilities” (“Broom Closet” ending, 
my emphasis), thus indicating that while the Narrator often speaks of himself as an individual, 
he does not actually think of himself as being human.  
Wishing to continue his narrative, the Narrator subsequently asks anyone nearby to 
remove the assumed dead body and place a new human in front of the computer after “making 
sure they understand basic first-person video game mechanics, and filling them in on the 
history of narrative tropes in video gaming, so that the irony and insightful commentary of 
this game is not lost on them” (“Broom Closet” ending). Through this demand, The Stanley 
Parable for the first time explicitly draws attention to the pre-knowledge required both to play 
a video game in general – namely the understanding of basic mechanics – and to understand a 
metareferential game (or any kind of metareferential work for that matter) in particular – 
namely a strong enough familiarity with the medium to recognise tropes and ironies.  
Once the Narrator has explicitly identified the ideal player of his (and Wreden’s) game, 
he instructs this presumed new player as follows: “Alright then […], just step out into the 
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hallway.” (“Broom Closet” ending). Through this change in verb tense, mood, and point of 
view, The Stanley Parable for the very first time employs and hence references the traditional 
method of issuing instructions through direct second-person imperatives instead of the 
Narrator’s typical third-person narration. If the player follows these instructions – and he or 
she has no choice but to do so (other than restarting or abandoning the game, of course) – the 
Narrator ultimately exclaims: “Ah, second player! It’s good to have you on board. I guarantee 
you can’t do any worse than the person who came before you.” (“Broom Closet” ending). In 
one last aside the Narrator thus references one final common video game feature, namely that 
of the competition between multiple players all trying to “beat” and surpass each other’s 
performances. 
The second secret, short ending which contributes to The Stanley Parable’s 
metareferential commentary by exposing specific video game features is triggered if the 
player realises that he or she can climb out of one of the office building’s windows (cf. what 
is known as the “Window”, “Voice Over” or “Song” ending). Due to the visual design of the 
relevant environment, the execution of the climbing action on screen looks less like a 
character’s exit through a window and more as if the player has found a way to “glitch” 
through the window74. Thus the trigger for this particular ending transforms even what is 
traditionally a common coding mistake into a meaningful metareference. For as the player 
soon learns this seeming glitch is of course far from accidental. Furthermore, the “Window” 
ending also acknowledges and exposes the typical player behaviour of actively searching for 
such “flaws” by relying on this very specific behaviour for the ending to be triggered in the 
first place. 
As soon as the player makes his or her way outside, the Narrator immediately explains 
the true nature of the seeming glitch as follows: “At first Stanley assumed he had broken the 
map, until he heard this narration and realized it was a part of the game’s design all along. He 
then praised the game for its insightful and witty commentary into the nature of video game 
structure and its examination of structural narrative tropes.” (“Window” ending). The 
“Window” ending thus contains the most strikingly explicit example of intra-compositionally 
metareferential narration in the entirety of The Stanley Parable. In fact, the Narrator’s precise 
analysis of this moment in the game he himself is a part of would be arguably more at home 
in an academic study than in a traditional purely (non-meta)fictional text. 
                                                 
74 I.e. has found a flaw in the environmental design which allows the player to squeeze his or her avatar past 
certain elements to reach an area which he or she was never meant to be able to see and access, possibly even an 
area outside of the constructed game world. 
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Having thus exposed the exact function of the “Window” ending, the Narrator 
subsequently asks the player with the help of floating, pixelated text – an homage to old-
school input systems – if he or she is “sick of this gag” yet. If the player chooses ‘no’, the 
game provides further “witty commentary” on structural video game and narrative tropes as 
well as on player behaviour. Most notably, the Narrator suggests that players are now 
probably wondering what would have happened if they had chosen ‘yes’ and whether it is 
worth replaying the sequence to find out. The Narrator further explicitly acknowledges that 
any potential worth of a replay would lie in the possibility to hear additional narration. In 
short, the Narrator throughout this section of the “Window” ending exposes some of the main 
elements consciously built into The Stanley Parable for the purpose of driving and directing 
the player’s curiosity and attention.  
If the player, in contrast, selects ‘yes’ when asked if he or she is “sick of this gag”, the 
Narrator – once more highly self-referentially – bitingly exclaims that nobody is stopping the 
player from restarting the game at any point. The fact that he or she has, however, clearly not 
done so even whilst apparently being unsatisfied with what is happening in the game is 
commented upon by the Narrator as follows: “I’m enjoying what seems to be an internal 
conflict going on where you are literally unable to act on your own desires to restart the 
game” (“Window” ending). Thus questions of decision-making and agency are brought up 
again, this time in a much more sarcastic manner. The game takes the insult contained within 
the ‘yes’ answer and immediately turns the tables on the player. The Narrator ridicules the 
player’s inconsistent or at least passive behaviour and eventually even begins to sing a highly 
insulting song about how insufferable Stanley is and how if the player is not careful he or she 
will soon become equally unbearable and incapable of action. 
 
6.3.2.4 The Art of Making Good Video Games 
The second to last ending of The Stanley Parable which contributes to the game’s 
metareferential tapestry is triggered if Stanley and the player deviate consistently from the 
Narrator’s descriptions after stepping through the “door on [their] right”. Eventually, the 
player and Stanley find themselves in a vast empty hangar (cf. “Games” ending), the sight of 
which elicits the following response from the Narrator: 
       
266 
 
You see? There’s nothing here. I haven’t even finished building this section of the map, 
because you were never supposed to be here in the first place. Broken rooms, exposed 
developer textures… is this what you wanted? Was it worth ruining the entire story I had 
written out specifically for you? Do you not think I put a lot of time into that? Because I did. 
[…] Help me here, Stanley, help me elucidate these strange and unknowable desires of 
yours. What would have made this game better? 
Through this response from the Narrator, the “Games” ending explicitly references hitherto 
unmentioned video game features, specifically usually masked elements such as developer 
textures and map grids which form the underlying skeleton of every video game. 
Additionally, the Narrator once more brings the topic of player motivation to the foreground. 
Finally, the “Games” ending also introduces an entirely new field to the metareferential 
discussion, namely that of what exactly can be done to improve the quality of a video game, 
and thus that of what exactly constitutes a good video game. 
The Narrator first initiates his explicit metareferential investigation into player 
preferences by proposing particular changes he could make to the game design – “What did 
you want to see? Vehicles? Skill trees?” (“Games” ending) – and thus exposing further typical 
video game tropes. From there, the Narrator moves on to a game-industry-specific format of 
asking these very same questions. Namely, he asks the player to “beta-test” individual 
elements he creates inside the test-chamber-like hangar and to then evaluate them on a scale 
from one to five. From an increased number of choices (suddenly there are three doors to 
choose from instead of two) to the inclusion of a worldwide leader board tracking playtime, 
number of doors opened, steps taken and endings achieved, several classic game elements are 
subsequently metareferentially pitched to the player.  
The Narrator always accompanies these beta tests with detailed questions about the 
player’s response to the respective elements, thus revealing the response those features 
traditionally aim to elicit in the process. For example, at the end of the leader board segment 
the Narrator asks: “Would you say that competitive leader board helped you feel motivated to 
keep walking through doors?” (“Games” ending). Through questions like this, The Stanley 
Parable provides explicit metareferential commentary on the function of certain medium-
specific features whilst simultaneously implicitly portraying the typical playtest / feedback 
loop characteristic of the final fine-tuning stages of video game development. Finally, the 
topic of choice is once more touched upon as well. For if the player ever rates anything as a 
three, the Narrator ridicules the player’s seeming lack of opinion, pointing out that not all 
made choices are automatically meaningful, and exposes the pitfalls of using rating scales for 
feedback at the same time.  
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Once the Narrator has received multiple answers from the player, he suddenly decides to 
show the latter an early prototype of an entirely different game. In a next room, the player 
(Stanley, at this point, seems to have been entirely forgotten and removed from the 
increasingly metaleptic Narrator / player interaction) is confronted with the following 
mechanical setup: a cardboard cut-out of a baby moves endlessly along a straight track 
towards a burning fire accompanied by piercing crying sounds; meanwhile, a button in the 
room can reset the baby back to its original starting point, thus temporarily saving it from the 
flames. In short, the player is presented with a strikingly to-the-point yet also highly reductive 
exemplification of a classic gameplay loop: a mechanical, a visual and an audio track 
combined create a fictional danger scenario without real-life consequences, which the player 
can avert by pressing a button. Whilst the player absorbs this tableau, the Narrator describes 
the contraption as “a very meaningful game – all about the desperation and tedium of 
endlessly confronting the demands of family life” and further comments that he thinks “the art 
world will really take notice” (“Games” ending). The banality of the presented gameplay 
contrasted with these lofty aspirations voiced by the Narrator – a contrast which forms a 
parallel to the motif of a family life reduced to hollow button presses portrayed in the 
“Apartment” ending – meanwhile introduces the next metareferential theme of this The 
Stanley Parable ending, namely Wreden’s contribution to the debate whether video games are 
qualified to be considered an art form or not. 
Based on the Narrator’s introduction of his prototype, the first impression players are 
encouraged to have of the debate is one of utter absurdity. Whether the brunt of the mockery, 
however, is directed at the idea of games as art or at the haughtiness of people assuming to 
have the right to judge what constitutes art and what does not is at this point still open to 
interpretation. Either way, the Narrator’s suddenly highly pretentious (and thus highly 
uncharacteristic) narrative style definitely pokes fun at a specific type of haughty, “artsy” and 
better-than-thou game developer as well. 
To hear all of the Narrator’s further elaborations on the topic, the player is required to 
keep pushing the baby-reset button for four hours in a row. For the Narrator soon announces: 
“[O]f course, the message of the game only becomes clear once you’ve been playing it for 
about 4h. So why don’t you give it 4h of play to make sure it’s effective” (“Games” ending). 
Whilst very few players would be willing to perform this tedious action – the game thus 
implicitly drawing attention to the difference between the player and Stanley, whose entire 
work day consists of nothing else but contently and repeatedly pushing buttons – there have 
been players with the skillset required to write a macro-program to click the button for them, 
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who have recorded their “gameplay” experience for posterity (cf. e.g. OuttaSpace). And being 
the highly medium- and player-aware game that it is, The Stanley Parable builds an entire 
metareferential sequence on top of this predicted player behaviour. 
In particular, after the player resets the baby’s movements several times, the Narrator 
himself remarks that he believes the player to be running such an automated program. The 
Narrator furthermore subsequently explicitly wonders if such a program does not “kind of 
ruin[] the point of the game, don’t you think? Wouldn’t that take the art out of it? You can tell 
me in your post-playtest analysis” (“Games” ending). And whilst expecting the player to 
manually perform the task at hand can certainly be considered madness, it is irrefutable that if 
the purpose of the prototype game really is to simulate the “desperation and tedium” of family 
life, then avoiding the tedium through the use of a program certainly does negate the game’s 
entire purpose.  
By exposing this dilemma, The Stanley Parable implicitly raises the question of what the 
perfect game-design soft-spot could be which would create a realistic enough simulation to 
trigger the required experience without fully frustrating the player. Furthermore, these words 
by the Narrator also draw the player’s attention to the debate surrounding the question of just 
how suited the medium of video games really is for the portrayal of negative experiences – a 
question which of course becomes particularly relevant in the context of emotionally and 
psychologically darker games such as Spec Ops: The Line75. While The Stanley Parable never 
explicitly provides a definite answer, it does indirectly suggest that the aforementioned soft-
spot might play an important role. 
If the player, with the use of a macro-program or not, pushes further on into the four 
hours of prototype gameplay, what he or she will soon notice is the fact that there is barely 
any Narrator commentary accompanying the player’s actions throughout this sequence and 
thus rewarding him or her for his or her resilience and determination. At first glance, this 
design choice might appear unusual, considering that – as explicitly acknowledged in the 
“Window” ending – the desire to hear more narration is one of the central forces driving 
player behaviour in The Stanley Parable. Yet unsurprisingly, this seemingly aberrant design 
choice is soon revealed to have a metareferential purpose when the Narrator’s voice explicitly 
addresses the fact that the player probably expected to hear more from him and announces 
                                                 
75 Horror games would, of course, also serve as potentially less metareferential but otherwise even more 
dramatic examples, as would more experimental, psychologically demanding games such as Hellblade: Senua’s 
Sacrifice, which is meant to simulate the experiences of a character caught in the middle of a psychotic episode 
(audio-visual hallucinations and all). 
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that this, however, will not be the case since he wants the player to engage with the prototype 
game for its own sake: “For the art! For the endlessly spiralling sense of pointlessness and 
despair! Yes, this is what drives your every action! Keep clicking that button! For hope! For 
freedom! For science! For love!” (“Games” ending).  
Other than this, the rare few narrative segments present throughout the four-hour 
sequence focus on encouraging the player and on the Narrator’s relentless emphasis of the 
artistic value of his prototype. “This is it, Stanley, art! I did it! Video games are art!” 
(“Games” ending) he exclaims as he adds a second cardboard cut-out (a puppy) and a second 
button (to prevent the puppy from being lowered into a piranha tank) at the two-hour mark. 
And “It warms my heart to see how deeply the message of this game has resonated with you” 
(“Games” ending), he announces shortly after. These proclamations of the Narrator’s artistic 
vision eventually culminate in the prototype’s grand finale triggered by the gameplay 
reaching the four-hour mark: The screen turns white, a one-to-one representation of the 
monolith from Stanley Kubrick’s filmic version of 2001: A Space Odyssey (1968) appears, 
and through floating text introduces itself as “the essence of divine art” (“Games” ending), 
which promises to one day carry the player to its serene afterlife garden.  
The pathos of this scene, when contrasted with the tediousness and absurdity of the 
preceding sequence, immediately brings the Narrator’s entire vision into question. This is, 
however, not to say that Wreden’s game mocks any kind of artistic ambition in video games 
in general. After all, The Stanley Parable itself is an artistically complex and undeniably 
ambitious computer game. The resulting question, therefore, is what exactly it is which makes 
Wreden’s creation better and/or less ridiculous than the Narrator’s prototype. The Stanley 
Parable never explicitly answers this question – and this lack of an answer, rather than being 
a mere omission, is the game’s chosen means of encouraging the players to think for 
themselves and to find their own answers to the unresolved problem in front of them now that 
the metareferential narrative has brought it to their attention. 
Meanwhile, if the player does not have the patience or the basic programming skill 
required to keep the baby alive for four hours, the Narrator frustratedly ends the playtesting 
experience with a sarcastic delivery of “Thank you for playing! Your input was extremely 
valuable”, thus referencing and foregrounding the typical language used at the end of 
feedback questionnaires. Frustrated by the fact that the player does not seem to value his 
creation, the Narrator furthermore decides to test if the player (and possibly Stanley) would 
more enjoy games made by other developers. For this purpose, The Stanley Parable contains 
two consecutive segments copied entirely from two existing, real-life video games – 
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Mojang’s Minecraft (2009) and Valve’s Portal (2007), respectively – and the Narrator 
transports the player and his invisible since first-person avatar straight into them.  
Throughout the subsequent two short scenarios, the Narrator still guides the player and 
Stanley within the respective game worlds in typical The Stanley Parable narration-driven 
manner. He does, however, also continuously comment on the characteristics of the two new 
games and how they compare to The Stanley Parable. In regard to Minecraft, for example, 
once he has demonstrated the typical exploration, resource, and building components of 
Mojang’s sandbox survival game, the Narrator soon remarks: “This is far more open-ended 
than I had in mind. I’m looking for something more narrow and linear, something that makes 
you feel utterly irrelevant. This won’t do it at all” (“Games” ending). In other words, through 
his commentary, the Narrator in this sequence draws explicit attention to video game genre 
characteristics and once more comments on the effects they have on the player’s experience 
(in this case specifically on his or her feelings of agency). In contrast, Stanley’s, the player’s 
and the Narrator’s arrival in Portal causes the latter to remark that “You… trapped in a glass 
box, with no way out, listening to me talk… Oh, it’s inspired. I couldn’t have done it any 
better myself.” (“Games” ending). This time, the Narrator first references the similarities 
between Portal and The Stanley Parable (setting, tone, prominent voice-over narration) 
before moving on to discover the deviating and genre-defining puzzle-solving elements 
central to Valve’s game and sarcastically rejoicing: “Critical thinking, Stanley. Your forte” 
(“Games” ending). 
In the long run, however, the Narrator does not derive enough pleasure from watching 
Stanley and the player engage with other people’s games. Therefore, he eventually almost 
petulantly encloses Stanley in a section of Portal he seemingly cannot leave and announces: 
So, why don’t you get cozy in this room, and if you have any grand revolutionary ideas for 
the perfect videogame, you can just sit there and let it ball up inside you for all eternity. I 
don’t need your advice. I don’t need your ratings. And I certainly don’t need the validation 
of a man whose job is to push buttons. I think I’ll just go about my business making 
meaningful cultural contributions to the world. And perhaps every now and then, I’ll think 
back to a man named Stanley who was objectively wrong in every decision he ever made. 
The thought won’t last long. (“Games” ending) 
Thus, having already parodied beta-testing and game-reviewing processes, The Stanley 
Parable’s “Games” ending finally also metareferentially tackles the topic of developer 
responses to criticism. The commonplace rebuttals of “if critics have so many great ideas why 
do they not execute them” and of “players just press keys while developers are true artists” 
are both implicitly referred to within the Narrator’s short monologue, accompanied by the 
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expressed belief that due to this inferiority of both critics and players game developers (in this 
case represented by the Narrator himself) do not really need either of these groups to exist.  
Whilst the Narrator, at least in this moment of frustration, seems to be completely certain 
of the opinion he is voicing, the pouty tone of his delivery triggers images of a sulking child 
in the player instead of visions of a declaration of independence. This idea is further 
reinforced by the metareferential context provided by the rest of The Stanley Parable 
(especially throughout the “Museum” and “Escape Pod” endings), which establishes on 
multiple occasions beyond any reasonable doubt that the Narrator is in truth nothing without 
Stanley and the players. Through this context, the Narrator’s postulation that developers and 
their games can exist and, more importantly, can fulfil any kind of purpose in a vacuum is 
immediately revealed to be short-sighted and utterly lacking in self-awareness.  
The longer the player remains within the enclosed Portal space without restarting the 
game, the more and more stubborn and infantile the Narrator’s monologue gets, eventually 
culminating in the following trailing-of speech: “He’ll understand soon what I was trying to 
tell him. […] Oh, yes. Yes, I’ll be back. There’s no other way. Once this ends, after it all 
comes to a close, then I’ll be back. The end will be here soon. Very soon. I can wait. ...” 
(“Games” ending). Yet of course, if a creator fully isolates him- or herself from his or her 
audience, no understanding can ever happen for there is in fact no communication which 
could initialise it. Therefore, as long as Stanley and the player are stuck in the Portal world, 
the Narrator is equally stuck, waiting, in a personal narrative which cannot progress without 
interaction. 
 
6.3.3 Conclusion: Metareferences in The Stanley Parable’s True Ending 
The final ending of The Stanley Parable which deserves further analysis is one I have, in fact, 
already mentioned before. The ending in question is the “Choice” ending, which does not 
actually end in the parodistic instructional video my examination of it finished with. In fact, 
two separate paths open up for the player as soon as the instructional footage ends. First, 
however, upon regaining sight of the office building environment in which Stanley is 
standing, the player is confronted with the circumstance that, as the Narrator observes, “this 
room has begun to deteriorate as a result of narrative contradiction” (“Choice” ending). More 
specifically, the extradiegetic player’s metaleptic intrusion into the story – or rather the 
Narrator’s sudden awareness of it – is depicted as having caused a breakdown of textures, 
code-elements are suddenly exposed as visible lettering, objects begin to randomly merge and 
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clip with each other, etc. In short, the Narrator’s sudden awareness of the presence of a “real 
person” is shown to have resulted in his quite literal inability to uphold the immersive illusion 
and to keep the mediated and constructed nature of the environment hidden. Instead, the 
medium-specific skeleton of all components suddenly rises to the surface, to the quite literal, 
physical and visual forefront of the player’s and the Narrator’s attention.  
Upon seeing this deteriorated state of the environment, the Narrator explains that “this 
place is not well-equipped to deal with reality” and urges the player to return to the story so 
that “the story will have resolution once again, and you’ll be home free in the real world!”. In 
other words, the Narrator invites the player to re-immerse him- or herself back into the 
narrative, by drawing attention to the captivating nature of an unresolved story. After all, 
unless they actively dislike and therefore abandon a game or narrative for good, most players 
(or recipients in general) will feel invested in and therefore bound to that game or narrative 
until they have mastered all obstacles, tied-up all lose ends, and thus can truly proclaim that 
they have “beaten” the game and are now “home free”. 
As is typical of The Stanley Parable’s gameplay loop, the player at this point has to 
choose whether or not he or she wants to heed the Narrator’s urgings. If the player refuses to 
follow the Narrator’s instructions, the environments throughout the building deteriorate 
further and further and the Narrator cannot stop the process even through attempted restarts. 
As his frustration grows he eventually exclaims “What did you think was so special about 
seeing the game undone? […] You – who thought you were so clever. […] What, did you 
think it would be funny? You just had to see?” (“Choice” ending), thus once more exposing 
and discussing possible motivations behind deviant player behaviour. 
If, instead, the player chooses to follow the Narrator’s instructions, the latter leads the 
player and the protagonist back to Stanley’s boss’s office where they should be able to resume 
the story. However, the layout and features of the office are slightly different this time around 
compared to those present in the direct “Freedom” ending. Most significantly, instead of 
being controlled by a keypad, the door to the secret Mind Control Facility now sports a voice-
activated lock. Accordingly, the Narrator’s description of the door-opening sequence is also 
different and goes as follows: “Stanley had been trained never to speak up, but now he would 
draw from within himself the courage to face the unknown. He drew a sharp breath, and then 
spoke the code” (“Choice” ending). Yet Stanley, as discussed before, of course does not 
actually have a voice with which to speak the code (arguably symbolic of the fact that Stanley 
the fixed construct cannot suddenly develop courage just because of the player’s deviant 
behaviour), thus the player cannot do anything but stand in front of the door in silence.  
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Furious, the Narrator verbally attacks the player for once again boycotting his narrative 
and shouts “Speak! Say something to me! Explain yourself! You coward!!” (“Choice” 
ending) – but, of course, the player cannot. Despite the Narrator being able to seemingly 
transgress diegetic boundaries by addressing the player directly, the player him- or herself 
cannot talk back. He or she can neither physically enter the narrative world to activate the 
lock nor can he or she answer the Narrator. Thus in contrast to the “Choice” ending’s earlier 
focus on the player as a “real person” capable of affecting meaningful change within the 
narrative across diegetic levels, this late section of the ending specifically exposes the 
limitations of the player’s transgressive potential. In this moment of the story both the 
Narrator and the player thus become arguably the most aware of the exact framework of the 
medial and narrative systems at work in The Stanley Parable – and on this realisation the 
screen fades to black.  
A few seconds later, the game resumes yet the (physical) perspective from which the 
player is observing events has changed dramatically. Whereas up to this point – in true first-
person-game fashion – the angle of the virtual camera has always suggested that the player is 
looking out through Stanley’s eyes, in these final moments of the “Choice” ending the virtual 
camera is floating above what seems to be the suddenly translucent ceiling of the game’s 
offices. Upon looking down, the player for the first time since the opening cutscene can 
actually see the figure of Stanley, standing far beneath the player in front of the two open 
doors which, according to the “Museum” ending, constitute the heart of The Stanley 
Parable’s metareferential story. Furthermore, the player can also hear the Narrator’s 
respective instructions again – though only quietly since the Narrator’s voice also originates 
from a lower (in this case physical as well as diegetic) plane and thus is muffled by the 
ceiling.  
With the player now separated from the protagonist by a physical fourth wall (or ceiling), 
Stanley of course cannot move, not to mention make a choice. Eventually, witnessing his 
protagonist’s utter inactivity, the Narrator’s voice begins to grow increasingly sadder and 
sadder as he keeps trying to convince Stanley to walk through one of the doors. 
 I… I need you to make a choice. […] the story needs you. It needs you to make a decision. 
It cannot exist without you. […] Whatever choice you make is just fine, they are both 
correct; you cannot be wrong here. We can work together; I’ll accept whatever you do. […] 
Please? Choose? Do something? Anything. This is more important than you can ever know. 
I need this. The story needs it. […] That’s alright. I’ll wait for you to decide what is the right 
thing to do. Take as much time as you need… 
With this, the Narrator’s voice slowly trails off and the words “The end” appear in floating 
text on the screen, followed by “Thank you for playing” and a classic credits roll.  
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This floating text, only present at the end of this specific ending, makes it clear that the 
“Choice” ending – whilst leaving the Narrator in limbo – is the one meant to serve as the 
ultimate conclusion (or “true ending”) for the player. This in turn identifies the Narrator’s 
final plea and the sequence’s visual focus on the player’s external and superior position as the 
last words, or moral, of The Stanley Parable. Through them, Wreden’s game summarises its 
main metareferential ideas one last time: it emphasises the existentially double-coded 
importance of choices; it draws attention to the medial, diegetic and interactive structures at 
work in video games; and, finally, through the Narrator’s emotional appeal, it foregrounds the 
fact that without players interacting with them and engaging with their worlds, games would, 
essentially, be deprived of their life force.  
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7. Metareference in Contemporary Narrative Online Video 
With vlogs, web-series and online video in general being such a young medium, in-depth 
theoretical studies on the subject are still a comparative rarity76. Consequently, this 
introductory chapter will be very brief. The formats have, however, been around for long 
enough to develop their own themes and language77, as well as to become aware of these 
themes and language – thus making metareferential works possible. 
Andreas Mahler has argued that “[t]alking about what you are doing (instead of simply 
doing it) seems to have become increasingly fashionable throughout the last couple of 
decades” (52). And while Mahler is talking specifically about contemporary writing and art, 
the popularity of social media, blogs and vlogs through which people continuously 
commentate their own lives certainly confirms his thesis for the online world as well. In 
addition, as Wolfgang Funk has pointed out, the transitions between fiction and reality are 
often particularly fluid in online media (cf. 127). This can be seen, for example, in the virtual 
reality premises of sites such as Second Life, in the supposedly “authentic” whilst still highly 
produced nature of YouTube and Instagram content, or even just in the most generic of online 
features, the anonymous internet handle, which allows users to pretend to be whoever they 
want (cf. Funk 127). This combination of established “talking about doing” patterns, of 
conscious self-stylisation and of fluid boundary transitions makes online content a perfect 
medium for metareferential discussions, which is why I have included it in this study despite 
its still comparatively limited corpus of fully metareferential works. 
For my analysis, I have chosen the YouTube series The Lizzie Bennet Diaries (2012-
2013) as a prime example for the metareferential potential of online media78. On the one hand, 
YouTube itself by way of being the “fastest-growing site in the history of the Web” (Snickars 
and Vorderau 11), the “very epitome of digital culture” (Snickars and Vorderau 11) and part 
of the “cultural zeitgeist around the world” (Lange, “(Mis)conceptions” 87) is arguably the 
perfect platform to be examined in a study like mine which is interested in the role media are 
                                                 
76 For first studies trying to define YouTube as a medium in more detail, especially in regard to its place amongst 
other media and to its future cf. Hillrichs; Jenkins, “Nine Propositions”; Marek; as well as the readers edited by 
Snickars/Vonderau and Lovink/Niederer, respectively. 
77 For an analysis of how these themes and language are now even packaged into specific instruction manuals on 
how to do YouTube right cf. Müller. 
78 By choosing a web-series for my analysis I am, of course, neglecting a variety of more medially complex 
types of digital fiction. The main reason for this is that I consider it impossible to do those complexities any 
justice within one single chapter. For studies which provide a much better introduction to the subject matter than 
I would be able to cf. e.g. Bell, Possible Worlds and “‘I Felt like I’d Stepped out of a Different Reality’”. 
       
276 
 
portrayed to play in our society. On the other hand, The Lizzie Bennet Diaries in particular are 
a highly metareferential work. 
Firstly, by being an adaptation of Jane Austen’s Pride and Prejudice (1813), the web-
series delivers implicit commentary on the differences between its own medium and Austen’s, 
as well as on the differences between the role of online content in our society and the role of 
literature in the early nineteenth century. Secondly, by combining elements of traditional 
scripted series with features of online vlogs, the web-series explores additional intermedial 
parallels whilst also discussing defining characteristics of its own medium. Thirdly, by 
surrounding their web-series with an entire network of additional online content, the creators 
of The Lizzie Bennet Diaries provide metareferential commentary on more than just one 
section of the worldwide web. Finally, in an age in which studies report strikingly high 
numbers of teenagers in particular consuming, creating and sharing online media content (cf. 
e.g. Jenkins 3), metareferential online content aimed specifically at these teenagers, portraying 
these teenagers, and attempting to raise their self- and medium-awareness carries additional 
significance. 
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7.1 Metareference in The Lizzie Bennet Diaries79 
My name is Lizzie Bennet, and this is my [vlog].  
(The Lizzie Bennet Diaries, signature opening phrase) 
Created by Hank Green and Bernie Su, The Lizzie Bennet Diaries are mostly a fictional 
YouTube vlog series, in which a modern-day American version of Austen’s heroine shares 
her life with the world as part of a university project required for her advanced degree in mass 
communication. Over the course of exactly one hundred short episodes, the series 
subsequently tells its adaptation of the Pride and Prejudice story through typical vlog-style 
narration and re-enactments by Lizzie, as well as through guest appearances by other 
characters. Using Rainer Hillrichs’ terminology, the episodes include a large variety of vlog 
sub-genres from “public diary clips” (Hillrichs 100) to “subject clips” (Hillrichs 102) to 
“parodic performance videos” (Hillrichs 103).  
These core vlogs are further supplemented by fictional twitter and Facebook accounts for 
most characters, by a homepage for modern-day Darcy’s company Pemberley Digital, by a 
LinkedIn profile for Mr. Collins, a Lookbook profile for Jane, a This Is My Jam account for 
Georgiana and by several additional short vlog series by other characters such as Lydia80 or 
Charlotte’s sister Maria81, all of which provide viewers with additional perspectives on 
events. Which character followed which when on social media, what web design elements 
were chosen by the different characters for the layouts of their respective homepages and 
channels82, what types of videos the different characters are making – all these elements are 
used in a creative, meaningful and highly metareferential manner by Green, Su and their team 
to contribute to The Lizzie Bennet Diaries’ narrative. 
This narrative, meanwhile, strives to incorporate all iconic elements of Austen’s classic 
work (incl. finding an ingenious way to keep the famous opening sentence despite the change 
of narrative voice and perspective) and to translate the novel’s core ideas into a modern-day 
setting, demonstrating their continued relevance in the process. In accordance with recent 
                                                 
79 For a previously published essay of mine on this topic with a slightly different focus cf. Baeva, “My Name is 
Lizzie Bennet”. 
80 Cf. The Lydia Bennet. 
81 Cf. Maria of the Lu. 
82 This aspect of Green’s and Su’s creative web of course mirrors the meaningful use of design in Austen’s 
original portrayal of Mr. Darcy’s estate, thus suggesting a parallel between the role homes played in the early 
nineteenth century and the role homepages play today. 
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theories of what constitutes a “good” adaptation83, the focus of The Lizzie Bennet Diaries 
throughout all this lies not only on the factual transposition of early-nineteenth-century plot-
elements into an early-twenty-first-century setting but on finding the modern-day emotional 
as well as cultural equivalents of the original issues depicted through the plot. 84  
Specifically, this means that just like Pride and Prejudice85, The Lizzie Bennet Diaries aim 
to portray the society of their time and to expose the social conventions at work. Even more 
specifically, just like Austen’s novel, The Lizzie Bennet Diaries focus on the societal 
expectations placed on both women and men, on the norms governing social interactions and 
communication, and on what constitutes socially acceptable behaviour. What makes this 
focus particularly interesting from the perspective of a metareferential study is the fact that 
The Lizzie Bennet Diaries suggest that in addition to the (economic) status and gender 
considerations described by Austen86, “new media” – and social media in particular – are one 
of the main factors shaping our social lives today.  
This belief is what makes The Lizzie Bennet Diaries so highly metareferential. It 
transforms the vlog series from a merely heteroreferential new media work about social 
norms to a metareferential new media work about (amongst other things) the impact of new 
media on our society. The Lizzie Bennet Diaries consequently discuss that very impact both 
by implicitly portraying and thus exposing the new media tropes which shape our societal 
conventions and by depicting explicit conversations and monologues which in turn analyse 
those tropes, curtesy of Lizzie’s degree in mass communication. In addition, the 
aforementioned tweets, Facebook posts, comments and websites expose further influential 
new media tropes by mimicking real-life linguistic and visual features of online self-
stylisation and communication.87  
 
                                                 
83 For introductions to such theories of adaptation as ‘translation’ or ‘appropriation’ cf. e.g. Emig; Leitch; 
Nicklas; Lindner.  
84 For the purposes of this chapter, I will restrict my analysis as much as possible to the specifically 
metareferential features of The Lizzie Bennet Diaries. For a more detailed analysis of the web-series as an 
adaptation cf. Baeva, “My Name is Lizzie Bennet”. 
85 Cf. e.g. Deresiewicz as well as McMaster for Austen as a “social commentator” (McMaster 114); Tanner for 
Austen’s writings as “detailed analyses of social manners” (xiv); Todd for Austen’s depiction of women and 
society (cf. 139, 142). 
86 For a study which, from a feminist perspective, focuses much more in-depth on these first aspects of the 
adaptation cf. Kostadinova. 
87 Since I am neither a linguist nor a scholar of design, I will focus my analysis predominantly on the 
metareferential elements of the core web-series – especially so since my study aims to examine narrative media, 
and twitter, Facebook and company websites do not really qualify as such, even if as demonstrated by Green and 
Su they certainly can be used for narrative purposes. For more detailed analyses of the transmedial aspects of this 
adaptation I therefore recommend Jandl; Seymour; Tepper. 
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7.1.1 The Medial Features of Web-Video 
On a highly implicit level, already the most basic stylistic and medial changes made to the 
Pride and Prejudice narrative in the process of the adaptation can be seen as double-coded, 
metareferential demonstrations of certain new media features. For example, Austen’s 
characteristic narrative voice is replaced with Lizzie’s own highly characteristic and yet 
typical of vlogs first-person narration directly into the camera, thus exposing the new 
medium’s inherently different “narrative” structure and seemingly stronger focus on a more 
personal (and arguably more intimate), immediate communication of thoughts. Furthermore, 
the entire narrative is broken down into thematically self-contained, three-to-five-minute-long 
audio-visual chunks which utilise further vlog-typical elements such as medium close-up 
framing, blurred backdrops of cosy and orderly rooms, and perfectly yet softly lit faces88. In 
short, every cinematographic choice made in The Lizzie Bennet Diaries is firmly guided by 
established vlog formulas. The professionally produced, fictional web-series aspect of the 
show merely shines through in the strikingly high production quality of each of the copied 
elements.  
What is metareferentially striking about all these copied elements, meanwhile, is the fact 
that they are exactly those which help create the aforementioned feeling of immediacy and 
intimacy whilst at the same time also constructing a highly stylised image of what immediacy 
and intimacy are. In other words, the elements adopted by The Lizzie Bennet Diaries strongly 
contribute to the in-between fiction and reality position of online media such as vlogs 
previously described by Funk. Specifically – taking the idea that television brought anchors 
and entertainers right into people’s living rooms one step further – through their choice of 
setting and backdrops, vlogs suggest that they are taking the audience directly into the content 
creators’ most private and personal space. Combined with the fact that online videos are 
frequently consumed on mobile phones and home computers within the audience’s private 
space as well, vlogs are thus firmly built upon the idea of unique levels of intimacy.  
At the same time, however, the medium close-up framing and blur filters commonly used 
in vlogs and consciously mimicked by The Lizzie Bennet Diaries make sure that the audience 
is still kept at just the right level of distance: they restrict the view of the private space to just 
what the creators are comfortable sharing and they place the camera just far enough from the 
                                                 
88 For more in-depth introductions to the audio-visual and performative conventions of video logs in general as 
well as to their general functions and effects cf. Hillrichs, especially 9-10, 128-150, 214-259; also Broeren, 
especially 158-159; Harley and Fitzpatrick. 
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vlogger to mask any potential “imperfections”. Similarly, the soft-lighting and warm colours 
further contribute to the creation of a homely and inviting atmosphere whilst – sometimes 
unnoticeably – enhancing, polishing and thus stylizing and constructing the vlogger’s 
seemingly personal and “authentic” space.  
Notably, however, the fictional narrative and professional production quality of The 
Lizzie Bennet Diaries make sure that none of these elements really go unnoticed. They move 
Green’s and Su’s creation just enough towards the blatantly mediated side of the fiction / 
reality spectrum to expose the series’ constructed nature whilst still remaining in close enough 
proximity to traditional in-between vlogs to encourage viewers to draw parallels and thus to 
notice the constructed nature of the latter medium as well. The same effect is further achieved 
by The Lizzie Bennet Diaries’ inclusion of additional medium-specific yet also actively 
medium-revealing features such as jump-cuts, signature openers, and floating text, all of 
which further remind viewers that what they are watching is a constructed piece of art.  
Whilst all these referenced vlog features are so extremely implicitly metareferential that 
viewers could easily miss their metareferential message – after all, The Lizzie Bennet Diaries 
do not even reference the tropes by breaking them and thus making them stand out – other 
increasingly explicit metareferential elements of the web-series incessantly contextualise their 
implicit brothers and sisters, thus aiding the latter’s salience. On a small scale, already the 
repeated number of times in which Charlotte (the initial camera operator of Lizzie’s videos) is 
portrayed to enter the frame only to soon return to her usual position behind the camera (cf. 
e.g. ep. 1 1:22; ep. 42 2:12-2:38) continuously remind viewers of the presence of that very 
same camera. Similarly, the always visible script pages for the costume theatre sequences (cf. 
e.g. ep. 1 1:30), through exaggeration, draw the audience’s attention to the fact that not all 
that happens on a web-camera is improvised. Most importantly, however, due to her pursuit 
of an advanced degree in mass communication, Lizzie herself is portrayed as a protagonist 
who is very aware of the different features and components of web-video, as well as of the 
specific audio-visual and narrative tools she herself employs in her vlogs. The few times she 
is not, The Lizzie Bennet Diaries specifically use these cases to portray their protagonist’s 
development into becoming aware, thus mirroring the motif of personal growth through 
increased (self-) awareness already central to Austen’s original narrative. 
Lizzie’s more common state of full awareness is usually depicted in The Lizzie Bennet 
Diaries in the form of either monologues by Lizzie or dialogues between her and Charlotte, in 
which the protagonist (and her friend) explicitly discuss(es) the videos the two are making. 
The web-series portrays debates about the right way to open (cf. e.g. ep. 5 0:27) and end (cf. 
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e.g. ep. 3 2:58-3:03) a video as well as about how many subjects should be addressed (cf. ep. 
11 2:31); there are references to viewers (cf. ep. 21 0:46-0:56, 1:16) and playlists (cf. ep. 27 
0:27); there are honest admissions that certain things, such as cute cat videos, are shown to 
boost view numbers (cf. ep. 10 0:04-0:20); there are elaborations on how copyright issues 
prevent Lizzie from singing Christmas songs on camera (cf. ep. 75 0:49-1:08); there is an 
entire episode filmed at Vidcon89 (cf. ep. 25 2:25-3:00); there is a discussion between Lizzie 
and Charlotte as to how polished a video should be since viewers demand a feeling of 
“authenticity” (cf. ep. 8 0:00-0:14); there is even an almost academic conversation between 
Darcy and Lizzie on the concept of hyper-mediation and the function of costume theatre in 
her videos (cf. ep. 80 1:37-2:20). 
In short, throughout their one hundred episodes, The Lizzie Bennet Diaries refer to a wide 
range of medium-related features and considerations. Whereas the discussions about 
openings, endings and subject matter focus on matters of content and demonstrate that there 
are more complex issues at work than merely whether a scene is scripted or not, conversations 
about viewers, viewer numbers and viewer demands expose the constant audience-awareness 
of creators and already hint at the highly controlled and calculated mercantile aspects of 
content creation. Furthermore, references such as the one mentioning playlists even draw 
attention to the external, technical features of the platforms which host the actual content. 
Finally, the narrative implementation of Vidcon further acknowledges external elements 
which have grown as part of a new medium-surrounding industry. 
 
7.1.2 The Social Significance of New Media 
As this short summary shows, many of the series’ in-character conversations about web-video 
often centre around fictio-metareferences which discuss the medium’s components, goals and 
identity. Yet The Lizzie Bennet Diaries also contain additional explicitly metareferential 
exchanges which provide commentary on the moral, ethical and social implications and 
effects of the medium’s features – especially as they relate to the topics of social interactions 
and norms, of public and personal perception, central to both The Lizzie Bennet Diaries and 
Austen’s original text. Throughout these exchanges, the web-series portrays the potential 
pitfalls of new media as well as their ultimate strengths. 
                                                 
89 The biggest annual convention for online video content, originally conceived by Green and his brother John 
Green. Designed as both an industry and a community event, Vidcon provides opportunities for networking, for 
learning about content production and marketing, and last but not least for interactions with fans. 
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Implicitly exaggerated through The Lizzie Bennet Diaries’ high production quality and 
explicitly discussed by Lizzie and Charlotte, already the visual polish-providing elements 
typical of a lot of web-content can be seen as ethically significant. After all, it is highly 
important for (especially young) viewers’ own self-esteem, as well as for their view of 
content creators and people in general, that they are aware that what they see in vlogs and 
other new media is, on average, only the best part of a person’s life. No matter how more 
immediate and “authentic” online content appears to be in comparison to, for example, 
movies or television series, it is still as mediated and constructed as any other artform. To use 
a concept already existing in Austen’s time and purposefully evoked by The Lizzie Bennet 
Diaries, what creators choose to show in their vlogs is the twenty-first century equivalent of 
their ‘public face’. This public face does not need to be a fully disingenuous mask yet more 
often than not it is a person’s most presentable, most accomplished, most composed and thus 
far from truly “authentic” persona. Being conscious of this fact and knowing how to engage 
with it appropriately is thus a central skill in regards to mature and mindful media 
consumption, and to mature social interactions in any public setting as well. 
In addition to this intricate relationship with the medium’s perceived “authenticity”, the 
constructed nature of web-video can, as with every medium, also become ethically and 
socially relevant through its effect on the objectivity of the content. As argued before, the 
perceived intimacy of the seemingly received access to a creator’s life and thought processes 
constitutes one of the most appealing qualities of new media content. Vlogs, blogs, a variety 
of social media – they are all built upon the premise that viewers (or readers) want to hear (or 
read) a certain creator’s opinion on a given subject or even just want to see this particular 
creator document his or her life and review his or her personal experiences. Yet while new 
media platforms really do provide unprecedented opportunities in this regard, The Lizzie 
Bennet Diaries also make sure to point out how detrimental it can be if audiences forget that 
what they are consuming is a highly personal, subjective and accordingly edited view of those 
experiences.  
In the web-series’ twelfth episode, Lizzie introduces this topic of subjectivity by 
exclaiming about her own content: “Of course I’m biased, it’s my video blog!” (ep. 12 0:45) – 
and this exclamation is highly indicative of the means through which matters of perception 
and objectivity are approached throughout the entirety of The Lizzie Bennet Diaries. For this 
very bias inherent to Lizzie’s vlog is what Green, Su and their team use as the metareferential 
focal point for the two eponymous traits of Austen’s novel to expose how ‘pride’ and 
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‘prejudice’ – encouraged by new media – still thwart our perception of our surroundings till 
the present day. 
 Austen frequently depicts her characters’ biases by constructing a narrative which, at 
least initially, incites readers to make the very same wrong judgements. For this purpose, she 
often introduces new characters and situations through the limited perspective of another 
character first rather than through an objective description given by an omniscient narrator90. 
The introduction of secondary characters in The Lizzie Bennet Diaries through Lizzie’s highly 
biased vlog commentary directly continues this stylistic tradition. Throughout the web-series, 
viewers are repeatedly encouraged to laugh along with Lizzie’s costume-theatre-parodies and 
biting narration and to thus participate in her acts of ridicule directed against her mother, 
Darcy (as Mr. Darcy is referred to in this adaptation) or Bing Lee (the modern-day Asian 
American version of Mr. Bingley) for quite some time before they ever catch an on-camera 
glimpse of the objects of this mockery and thus receive an opportunity to form their own, less 
biased opinions91. 
While Austen’s novel presents proud and prejudiced behaviour in the early nineteenth 
century as a personal flaw unintentionally nurtured by societal norms (cf. e.g. Deresiewicz 
504-505), The Lizzie Bennet Diaries metareferentially suggest that in the twenty-first century 
this particular flaw is also very much enabled by social media. In the web-series, Lizzie’s 
highly sarcastic commentary on her social surroundings is (at least initially) presented as the 
main defining feature of her vlog and the basis for her quickly increasing popularity and 
channel growth. The idea of gossip as a form of communal entertainment, established in Pride 
and Prejudice, is thus shown by The Lizzie Bennet Diaries to be still alive and well in present-
day society, and to have, in fact, even been elevated into an actual medial art form with 
thousands of online followers. Furthermore, just like the original Elizabeth is frequently 
shown to imbue her gossip with extra wit in an attempt to entertain and impress the people 
around her, Lizzie is shown to grow increasingly “witty” – which considering her style of 
observational comedy more often than not translates into increasingly nasty – in her 
commentary throughout her early vlogs, arguably for the main purpose of impressing her 
viewers and attracting new ones.  
                                                 
90 A good example is the scene in chapter three of the novel, in which Mr. Darcy is introduced through the way 
he is perceived by the Longbourn society: first as “pronounced […] to be a fine figure of a man”, soon 
“discovered to be proud” (Austen 12, my emphasis). 
91 (Mr.) Darcy, for example, only fully appears on-screen in the sixtieth episode of the web-series while the first 
detailed on-screen description of him by Lizzie occurs as early as episode six. 
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To give some examples, Darcy is first described in an episode titled “Snobby Mr. 
Douchey” (ep. 6), and this is, actually, one of the nicest things Lizzie has to say about him at 
this point. Similarly, the web-series’ protagonist unabashedly calls Mr. Collins a 
“narcissistic”, “self-absorbed” “dick” on camera (cf. ep. 25 2:25-3:00). Finally, Lizzie 
repeatedly reduces her young sister Lydia to the butt of a joke, calling her a “humps the 
neighbour’s leg, never know where she sleeps puppy” (cf. ep. 2 1:11), a “stupid whorey slut” 
(cf. ep. 2 0:11) and a “boy-crazy, completely irresponsible substance-abuser” (cf. ep. 23 3:23) 
throughout a number of different episodes. Engulfed in her desire to produce appealing 
content, Lizzie thus demonstrates an ever-growing disregard for the feelings of the people she 
ridicules and, more importantly, for the damage her very public shaming – shaming that she 
would never be able to fully remove from the internet – could do to their reputations. In other 
words, for the sole purpose of entertainment, Lizzie is shown to engage in typical internet 
“troll” behaviour – and, most strikingly, she seems to do so entirely unwittingly. For all her 
academic engagement with the subject, the early Lizzie is portrayed as strikingly unaware (or 
at least as strikingly in denial) of the consequences which come from the strong societal 
impact potential of her chosen medium.  
The ethically highly problematic nature of this behaviour is the next core element of The 
Lizzie Bennet Diaries’ metareferential message. Ultimately, the web-series makes sure to 
confront its protagonist with the full extent of new media’s impact potential, raising both the 
protagonist’s and the audience’s awareness of the issues involved at the same time. In 
particular, Green, Su and their team achieve this goal through their adaptation of Lydia’s 
plotline. In the weeks leading up to the release of the relevant episodes, the comment sections 
of The Lizzie Bennet Diaries (as can be seen till the present day) were filled with real-life 
YouTube commenters discussing what the appropriate modern-day version of Lydia’s story 
should be, seeing how elopement and/or pre-marital sex generally do not carry quite the same 
social stigma today as they did in the early nineteenth century. The two most common 
assumptions suggested that the young Bennet sister would either get pregnant or raped (or 
both). Instead, however, The Lizzie Bennet Diaries’ presented a much more metareferential 
adaptation of the narrative which further established the web-series’ overall theme of ‘the 
effect of new media on our society’: in The Lizzie Bennet Diaries, the psychologically abusive 
Wickham manipulates the by then, thanks to her older sister, internet-famous Lydia into 
making a supposedly private sex-tape which he subsequently announces he will post on the 
internet in exchange for subscription fees.  
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This metareferential plot change combines the novel’s portrayal of Lydia’s socially 
frowned-upon, supposedly too sexual behaviour with references to new-media-specific, 
adjacent phenomena such as revenge porn sites and leaked sex tapes and/or nude pictures. By 
doing so, the web-series draws attention to some of the dark corners of the internet as well as 
to the still existing judgemental societal norms which give these dark corners their power. 
Throughout their portrayal of Lydia’s medium- as well as society-induced downfall, The 
Lizzie Bennet Diaries furthermore particularly emphasise the emotional impact such a 
development can have on a (young) woman by depicting their late-stage Lydia – unlike 
Austen’s – as fully aware of the potentially disastrous consequences of Wickham’s 
manipulations for her future. Web-series Lydia does not need her sister to tell her that “the 
internet is forever” (ep. 85 3:34-3:44) and so the audience is forced to witness the young girl’s 
otherwise high-energy spirit nearly being broken by the events. This darker and more 
disturbing approach to Lydia’s story increases the plotline’s emotional impact on both Lizzie 
and the audience, shocking both parties into a fuller awareness of the medium (and society) 
they are dealing with. 
In the case of Lizzie, the web-series admittedly contains several earlier examples of a 
slowly awakening medium awareness when the protagonist, for instance, realises and 
explicitly comments that Darcy could actually sue her for some of the things she has said 
about him (cf. ep. 61 1:41-1:50); or when she is visibly shaken by the fact that Georgiana, at 
their first meeting, is already familiar with her videos (cf. ep. 77 1:45, 2:50). Still, it 
ultimately takes Lydia’s tape for Lizzie to fully realise just how extreme the potential 
consequences of “exposing” one’s self (cf. Austen 222) and one’s life on the internet can be, 
as well as the consequences of exposing others. After all, whilst they are never explicitly 
acknowledged by Lizzie on camera, the parallels between the tape-based sexual shaming of 
Lydia by Wickham and Lizzie’s own shaming portrayal of her younger sister in earlier 
episodes are glaring. 
In other words, one of the main themes of The Lizzie Bennet Diaries’ metareferential 
message is a discussion of just what and how much one should share on the internet, and for 
what purpose92. The demeaning of others for the sake of entertainment, views, money or fame 
is unmistakeably criticised – yet the potential for good inherent to a certain amount and 
certain types of openness is also immediately presented. For example, both Lydia (cf. e.g. ep. 
                                                 
92 For an analysis of the importance of these questions for vloggers and in the context of YouTube and social 
media in general cf. Lange, “Publicly Private”; as well as Strangelove, especially 4, 75. 
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94 0:26-0:36, 3:49-4:04) and Georgiana (cf. e.g. ep. 82 0:36-1:12) – like so many real-life 
vloggers (cf. Lange, “Vlogging” 298) – are eventually shown to express not only a desire but 
a need to appear on camera to publicly share their experiences with Wickham as a way of 
proving their own strength, of having their voices heard, and of hopefully helping others who 
might have had similar experiences. The importance of visibility and public discourse when it 
comes to difficult issues is thus addressed, as is the catharsis which can be achieved by 
sharing bad experiences, finding people who have had similar ones, realising that one is not 
alone, and consequently seeing that things can and will get better. And new media, according 
to Lydia and Georgiana, are a particularly well-suited platform for all these processes. 
In addition to the two topics of gossip and (self-)exposure through new media, both of 
which correspond to questions of reputation, public perception, pride and prejudice raised in 
Austen’s novel, the next Austenian theme The Lizzie Bennet Diaries tackle is that of 
interpersonal communication. In Pride and Prejudice the still rigid social norms of the period 
regarding cross-gender and cross-class interactions (cf. e.g. Russell) are portrayed as the 
source of many misunderstandings and are therefore subjected to criticism. In contrast, in our 
current society, social media has seemingly opened up an unprecedented amount of 
communication channels across all societal boundaries. Whether these channels, however, are 
utilised for good and to the full extent of their potential is an entirely different question, and 
one which The Lizzie Bennet Diaries discuss in detail93. 
For this purpose, the web-series is full of examples of modern-day media-based 
communication. Whereas Austen’s neighbourhood women, for instance, still needed to meet 
up on the street to exchange the latest news, Lizzie explains that her mother and the latter’s 
friends are using Facebook to exchange information about the newly arrived Bing Lee (cf. ep. 
4 0:32). The young generation’s new means of communication, meanwhile, are portrayed to 
be even more versatile when in the same episode Lydia explains her own method of learning 
more about Bing Lee with the words “I talked to Marie, who texted Ben, who called his--” 
(ep. 4 1:53) – at which point Lizzie cuts her off.  
Notable throughout all these examples is the fact that all the new technological means of 
communication, at least in early episodes, are thus shown to be predominantly used for the 
exchange of gossip rather than to facilitate serious interpersonal exchange. This motif is 
expanded upon in later episodes of The Lizzie Bennet Diaries when the web-series further 
                                                 
93 For an analysis of these very same questions in regards to YouTube’s general potential as a social platform cf. 
Harley and Fitzpatrick. 
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suggests that new and social media might, in fact, not be well-suited for important 
conversations at all as these types of media seem to tend to encourage people to talk at each 
other rather than with each other. For example, just like in Austen’s novel and despite the 
modern communication channels at his disposal, Bing Lee never talks to Jane about his 
impending departure from Netherfield – he does, however, publicly tweet how much he is 
looking forward to spending time in Los Angeles (cf. @bingliest as well as on-screen mention 
in ep. 47 3:33-3:43). Jane, who Bing knows is following him on the platform, thus still 
receives the news from him – yet in one of the most impersonal ways possible. In addition to 
this twitter example, each and every instance of characters following and unfollowing each 
other on social media can be seen as a further illustration of characters publicly yet indirectly 
voicing their opinions about each other without actually having to express their thoughts and 
feelings face-to-face. Finally, and even more blatantly, the core web-series itself repeatedly 
portrays Lizzie and Lydia as – instead of just sitting down and talking with each other – 
spending large portions of their respective vlogs either talking about each other or talking 
passive-aggressively at the camera for the sole (sometimes even explicitly acknowledged) 
purpose of having their respective sister hear what they have to say when the latter watches 
the video (cf. e.g. The Lizzie Bennet Diaries ep. 74 1:07-2:40, ep. 76 3:05-3:20; The Lydia 
Bennet ep. 24 2:29-3:22).  
In other words, time and time again throughout the series, instead of presenting new 
media as a means of bridging the communicational divides of Austen’s early nineteenth-
century society, The Lizzie Bennet Diaries depict entirely new divides created or at least 
facilitated by the new technology. In contrast, all deep, meaningful and life-changing 
communication between characters is shown to happen in the form of two people talking 
to/with each other, face to face, either in front or more often even away from the camera. The 
only instances in which serious communication is depicted as happening through the medium 
of the internet are the aforementioned videos of Lydia and Georgiana addressing the audience, 
as well as the later and thus more mature and self-aware videos of Lizzie addressing her 
audience to share what she has learned through her experiences. In those instances, The Lizzie 
Bennet Diaries notably acknowledge new media’s powerful potential for sharing important 
(and/or entertaining) insights and ideas with others and thus learning from each other’s 
experiences. Still, when it comes to complex interpersonal communication, the importance of 
a non-mediated, direct, two-way exchange is emphasised. 
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7.1.3 The Business versus the Art of Online Content Creation 
The final theme of Austen’s novel metareferentially incorporated into The Lizzie Bennet 
Diaries is the theme of money. Whilst the adaptation also addresses many not media-related 
economic facets of contemporary life, it goes into particular detail when it comes to the 
portrayal of the monetary aspects of web-video creation. The first character to bring up the 
subject and to thus put it in front of the camera in form of an explicit metareference is Mr 
Collins, who in this version of the story works for Mrs De Bourgh’s venture capitalist 
company, which in turn is looking to expand its web-video department. Throughout his two 
main episodes, Mr Collins gives several speeches on the “untapped market potential” of web-
video and describes the new medium as a “progressive new frontier” for which the young 
generations are leaving traditional media (cf. ep. 25 1:20-1:40; ep. 36 2:41-2:53). Thus 
dropping marketing buzzwords left, right and centre, Mr Collins furthermore explicitly lauds 
the market value of Lizzie’s emotional connection to her audience (cf. ep. 36 3:38-3:44) – 
much to the latter’s indignation.  
In addition to the protagonist’s own objections, Mr Collins’ highly mercantile approach 
to Lizzie’s content is eventually most strongly juxtaposed with Darcy’s praise of Lizzie’s 
vlogs, which in contrast focuses on the protagonist’s ability to create works which “resonate” 
with viewers (ep. 83 1:49). In the process, The Lizzie Bennet Diaries’ metareferential twist to 
the function of both Collins and Darcy is revealed. Whereas in Pride and Prejudice the two 
men serve as representatives of the two arguably opposing early nineteenth-century marriage 
ideals of, on the one hand, financial security above all, and on the other self-fulfilment 
through love, the web-series uses the two characters to portray these very same ideals – only 
now in the context of content creation as a profession.  
Metareferentially transformed into a representative of the financial stability which can 
come from working in a booming industry, The Lizzie Bennet Diaries’ Mr Collins does not 
offer first Lizzie and then Charlotte his hand in marriage but instead he offers the women a 
job at Mrs De Bourgh’s company94. There, they would be paid a comfortable salary to 
produce, according to Lizzie, “corporate videos, bad reality TV and pointless commentary 
vlogs” (ep. 42 3:12) – or in other words, to create shallow and market-oriented web-content 
which has no artistic, social or cultural value but simply generates a lot of money for different 
companies.  
                                                 
94 For a more detailed analysis of this focus shift from love and marriage to career throughout the entirety of the 
web-series cf . Zerne. 
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Appalled by the idea, Lizzie, just like her literary predecessor, immediately declines Mr 
Collins’ offer for ideological reasons. Her best friend Charlotte, however, burdened by 
debilitating debt and pressing familial responsibilities (cf. ep. 42 1:23-1:36), adopts a more 
realistic approach and accepts the job. This results in a dramatic on-camera argument between 
the two friends during which Lizzie vocally criticises Charlotte for giving up her passion, for 
abandoning her artistic pursuits and for outright “selling-out” (ep. 42 2:54). And with these 
final words, the web-series traces the most famous insult thrown at content creators today all 
the way back to Austen’s ideas of passion above money and combines both ideas into one 
cohesive metareferential package (cf. Austen 120, 123; The Lizzie Bennet Diaries ep. 42 1:54, 
2:54-3:28).  
This package is further enriched by additional less explosive yet equally explicit 
metareferential conversations between the two friends, all of which demonstrate Lizzie’s and 
Charlotte’s radically different approaches to the medium-based work they have chosen to do 
for a living. Whereas Lizzie is repeatedly shown to daydream about her friend’s future fame 
(cf. ep. 16 1:21-1:31, 2:34) and about how she herself will “save the world [and] change the 
culture” (ep. 97 1:56; cf. also ep. 21 2:27-3:17), Charlotte is portrayed as someone who 
believes this type of success and idealistic dreams to be far too unpredictable to serve as a 
sustainable goal in life (cf. ep. 16 2:52-3:18). And throughout the entirety of the web-series, 
The Lizzie Bennet Diaries never resolve this dichotomy. With Lizzie calling Charlotte’s 
approach “robotic”, “cynical” and “clinical” (ep. 16 3:22, 3:27, 3:29), and with Charlotte 
defending her own position as “practical” and “sensible” (ep. 16 3:26, 3:28), The Lizzie 
Bennet Diaries leave it to the audience to decide who of the two friends is in the right – or 
rather to realise that there might actually not be a ‘right’.  
Just as Lizzie – even more so than Elizabeth – eventually needs to become aware of her 
own naivety and to realise that she is judging her friend too harshly, so the web-series’ 
viewers are encouraged to become aware of the fact that, in the end, just like every other 
medium (cf. e.g. Sorkin’s metareferential elaborations on the topic), online content as an art 
form will always be torn between artistic and/or ideological considerations on the one hand, 
and material ones on the other. Rather than blindly ignoring this reality as Lizzie initially 
does, The Lizzie Bennet Diaries suggest that web-content creators and audiences should 
instead try to find ways to make the best of this situation. Eventually, Lizzie – just like 
Austen’s own heroine – is shown to be lucky enough to experience both creative freedom and 
financial security through personal as well as professional support from Darcy. Charlotte’s 
choice, however, is portrayed to be equally valid as she, with time, steadily (if very slowly) 
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begins to gain influence and thus regain her freedom in Mrs De Bourgh’s company (cf. e.g. 
ep. 55 0:55-1:17, 2:25-2:38).  
 
7.1.4 Conclusion: The Lizzie Bennet Diaries, a Fully Metareferential Adaptation 
As this chapter shows, The Lizzie Bennet Diaries – the last work I chose to analyse for my 
study – take Pride and Prejudice’s portrayal of a young woman’s journey to self-awareness 
through a minefield of early nineteenth-century social norms and conventions and adapt it 
into a web-series which focuses specifically on the minefield of social media norms and 
conventions which impact our present-day society. In other words, while Austen’s work itself 
already includes a variety of references to the role different artforms played in the author’s 
society – from Elizabeth’s reading habits, to Mr Darcy’s art collection, to Georgiana’s music, 
etc. – The Lizzie Bennet Diaries through their fictional vlog setting and mass communication 
studying protagonist position their own references to new media entirely in the foreground of 
both the web-series and the viewers’ attention. Their heroine’s growth and increased self-
awareness are thereby portrayed to go hand-in-hand with an increased medium-awareness 
which makes Lizzie a better, more compassionate and less judgmental person as well as a 
better content creator who uses her medial reach not merely to ridicule others but to address 
important issues and promote (self-)reflection and understanding95. Combined with an overall 
increase in the frequency, explicitness and scope of the metareferences found throughout 
Green’s and Su’s work in comparison to Austen’s, these changes to Pride and Prejudice 
made during the adaptation process make The Lizzie Bennet Diaries a fully metareferential 
work.  
Finally, as is typical of the genre, this fully metareferential work also contains a variety of 
medium-related messages for its viewers. Firstly, just as Elizabeth and her early nineteenth-
century audience were encouraged to abandon their ‘pride’ and ‘prejudice’ to achieve 
happiness, Lizzie and her modern-day audience are encouraged to step beyond the use of 
social media as a gossip disseminator and mouthpiece for their opinionated selves, and to 
instead use the new technological means at their disposal to express their creativity and to 
connect with others. Secondly, the web-series’ viewers are also urged to at least from time to 
time let go of what Jane in one episode refers to as the “safety-blanket” (ep. 33 0:28) of new 
                                                 
95 Cf. e.g. the difference in Lizzie’s initial use of costume theatre to mock Mrs Bennet (ep. 4 0:52-1:30) vs. her 
much later and much more sincere use of the same technique to try and imagine what Charlotte would say and 
do in a specific situation (ep. 96 2:33-3:08). 
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media and to enter into meaningful, real-life social interactions – for in the end, in the words 
of Lizzie herself, “[t]alking to the internet [is] not the same as talking to people” (ep. 96, 
3:36). 
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8. Comparative Analysis and Resulting Conclusions 
All theoretical considerations regarding the typology, functions, effects and topics of 
metareferences collected throughout this dissertation can eventually be subsumed into the 
following schematic: 
  
Fig. 2: Aspects of Metareference 
If this schematic is then applied as an analytical template onto all the different works 
examined in this dissertation, a large number of similarities as well as several differences are 
revealed. Considering the focus of this dissertation, it is no surprise that the metareferential 
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elements in all works discussed are highly functional as well as essential to the understanding 
of the works at hand. Yet exactly how this essential role of metareferences is established and 
to what purpose, those are the questions which deserve a concluding comparative study.  
 
8.1 Types of Metareferences Used in Contemporary Narrative Media 
Starting from the top with Wolf’s modal distinctions, a look at the different case studies 
included in my study shows that the metareferences in all works discussed are fluently 
connected to the non-metareferential parts of the respective narratives. The frequency of 
metareferential elements in all works is furthermore so extensive that metareferences can be 
found in all possible positions. Even in works such as BioShock, SpecOps: The Line and 
Atonement in which the ultimate revelation of the narrative’s metareferential message is 
presented as a highly marginal final twist, there is always a lengthy build-up of smaller 
metareferences leading up to these endings. In BioShock, questions of agency, choice and 
personal freedom are central to every chapter of the game from the very first moment the 
protagonist and player encounter one of Andrew Ryan’s slogans. In SpecOps: The Line the 
portrayal of the hardships of war interferes with the players’ shooter-game power fantasy long 
before the ending exposes the full extent of Walker’s trauma. Finally, the power and potential 
of narratives and their function are discussed continuously throughout Atonement long before 
the revelation of Briony’s fictional authorship exposes the/her narrative’s particular purpose.  
It is, however, interesting to note that despite these similarities between the structure of 
the three works in question, one of the three final twists still has a particularly strong impact 
on the salience of the metareferential message of its respective narrative. Namely, whereas 
SpecOps: The Line and especially Atonement can be easily recognized by their respective 
audiences as metareferential works from very early on, BioShock’s build-up to the “would 
you kindly”-revelation is much subtler and thus needs the final twist to fully communicate its 
metareferential message. On the ‘most obvious’ end of this spectrum, Atonement contains so 
many content-based, explicit, both intra- and extra-compositional discussions of 
metareferential topics that the ultimate twist merely contributes one final part to an already 
clearly established whole. Similarly, SpecOps: The Line, while having much fewer explicit, 
verbalised references to video game violence and trauma, still breaks so many content-based 
and form-based narrative conventions so dramatically that only the most emotionally 
hardened of players would be able to resist the self- and metareferential impact.  
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In contrast, on the ‘least obvious’ end of the spectrum, BioShock’s early metareferences 
are so highly double-coded that without the narrative twist the parallels between the game’s 
themes and the player’s reality could easily be missed by recipients not particularly skilled in 
metaphor extrapolation. After all, on the content level, the game’s existential and 
philosophical debates about agency and individual freedoms could easily just be commenting 
on the in-game world, or at best on real-life politics in general. An application of these 
concepts onto player experiences, specifically, is in no way required for the narrative to make 
sense. Similarly, on the form level, the game’s metareferentially charged dynamic between 
Atlas’/the game’s instructions and the protagonist’s/player’s obedience is so perfectly in line 
with traditional medium conventions that very few if any players would automatically 
question it. In fact, BioShock’s eventual twist relies on exactly this lack of awareness for the 
“would you kindly”-revelation to have its desired dramatic, worldview-shattering effect.  
As a result, more than any other work discussed in this paper, BioShock arguably 
warrants a second playthrough for a full, detailed understanding of all metareferential 
elements present in the game to take place. And yet, the extent of explicitness within the 
revelation itself, as well as the fact that the twist is not placed in a fully marginal final 
position but is still followed by multiple chapters in which the player and protagonist get to 
directly engage with the consequences of their newly acquired self-awareness make sure that 
the core of the game’s metareferential message is still blatantly clear by the end of the very 
first playthrough. While it might take longer for the different metareferential elements of 
BioShock to come together, in the end, the game follows the same pattern which can be 
observed in all works discussed in my study: it relays its final message through a calculated 
and precisely balanced unification of explicit and implicit metareferences. 
In addition to providing different examples of how implicit and explicit elements within 
an extensively metareferential work can be combined to increase each other’s salience, the 
works discussed throughout my study furthermore all show how intra- and extra-
compositional metareferences as well as content- and form-based metareferences can be 
equally intertwined to achieve the same effect of a heightened salience.  
In regards to Wolf’s category of ‘scope’, the more established narrative media of 
literature, film and television have it particularly easy to refer back to a large number of 
classic predecessors. As a result, the number of the extra-compositional metareferences in the 
works from these media is especially high: most notably in Atonement, but also in the latter 
two Sorkin series, and of course in both Shadow of the Vampire and Hugo, in which – thanks 
to the narrative focus on the fictional versions of Murnau and Méliès – two specific extra-
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compositional metareferences play a particularly central role. Still, this is not to say that new 
media are incapable of extra-compositional metareferences. Already SpecOps: The Line 
demonstrates through its adaptation of Heart of Darkness and Apocalypse Now that video 
games are equally capable of referencing works from a variety of medial traditions; and The 
Stanley Parable even finds a way to incorporate two external games within itself. Finally, The 
Lizzie Bennet Diaries’ extra-compositional metareferences to the web-series’ own medium 
admittedly restrict themselves to mere mentions of Vidcon and of general new media genres 
and features – yet even those few elements already acknowledge the forming of a tradition 
and thus hint at the ever-growing metareferential potential of this youngest medium.  
What is particularly noteworthy about these uses of extra-compositional metareferences 
in all works discussed is the fact that in addition to providing commentary on predecessors, 
traditions and the respective medium in general, these metareferences are eventually almost 
always linked back to provide direct, intra-compositional commentary on the work at hand as 
well, or at least on the work-within-work present in so many of the covered narratives. For 
example, the discussion of classic narratives in Atonement says as much about the classic 
narratives as it does about Briony’s and McEwan’s narrative(s). Shadow of the Vampire’s 
statements about the Gothic nature of the film medium and industry as well as Hugo’s 
statements about the magical potential of both apply to the referenced films of Murnau and 
Méliès as much as to those of Merhige and Scorsese. Sorkin repeatedly uses extra-
compositional references to predecessors to exemplify and explain his own characters’ (and 
famously his own) goals behind their (and his) medial works. And finally, Spec Ops: The Line 
and even more so The Stanley Parable only reference external works and media to compare 
them to their own: Spec Ops: The Line implicitly demonstrates how video games can uniquely 
contribute to the discussion of the topics of Conrad’s novel and Coppola’s film, and The 
Stanley Parable’s Narrator explicitly comments on the similarities and differences between 
Minecraft, Portal and his own game. In short, as was the case with the implicit and explicit 
metareferences examined before, the extra-compositional and intra-compositional 
metareferences in the works at hand are all constructed to work together, constantly referring 
back and forth to each other and thus creating a metareferential whole. 
This same approach is also taken by the works discussed in my study in regards to their 
use of content- and form-based metareferences. Both types are once more continuously 
combined to carry the individual works’ respective messages. And it is particularly important 
to note that it really is all discussed works, no matter the medium, which contain meaningful 
metareferential commentary provided through both form and content. Traditionally, as seen in 
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chapter one, ‘form’ in this context is usually associated with the level of the narrative in 
literature. Yet as the works discussed in this study show, this is not the only viable option. 
Firstly, literature itself – as demonstrated by The Book Thief – can of course be 
metareferential on an even higher formal level outside the narrative, for example by using font 
and layout features to evoke the hand-written nature of Max’s book and contrast it with the 
print format we usually associate with the medium today. Secondly, the works discussed in 
chapters four through seven further show that film, television, video games and web-video all 
equally have their own unique ways of being metareferential on a form level.  
The most common method of form-based metareference in all these audio-visual media is 
the functional and salient play with medium- and/or genre-typical audio-visual devices such 
as lighting, framing, editing or sound-design for the specific purpose of bringing the use of 
these devices to the audience’s attention. Video games, however, as seen in all three examples 
discussed in this dissertation, have an additional level through which they can transmit 
metareferences (and meaning in general), namely that of the game rules and mechanics. 
Located on a diegetically fascinating intersection between the player and content levels, these 
mechanics are uniquely well-suited to have a simultaneous effect on both the story world and 
the player’s real-life experience, and to therefore blur diegetic boundaries in a traditionally 
metareferential manner. In other words, rather than needing to break a fourth wall to directly 
address their audience, video games thus already have a unique feature natively built-in the 
whole purpose of which is to facilitate and simulate communication across the fourth wall. 
This feature, utilized meaningfully and metareferentially in all three games discussed in this 
paper as well as in all games mentioned at the end of the medium’s introductory chapter, 
makes the study of metareferential video games particularly fruitful and warrants a much 
more in-depth analysis in the future. 
Finally, moving on to Wolf’s category of metareference ‘content’, a comparison between 
all works discussed in my study suggests that, unlike their Postmodern predecessors, 
contemporary metareferential media contain far more fictio-metareferences than they do 
fictum-metareferences. True, Atonement’s final part calls the “authenticity” of the narrated 
ending of Robbie and Cecilia’s story into question; true, Shadow of the Vampire includes 
several conversations on the topic of realism in cinema; true, The Stanley Parable destroys 
any chance of Stanley’s world being considered a ‘real’ one already at the game’s first 
narrative crossroads; and true, the mental states of the protagonists in BioShock and SpecOps: 
The Line lead to repeated misinterpretations of reality and even to the full mistaking of 
hallucinations for reality. Still, in the entire metareferential complex constructed by each of 
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these works, those fictum-metareferences constitute only comparatively minor parts. In fact, 
within their respective strongly fictio-centric contexts – contexts created by the much more 
central, extensive and connected use of medium-discussing metareferences in the respective 
works – even these fictum-metareferences provide double-coded commentary on the different 
media as much as they do on questions of fiction versus reality. 
In Atonement, for example, the final narrative twist and open ending can be seen as just 
another literary tradition (in this case a Postmodern one) which has influenced both Briony’s 
world view and her written work. In Shadow of the Vampire, the focus is similarly not on 
whether there is such a thing as ‘reality’ in the first place but on the much more pragmatic 
question of how ‘realism’ can be achieved and constructed within the specific medium of 
film. This idea is also picked up by other works from different media discussed in this 
dissertation, for example through conversations about ‘authenticity’ in The Lizzie Bennet 
Diaries or debates about the role, significance and even definition of ‘facts’ in The 
Newsroom. Finally, the metareferential portrayal of confused mental states in BioShock, 
SpecOps: The Line and The Stanley Parable never suggests that the developers believe 
players themselves to be prone to mistaking game worlds for the real world. Instead, all three 
video games simply draw attention to the fact that both protagonists and players can be 
unaware of the rules of the “game” they are playing (both literally, meaning the rules of the 
medium, and figuratively, meaning the rules of life) and of the impact those rules have on 
their respective selves. 
In short, unlike their prototypical Postmodernist predecessors, many contemporary 
metareferential narrative works – based on the cases analysed in this study – seem to be less 
interested in a discussion of the general existential question of whether reality exists or 
whether all our experiences are mere fiction, and more concerned with the far more practical 
and functional question of how exactly our realities can be and are influenced by fiction. 
Having seemingly accepted the Postmodernist revelation that our lives are guided and/or 
constructed by/according to media-transmitted narratives, the works discussed throughout this 
study all move on to examine precisely how their respective media impact which aspects of 
our lives, and what we as recipients can and should do to make the best out of this media-
shaped reality. 
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8.2 Topics Discussed through Metareferences in Contemporary Narrative Media 
In their respective narrative examinations of these topics, the different media under discussion 
noticeably focus on different features of their own medium and its relation to our real-life 
experiences. Both novels, for example, almost entirely ignore industry-related aspects and 
instead focus on the crucial role narratives – literary or not – play in our lives. Birgit 
Neumann has pointed out that literature picks up cultural repertoire, depicts it, and in the 
process influences it in turn; and that by doing so, “[l]iterary works actively participate in the 
formation of individual as well as collective versions of the past, and of concepts of identity” 
(Erinnerung 5, my translation). This idea lies at the core of both Atonement’s and The Book 
Thief’s metareferential discussions.  
Especially Atonement with its extensive metareferences to literature’s history – both to 
the medium’s ideological and to its aesthetic and stylistic developments – is a perfect fictional 
portrayal of Neumann’s statement. Time and time again, the novel depicts how the cultural 
repertoire contained in the books Briony, Robbie and Cecilia read and have read directly 
influences the characters’ thinking, their language, their behaviour, and in the case of Briony 
even her own writing – thus directly shaping the contributions those characters themselves in 
turn make to society and culture. This same idea is also picked up in The Book Thief. For even 
if Zusak’s use of predominantly fictional instead of real-life books to impact Liesel makes his 
portrayal of literary influences less concrete and detailed, the depicted effect of those 
influences remains the same. In fact, by its additional focus on oral traditions and the 
communal sharing of stories, The Book Thief portrays one further way through which 
narratives become part of our collective cultural repertoire. 
In addition to examining the influence of literary narratives on our lives, both novels 
furthermore portray the idea that, writers or not, we all create narratives for ourselves every 
day. As Ansgar Nünning has pointed out with reference to Paul John Eakin, “we remember 
and become who we believe to be by means of the stories of self we have learned to tell, the 
latter being as much based on socially constituted and fictional models of self and identity 
provided by the respective cultures we inhabit as on facts” (“Editorial” 4). In other words, 
according to Nünning and Eakin, we all sort our memories – reliably or unreliably (cf. 
Neumann, “Der metamnemonische Roman” 308) – and construct our identities in accordance 
with narrative traditions. Or as Briony, Max, Liesel and even Zusak’s Death show, we process 
our experiences as stories and create stories to process our experiences and to make sense of 
them. In both Atonement and The Book Thief, in other words, the metareferential portrayal of 
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characters writing novels goes beyond mere commentary on how writers write stories and 
instead provides insight into how we all “write” stories. In the words of Linda Hutcheon, 
“[d]aily we create worlds for ourselves – that is, ordered visions of our lives (real or fantasy)” 
(48). Consequently, as Hutcheon continues, “the novelist’s act is basic to his human nature” 
(48) – and to all humans’ natures in general. 
While the two novels analysed in this paper thus focus closely on their medium’s 
narrative core, the two films under discussion approach their medium from a noticeably 
different perspective. Firstly, both Shadow of the Vampire and Hugo emphasise the 
technological aspects of their medium and the magic-like quality of films, especially for 
audiences unfamiliar with the technological tricks at play. Both films furthermore suggest that 
even knowledge of those tricks, of the medium’s language and aesthetic, however, does not 
fully dispel cinema’s power. After all, Murnau and Wagner still show an almost fanatic 
appreciation for their medium, and both Hugo and Tabard only become even more enamoured 
with cinema once they get a glimpse behind the curtain, or rather behind the screen and 
camera. Just like being able to repair automata by understanding how they work only seems to 
make Hugo and his father more fascinated with the craftsmanship and creativity involved in 
their construction, a more medium-aware, questioning and potentially critical engagement 
with cinema – so the two movies suggest – does not need to end in a disillusionment with the 
medium, quite the opposite, in fact. 
Still, film’s magical nature is not only portrayed as something positive and limitless in 
the two films analysed in this dissertation. After all, even Méliès is shown to question the 
strength, potential and significance of cinema as a predominantly escapist medium in a world 
shaped by so many “real” impactful events such as wars. Meanwhile, Shadow of the Vampire 
in its entirety seems to, at least at first glance, present a very critical view of the medium of 
film as a dark and Gothic mechanical vampire. Yet a closer look at Merhige’s work soon 
shows that – in a typically Gothic manner – what is actually criticised throughout the film is 
not so much the thing, the medium, itself but what people make of it.  
In the end, it is the industry’s arrogant, reckless, decadent and obsessive nature as well as 
the even more arrogant, reckless, decadent and obsessive nature of certain individuals 
(stardom and god-complexes, for example, are portrayed as both systematic and personal 
defects) which lead to all the horrors which descend upon Murnau and his crew. Cinema or 
film itself, meanwhile, is portrayed in Shadow of the Vampire at its purest in the scene in 
which Schreck uses a projector to watch footage of the sun. That is to say, for all its creators’ 
flaws and all the pitfalls of production, the magical and awe-inspiring potential of the final 
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product is never negated even in Merhige’s Gothic work. Meanwhile, Scorsese’s film outright 
extols the wonders and beauty of that very same product’s potential as Méliès’ (self-
)deprecating and dismissive views of his own work are proven wrong by Tabard, both 
Cabrets, Isabelle and an entire theatre full of people acknowledging film as a medium worthy 
of preservation. 
Many of the topics addressed in the context of both literature and cinema reappear in 
Sorkin’s metareferential work on television. Due to the more extensive format of his chosen 
medium, Sorkin furthermore has the opportunity to go into much more detail on a large 
number of these topics. Across the nearly hundred episodes of all three series combined, 
Sorkin’s work provides many in-depth discussions of industry features such as production and 
marketing, of aesthetic and technological features, of creative features such as writing and 
performing, and last but by no means least of receptive features such as the impact of 
television both on individual viewers and on society in general.  
In regards to the cultural impact of their medium, both Sports Night and Studio 60 on the 
Sunset Strip focus predominantly on the escapist and inspirational potential of television in a 
manner highly reminiscent of the portrayal of cinema’s effects in Hugo. The joy and elevation 
which illuminate the faces of the Sports Night team during the African runner’s world record, 
for example, are exactly the same which can be witnessed, at one point or another, in the eyes 
of all of Hugo’s protagonists when they are mesmerised by a film or a functioning automaton. 
Similarly, in both Sorkin’s and Scorsese’s works, these very same joy and elevation are 
depicted as a force capable of inspiring their respective viewers to believe in themselves and 
to follow and fulfil their own dreams. Inspiration, in other words, is portrayed not merely as a 
temporary positive feeling or mental state but as a functional force which can lead to actions 
which shape our real world and in turn serve as inspiration for future generations. 
In addition to thus lauding the power of inspiration, Studio 60 in particular also explicitly 
advocates for the positive effects of escapism. While Hugo never directly contradicts fictional 
Méliès’ belief that his films were of limited importance during the war, Sorkin’s portrayal of 
Tom’s proclaimed esteem for his medium’s ability to take people’s minds off their troubles 
clearly supports the character’s views on the matter. With the help of this scene, Studio 60 
explicitly defends escapist media against derogatory dismissals by critics who share 
disillusioned Méliès’ and Tom’s parents’ beliefs.  
Finally, through his third metareferential series of The Newsroom, Sorkin furthermore 
advocates for the potential of television to positively shape our public socio-political and 
cultural discourse. Admittedly, current industrial machinations are presented as often 
       
301 
 
preventing the medium from reaching its fullest informative and debate-encouraging 
potential. Yet Sorkin’s exposure of these machinations and his depiction of what the medium 
could be without them serves as an appeal to audiences, creators and to industry financiers to 
be wary of the pitfalls and to help fix and subsequently elevate television to the force for good 
it could be. For even during the most medium-critical metareferential segments of his series, 
Sorkin always foregrounds the inspirational function of television by using his own television 
work to hopefully inspire both producers and consumers of television to do and be better. 
While the three media discussed up to this point can be considered comparatively 
established within our society and culture, the remaining two of video games and web-video 
are still relatively new additions to the medial and cultural landscape. Consequently, it is not 
surprising that metareferential works from these two media, in addition to examining their 
medium’s (potential) impact on society, also spend a particularly large amount of time 
discussing their own medium and its characteristics as such. 
Starting with video games, a first medium-specific trait and related debate with which all 
three games discussed in this dissertation engage is the topic of whether games are capable of 
telling as multifaceted and “sophisticated” stories as other media. Already through the 
complex nature and existential themes of their own metareferential narratives, all three 
analysed games demonstrate beyond any shadow of a doubt that the medium of video games 
is perfectly capable of portraying “serious” topics and of triggering (self-) reflection in the 
players. While a decade ago Marie-Laure Ryan still proclaimed that unlike literature which 
“seeks the gray area of the ambiguous” games thrive in a world of black and white since “if 
players [especially of shooter games (cf. Avatars 197)] had to debate the morality of their 
actions, the pace of the game, not to mention its strategic appeal, would seriously suffer” 
(Avatars 196), BioShock, SpecOps: The Line and The Stanley Parable all show that 
intermittent moral (self-)reflection does not have to be detrimental to the overall gameplay 
experience but can in fact exist in perfect synergy with it. Similarly, whilst Ryan expressed 
the worry that extreme emotions might not be suitable for in-game experiences, arguing that 
“[t]he personal experience of many fictional characters is so unpleasant that users would be 
out of their mind – literally as well as figuratively – to want to live their lives in the first 
person mode” (Avatars 124), BioShock, SpecOps: The Line, but also games such as the now 
repeatedly mentioned Hellblade: Senua’s Sacrifice, Brothers: A Tale of Two Sons and many 
others have by now repeatedly proven that many players are perfectly capable of not being 
overwhelmed by their first- or third-person interaction with dark, difficult content. 
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A second medium-typical argument addressed by all three analysed games is the question 
of whether video games are better suited for narratological or ludological analyses. Rejecting 
this dichotomy, BioShock, SpecOps: The Line and The Stanley Parable all demonstrate that 
narrative and mechanics do not need to be treated as separate or opposing entities. Instead, 
they can work together to create one meaningful whole. From the metareferential and 
symbolic use of player instructions to the equally double-coded play with player choices and 
player-control, the case studies in chapter six contain many examples. With the help of these 
examples, all three games demonstrate that contrary to certain prevalent theories on the topic 
(cf. e.g. Rapp, Selbstreflexivität 42; Ryan, “Beyond Myth”; Walton), narrative (and 
metareferential commentary for that matter) in video games does not need to be transmitted 
exclusively through film-like cutscenes which forgo interactivity and thus barely constitute 
gameplay. In the process, the three games also prove that, contrary to Espen Aarseth’s 
suggestions (cf. “Playing Research” 2-3), it makes no sense for games to be segmented and 
analysed separately by scholars from different disciplines who are only interested in 
individual aspects such as the mechanics, the narrative or player psychology because the 
meaning of complex, ambitious games such as the three discussed in this study can only be 
understood through the consideration of all these elements and their interplay.96 In fact, 
BioShock, SpecOps: The Line and The Stanley Parable all position their metareferential 
discussions exactly at these intersections.  
For example, in SpecOps: The Line the discrepancy between the characters’ and the 
players’ psychological responses to violence is one central metareferential topic which the 
game addresses both through explicit conversations on heroism within the narrative and 
through mechanical elements deconstructing the classic power-fantasy trope. Similarly, in 
BioShock as well as in The Stanley Parable existential questions regarding the psychological 
and social significance of choice are raised both on the mechanical and on the narrative level 
of the game: who is in (figurative as well as literal) control of a person’s/character’s actions; 
what roles do participants and rules play within a game(-like) system (cf. e.g. Juul, Half-Real 
23, 28; Neitzel, Gespielte Geschichten 195, 229, 244-251; Ryan, Avatars 100, 108-120; 
Wilhelmsson 63); how meaningful are any made choices; what are the consequences of a lack 
of repercussions for choices and what does that tell us about players’ moral codes within and 
outside the game (cf. e.g. Penny) – all these metareferential questions are exposed by 
                                                 
96 For a first analytical template of possible element interactions cf. Ryan, Avatars 200-202. 
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BioShock, The Stanley Parable and by SpecOps: The Line as highly relevant to our everyday 
lives and our sense of self and agency. 
The three games further suggest that their medium is particularly well-suited to make 
recipients engage with all these topics since the interactive nature of video games allows for a 
direct simulation and thus for a first-hand experience of the psychological dilemmas at hand. 
Simulation, of course, is commonly used in psychotherapy as a means of helping patients 
experience different situations, face their fears and discover the rules which govern both the 
situations and the fears (cf. e.g. Bateson 191; Frasca, “Videogames of the Oppressed” 87-88; 
Neitzel, “Involvierungsstrategien” 87; Penny 74) – and video games, according to BioShock, 
SpecOps: The Line and The Stanley Parable, can achieve a similar effect due to the medium’s 
unique interactive nature. When the metareferential elements embedded in the narrative of all 
three games expose the game’s rules and encourage players to look at them and their own 
motivations for following them critically, the three games thus simultaneously, through 
simulation, also show players how to question all their motivations and all rules they follow 
in their everyday lives as well.  
This successful promotion of self-awareness and self-reflection becomes particularly 
significant in the context of video games when one considers the exact type of criticism 
which, on a regular basis, is directed especially towards violent video games. After all, even 
scholars who do not wish to condemn the medium in its entirety frequently suggest that the 
killing of an enemy in a video game is uncomfortably (and arguably dangerously) closer to 
being a reference to a “real” killing than to being a mere speech act due to the fact that the 
mock-killing of an enemy in a game really triggers the depiction of a death and the 
subsequent potential satisfaction in the player for causing and watching an enemy “die” (cf. 
Nöth et al. 161; cf. also e.g. Bonfadelli 288; King and Krzywinska 22; Ryan, Avatars 190-
191). And, certainly, this triggering power of video games is impossible to deny since it is 
exactly what makes simulations a functional psychotherapeutic tool in the first place (cf. 
Murray, Janet H. 170). Yet why do scholars consider this feature dangerous in video games 
whilst they clearly acknowledge it as useful in the context of psychotherapy? In addition to 
aspects such as the professional supervision and construction of the latter type of simulation, 
one central answer relates to the presumed difference in player versus patient awareness. 
Janet H. Murray pointed out already two decades ago that the removal of “anti-social” 
gameplay and material is not required if the material is presented in a form “in which it can be 
engaged, remodelled, and worked through” (173) just like it would be in the context of 
psychotherapy. And while there are many different ways in which such an improved 
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presentation could be achieved, the use of metareference in games such as SpecOps: The Line 
certainly provides one great example. 
Without withholding the challenge-related and tactical aspects which drive many players 
to shooter games (cf. Vorderer 73-74), and without even fully withholding the agency-, 
control- and power-fantasies which drive many others (cf. Klimmt 247; Murray, Janet H. 99; 
Neitzel, “Frage nach Gott” 61; Newman 16; Ryan, Avatars 99), SpecOps: The Line through 
its use of metareferences succeeds to expose the moral and ethical complexities of exactly 
these player drives and to vehemently encourage players to “engage with” them and “work 
through” them. The inherent potential of metareferences for double-coded communication is 
what makes this possible – just as it makes it possible for BioShock to raise awareness 
regarding the pitfalls of ultimate personal agency and individualism (both in video games and 
in real life) and for The Stanley Parable to explore the spectrum between mind-numbing 
routine on the one hand and extreme disregard for any type of order(s) on the other (once 
more as related to video games as well as to real life). In other words, the three games’ use of 
metareferences is what answers Winfried Nöth’s question of whether computer games are 
merely “play for play’s sake, as [is] chess” or whether “they create virtual realities with the 
potential to subvert the conventional values of culture and society” (“Self-Reference”, 23) 
with a clear ‘the latter’.  
Finally, the last medium touched upon in this dissertation is that of web-video; and a 
comparison between my analysis of The Lizzie Bennet Diaries and the preceding case studies 
shows that the web-series’ use of metareferences is very similar to that of the other works 
discussed up to this point. Just like the novels and video games under discussion, the web-
series spends comparatively little time on the portrayal of industry aspects. Furthermore, just 
like BioShock, SpecOps: The Line and The Stanley Parable it also barely refers to it medium’s 
history, as can be expected from a medium this young. Instead, The Lizzie Bennet Diaries 
focus on the exploration of new media features and aesthetics, both through implicit exposure 
of conventions through imitation and through explicit verbal conversations between 
characters. In addition, the web-series – once more similar to the video game examples just 
discussed – also demonstrates that web-video is capable of tackling complex and important 
issues and narratives. After all, the web-series is an effective, clever and thoughtful adaptation 
of a literary classic, and can also stand on its own two feet as a complete and multifaceted 
example of new media art. Lastly, just like all works discussed up to this point, The Lizzie 
Bennet Diaries also once more particularly focus their metareferential commentary on those 
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features of web-video, online content and social media which most directly impact our society 
and our everyday lives.  
A large number of contemporary studies have shown that new media play an increasingly 
important role, especially in the lives of young adults. According to multiple studies, new 
media are the ones teenagers spend most time consuming, with YouTube and social media 
forming the pinnacle of this development.97 Consequently, teenagers increasingly cite 
vloggers and bloggers (or “influencers” as they are called in the marketing world) as their 
main role models and list the latter’s “relatability” and, most importantly, (perceived) 
“authenticity” as the main reasons for this (cf. SCHAU HIN!; Wasshuber). This explanation, 
however, demonstrates that the amount of meticulous pre-selection, planning, staging, and 
post-production which goes into each video or picture posted online is often neglected – and it 
is exactly this lack of awareness in viewers which makes “influencers” so good at 
“influencing” their young audiences (namely at often more or less secretively and/or 
manipulatively professionally marketing products to them). This lack of awareness is also 
what, in the worst cases, can lead to feelings of inferiority and even depression in teenagers 
whose looks and life are unable to fulfil the completely unrealistic standards of the supposed 
“everyday” set by online videos and Instagram pictures. To combat these issues, it is therefore 
absolutely crucial to help teenagers gain and develop their missing medium-awareness – and 
The Lizzie Bennet Diaries, through their metareferential approach, do exactly that.  
In addition to acknowledging and directly portraying the constructed nature of web- 
video and promoting media competency in the process, The Lizzie Bennet Diaries furthermore 
focus their metareferential attention on the question of how social and new media in general 
shape our everyday culture as well as our communicative skills. Similar to the way in which 
Atonement and The Book Thief portray the crucial role narratives play in the forming of our 
world views and perception, The Lizzie Bennet Diaries suggest that social media are changing 
the way we talk with – or often rather at – each other. They, however, also depict the ways is 
which new media can help widen our social circles, raise the number of our potential 
communication partners and thus increase the number of different views and ideas accessible 
to us. In addition, in a manner resembling the approach observable in works such as Hugo or 
Sorkin’s television series, The Lizzie Bennet Diaries furthermore emphasise the creative and 
artistic potential equally inherent to new media if they are used meaningfully and (self-
                                                 
97 For exact numbers from Switzerland and Germany cf. e.g. Bundeszentrale für gesundheitliche Aufklärung; 
Medienpädagogischer Forschungsverbund Südwest (mpfs); Zürcher Hochschule für angewandte Wissenschaften 
(ZHAW), Department angewandte Psychologie. 
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)consciously for purposes such as self-expression, public discourse or pure heart-felt and joy-
filled entertainment. In short, just like all works discussed in this dissertation, while they 
present an undeniably critical view of some aspects of their own medium, The Lizzie Bennet 
Diaries also always pay homage to that very medium and place a metareferential spotlight on 
its strengths and potential as well as on its latent pitfalls. 
 
8.3 The Functions and Effects of Metareferences in Contemporary Narrative Media 
Moving on from this comparative summary of the main topics which the analysed works 
explore metareferentially, the last aspects which need to be examined are the functions and 
effects to which the different metareferences are deployed. If one compares the works under 
discussion not only amongst each other but also to their classic Postmodernist predecessors, 
one big difference in effect is immediately noticeable: namely, the use of metareferences in 
the newer works is far less violent and narrative disrupting than it used to be in traditional 
Postmodernist metafiction. The main explanation scholars have brought forward for this 
change in effect assumes that by now metareferences have simply been used so often and 
have become so commonplace that they have been naturalised even in popular culture and 
have thus lost a lot of their shock value (cf. e.g. Butler 313-314; Dunne 189; Kukkonen, 
“Metalepsis” 13). Yet while there certainly is a basis to this general observation, in the case of 
the works discussed in this dissertation, the real explanation is arguably much more specific 
and closely linked to the exact types of metareferences used in the works.  
Most striking in this regard is the fact that there are markedly fewer metalepses within the 
new works, and that the few that exist are (1) mostly rhetorical, and (2) are portrayed within 
the medium of computer games in which the hierarchical boundaries between game, 
protagonist and player are already inherently more porous than in any other medium. In other 
words, the most common transgressive metareferential device so popular throughout 
Postmodernism is barely utilised in the works discussed in this dissertation. Furthermore, the 
contemporary works’ extensive incorporation of explicit, verbalised metareferential 
discussions between characters further integrates many metareferences into the narrative 
rather than predominantly using them to destabilise said narrative.  
In fact, even the most dramatic metareferential twists and revelations discussed 
throughout the last five chapters never fully disrupt the narrative of their respective work for 
the explicit story-level metareferences surrounding them serve as fluent transitions between 
the purely fictional story elements and any potentially illusion-breaking metareferential ones. 
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As a result, audiences are continuously encouraged to naturally and softly fluctuate between 
immersion and (self-)reflection rather than to be thrown out of the first by a sudden, isolated 
and unconnected intrusion of the second. The possibly most striking example of this is 
Atonement’s seemingly open ending to Robbie’s and Cecilia’s story. For where 
Postmodernists traditionally would have just let loose ends dangle, in Atonement the 
revelation of the uncertainty surrounding the “true” ending of the couple’s story is 
immediately followed by an explicit explanation of the reasons and meaning behind said 
uncertainty by the fictional author. 
Such attempts to explain through metareference rather than to violently destroy illusions 
and shock people into existential realisations are a core characteristic of all works discussed in 
this dissertation. Without wanting to suggest that this is the case for all contemporary 
metareferential novels, films, (web-)series, video games, etc., there at least seems to be a clear 
subset or sub-genre of metareferential works on the rise which – despite being undeniably 
critical and not merely interested in inside-jokes and fourth-wall-breaks for the sole purpose 
of comedy – focus on relaying their metareferential messages more gently, more concretely 
and less abstractly. In chapter one I referred to the seeming discrepancy pointed out by 
scholars between the high “intellectual” demands posed on audiences by metareferential 
works and the increasing inclusion of metareferences in pop-cultural works. All different 
media analysed in the last five chapters, however, demonstrate that the accessibility of 
metareferential works can be increased based on the types of metareferences used, thus 
dissolving or at least reducing the discrepancy at hand. 
Working off the previously established idea that metareferences do require a certain 
degree of (medium) competence from their audiences but that they simultaneously are also a 
tool capable of raising the competence in question, all analysed works employ a variety of 
metareferential elements which appeal not only to audience members with an already strong 
medium awareness but also to any readers, viewers and players willing to widen their 
horizons. In fact, throughout the works, there often even is a noticeable build-up towards 
increasingly complex metareferences, which thus helps ease less medium-savvy audience 
members into the respective topics: Atonement, for example, opens with light-hearted, 
humorous commentary on the nature of child Briony’s first play before eventually arriving at 
the existential commentary provided by Briony’s ultimate work; Shadow of the Vampire 
opens with Murnau’s comparatively straightforward artistic manifesto as well as with more 
humorous asides about “natives” walking into frames and only slowly uncovers more and 
more of cinema’s uncanny nature; The Newsroom initially advocates for the seemingly 
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absolute ideals of facts and integrity before carefully introducing related moral ambiguities; 
SpecOps: The Line has characters voice thoughts on violence and its effects long before 
confronting the players with the full PTSD-based disintegration of their own power fantasy; 
The Lizzie Bennet Diaries are merely a fun class project for Lizzie before they become her 
platform for serious social commentary; etc. In short, by slowly introducing more and more 
complex medium-related topics into their narrative, the works discussed in this dissertation 
purposefully yet very carefully introduce their audiences to a variety of metareferential issues 
whilst simultaneously always encapsulating those issues in strong, unbroken, immersive 
narratives which provide further appeal and thus make the issues even more accessible to 
recipients. 
During the “Apartment” ending of The Stanley Parable, the Narrator at one point voices 
the following worry: “How can I tell him in a way that he’ll understand, that every second he 
remains here, he’s electing to kill himself? How can I get him to see what I see? How can I 
make him look at himself?” (my emphasis). These questions are exactly the questions which 
lie at the core of the metareferential works discussed in this paper. Through their choice of 
metareferences, they all try to help their audiences “understand”, help them see what the 
professionals in the respective media industries see, and ultimately, help audiences examine 
not just the medium they are consuming itself but also the way in which it is impacting their 
lives and selves. All the while, the metareferential communication of relevant information 
through that very same medium the audiences are already consuming serves as the answer to 
the Narrator’s “how”s. For as Sam Waterson, the actor portraying Charlie Skinner, points out 
in the DVD audio commentary to The Newsroom’s apology speech “it’s all very well to be 
speaking to the converted in a school somewhere” but to be really effective metareferential 
conversations belong out in the open and in the hands of actual audience members (1x03 
06:12). After all, very few teenagers will voluntarily read a study on the effects of new media, 
very few gamers will engage with another fatalistic editorial proclaiming that computer games 
are making their players violent, and very few people in general have access to or even 
interest in academic discourse. They do, however, consume narrative media – and through 
metareference, those media can bring the discourse straight to the audiences it most directly 
concerns.98 
                                                 
98 In fact, I found at least one instructional essay discussing practical ways for teachers to use The Book Thief to 
teach the importance of literacy to reluctant teenagers (cf. McCulley).  
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In the process, as further demonstrated by the works discussed in this dissertation, 
creators can fight the potential public scapegoating of their medium as well as the dismissal of 
their medium by critics and/or by competing media (cf. e.g. Starre 199, 205). In contrast, 
creators can metareferentially advocate for their own (most likely chosen for a reason) 
medium’s strengths and show how these strengths can be utilised to their full potential as long 
as certain equally metareferentially acknowledged pitfalls are avoided. The avoidance of such 
pitfalls, meanwhile, the analysed works further suggest, can be facilitated by an increase in 
media competency, to which a targeted use of metareferences by creators can directly 
contribute.  
Finally, in addition to promoting a critical yet appreciative and productive engagement 
with their respective media, all the works discussed in this dissertation furthermore promote 
the same critical yet appreciative engagement with metareferential art in general. All analysed 
works make it very clear that them talking about their respective art forms has nothing to do 
with “art for art’s sake” or with self-absorption. Instead, all works discussed in the last five 
chapters univocally emphasise the fact that we live in a highly media-saturated and 
medialised society, and that therefore any metareferential encouragement to constructively 
engage with a medium is also automatically an encouragement to constructively engage with 
our society.  
In the end, Atonement and Hugo are not merely novels portraying novelists, they are 
narratives portraying the ways in which narratives shape our world and in which everyone of 
us can therefore consciously use narratives to do the same. Similarly, Shadow of the Vampire 
and Hugo do not simply portray how movie magic is created but how that magic can impact 
our lives, be it by enriching or by grotesquely distorting them. Aaron Sorkin’s three series are 
not a hundred-episode-long self-centred complaint about television executives suppressing 
talent and creativity but are a multifaceted discussion of television’s power to make us all 
better people by informing, inspiring, entertaining and – when needed – by distracting us. 
BioShock, SpecOps: The Line and even The Stanley Parable are not merely proof of their 
medium’s potential for self-reference and complex narratives but they specifically address the 
important roles agency, independence, choice-making and consequences play in our every-
day lives. Finally, The Lizzie Bennet Diaries are not just a mock-vlog using metareferences 
solely for parodistic purposes but they also thematise the effect of social and new media on 
our socio-cultural reality. 
Marion Gymnich and Ansgar Nünning with reference to Hubert Zapf have argued that 
literature (and by extrapolation arguably every medium) has a unique potential to expose and 
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consequently regulate both societal and cultural deficits as well as blind spots (cf. 19) – and 
the works analysed throughout my study all suggest that metareferences are some of the best 
tools media have at their disposal to realise this potential: firstly, because metareferences are 
exceptionally well-suited to draw attention to blind spots since the raising of awareness 
through exposure is one of their most basic functions; and secondly, because the specific style 
of metareferences used in the works under discussion can stimulate regulation particularly 
well by getting large audiences involved in the discourses which shape our society and 
culture. The use of these types of metareferences is therefore, according to the works 
discussed in this dissertation, a lot more than the mere “narcissistic”, (wannabe-)“high-brow”, 
feelings-of-superiority-encouraging game which critics, as seen, keep making it out to be. It is 
a way of directly equipping every-day people with the knowledge and tools required to 
overcome certain societal and cultural deficits and to thus improve their and all our lives. It is, 
in other words, a public service. 
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